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Abstract 
This thesis consists of six chapters dealing with several issues related to the 
common theme of improving the insurance regulation and supervision in China based 
on China's realities and experience drawn from some selected regimes. Chapter I 
provides an overview of China! s insurance industry and its regulatory framework with 
an aim at providing a platform for deeper discussions in the following chapters. In 
particular, it reviews the 2002 revision of PRC Insurance Law. 
Chapter 2 critically examines the liberalisation process, competition issues and 
relevant legal framework in China's insurance sector in the context of the WTO 
accession and the international convergence of regulatory standards and practices. 
Chapter 3 examines how China's insurance regulation and supervision can be 
effectively and efficiently improved by the implementation of market-based 
approaches, shifling some of responsibilities for supervision onto insurance firms and 
the insurance industry through greater corporate governance, active self-rcgulation by 
the industry, and reinforced insurers' transparency. 
Chapter 4 addresses issues on the restructuring of China's insurance prudential 
regulation and supervision from four sides: the inefficiency of solvency management 
existing in the insurance industry, the framework of prudential regulation, the upgrade 
of early warning system, and the need to establish policyholder protection funds. 
Chapter 5 demonstrates the urgent needs for both relaxing restrictions on insurers' 
investment and improving investment regulation, and discusses a set of regulatory 
measures that would both facilitate insurers' effective portfolio management and 
safeguard the soundness of the insurance sector. 
Chapter 6 examines rate regulation and impacts of rate deregulation in China's non- 
life insurance markets, focusing on auto insurance as a typical case. By drawing 
experience from the rate regulation in the US property and casualty insurance, it shows 
that China needs certain legal environment to escort a gradual liberalisation of rate 
control. 
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Introduction 
This thesis is structured into six chapters concerned with different, but interwoven 
facets of improving insurance regulation and supervision in China. 
a Background 
Insurance regulation can be broadly defined as a mechanism to govern the conduct of 
the participants in insurance markets. ' It can be viewed from two broad angles: 
governmental regulation (involving the three aspects of its legislative, judicial and 
administrative functions) and self-regulation by either the insurance industry or 
insurance firms, or both. ' Insurance supervision is "part of the executive power" for 
on-going supervision of the participators in the insurance market, which is normally 
carried out by an insurance supervisory authority. ' 
Regulation and supervision, as part of the means by which regulators attempt to 
improve the efficiency and safety of insurance markets, exist world-wide, and vary in 
different countries. ' Insurance sectors in most developed countries have been 
experiencing a process of regulation, deregulation, and re-regulation. With advances of 
globalisation and liberalisation, competition in insurance markets has been becoming 
fiercer, and the role of insurance regulation and supervision is growing. Weak 
' See Brady, U., Mellinger J. H. & Scoles, K. N., (1995) The Regulation ofInsurance. Insurance Institute 
of America p1 -2 (1995). Developing a commonly accepted definition of insurance regulation seems to 
be difficult, because regulation itself, which includes insurance regulation as one specific type of 
regulation for the insurance market, is difficult to define because of the wide diversity of theories and 
views of regulation. As for a description of such diversity, see Mitnick, B. M (1980) The Political 
Economy of Regulation: Creating, Designing and Removing Regulatory Reforms, New York: Columbia 
University Press, p5-7. 
I As for a brief description of insurance regulation, please see "Regulation", "Glossary of Insurance 
Policy Terms" OECD (2938) 1999, p72. 
Id. "Supervision", p87. 
For a deeper look at the divergence of insurance regulation and supervision in different countries, see 
Werner Pfennigstorf (1996) Public Law of Insurance, Volume IX, International Encyclopaedia of 
Cothparative Law J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tubingen, and Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Also see 
"Insurance Regulation in OECD Countries, Asian Economies and CEEC and NIS Countries", and 
"Comparative Tables on Insurance Regulation and Supervision in OECD Countries (Paratte Report)" the 
Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 2001, both available at 
<http: //www. oecd. org> 
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regulation and supervision can be seen as the central causes of the financial crises that 
hit South East Asia, Russia and Latin America in recent years. This sounded the alarm 
to financial regulators. How create an effective and efficient insurance regulatory and 
supervisory system is a difficult issue facing regulators all over the world. 
Along with the ever-deepening penetration of economic reforms, the Chinese 
insurance market is booming and playing an increasingly important role in the national 
economy. ' During 1980-2002, insurance premium income grew at an average annual 
rate of nearly 34.4% which is much higher than the 15.65% nominal average annual 
growth rate of the GDP. " However, the market, although enjoying an enormous 
potential, " is still in its infancy. ' The Chinese insurance sector is facing many 
constraints. The main problem is that the insurance industry, having been in a process 
of high-speed development in the last decade, is revealing a state of insufficient 
solvency as a whole industry. This is incidentally evidenced by features such as the 
major national insurers' low level of capitalisation and low level of solvency ratios, 
along with their low operation profitability in both underwriting and investment. 
Moreover, life insurers especially suffered huge losses due to negative interest margins 
since the People's Bank of China (PBOC) cut interest rates seven times. There exists a 
general lack of insurance awareness for consumers in China. Professional and service 
standards are currently low, which restricts the growth of the market, while shortages of 
actuaries and professional insurance management staff have contributed to poor 
business practices by insurers. The sector also suffers from the immature legal 
' For a discussion on the role of insurance in economic development, see Harold D. Skipper (1997) 
"Foreign insurers in emerging markets: issues and concerns" Centre for Risk Management and 
Insurance, Georgia State University, Occasional paper 97-2. 
' It is estimated that the real annual growth rate of premium income during 1980-2001 is 20% whereas 
the real rate of GDP is 9.7%. 
1 It believes that China has many economic and social indicators of robust growth in its insurance 
demand. Ile ever increasing progress of the socio-economic development, the sustained GDP growth, 
the ever growing international trade, the increasing urbanisation and industrialisation, the enlargement of 
a middle class along with accumulation of people and wealth, the aging population, and the 
government's plan to transfer the social security and health care systems into the private sector, all 
indicate the growing dimension of risks and suggest the future demand for insurance business will be 
high in the decades to come. 
' For example, measured by total premium volumes, in 2000, the size of the China insurance market 
(US$19,278nin) was only 8.1% of the UK market (US$236,960mn). See 2.3.5 "Tbe combination of 
policies: opening up and protectionism", Chapter 2. 
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framework that is largely out of line with both the requirements for the industry's 
development and international standards and practices in a number of respects. 
Problems arc related to the dcficicncy that exists in insurers' corporate governance and 
the industry's self-rcgulation and to the stiff regulation that bottlenecks insurers' 
investment. Many aspects of the current prudential regulatory and supervisory system 
need to be upgraded, and a gradual deregulation of prices is desirable. Other problems 
existing in the current system include the lack of an effective claims handling 
mechanism, the low level of truthfulness of and the poor information disclosure by 
insurance firms. In addition, China's legal system (including insurance legal system) 
relies too heavily on administrative bodies; rule of law reforms need to be 
strengthened! Furthermore, China has to libcralise the insurance market to meet its 
obligations as a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), which makes 
competition in the market fiercer. 
Along with the speeding up its transition to a market economy in a comprehensive 
way, China is to develop a modem and viable insurance market. Further boosting the 
development of the market needs a fair, competitive external environment and 
especially a suitable legal infrastructurelo that is consistent with China's realities, WTO 
requirements, and emerging international regulatory standards. How to improve China! s 
insurance regulatory and supervisory system based on China's realities and the overseas 
experiences so as to provide a fitting legal environment for sustainable development of 
the industry is an important issue calling for in-depth researches and discussions. 
b. Objectives 
This study selectively addresses issues on five inter-related aspects that appear to be 
urgent on improving the regulation and supervision of insurance market in China. 
"A perfect legal system should be a trinity of legislation, jurisdiction, and administration. Legislation is 
the basis; jurisdiction is the crux whereas administration should be only complementary. In China, 
rampant judicial corruption seriously damaged public confidence in the legal system. See Editorial 
Comments. Renmin Sifia (People's Judicature) 1998 No. 8, pl-3. In recent years, China has adopted 
strict measures to sort out this problem. 
" Generally, in order to play its economic and financial roles, the insurance sector requires preconditions 
for its growth. Ultimately, the growth in per capita income and an improvement in distribution are major 
determinants of the growth of insurance demand. A stable macroeconomic environment and the 
existence of strong corporate governance promote the development of the sector and the confidence of 
business. A strong and consistent regulatory and supervisory system is needed for safeguarding the 
stability of the sector and the solvency of individual firms and protecting the interests of policyholders. 
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Areas covered include the opening up and liberalisation, market-based regulatory 
approaches, prudential regulation, investment regulation and market-oriented reforms 
on rate regulation. These selected areas are crucial to the insurance industry 
development in China, and probably are so for those in other emerging economies. The 
objectives of this study are to provide an overview of the regulatory and supervisory 
systems of China! s insurance sector and probe some essential issues on improving the 
systems. More specifically, as a basic train of thoughts, this research seeks: 
- to review the development of main aspects of regulatory and supervisory systems 
in the selected areas; 
- to assess current situation of the systems, identify their strengths, vulnerabilities 
and risks; 
- to ascertain their development needs; 
- to compare and evaluate the systems with their counterparts in the US, the EU, and 
other regimes, and measure the systems against the standards developed by the 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) and other related 
international organisations, e. g. WTO, OECD, the European Union (EU), etc; and 
as a result, 
- to make some recommendations hopefully helping strengthen the China's 
insurance regulatory and supervisory systems in the selected areas. 
c. Research methodology 
The study was carried out by using a set of research methods. It combines literature 
reviews, fieldwork, and analyses based on theoretical studies and authoespast work 
experiences in law teaching, legal and accounting practices. The research findings, 
judgements, conclusions and recommendations have been reached by adopting 
comparative studies, economic analyses, quantitative and qualitative analyses while 
taking into views and opinions of scholars and experts. 
The study has been based on a variety of primary sources (mainly statutory materials 
of international organisations and national jurisdictions) and secondary sources (the 
major reference sources: China Insurance Almanac 1998,1999,2000 and 2001 
editions, China Statistics Almanacs, and China Economy Almanacs). As the draft of 
this thesis was completed in 2002, most primary sources, especially China! s insurance 
law, regulations and rules, are those dated before 2003, except a few being updated to 
April 2003. Due to the availability of materials, information about the Chinese 
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insurance market are largely dated before 2001, with some being updated to the end of 
2002. Basically, the secondary information about the evolution and current situations of 
insurance markets in China and some developed countries such as the US and the UK 
are from published documents and articles, and from information in publications of 
firms related to insurance business. They are mainly through such channels as related 
magazines, newspapers and websites. To further look into the situation of the Chinese 
insurance market, the author carried out investigations including some observations and 
interviews. 
d. Basic assertions 
Overall, this thesis asserts that the strategies for improving China's insurance 
regulatory and supervisory systems in the short-terni and medium-terrn should aim to 
achieve the following objectives: protecting insurance entities' (especially 
policyholders) legitimate rights and benefits in the market; strengthening the financial 
resilience of insurers and safeguarding the stability of the market; increasing the 
industry's overall competitive ability in the post-WTO environment; combining market 
disciplines with government regulation and supervision, and balancing the fairness and 
efficiency of the market. To better integrate into the global market, China needs to 
actively adopt best practice in the world. It advocates the IAIS's assertions that as a 
transitional economy, insurance system reforms in China by drawing on overseas 
experiences and practices must take into account China! s realities. " In addition, China 
needs to adapt the systems to changing conditions. 
The remainder of this introduction briefly reviews each chapter which applies the 
above basic assertions to the process of specific issue research. 
e. A brief description of each cliapter 
Chapter I provides a general observation on China's insurance industry and its 
regulatory framework with the aim of providing a background and a platform for 
further deeper discussions in the following chapters. 
During the past decade, the insurance markets world-wide have been undergoing an 
unprecedented evolution in terms of their market structure, products and services, and 
their scope of operations and transactions, and firms' organisational structure. This 
11 "Guidance on Insurance Regulation and Supervision for Emerging Market Economies" IAIS 
September 1997. 
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evolution is being spurred by national and global competition, the integration of 
financial services markets, along with other economic, demographic, political, and 
technological forces. Subject to increasing external and internal pressures, insurance 
regulators world-wide have engaged in unprecedented efforts of regulation and 
supervision in an attempt to build a pro-competitive environment facilitating market 
innovations meanwhile protecting public interest. Section 1.2 provides an overview of 
this trend, generating its implications for China. 
Since the founding of the PRC, the Chinese insurance industry and insurance 
regulatory and supervisory systems have undergone a long and tortuous process. 
Section 1.3 identifies the three stages of China's insurance development followed by 
analyses of the main factors that underlie achievements of the insurance sector in the 
last decade. It then discusses main problems -facing the sector. Section 1.4 briefly 
reviews the history of China's insurance legislation and then outlines the current 
legislation framework. Section 1.5 as a main part of the chapter, introduces the first 
revision of the 1995 Insurance Law, and discusses the issues that are not (or not fully) 
covered by the new law. The chapter ends with a brief conclusion. 
Chapter 2 deals with the issues on opening up and liberalisation of the market. As a 
member of the WTO, the liberalisation of foreign investment in the insurance market is 
inevitable. The urgent issue facing China's regulators is how to create a legal 
environment which enables China to initiate the useful and abolish the harmful of the 
opening up while honouring its commitments to the WTO. Beyond this, a broader issue 
is how to deal with the whole range liberalisation of the insurance sector. 
The section 2.2 reviews the efforts to define the liberalisation in the insurance 
markets and practices concerning market access liberalisation in both developed and 
developing countries. These are followed by discussions on their implications for 
China. Section 2.3 focuses on insurance market opening up and liberalisation in China. 
It outlines the provisions concerning insurance in GATS as well as China's 
commitments. Then, it discusses a specific regulation concerning foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in the insurance sector, the 2001 Regulation for Administration of 
Foreign Funded Insurance Companies (FFIC Regulations). Following this, the 
combined policies of opening up and local protection adopted by China are identified 
and analysed. Section 2.4 provides an observation on unhealthy competition seen in the 
market, which raises requirements for market libcralisation in a solid and step-by-step 
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manner in order to cultivate a competitive and efficient market. The chapter ends with 
addressing some regulatory issues relating to the liberalisation. 
Effective insurance regulation can hardly be realised without the co-ordination of 
insurance firms and the insurance industry with regulatory authorities. As low quality 
of management is a common failing of Chinese state-owned insurers and one root of 
rampant unhealthy competition, improving the equality of insurers' management is 
crucial. Chapter 3 probes how insurance regulation and supervision within China could 
be improved by strengthening insurers' corporate governance and information 
disclosure and self-regulation of the insurance industry. Section 3.2 reviews the 
conceptual framework and importance of corporate governance for insurance 
regulation, and then observes the current situation of state-owned insurers' corporate 
governance which is not encouraging. It also examines two current topics: listing and 
shareholding, and presents the recommendations on the enhancement of corporate 
governance in the Chinese insurance sector. Section 3.3 examines the importance of 
information disclosure by insurers, the situation in China, and, nccessary measures 
needed for further improvements. Section 3.4 describes the current situation of self- 
regulation in the Chinese insurance industry and discusses areas to be enhanced. 
The Chinese insurance sector is in a transition from a material regulation to a 
combination of prudential regulation and market performance regulation, with a future 
advance towards focusing on prudential regulation. To these ends, it is essential to 
restructure the current prudential regulation and supervision framework. Chapter 4 aims 
to discuss some selected issues on the restructuring by drawing on lessons of prudential 
regulation in the regimes of the US, the European Union (EU) and the IAIS. Section 
4.2 observes current trends and developments of prudential regulations in some 
regimes. Section 4.3 examines the basic situation of solvency and risk management in 
the Chinese insurance industry, identifying and analysing deficiencies in the industry. 
Section 4.4 then provides an overview of and comments on the framework of 
prudential regulation and supervision in China. Section 4.5 discusses the issues on early 
warning system and section 4.6 deals with the issues concerning the establishment of 
policyholder protection system in China. The chapter concludes with some 
recommendations on improving prudential regulation and supervision in China. 
The Chinese insurance industry has been suffering from severe investment 
deficiencies in terms of volume of and return on investment, which threat insurers' 
solvency and their further development. The problem can be traced back to a number of 
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causes, including strict restrictions on insurers' investment channels long imposed by 
the government, various immature markets, and insurers' unsophisticated investment 
skills. How to loosen government restrictions and create an appropriate legal 
environment for rational insurance investment are the issues to be addressed urgently. 
Chapter 5 starts with a brief review of roles of insurers' investment, investment risks 
and the related regulatory issues. Then, section 5.3 provides an overview of the 
regulatory framework governing insurers' investment in China, together with a brief 
overview of the development of insurers' investment. Section 5.4 identifies the main 
problems in the investment to demonstrate the urgent needs for relaxing restrictions on 
the investment and improving investment regulation. Section 5.5 highlights that it 
would hardly archive a sound interaction between insurance funds and capital markets 
in the absence of insurers' efficient investment management and supportive 
infrastructure and effective regulation in the both sectors. Mainly based on "Selected 
Principles for the Regulation of Investments by Insurance Companies and Pension 
Funds"(OECD, 2000), section 5.6 discusses a set of issues related to creating a legal 
environment for insurers' effective portfolio management and risk control and at the 
same time safeguarding the soundness of the Chinese insurance sector. The chapter 
concludes by presenting some recommendations. 
Finally, China has undergone reforms on its stiff insurance rate regulation over the 
past decade. The objectives are to accelerate competition among insurers thus 
expanding the options, service, and quality opened to consumers, ensure innovative 
new products reaching market quickly, and reduce negative effects of rate regulation. 
The 2002 Insurance Law sets forth bases for premium rate regulation and deregulation. 
The following task is to improve the prior approval and file-and-use systems. As a 
transitional economy, China needs cautiously to adopt a comprehensive approach to 
rate deregulation by learning lessons from developed countries and taking into account 
realities and the needs of China. Section 6.2 in Chapter 6 presents some observations 
and discussions on rate regulation in property/casualty insurance in the US, with a 
focus on Californian Proposition 103, which could enlighten the rate reform in China. 
Section 6.3 gives a brief description of and comments on rate regulation in the 
insurance market. Then, section 6.4 focuses on rate regulation and deregulation in the 
auto insurance as a typical case, which is followed by discussions in section 6.5 on the 
finding that the current situation does not fit for market-based pricing. The chapter 
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concludes with some recommendations on appropriate measures that are needed to 
escort rate deregulation. 
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Chapter I 
Insurance industry and regulation system in China: 
general observations 
1.1 Introduction 
The insurance industry of China revived in 1979. Since then, after more than two 
decades of development, the industry has made great progress and played an ever more 
important role in China! s socialist market economy. Meanwhile, the government has 
been steadily establishing a legal framework for the industry. This chapter provides an 
overview of China's insurance industry and its regulatory and supervisory system with 
the aim of providing background and a platform for further deeper discussions in the 
following chapters. Section 1.2 is an overview of insurance regulation and supervision. 
Section 1.3 provides a panoramic sight of the development of the Chinese insurance 
industry. In particular, it identifies factors that underlie achievements of the insurance 
sector in the last decade and main problems facing the sector. Section 1.4 briefly 
reviews the history of China's insurance legislation and then outlines the insurance 
legislation framework. Section 1.5, as the main part of this chapter, introduces the first 
revision of the 1995 Insurance Law, and discusses some issues that are not (or not 
fully) covered by the new law. The chapter ends with a brief conclusion. 
1.2 An overview of insurance regulation and supervision 
1. ZI Insurance regulation and market disciplines 
Why regulate insurance business? Legislators, regulators, academics, professionals, 
and the regulated view this question from various angles: the objectives, rationale, and 
reasons of insurance regulation. In practice, these three aspects do not always coincide. 
The objectives of regulation normally refer to the purposes or the outcome it is trying to 
secure, the rationales of regulation explain why regulation is justified on economic and 
social criteria if the objectives are to be achieved, and the reasons for regulation 
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often deal with why in practice regulation takes place or its motivation. ' Almost every 
law, regulation, rule, and ordinance on insurance manifests its general or specific 
regulatory objectives. Some of these objectives focus on making the insurance market 
operate productively, e. g. to maintain the safety and solidity of insurance undertakings, 
to facilitate development of an insurance market (mainly by promoting the efficiency of 
the market), or to defend the fairness, equality and reasonableness of insurance 
transactions. Some emphasise economic considerations which go beyond the frame of 
the insurance industry, e. g. to provide a supporting function in the development of the 
national economy, to complement social security, to control accumulated insurance 
funds and channel these funds to where the overall national economy is in need, or to 
assist control of foreign currency. There are also objectives that target social and 
political aspects, for example, to protect consumers (policyholders), and to execute 
local protectionism (including protecting the local insurance industry and the national 
economy). ' Specific objectives in different countries and different periods vary, 
whereas in recent years there is an increasingly and commonly accepted view that the 
core objective of insurance regulation and supervision is to maintain efficient, fair, safe 
and stable insurance markets for the benefit and protection of policyholders? 
The rationale for government intervention in insurance market is justified by the 
regulatory function of addressing market failure. Western economies praise highly the 
principle that perfectly competitive markets ensure an improvement in social efficiency 
without any regulation. ' The model of perfect competition has four assumptions: (1) 
many firms are in the industry, but each one produces an insignificant portion of total 
industry supply, and therefore has no power to affect the price of the product; (2) there 
are no barriers to entry into the industry; (3) all firms produce a homogeneous product; 
I See David Llewellyn (1999) The Economic Rationale for Financial Regulation the UK FSA 
Occasional Paper p8. 
' Kimball divided the objectives of insurance regulation into two categories: the internal objectives and 
external objectives. The former centrcs on operation of insurance industry, while the latter concentrates 
on certain important public policies. See Kimball S. L. (1969) "An Approach to a General Theory of 
Insurance Regulation" 
Insurance Core Principles Methodology IAIS 2000. 
The neo-classical school of economics suggests that a highly competitive and fully informed market 
will result in an optimal allocation of resources. Consumers in such a market will purchase the products 
that maximise their own personal benefits by knowing the products and the prices. This will not permit 
inefficient providers to prosper, and therefore, no demand for regulation. 
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and (4) both producers and consumers have perfect knowledge of the market. ' 
However, as economists admitted, perfect competition does not exist in reality. It is 
also widely recognised that even a perfect market can fail to produce cfficient outcomes 
for a variety of reasons such as externalities, imperfect competition, market misconduct, 
and information inadequacy and asymmetry. Therefore, governments need to correct 
market failure by regulation. 
On the other hand, the market is considered to be capable of playing a crucial role in 
disciplining participants. Western economists usually apply the structure-conduct- 
performance model as a basic framework for analysing insurance markets. According 
to Scherer and Ross, ' the basic hypothesis of the theory is that market structure 
determines market conduct, which in turn determines market performance. ' 
Furthermore, they believe that a market with easy entry and exit and a relatively large 
number of operators causes firms to behave independently and competitively, which, in 
turn, leads to good market performance. Western economists consider that competition 
facilitates the efficiency of markets in allocating resources. ' When evaluating the 
structure and performance of insurance markets, they also often use the concept of 
workable competition as a benchmark. ' They acclaim that in an insurance industry with 
'John Sloman Economics 3rd ed. Prentice Hall 1997. Chapter 11. 
' Scherer F. M. and David Ross (1990) Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, 3rd ed. 
Rand McNally Chicago. 
7 Market structure contains a series of factors; the most significant are: the number of buyers and sellers 
and their size distribution, the height of barriers to access to/ exit from the marketý cost structures, the 
character of buyer and seller information, and the degree of product differentiation. Market conduct 
refers to the actual behaviour (Le. degree of independence) of firms in operation, e. g. setting prices and 
output levels, product design, advertising, innovation, and capital investment. Market Performance is 
the actual results of company operations. It includes, for example, price, profit, output levels, solvency, 
efficiency of production and allocation, the rate of technological progress, and equity. This note is 
heavily drawn from Robert W. Klein (2001) "Conceptual framework for analysing insurance markets" 
Centre of Risks and Management, Georgia State University. 
' John Sloman Economics 1997 Chapter 11. 
' The concept of workable competition was developed to analyse the necessity of regulation or other 
forms of government intervention. According to Scherer and Ross, workable competition arguably 
exists when the structural characteristics of a market reasonably approximate the conditions for perfect 
competition and government intervention cannot improve the performance of the market. See supra note 
6. 
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workable competition, the market is relatively diluted"' and very diverse in terms of 
sellers, buyers, products, and distribution systems, and entry barriers are low. This 
competitive market structure leads to competitive conduct and good market 
performance, while profits appear to be in line with other industries of similar risk. 
Therefore, government intervention can hardly improve market performance 
significantly. " However, the market function in workable competition conditions 
could be distorted in the presence of inadequate information or distorted incentives. " 
The need for regulation and the crucial part of market disciplines raise the question 
of properly balancing and integrating the two parts. The insurance regulation around 
the world continues to evolve as time goes on. Largely, changes in the last decade 
emerged in response to the driving forces such as globalisation, liberalisation, and 
technological advance, and in an effort to marry (sometimes the conflicting) objectives 
of market stability, efficiency and consumer protection. New approaches to regulation 
emphasise regulatory efficiency, market discipline, self-regulation by insurance 
industry and insurance firms, and prudential regulation. These regulatory methods 
represent a further shift away from command and control styles of regulation. In 
addition, the development and implementation of international standards of regulation 
and supervision are put on an increasing important place with the spreading of 
globalisation. " 
" Insurance industries usually use the 5-firm/10-firm concentration ratio (the market share of the top 
five/ten insurers) and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (the sum of the squared market shares of all 
insurers) to measure the market concentration. The merger guidelines established by the Department of 
Justice of the US consider markets with HHls in excess of 2,000 to be highly concentrated, and, hence, 
mergers in such markets are subject to closer scrutiny. The US insurance market's HHI values are said 
to range from 184 to 808, with most lines falling between 200-300. The market is therefore generally 
considered competitive. See Robert W. Klein (2000) "Overview of the Insurance Market" Centre of 
Risks and Management, Georgia State University 
" See Robert W. Klein (2000) "The Economics of Insurance" Centre ofRisks and Management, Georgia 
State University 
12 See "Guidance on insurance regulation and supervision for emerging market economies" IAIS, 1997 
" See David Zaring "International law by other means: the twilight existence of international financial 
regulatory organisations" Texas International Law Journal Spring 1998, and Thomas Oatley "The 
dilemmas of international financial regulation" Regulation Vol. 23 No. 4 
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1.2.2 Internationalisation of regulation 
The IAIS" and some international organisations (e. g. UN and OECD) are 
endeavouring to address regulatory divergence in insurance markets through proposing 
international standards and other harmonising activities, e. g. training and seminars. One 
paper of standards is "Insurance Core Principles Methodology" (the Methodology), 
which explains in detail the "Insurance Core Principles" (the Core Principles) issued by 
the IAIS. The methodology intends to provide criteria that enable IAIS members to 
conduct comprehensive, precise and consistent self-assessments of their compliance 
with the Core Principles. The other document that is particularly important for 
emerging economies is "Guidance on insurance regulation and supervision, for 
emerging market economics", which probes roots of problems in insurance markets in 
merging economies and provides suggested measures and action plans to solve the 
problems. 
1.2.3 Regulation vs. efficiency, cost-effectiveness 
OECD countries underwent the first generation of regulatory reforms in the 1990s 
following the privatisation/deregulation. experience that began in the 1970s. 's The 
reforms, a "transition from state-led to market-led growth" 16 , had a "fundamental 
objective to improve the efficiency of national economies and their ability or adapt to 
change and to remain competitive. "" This was archived by enhancing "the 
performance, cost-effectiveness, or legal quality of regulations and related government 
" The IAIS was established in 1994 as a non-profit corporation in which insurance regulators and 
supervisors from more than 100 jurisdictions participate. It's aims are to: promote co-operation among 
insurance regulators; set international standards for insurance supervision; provide training to members; 
and co-ordinate work with regulators in the other financial sectors and international financial 
institutions. The IAIS is continuing to develop principles, standards and guidance papers of 
international standards for insurance regulation. See <http: www. iais. org> 
" The roots of the reforms are the hidden costs of out-datcd, rigid, and expanding regulation which 
revealed in "oil shocks, currency volatility and declining tariffs, growing awareness of the complexity of 
enviromnental degradation, and rapid regulatory inflation" in 1970s and 1980s. See "The OECD report 
on regulatory reform" OECD (2838) 1997. p14. 
16 Scott II. Jacobs (1999) "The second generation of regulatory reforms" Speech for IMF Conference on 
Second Generation Reform 8-9 November 1999, p I, and supra note 15. 
17 Supra note 15, p 10. 
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formalities". " Accordingly, as a part of the reforms, there was a shift in insurance 
regulation from focusing on security to balancing between security, competitiveness, 
and regulatory cost-effectiveness. 
In the past several years, some developed countries highlighted cost-effectiveness 
and competitiveness in insurance regulation (and in the regulation of banking, 
securities and other financial institutions), explicitly placing the two standards as 
regulatory priorities. For example, the Financial Services and Markets Act (FSMA) of 
the UK (which came into full effect on December 1,2001) sets out the statutory 
principles of good regulation. " They-emphasise: "the need to use the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) 's resources in the most efficient and economic way; the 
responsibilities of senior management of regulated firms; the principle that a restriction 
imposed on a person or a firm should be proportionate to the benefits derived; 
desirability of facilitating innovation; desirability of facilitating competition; the 
desirability of maintaining the competitive position of the UK; and the need to 
minimise the adverse effects on competition in discharging the FSA's functions. " The 
FSMA also requires the FSA to undertake and publish, as part of the consultation 
process, a cost benefit analysis of its proposed rules, or proposed general guidance on 
rules. In addition, the FSA is required to explain why it believes that making the 
proposed rules is compatible with its general duties (principally the statutory objectives 
and the principles of good regulation). " In its major report, "The future regulation of 
insurance", " the FSA detailed the action which the FSA had taken and stated its 
" "Recommendation of the Council of the OECD on improving the quality of government regulation" 
OCDE/GD(95) March 1995. For the summary of benefits of the regulatory reforms, see Scott H. Jacobs 
(1999), supra note 16. 
" FSMA art. 2. 
2' FSMA art. 6. 
2' Available at <http: //www. fsa. co. uk> 
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intention to significantly change its style of, and approach to, insurance regulation. " 
In the US, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), signed into law in November 
1999, was proclaimed as bringing financial modernisation to the US and rationalising 
the US financial regulatory structure . 
2' The Act created a new type of entity called a 
financial holding company (FHC), which ended the "financial depression" that was 
caused by prohibitions against convergence of the banking, securities, and insurance. 
Entities controlled by a FHC are regulated by function. For example, insurance 
activities arc regulated by state regulators. The main impetus of the Act is to improve 
the efficiency and competitiveness of the financial services industry. 
The Financial System Inquiry` carried out in Australia finds that the financial 
system has entered an cra of accelerated change. This requires regulation to adapt both 
to facilitating greater competition and efficiency in the financial sector and securing the 
integrity and stability of the sector. The Inquiry emphasises that the financial system 
should be more strongly competitive and efficient. The reconfiguration of the 
regulatory framework would "create a flexible structure better able to adjust regulation 
to maintain cost effectiveness in the face of changing circumstances; provide a more 
clearly focused and accountable structure that meets (and helps form) legitimate 
community expectations for consumer protection and financial safety. , 21 
The observations above provide China with some valuable implications. Both states 
and markets can not be perfect and, therefore, both perceptions that markets know the 
best and that regulation is counter productive are wrong. In order to play its economic 
and financial role, the insurance sector requires a framework of stable and liberal 
regulation that provides adequate incentives for efficiency and allows insurers to 
innovate. Insurance regulation must aim at creating a competitive market, safeguarding 
" This is primarily driven by the Baird report, an independent report commissioned by the FSA board 
into the FSA's regulation of Equitable Life. However, other recent issues also put the FSA under 
increasing pressure to reform the regulation of insurance by adopting a more proactive approach, similar 
to banking regulation. They include insurance company failures (e. g. The Independent), instances of 
mis-selling and business challenges to the insurance industry (e. g. the World Trade Centre losses). The 
report demonstrates the FSA's determination to significantly change the style of, and approach to, 
insurance company regulation. 
" See Ivan E. Mattei & Wolcott B. Dunham, Jr (2000) "The new business of banking and insurance 
under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley" Practising Law Institute Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook 
Series PLI Order No. 130-00QU. 
"Wallis Report" Australia, March 1997. 
Id. "Executive Summary". 
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the stability of the sector and the solvency of individual insurers, and protecting the 
interests of policyholders. The internationalisation trend reminds China of the need 
that, to integrate better into global (insurance) markets, China should consider to 
implement MIS standards based on its own conditions. In addition, China needs to 
properly balance the objectives between security, competitiveness, and regulatory cost- 
effectiveness in its effort of improving insurance regulatory and supervisory system. 
1.3 China's insurance industry 
1.3.1 Briefhistory 
a. Pre-founding ofthe PRC 
The modem insurance industry in China was an outcome of the introduction of 
foreign insurance systems. In 1805, British merchants established the Canton Insurance 
Society in Guangzhou, which is quite commonly considered as the first insurance 
company to appear in China. "' In 1865, China's first domestic capitalised insurance 
company named Me Insurance Company was opened in Shanghai, offering insurance 
coverage for shipments. Ten years later, the Baoffian ZhaoShangJu (Commercial 
Bureau of Insurance), the first Chinese insurance company with a far-reaching 
influence on the industry then, also appeared in Shanghai. In 1912, the Hua An HeQun 
Life Insurance Company was established in Shanghai as the first domestic capital life 
insurance company of China. For the whole 19th century and up to the outbreak of 
World War II, the Chinese insurance market developed rapidly. Foreign capital, mainly 
British and American, however, monopolised the market, particularly the reinsurance 
market, even though there was a short period of growth in domestic capitalised 
insurance companies. " Statistics show that in 1933 foreign-owned companies took 
more than 87% premium income in Shanghai - the centre of China! s insurance sector 
then - and in 1935 there were 166 foreign-owned insurance companies while the 
number of domestic companies was only 48. The period from 1936 to 1949 (when the 
GuoMingDang government retreated from the mainland) saw the flourishing of 
domestic insurance companies as a result of bureaucratic capital pouring into the 
' However, this is debated. For a detailed discussion, see Shanghai Baoxian (Shanghai Insurance) 
Vol. 6,1992. p25-29. 
" Chinese private, bureaucratic and warlord capital poured into the insurance industry during the World 
War I when westerns concentrated their efforts on the war. 
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insurance sector. Before the founding of the PRC, there were 232 insurance companies, 
of which 48 were foreign-owned. " 
b. Post thefounding of the PRC 
1949 - 1957 This period saw the rectification and recovery of the insurance sector of 
the old days by the government of the new China. After the foundation of the PRC, the 
communist government put in order and took over insurance companies controlled by 
bureaucratic capital. It also reregistered the domestic privately owned insurance 
companies, closing two-thirds of them. " In addition, the government founded the 
state-owned Peopleýy Insurance Company of China (the former PICC), " and effectively 
forced foreign-owned insurance companies to withdraw from China's insurance market 
by mandating all businesses to insure with the national insurance company. These 
events marked a new cra of the insurance development of China. During the three-year 
Period ofNational Economic Recovery and the First Five-Year Plan, the former PICC 
operated following the guidelines of "safeguarding state assets, ensuring production 
safety, facilitating flow of commodities, stabilising people's livings, organising private 
idle funds, and expanding the state funds". " It accordingly developed a variety of 
coverage, and gave strong support to the construction of the national economy. 
However, late in this period, a phase of gradual contraction emerged due to the 
government considering that the planned economy did not require commercial 
" For the history of early development of China's insurance industry, see Wu Kequan & Wei Yuanjie 
(1997) Jinii Shanghai Baoxian Shichang (Shanghai Insurance Market Today) Shanghai People's 
Publishing, p 1- 18. Also Sun Shangqing & Ren Xingzhou (1997) A Grand Market in China Retrospect 
andProspect New World Press p132. 
" By October 1951,28 privately-owncd insurance companies still in operation were merged into the 
Xinfeng Insurance Company and the Taiping Insurance Company. Both of them withdrew from the 
domestic market to handle overseas market five years later. 
'0 The former PICC (in comparison with the existing PICC, see note 38) was established on October 20, 
1949 by unifying a number of state-owned people's insurance companies founded by the communist 
government in liberated areas during the civil war. By October 195 1, the former PICC had established 
468 branches and subsidiaries.. 
11 Ile first National Insurance Conference organised by the PBOC in September 1949 set out these 
guidelines. 
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insurance whose roles were compensation. " 
1958 - 1979 Insurance business in this period was all but suspended. Under the 
influence of the Communist Wind in the Great Leap Forward in 1958, insurance 
business became seen as a bourgeois product unnecessary for a socialist centrally- 
planned economy, and was accordingly abandoned. In October 1958, the WuHan 
national financial conference deemed that the role of insurance in China was defunct, 
so the domestic insurance business except international cargo and aviation insurance 
should be stopped after the spread of People's Commune. " From May 1959, the PICC 
which had become a department of the PBOC, survived only for the purpose of 
international trade, and handled just overseas insurance business. 
1979 - Now The State Council decided in 1979 that the former PICC should resume 
all the domestic insurance business to suit the needs of reforms and the opening up to 
the outside world. "' Since then, the national economy has been fast developing through 
continuous transformation of both the economic structure and mode of economic 
growth, and the insurance industry, as an important component of the national 
economy, has therefore expanded dramatically. 
In 1980, China's insurance premium income stood at only Rmb460mn. In 2002, it 
came to over Rmb305.4bn (US$36.7bn). This figure is 663 times greater than that of 
the 1980, and averages a nominal annual growth of nearly 34.4%, which is much higher 
than the 15.65% nominal annual growth rate of the GDP. Life insurance income in 
2002 made up 74.5 % of total premium income. This growth is coupled with steady 
increases of both insurance density (per capita premium income) and insurance depth 
(the proportion of premium income to GDP) (see Table 1.1). In company with the fast 
expansion of business, the total assets of insurers increased substantially, with over 
" In 1953, the former PICC stopped insurance business in the rural areas. In 1955, it stopped 
compulsory property insurance in the six departments of railways, grain, post and tele-communications, 
geology, water conservancy, and transportation. Compulsory property insurance was totally cancelled 
two years later. For the history in this period, see Wu Kequan & Wei Yuanjie (1997) supra note 28, p 18- 
24. 
" See "Suggestion on the Issues of Finance Management of People's Commune in Rural Areas" The 
State Council, October 1958. 
"' See "Summary of Branch Governors Conference of the People's Bank of China" April 1979. 
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0.3 Rmb649.4bn (US$78.2bn) by 2002,841 times greater thad that by 198 5 The 
settlement of claims also went up. As the Table 1.2 shows, the settlement amounts 
arose from Rmb4.3bn in 1988 to Rmb8O. lbn in 2001. The industry also contributed 
considerably to fiscal revenue. In 1998 alone, the industry paid Rmb4.82bn in business 
tax. Through the process of risk transfer, compensation, and taxation, the industry has 
massively contributed to sound economic stability and development. 
Table 1.1 Size and Growth of Premium Income, Insurance Density and 
Insurance Depth During 1980-2002 In China 
Year Premium Income 
(Rmb billion Yuan) 
Growth Over the 
Previous Year % 
Insurance 
Density % 
Insurance Depth 
(Rmb Yuan) 
1980 0.46 0.10 0.47 
1981 0.78 69.57 0.16 0.78 
1982 1.03 32.05 0.20 1.01 
1983 1.32 28.16 0.22 1.29 
1984 2.00 51.52 0.28 1.93 
1985 3.31 65.50 0.37 3.17 
1986 4.58 38.37 0.45 4.33 
1987 7.10 55.02 0.59 . 6.62 
1988 10.95 54.23 0.73 10.05 
1989 14.26 30.23 0.84 12.89 
1990 17.85 25.18 0.96 5.76 
1991 23.97 34.29 1.11 20.93 
1992 37.80 57.70 1.42 32.71 
1993 52.50 38.89 1.52 45.03 
1994 63.00 20.00 1.35 52.57 
1995 68.30 8.41 1.17 56.39 
1996 77.60 13.62 1.14 63.40 
1997 108.00 39.18 1.44 87.36 
1998 124.73 15.49 1.57 100.89 
1999 139.32 11.70 1.70 110.60 
2000 159.58 14.54 1.78 126.07 
2001 210.93 32.18 2.20 165.28 
2002 305.31 44.74- 2.98* 237.64* 
Sources: China Insurance Almanacs, China Statistics Almanacs and financial reports of - 
the forme; PICC. 
*Zhongguo Zhengquan Bao (China Securities News) February 20,2003 
Table 1.2 Insurance compemsation and pajiýýJnts fWd - lna'duriný iý88-200! ýGb. b'n) 
Item 1988 1989 . 1990 1991 1992 1993 
1 1994 
Non-life 4.3 3.82 8.11 7.65 11.2 13.7 19.5 
Life na 1.37 2.6 3.35 5.88 9.1 10.1 
199S 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Non-life 24.2 25.9 27.6 55.6 51.0 52.7 59.8 
Life 6.47 5.5 17.6 23.8 19.2 17.6 20.3' 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of the PRC Gazettes 1988-2001 
1.3.2 Underlying factors for the success 
33 See "Statistics" at <http: //www. circ. gov. cn> 
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The cardinal factor for the rapid progress of China's insurance sector lies in ever 
deepening reforms; moreover, the implementation of the opening up policy including 
gradually liberalising the insurance market access for foreign insurance institutions is 
an indispensable driving force (see Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion). Reforms in the 
overall market orientation of the economy and the speedy development of the national 
economy have boosted ongoing demand for insurance. Meanwhile, the internal reform 
of the insurance industry, facilitated by the government, has stimulated the expansion 
of insurance supply. Opening up to the outside world has attracted huge foreign 
investment including the investment by overseas insurance firms, accelerating the 
whole national economy as well as insurance demand and supply. 
a. Alational economy and insurance industry 
The domestic economy of China performed well in the last two decades. According 
to "Economy Report- China" compiled by Asian Development Bank (ADB), "' China's 
main economic indicators have been encouraging during 1992-2000 (Table 1.3). The 
GDP realised successive growths with an above 7.1 percent of annual growth rate (in 
1999, the lowest rate during the period) in real terms. This growth was accompanied by 
both low GDP dej7ator and a low annual increase of the consumer price index (CPI) 
that had been kept since 1997. It was also assured by the steady increase of the total 
investment. Consumption demand grew steadily, along with continued improvement in 
the standard of living. The unemployment rate stood at 3.1 during 1997-2000. 
Although with the largest population in the world, China successfully implemented 
"birth control policy" thereby effectively alleviating pressures imposed on economic 
growth by the heavy population. The exchange rate was maintained stable after the 
government had devalued the Chinese currency in 1993. The statistics showed that 
there has been a quite stable relationship between China's national economic 
development and insurance business. In addition, some indictors from the National 
Bureau of Statistics of the PRC also revealed positive factors to the increase of 
insurance demands. Indexes such as annual per capita disposable income for both 
urban residents and farmers, the total savings in financial institutions including the 
savings of households, and exports and imports increased dramatically (Table 1.4). All 
these favourable economic circumstances acted positively on the insurance business. 
I "Economy Report- China" 2001 Economic Outlook ADB. 
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Table 1.3 China: Overall econornic performance 
7 1992 1 1993 1 1994 1 1995 1 1996 1 1997 1 1998 1999 1 21104) 1 
GDP and Major Cn ilionenh (percent cl mij! e from previonq ve ir, excel)te(I aq noted) 
Nominal GDP 
(USS billion) 
483 601.1 540.9 I 697.65 816.9 903.0 960.9 991.1 1.080 
, 
Real GDP 14.2 13.5 12.6 10.5 9.6 9.8 7.8 7.1 8.7 
Total Consumption 14.2 9.3 8.0 9.2 9.3 6.1 6.8 7.9 10.4 
Total Inve.., cirnew 12.9 24.9 15.6 15.5 10.4 7.1 14.4* 5.2 9.3 
Econoepicindicntorq(vercent hangeft iii)revititiive: ir, exceitn. qiinte(l). 
(; DP Deflator 7.9 14.6 19.5 1 13.1 6.1 1 1.5 -1.3 1 . 2.0- 0.9 
CPI 6.4 14.7 24.1 17.1 8., l 2.9 -0.9 -1.4 0.4 
Short-Term Interest 
Rale (percent) 
8.1 8.8 9.0 9.0 9.72 7.65 6.34** 5.58 5.58 
Exchange Rate 
MMMSS) 
5.5 5.76 8.62 8.35 8.31 8.28 8.28 8.28 
I 
8.28 
Unemployment 
Rate (jvrcenl) 
2.3 2.6 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 
Population 
(millions) 
- 1,171.7 1,185.2 
t 
1.198.5 1,211.2 1,223.9 48.1 1,259.1 I 
1,265.8 
Real investment in t-txeu Assets urowin 
** Three-month inter-bank rate. 
Source: "Economy Report-China" Economic Oullonk 2001 ADD 
Table 1.4 Some economic Indictors of China during 1992-2001 
Ilerliq 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 & 2001 
Total saving in - 2.32 2.92 4.59 6.86 8.24 9.57 10.88 
12.38 14.36 
financial institutions 
(Rmh trillion Yunn) 
SavinLs of households 1.15 1.48 2.15 2.97 3.85 4.63 5.34 5.96 6.43 7.38 
Annual per capita 1,826 2,337 3,179 3,893 4,839 5,160 5,425 5.854 6,280 6,860 
disposable income for 
urban residents (Rnib 
Yuan) 
Annual per capita 784 921 1,220 1.578 1.926 2,090 2,160 2,210 2,253 2,366 
disposable income for 
farmers (Rmh Yuan) 
F. xports (US$ billion) 850 918 LVO 1 A88 1,511 1,827 _11,838 
1.949 2,492 2,662 
Imports (US$ billion) =. 806 - 1,040 = () R 1,157 1,321 1,388 1.424 1.402 1,658 2.251 2.436 
Foreign direct 1111 .6 111.6 57 
- 2 6 338 377 423.5 453 456 4G4 407 468 
investment (FDI US$ 
billion) 
Source: National Burean o1watistics of Ine rj(L, UaZt; tLt: b I YYZ. -. LVV I, 
b. Reforms and insurance industry 
Various reforms, which underpin the national economic growth, have direct influence 
on the increase of insurance demaiid. When the economic reform began in China's rural 
areas, it succeeded in mobilising the enthusiasm of the mass of farmers, releasing C; 
agriculture production power. To protect themselves from natural disasters and other 
kinds of risks, the increasingly successful farmers insured their corps, machinery, and 
their lives. The reform of the state owned enterprises (SOEs) not only sets them free 
from government control but also. makes them responsible for their own losses. This 
created great demand for commercial insurance because enterprises needed to bear risks 
by themselves. The loss of the traditional iron rice bovvI in state owned enterprises and 
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institutions has left state employees feeling unsecured. Furthermore, the ongoing 
reforms in the areas of pensions, housing, and medical system, etc. have already 
replaced the wide range of government-provided welfare with kinds of pensions, a 
housing mortgage system, and social security. These stimulated the demand for 
insurance, especially life insurance, as the new systems are less secure than the old ones 
mainly owing to inflation. 
On the other hand, since reform and opening up to the outside world, China has also 
carried out a serious of reforms on the insurance syýtem formed as it was under the 
conditions of the planned economy. These have enabled the industry to meet the ever- 
growing demand for insurance. Firstly, the government expanded market entities, 
introducing a competition mechanism into the industry. Secondly, in accordance with 
the principle of separate operation and administration ofproperty and life insurance, 
the government separated the former PICC into three independent companies, viz. 
PICC, China Life, and China Re. " Thirdly, it allowed each company control over its 
own business and made them financially independence, thereby speeding up the 
process of the restructuring of the SOEs. The emphases on profit making and risk 
control made insurers responsive to market forces and focusing on internal control. The 
government encouraged the sitting up of shareholding limited companies as the main 
organisational form for insurers, gradually making that SOEs align with the lines of 
modem corporate system. Fourthly, the establishment of the China Insurance 
Regulatory Commission (CIRC) unified the various regulatory and supervisory 
responsibilities to strengthen regulation and supervision of the industry. In addition, the 
rapid expansion of the industry pushed the government to make tremendous efforts to 
create a competitive and fair legal environment. So far, China has been establishing a 
preliminary insurance regulation and supervision system that consists of legislation, " 
supervision, and governmental co-ordination, together with a judiciary and an 
arbitration system. Industry self-regulation is developing as well. All these measures 
" The former PICC, a state-owned monopoly, was initially transformed into the People's Insurance 
(Group) Co. of China in 1996, with four whole owned subsidiaries (Life, Property, Reinsurance, and 
PICC Hong Kong Ltd. ), and then further split up into People's Insurance of China Co. (PICC), People's 
Insurance of China Co. (China Life), China Reinsurance Co. (China Re), and China Insurance Company 
(operating in Hong Kong) respectively in 1998. See Li Sin "A reshuffle in the insurance sector" China 
Economic News Vol. 20 (May 10,1999), p6. 
" See section 1.4. "The regulation and supervision in the insurance industry in China" 
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greatly attributed to enhancing the overall scope and strength of the insurance industry, 
and an effective increase in its supply capacity. 
c. The development ofa increasingly competitive market 
Before 1986, China had only one insurance company, which was the former PICC, 
and the market was highly monopolised. Since then, according to the needs of 
insurance market development, the regulators have successively licensed a number of 
insurance companies. According to the CIRC, by 2001, China already had 52 insurance 
companies. Among them, 25 companies are Chinese-funded insurers (see Table 1.5), 
and the remaining 27 companies are foreign-funded insurers (see Table 1.6). More and 
more entrants have given the market a more competitive image; market oriented 
competition has also vigorously promoted the insurance companies' efforts in 
Table 1.5. Chinese domestic Insurers 
1. Name 2. Year of App/Est. 3. Sector 4. Ownership 5 National/reglonall 
Ming An Insurance(Hong Kong) 1982 P Branch Hainan 
Ming An Insurance(Hong Kong) 1982 P Branch Shenzhen 
PICO 1998 P State-owned N 
China Ufa 1998 L State-owned N 
China Re 1998 Reinsurance State-owned N 
Xinjiang Corps Insurance Co. 1986 P State-owned R 
Ping An Insurance Co. Ltd. 1988 Composite Share-hold N 
China Pacific Insurance Co. (CPIC). 1991 Composite Share-hold N 
Now China Ufa Insurance Co. Ltd.. 1996 L Share-hold N 
Taikang Ufa Insurance Co. Ltd. 1996 L Share-hold R 
Huatal Property Insurance Co. Ltd. 1996 P Share-hold R 
Sinosafe Property Insurance Co. Ltd. 1996 P Share-hold R 
Yong An Property Insurance Co. Ltd. 1996 P Share-hold R 
ran An Property Insurance Co. Ltd. 1997 P Share-hold R 
Dazhong Property Insurance Co. Ltd. 1997 P Share-hold R 
Zhong Hong 1998 L Share-hold R 
Ming Sheng* 2001 L Share-hold R 
Oriental 2001 
Shang Ming 2001 
Heng'an 2001 
*Ming Shang Is the first First private Insurer established In China 
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transforming their management concepts to gradually establish and strengthen a 
consciousness of service, competition, effectiveness, and development, so guiding the 
insurance market from a quantitative expansion towards qualitative improvement. 
e. Emerging intermediaries 
In the era of the former PICC's monopoly, business was done mainly by its staff with 
some agents including such as transportation enterprises in transportation insurance, 
and community social workers in life insurance. There were no incorporated 
intermediaries before 1998 when the British Sedgwick Group obtained a trial license to 
conduct insurance brokerage business. Since then, domestic intermediary organs have 
started from scratch. Various insurance intermediaries, such as loss adjusters and 
brokers, have emerged, and insurance agents have flourished with 650,000 individual 
agents and 35 agent companies operating by 2001. 
f Diversifying products 
The industry once had only 30 or so varieties of products, mainly made up of 
property insurance and accidental injury insurance (with very limited coverage such as 
fire, transportation, individual endowment insurance, industrial life and marine). Owing 
to the demand generated by ongoing market reforms, the industry has had to develop its 
product varieties. By 1999, there were more than 2,000 insurance varieties (see Table 
1.7 and 1.8). In recent years, this preliminary diversification expanded with life, 
accident, health, property, liability, credit and guarantee insurance advancing side by 
side. In particular, the structure of the industry fundamentally changed at the end of 
1997 when life insurance premium made up Rmb60bn, 56% of the total premium 
collected, surpassing property insurance premium for the first time. In some cities, this 
reverse was even higher. For example, by 1998, in Beijing, life premium was 72.5% of 
the total premiums, in Shanghai, 67.8%, and in Guangzhou, 63.5%. Since the first 
investment-I inked product in China was launched by Ping An in late 1999, many new 
life insurance products including various investment-linked products and participating 
products have been launched, firmly supporting the growth of life insurance. " A 
variety of products played an important role in both structural transformation of 
" It was reported that in 2001, traditional non-participating, investment-linked and participating business 
amounted to 39%, 27% and 24% respectively. See Paul Headey, John Law and Carol Zhang "China life 
insurance market: can the foreign entrants compete? " Milliman Asia April 2002. 
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enterprises and raising social security. It also promoted China's foreign trade and 
international economic and technical co-operation. 
Table 1.7 Premium Income in different kinds of life insurance In 1999 (Rmb mn) 
Products Detailed kinds of products Premium Income 
Fixed-term life insurance 132 
Double risks life insurance 9,128 
Group insurance Whole life insurance 223 
Annuity 11,528 
Accident insurance 5,598 
Health insurance 1,275 
Subtotal 22,486 
Fixed-term life insurance 191 
Double risks life insurance 19,801 
Individual insurance Whole life insurance 24,526 
Annuity 10,165 
Accident insurance 1,008 
Health insurance 2,863 
Subtotal 58,554 
Total 81,040 
Source: Shanghai Baoxian (Shanghai Insurance) 2000, No. 4. 
Table 1.8 Premium income In different kinds of property Insurance In 1999 (Rmb mn) 
Products Detailed kinds of products Premium income 
Enterprise property insurance 11,132 
Domestic property insurance 1,224 
Motor vehicle and third party 
liability insurance 
30,615 
Aeroplane insurance 467 
Property insurance Ship insurance _ 1,105 
Transportation of goods insurance 3,464 
Construction, installation project and 
third party liability insurance 
552 
Machinery damage insurance 483 
Space flight and nuclear power 
insurance 
153 
Other kinds of property insurance 520 
Subtotal 49,715 
Product liability insurance 174 
Liability insurance Employer's liability insurance 1,025 
Public liability insurance 176 
Other kinds of liability insurance 257 
Subtotal 1,632 
Credit insurance Credit insurance 239 
Guarantee insurance Guarantee insurance 141 
Agriculture insurance Agriculture insurance 632 
Total 52,359 
Source, Shanghai Baoxian (Shanghai Insurance) 2000, No. 4. 
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1.3.3 Main problems and major concerns 
a. Economic significance 
The economic significance of the industry to the national economy is not yet 
substantial. Firstly, the industry had only 52 undertakings (life, non-life, and 
reinsurance companies) by 2001. Secondly, by 1999, it provided jobs for about 221,000 
employees, among them 178,000 employed by state-owned companies, "' and 43,000 by 
other kinds of companies, representing 0.03% of the total employees in the country 
(705,860,000). 4' Thirdly, by 2000, its turnover, which reached RMB159.58 billions 
(US$ 19,278 million) in terms of premium, represented some 1.79 % of the GDP, 
ranking 61st in the world in terins of insurance density. Fourthly, compared with 
foreign insurance companies, domestic insurance companies hold insignificant amounts 
of the total assets, and what is worse, some have serious problems with solvency. By 
2002, the total assets of insurers in China reached Rmb649.4bn (US$78.2bn). By 
comparison, the value of the total assets managed by Allianz Group (Germany), a 
leading insurer in the world, reached Euro989bn at that time. 42 Fifth, amounts of 
investments by the industry reached Rmbl7l. 258bn in 2001, which are insignificant, 
only 1.79 % of the GDP (Rmb9,587.728bn). 
b. Market structure: from a monopoly to an oligopoly 
The lack of sufficient, effective and orderly competition is a serious concern facing 
China's insurance. With the implementation of reforms and opening up policy, China's 
insurance market began to liberalise gradually. The former PICC's monopoly was 
broken up. However, by examining the structure of the industry, it is clear that the 
market is still highly concentrated with the top five domestic companies, namely, 
PICC, China Life, Ping An, CPIC, and China Rc., having the lion share. Of the 52 
companies operating in China, only eight are allowed to operate on a national level. 
Other local domestic companies and foreign companies are limited to particular 
regions, resulting in very small market shares. The market share of foreign companies 
<http: //www. stats. gov. cn/yearbook2OOO> (visited on November 19,2002) 
Id. 
"' "Annual Report 2002" Allianz Group, at <http: //www. allianz. com> 
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. o, -, ctllcr is minuscule. less than 2"o of' the total premium income in 
2000-'ý Both life 
and 11011-IIIC IIISLII-aIICC markets are highly concentrated with oligopoly seen In both 
national and regional markets. while the monopoly of' China Re. In the rcilISLiratice 
Industry ended only In 2002. " 
III the national market. there were tell dOIllCStIC IIISUrcrs and nine 601-C1211 IIISUrcrs 
operating III the 11011-IIIC il"IS1.11-ance market by 2001. FOLII' 01' the tell domestic inSUrers 
conducted business oil a nation-widc basis as national insurers, while the I-cmaining 
domestic Insurers were regional players. Foreign insurers were confined primarily to 
sllam-dlalý with tile CXceptioll of' AM, which has branches III other Chinese cities, such 
as (MaIll-1/11OLI, SlICII/11CII, alld Foshan. The top dirce companies - PICC, China Pacific, 
alld Ping An - scooped nearly 97 '/'/) of' the market share in 2000, with tile remaining 
ShaI'C dIStI'IbLItCd allIOII(' the Other domestic companies and the f'orcign insurers (see 
Chart I. I). T11C 11'1'C IiIISUrance market saw a similar situation. Six domestic Insurers and 
tell 1'01-Cl, "Il IIISLIrcrs operated in tile market by 2001. The combined share of' the top 
three compallics- ('111,11a 1,16C. Ping An, and China Pacific - was nearly 96 '/)/o lin 2000 
(see Chart 1.2). 
Chart 1.1 Non-life Insurance Market shý 
(2000) 
CPIC, Others Foreign 
Ping An 
77.6% 
Chart 1.2 Life Insurance Market share (2000) 
CPIC Others Foreign 
8.5% 2( 5,1 0 
Ping An 
225", 
China Life 
64.5% 
In regional markets, the situation is similar to those of' tile national. The four top 
CoMpallics arc donillialit in most areas. However, tile level of competition within 
regional markets varies oreatly, characteriscd by tile big gaps between eastern and 
%vestcrn China, and betwcell rich and poor areas. The more advanced castern areas and 
coastal cities, especially some largc cities such as Shanghai, GUaI1gZlIOU, and Beijing 
xvitness fierce competition, whereas the slower economic areas in the central and 
"China: No Room to (how? "'Hic E, i, s t 1111(41ýgence Unit Lid. JLIIIC 19,2000. 
Swiss Rc. and Munich Rc. got tlicir licenccs for doing reinsurancc busincss in China in 2002. 
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western China have more low-level business. For example, in 2000 there are 19 
insurers operating in Shanghai, the first city opened to foreign insurers and a 
particularly attractive market with 12 million people and GDP per capita over 
US$3,000 and premiums Rmbl27.69bn (US$15.4bn). 4' By contrast, there were only 
four insurers, viz. PICC, China Life, Ping An, and CPlC in He Nan province, with life 
premiums just about Rmb3.03bn in 1999.46 In Shan Xi province, which locates in west 
area of China, with famous city Xi An as its capital, there were five insurers and 
premiums only recorded Rmb2.4bn in 2000.41 In most county-level cities, only PICC 
and China Life are serving the market. 
The concentration of the market has its roots in China's insurance history, and stems 
from nation-wide business networks and the communication and relationship with 
customers built by the former PICC during its long time monopoly and domination 
over the market. PICC, China Life and China Re., the three successors to the former 
PICC, inherited this legacy and consequently enjoyed a very competitive edge. The 
second reason is that China was very cautious in granting licenses to new domestic 
insurance companies, and applied protectionist policies to prevent foreign access. 
Consequently, only dozens of new domestic entries squeezed into the market in recent 
years. The high concentration is also largely due to the severe restrictions on scope of 
the operations of both non-mainstream domestic companies and foreign companies. 
c. 01her major concerns 
There are concerns over insurers' solvency, investment performance, corporate 
governance, fiercer competition in the wake of the WTO accession and insurance 
liberalisation. The insurance industry, having been in a process of high-speed 
development in the last decade, is revealing low profitability and insufficient solvency 
(see Section 4.2, Chapter 4). In particular, life insurers' solvency is greatly threatened 
by the serious problem of interest-driven loss, as they had sold large quantities of 
expensive fixed-intercst-rate insurance policies at the peak of business during 1996- 
1999 (see Section 5.4.3, Chapter 5). Investment by insurers in terms of investment 
volume of and return on investment is deficient, threatening insurers' solvency and their 
further development (see Chapter 5). The sector also suffers from the current legal 
Shanghai Bao Xian (Shanghai Insurance) 200 1, No 4. 
Cai ShiNan and IN XianRui "Analysis of trends in the insurance market of HuNan" Xrong Lilun Yu 
Shyian (Finance Theories and Practices) 2000, No. 5. 
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framework that is largely out of line with both the requirements for the industry's 
development and international standards and practices in a number of respects. 
Problems are related to the deficiency that exists in insurers' corporate governance and 
the industry's self-regulation, the low level of truthfulness of insurance firms, poor 
information disclosure by insurance firms (see Chapter 3), and the stiff regulation that 
bottlenecks insurers' investment. Many aspects of the current prudential regulatory and 
supervisory system need to be upgraded (see Chapter 4), and a gradual deregulation of 
prices is indispensable (see Chapter 6). In addition, China has to liberalisc the insurance 
market to meet its obligations as a member of the WTO, which makes competition in 
the market fiercer (see Chapter 2). Perhaps one major challenge is that the Chinese 
culture does not look upon insurance favourably, as insurance is a relative new industry 
in China, compared to banking. There exists a general lack of insurance awareness for 
consumers in China. " Insurance fin-ris have to operate rather carefully to win 
consumers' trust; regulators need to monitor insurers' operations closely. 
1.4 The regulation and supervision of the insurance industry in China 
1.4.1 A brief history of China's insurance legislation 
The first specific regulation on insurance in China's contemporary history, the 
Insurance Industry Rules (7 chapters and 105 articles) was drafted in 1907, but failed to 
be ratified by the Qing Dynasty. In 1917, the Northern Government issued the 
Insurance Industry Act (42 articles), and in 1929 the government of Republic of China 
promulgated the Insurance law which was lately revised in 2001., Before World War 11, 
English laws were substantially applicable in China, as British and American 
companies dominated the market, and the foreign insurers' association in Shanghai set 
At <http: //www. drcnet. org> November 26,200 1. 
A survey by the Development Research Centre (DRC) of the State Council indicates that the Chinese 
insurance market is still underdeveloped and insurance awareness needs improving. Ile survey polled 
22,182 families in 50 cities. Only 6 percent of those families said they had enough insurance 
knowledge, while 36 percent said they knew little about insurance. It also showed Chinese citizens 
prefer saving money in banks or paying for house loans. Only 9 percent of consumers chose to invest in 
commercial insurance. Xinhua News Agency, August 15,2002. 
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out policies, clauses, premium rates and commission rates in the English language. "' 
The evolution of insurance legal system in the PRC was in its tortuous way similar to 
that of the country's whole legal system in its over 50-year history. It can be roughly 
divided into two periods: pre- 1980, when the insurance legal system declined markedly 
from its early establishment; and post-1980, a period of revival and prosperity. 
Following the foundation of the PRC, the new government proceeded to abolish all 
the legislation of its defeated adversary, and promulgated a series of laws and 
regulations governing compulsory insurance and commercial insurance. These were 
seen as beneficial to the revival of the new-born country's economy. " It also founded 
the former PICC which was designated as both a monopolised company and an 
industry regulator. However, the Legal Nihilism generated in the Movement of Anti- 
Rightists in 1957, together with the Culture Revolution which began in 1966, 
demolished almost the whole legal system of the PRC. - Only three compulsory 
insurance laws" remained before 1980 when a notice was issued by the PBOC to 
overwhelmingly restore the former PICC's business. " The restoration aimed to support 
the important reforms which had been implemented in other sectors of the economy. 
In the 1980's, the construction of a new regulatory framework for the insurance 
sector was initiated. The first steps were the issuance of the 1983 Regulations on 
Contracts for Property Insurance, and then the 1985 Provisional Regulations on the 
Administration of Insurance Enterprises which restored competition to the insurance 
industry and transferred the regulatory function of the former PICC to the PBOC. 
More legislative activities took place in 1990s. The 1992 Provisional Measures on the 
Administration of Insurance Institutions with Foreign Investment in Shanghai (1992 
Shanghai Measures) was the first legislation addressing foreign insurers' market access. 
Then, the most important event was that the long-awaited promulgation of 1995 
Insurance Law. Following the law, some supporting legislation and implementing 
regulations were promulgated, including the 1996 Provisional Regulations for the 
Administration of Insurance (Administration Regulations). A great change took place 
" See Kequan Wu and Yuanjie Wei (1997) Jinri Shanghai Baoxian Shichang (Shanghai Insurance 
Market Today) Shanghai People's Publishing July 1997, pI- 18. 
" In early 1950s, a series of compulsory insurance laws were promulgated in lines of aviation, passenger 
transport by railways and ships. 
" Id. 
'2 See "Notice of PBOC regarding the restoration of insurance business" The State Council 1980. This 
notice is widely seen as an important document initiating the resurrection of China's insurance sector. 
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in November 1998 with the establishment of the industry watchdog, the CIRC. It 
resulted from the separate administration of banking, securities activities, and insurance 
in order to deepen financial reforms and minimise financial risks. Since its 
establishment, the CIRC has been making great efforts to strengthen regulation and 
supervision. Besides the 2000 Insurance Company Regulations, main legislative 
activities include four regulations in 2001, including: theAdministrative Regulations on 
Foreign-Invested Insurance Companies (2001 FIIC. Regulations) issued by the State 
Council, the Administrative Rules on Insurance Brokerage Companies, the 
Administrative Rules on Insurance Appraisal Institutions, and the Administrative Rules 
on Insurance Agency Institutions. The most important event is that the first revision of 
the 1995 Insurance Law was passed in 2002. Apart from these, more new regulations 
are in the process of drafting. The CIRC has announced it will promulgate regulations 
on corporate governance of insurance companies; administration measures on the use 
of insurance funds; penalty measures on illegal behaviours in insurance business; 
administration measures on reinsurance; and administrative measures on information 
disclosure of insurance companies. 
1.4.2 China's insurance legislative structure 
After over two decade of efforts on legislation, China has already established a 
primary legal framework on insurance that consists of documents with different legal 
effects" governing administrative, civil, and criminal areas respectively. , 
The Insurance Law falls within both administrative law and civil law. Having both 
distilled the distinct experiences of China! s industry and codified internationally 
recognised insurance principles, the 1995 Insurance Law is the first attempt to create a 
national regulatory structure for the burgeoning China! s insurance business. The law 
contains general principles governing insurance activities, and provisions relating to 
" Under the Chinese Jurisprudence, a hierarchy of legal provisions exists: 1. Constitutional law, the 
basic law of the country; 2. Laws and regulations related to specific areas and legislated by the National 
People's Congress (NPC) and its Standing Committee, with legal effects just inferior to the constitutional 
law; 3. Regulations, rules, orders, and notices enacted by the State Council and its subordinate 
departments; 4. Regional regulations and rules legislated by provisional congresses and governments 
with provisional legal effects; 5. Regional rules, orders enacted by congresses and governments at 
county level with local legal effects. 
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insurance contracts, insurance companies and insurance administration. " The other 
three main regulations are: the 1996 Administration Regulations promulgated by the 
PBOC, the 2000 Insurance Company Regulations promulgated by the CIRC, and the 
2001 HIC Regulations by the State council. The 1996 Administration Regulations lay 
down in more detail the comprehensive criteria for implementing the 1995 Insurance 
Law. The 2000 Insurance Company Regulations embrace general principles of 
regulation of insurance companies. Its main sections include establishment of insurance 
companies and branches, operation, control on policy and rate, insurance funds and 
investment, solvency, reinsurance, supervision and inspections, and penalties. The 2001 
FIX Regulations set forth a new framework for foreign investment in the insurance 
industry following China's accession to the WTO, which in fact supersedes the 1992 
Shanghai Measures. 
The main body of insurance legislation is administrative regulations and rules. 
Before the CIRC took responsibility for governing the insurance industry, the old PICC 
and PBOC laid down a number of administrative rules. " Since its establishment, the 
CIRC has reviewed or revised about a hundred old rules made by its predecessors, and 
set out a number of new rules. " The State Council and some relevant ministries, e. g. 
the Ministry offinance, also laid down administrative regulations and rules concerning 
insurance taxation and accounting among others. " There are also a number of 
regulations and administrative rules at different levels of regional congresses and 
governments. " 
Regarding the civil law regime, besides the Insurance law, there are some other laws 
and regulations governing insurance contracts. For example, the 1992 Maritime Law 
contains provisions covering the insurance of maritime activities. The 1985 General 
I For the commentary of the law, See Edward Epstein and Andrew Hallworth (1996) "The new 
insurance law of the People's republic of China" International Law Review 1996, No. 2, p6l-63. 
" For example, on life insurance, the Urgent Notice of PBOC to Adjust Nominal Rate By Insurance 
Companies (1996); on reinsurance, the Conditions of Compulsory Ceding to PICC (PBOC 1996); and on 
licensing administration, the supplementary Notice ofPBOC on Issues Concerning the Examination and 
Approval ofBranch OJf1ce ofAn Insurance company (1996). 
' For example, the Notice of CIRCfor Consolidation ofMotor Insurance Market (1999). It is the first 
rule issued by the CIRC. 
" For example, the State Council's 1998 Notice Concerning Some Issues About the Adjustment of 
Taxation Policies on Financial and Insurance Institutions, and the Ministry of Finance's 1999 
Accounting Rulesfor Insurance Enterprises. 
" For example, the 1992 Shanghai Measures, issued by the Congress of Shanghai Municipality. 
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Principles of Civil Law is an important statute stipulating general principles regarding 
contracts, agency and product liability, etc. The 1999 Contract Law governs all kinds 
of contracts, including insurance contracts, in addition to the relevant provisions in the 
Insurance Law. 
In the criminal law regime, the 1979 Criminal (revised in 1997) sets out various 
crimes involving in insurance business and their related penalties. The 1995 Decision of 
the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Punishing Crimes of 
Disrupting the Financial Order lays down detailed provisions for the punishment of 
violations committed by insurance firms, the insured or beneficiaries. 
In practice, judicial interpretations and case law in China to some extent contribute 
to the law making process. The Supreme People's Court has issued a number ofjudicial 
interpretations as guidance when laws and regulations are phrased in general terms. 
Such interpretations of applicable law are binding on judges at all levels below. There 
are some judicial interpretations for insurance cases. " As regards case law, China is a 
country with a statutory law tradition, making case law only a guide theoretically. 
However, in fact, precedents are among the considerations that the Chinese judges 
make when they hear cases. Since 1985, the Supreme Peqpleý Court has been selecting 
some cases' from its own jurisdiction, as well as from those of lower courts for 
publication in the Supreme Court Gazette. Most published cases arc lower court 
decisions, but the Supreme Court edits or rewrites the opinions. In addition, lower 
courts may be given (even decisive) opinions on specific cases through the reporting 
channels ofjudicial system. 
1.5 The revision of PRC Insurance Law: a transitional change 
The first revision of the 1995 PRC Insurance Law was passed at the 30" Session of 
the Standing Committee of the 9th National People's Congress of China (the Standing 
Committee of the NPQ on October 28,2002 and became effective on January 1,2003. 
Li Peng, the chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC, said at the 28' session of 
the committee, that the decision to revise the 1995 Insurance Law would better protect 
" For example, the 1996 Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court for Several Issues on Goods 
Transport by Railways. This document contains the standards for judging when a situation such as 
valued policy, or under- insurance, exists in insurance contracts relating to goods transport by railways. 
It can be retrieved at <http: //www. chinalaw. coni> 
' There were dozen insurance cases published in the Supreme People's Court Gazette by 2001. 
45 
the legal rights of the insured and insurers, improve the supervision of the insurance 
market, and promote the healthy development in the insurance sector. "' However, on 
closer analyses, the amendments concentrate only on the aspects of regulation and 
supervision, and leave untouched those provisions relating to contracts which also need 
revising. "' In addition, the legislators obviously manifested their caution towards 
addressing the some major issues on liberalisation in the insurance market, e. g. the 
need to dismantle the restrictions on insurers' investment activities. Generally, the new 
revision, although seen as an important step towards upgrading China's insurance legal 
framework, is a transitional measure, and consequently, it seems that the law needs 
further amendments in the near future. 
1.5.1 Background 
The 1995 Insurance Law ended a period in which there was no basic law governing the 
insurance business in the PRC, and marked a new era in the development of the 
Chinese insurance industry. As the first comprehensive national law for the insurance 
industry, the law had played an important role in spurring the industry's development 
since its introduction. It provided a legal framework for the protection of the legal 
rights of the insured, ensured the healthy operation of insurance companies, and laid 
down a foundation for China to further open up its doors to foreign investment in the 
industry. 
As both the external and internal environments of the insurance industry have seen 
significant changes since the promulgation of the law, many provisions in the law 
became outdated and needed amendments. For instance, since the promulgation, the 
Chinese insurance market grew rapidly. Premium income in 2002 came to over 
Rmb305.4bn (US$36.7bn). That figure is over four times that for 1995 (US$8.2bn). 
Secondly, some large Chinese insurers have grown to be on an equal footing with 
foreign insurers. For instance, China Life, Ping An and CIPC were ranked 13". 23 d, 
and 28' respectively in top 100 life insurers in Asia in 2001 by. 4sia Week magazine. " 
Thirdly, while in 1995 there were only 9 insurers operating on the mainland, the figure 
had increased to 52 by 2001. The large number of new market entrants, together with 
" "China's legislation updates Insurance Law" At <http: //www. cei. gov. cn> October 29,2002. 
62 The 199S Insurance Law contained both insurance regulation and supervision and insurance contract 
law. 
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the split of former PICC into three individual insurers, ended the period of monopoly 
and led to a much more competitive market. Under the pressure of competition, 
domestic insurers, with the help of the regulators, made fruitful efforts in the 
improvement of their risk management and self-regulation. For example, Ping An, 
whose branch in Shenzhen achieved an international quality award (ISO 9001: 2000) 
from BSI Asia, was named by Capital magazine as "the best insurance service 
company" in China. " Meanwhile, various insurance intermediaries flourished. 
Regarding the changes in the regulatory and supervisory environment, the most 
significant event was the establishment of the CIRC, which replaced the PBOC as the 
state insurance regulator. Finally, as China became a full member of the WTO, it is 
necessary to bring China! s Insurance Law into line with international practices and 
adaptable to the new conditions. 
The process of revision had lasted for nearly four years. As early as in 1999, the 
CIRC invited experts to Shanghai to discuss the revision of the law. In the early 2001, 
the regulator set up a revision panel to prepare a draft amendment based on researches 
which summarised experience and opinions gathered from the parties concerned. The 
draft was submitted to the State Council and then, after being modified by the Law 
Department of the State Council, submitted to the NPC in June 2002. It finally got the 
green light afler several modifications in congressional discussions. 
1.5.2 The ainis ofthe revision 
According to Wu DinFu, newly appointed chairman of the CIRC, the main 
objectives of the revision are to honour China's WTO commitments, better protect the 
interests of the insured, and strengthen regulation and supervision over insurance 
companies. Furthermore, it also aims to ensure that China's insurance sector is in line 
with international practices, and enhance reforms and develoPmcnt within the 
industry. " 
1.5.3 Main aspects ofthe amendments 
Asia Week 2002, January. p7-13. 
At <http: //www. bsi-global. com> and <http: //www. pal 8. com> visited at June 6,2002. 
"Wu DingFu speaking on the new Insurance Law" at <http: //www. drenet. org> October 10,2002. 
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Regarding changes to the numbering of articles, among the total 152 articles in the 
original Insurance Law, 33 articles have been revised, another 2 merged into one, and 
furthermore, 6 new articles are added, leaving the new law with 158 articles altogether. 
In summary, the amendments concentrate on the following aspects. 
a. Honouring commitments to the WTO 
The new law abolishes the rigid requirement on re-insurance for non-life insurance 
business, to bring it into line with China! s commitments on entry to the WTO. Under 
the previous law (art. 101), 20 per cent of each non-life insurance policy had to be re- 
insured (in fact, with China Re. the state-owned reinsurer). As part of China's WTO 
commitments, the ratio should be reduced at the rate of 5 percent every year with the 
requirement to be completely abolished in four years. The new law accordingly 
removes the statutory reinsurance requirement, and replaces it with a statement 
(art. 102) that insurers shall handle re-insurance business in accordance with CIRC 
regulations. "' 
In addition, art. 154 echoes the commitment that foreign-funded insurance 
organisations can be in the forms of a joint venture, a subsidiary or a branch of a 
foreign insurer. By contrast, the previous art. 148 only permits two forms: insurers with 
foreign shareholding and branches of foreign insurers. 
b. Revising those provisions incompatible with the development pace of the insurance 
sector 
The new law ratifies the status of the CIRC as a state insurance regulator. 
Previously, the law designated "financial regulatory and supervisory authority" (in fact 
the P130Q as the insurance regulator. 
Given the establishment of agent companies, the new law repeals the previous 
provision (old art. 124) that insurance agents should not be entrusted with two (or more) 
life insurers, and states (art. 129) that only individual agents can not represent more than 
one life insurer. In practice, the previous provision hindered the development of the 
In October 2002, the CIRC issued the 4dministrative Rules for Business Scope and Operational 
Capital Required to Establish Reinsurance Companies. According to the regulations, newly-established 
life or non-life insurance companies should have a threshold paid-up capital of Rmb200bn 
(US$24.18nm) or convertible foreign capital of the same value while insurance companies running both 
businesses need Rmb300mn (US$36.28nm) or the same amount of convertible foreign capital. 
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professional and pluralistic insurance agent, and encouraged a monopoly of the existing 
insurance business, which acted against fair competition in the insurance industry. The 
relaxation on institutional agents makes such agents as banks, securities houses and 
post offices no longer limited to being agents for only one insurer. 
The new law vindicates the practice of bringing life insurers into reinsurance, which 
was established by the CIRC 1999 Compulsory Ceding Conditions which superseded 
the provision in the 1995 Insurance Law that required only non-life insurers to reinsure 
their business. 
The new law also eases restrictions on insurers' investment of their funds, although 
they are still banned from running securities firms and other businesses. To reduce 
possible financial risks, the 1995 Insurance Law only allowed insurers to invest their 
funds through restricted channels, including bank deposits and treasury bonds, and 
proscribed insurers from using their funds to establish securities companies or invest in 
other companies (old art. 104). With the gradual liberalisation of investment restrictions 
by the authorities in the last seven years, insurers have been allowed to invest directly 
into the inter-bank market and indirectly in the stock markets via mutual funds. 
Accordingly, the new law (art. 105) states that insurance funds should not be used to 
establish securities or companies enterprises who have nothing to do with the insurance 
business. 
c. Deregulating term andpremium rate controls 
The most significant change in this revision is perhaps on terms and premium rates 
regulation. The amended law allows insurers to establish their own terms and premium 
rates, ending the practice of the regulatory commission setting the terms and rates. It 
states (art. 107) that insurance rates and items related to public interests, compulsory 
insurance and new forms of life insurance, and so on, should be approved by the 
insurance regulatory authority who should adhere to the principles of safeguarding 
public interests and prohibiting unfair competition. The law empowers the CIRC with 
the right to set out the scope of rate and term approval and related executive rules. 
Terms and rates relating to other kinds of insurance business except for aforementioned 
ones should be submitted to the CIRC for the record. By contrast, the 1995 law (old 
art. 106) required that the basic terms and premium rates for the main types of risk had 
to be formulated by the authority, while terms and premium rates for other types of risk 
could be set by insurers and then had to be submitted to the authority for the record. It 
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is believed that this relaxation of terms and premium rates regulation will propel the 
relatively fragile domestic insurers to be involved in competition. 
d. Strengthening prudential regulation and supervision 
The new law clarifies the insurance regulatoes duty of prudential regulation by 
adding a new article (art. 108) which states that "insurance regulatory and supervisory 
authority shall set out and improve regulatory and supervisory indexes for insurers' 
solvency, and monitor insurers' solvency margins. " This manifests the importance of 
the issue. In addition, the new law also emphasises the infrastructure of prudential 
regulation. 
Firstly, it revises the previously imprecise provisions on reserves. According to the 
1995 Insurance Law, non-life insurers were obliged to set aside no less than 50% of the 
retained insurance premiums of the current year to the unearnedpremium reserve, " and 
life insurers were required to allocate the full value of the effective life insurance 
policies to the life assurance reserve. However, non-life insurers in practice often chose 
more precise methods, e. g. "1/8", "1/24" or "11365" to allocate the unearnedpremium 
reserve, while the definition of "the full value of the effective life insurance policies" 
seems to be blurring. Instead, the new law sets out principles for building a reserve 
system, which states (art. 94) that insurance companies shall allocate various reserves 
according to the principles of safeguarding the benefits of the insured and guaranteeing 
their solvcncies; the insurance regulator is responsible for setting out details of reserve 
standards. 
Secondly, it expands the actuary system from only life insurance business to both 
life and non-life insurance business, requiring all insurance companies to establish 
their own actuarial reporting systems (art. 12 1). 
Thirdly, it consolidates the financial reporting system by adding more requirements 
to insurers' existing duties. Besides the existing requirement of filing annual financial 
reports no later than three months after the end of the financial year as well as monthly 
business statistics statements for each previous month, " insurers are required by the 
new law to record their insurance business in business reports, financial statements, 
actuarial reports, and other statements, documents and data, based on facts. Falsified 
records, misleading representations and material omissions are prohibited. 
The 1995 Insurance Law, Art. 93, 
Ile 199S Insurance Law, Art. 117,118. 
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e. Keeping in line with international practices 
According to the 1995 Insurance Law and the tradition in the Chinese insurance 
industry, insurers have been normally divided into two main kinds: property insurers 
(dealing with property, liability, credit and surety insurance) and life insurers (operating 
life, accident, and health insurance). To be more in line with the common practice in 
the world, the new law allows property insurers to sell accident and short-term health 
insurance policies, which were previously solely undertaken by life insurers. This 
stipulation follows the division of life and non-life insurance that is accepted 
internationally. Meanwhile, the revised law still maintains the previous provision that 
an individual insurer cannot sell non-life and life insurance at the same time. 
f Consolidating supervision 
The revised law consolidates the provisions in the chapter of "legal responsibilities", 
linking them to China! s current Criminal Law and associated rules. 12 articles of a 
total of 38 new articles are within this aspect (art. 139,140,142-150, and 152), with 
some relating to the supervision of insurers' activities. The new law makes it clear that 
insurers and their personnel will be criminally liable in frauds and other crimes 
according to the Criminal Law if they commit crimes by frauds or defaults of contract. 
It also outlaws various deceptive trade practices by insurance brokers or agents. The 
new law increases the sums of fines that the regulators can impose; it also grants 
regulators the power to inquire into insurers' deposits in financial institutions. 
1.5.4 Comments 
a. Insurers'investnient channels 
One of the most highlighted issues is that the step towards investment liberalisation 
is apparently not as big as was expected by domestic insurers. " Removal of stiff 
investment restrictions, especially allowing insurers more easily to use idle funds, e. g. 
directly to invest into stock markets, and freely to establish special investment 
companies, have been long called for by domestic insurers who are facing an 
investment bottleneck caused by the restrictions that hampered the growth of China's 
" See "The new Insurance Law: stepping on a same stage" CaYin Zhoukan (Financial Weeks) November 
11,2002. 
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insurance sector in the last decade. Although there are some slight changes on the issue 
of investment, insurers are still not allowed to establish special investment companies 
which could help invest their large quantities of idle funds. All investment schemes, 
including the acquisition of shares or setting up ofjoint ventures, must be approved by 
the CIRC. 
The legislators' caution in a bid to weed out possible financial risks reflects their 
concerns over the present conditions of insurers' investment. China's underdeveloped 
financial markets, especially volatile stock markets, limit opening investment vehicles 
to insurers. For example, Securities investment funds recorded an average capital 
return rate of 12 percent in 2000, but this rate sharply fell to 2.25% in 2001. " 
Currently, non-performing loans amount to over 30 percent of the total assets of the 
whole banking industry. This may trigger crises which could spread over the whole 
financial system if financial institutions' (including insurers') activities are not kept 
under a proper control. Furthermore, domestic insurers normally lack sophisticated 
investment skills, leaving their investment performance poor in the past years. 
While the legislators reasonably worry about the stride of investment liberalisation, 
experiences have shown that stiff investment policies have often threatened to choke 
off domestic insurers' sustainable growth, especially as they grow rapidly and more 
foreign rivals began to enter the market. This requires insurance investment channels to 
be further expanded to take full advantage of the funds available for insurers and the 
economy, enabling insurers to create healthy fund circulation. Further, the 
development of healthy stock markets needs a sound interaction between insurance and 
stock markets, especially the full display of life insurers' role of important institutional 
investors. Meanwhile, the contradiction between investment demand and backward 
investment environment requires the regulators to delicately balance the relationship 
between them. 
b. New chancefor non-life insurers 
China has long lacked sufficient coverage of passenger injury and death for insured 
vehicles, due to the prohibition against non-life insurers operating such a business. That 
property insurers can operate short-term health insurance and accident insurance with 
the approval of the CIRC is expected to greatly stimulate non-life insurers' business, 
7'At <http: //www. netrisk. com/news/dailynews> August23,2002. 
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especially the auto insurance business. It will also trigger competition on these two 
lines between non-life and life insurers. 
c. Bancassurance and co-operating distributions 
The lifting of the restrictions on institutional life-insurance agents will give further 
impetus to bancassurance and other kinds of co-operating distributions. In recent years, 
insurers have been increasingly competing for connections with banks, securities 
houses and post offices in areas such as cross-selling, payment handling and e- 
commerce. For example, branches of Ping An and the Industrial and Commercial Bank 
of China (ICBC) both in Beijing are co-operating, with the ICBC Beijing branch's 30 or 
so outlets acting as sales agents of Ping An. In the life insurance sector, bancassurance 
sales have risen to become, after personal and group life insurance, the third-largest 
source of revenue for life insurers. In addition, global insurers entering China are likely 
to rely on the bancassurance method in their expansion. These factors, together with the 
fact that banks and other institutional agents are no longer limited by law to acting as 
sales agents for only one insurer, will intensify the competition between insurers to tie 
up with banks and other institutions as their sales agents. 
One big concern over increased competition is that it may spark a fierce rivalry 
among insurers, who will probably resort to price war to gain more institutional outlets. 
In the past, banks usually charged insurers different rates of commissions according to 
locations and products. Since the new law deregulated premium rate control, allowing 
insurers to set premium rates themselves, insurers may scramble for more institutional 
outlets by increasing commissions. The CIRC needs to pay close attention to the 
concern to ensure financial prudence in the spread of bancassurance and co-operating 
distributions. Since both Chinese banks and insurers suffer from weak capital bases, the 
regulator needs to emphasise capital adequacy for insurers, and their risk management 
ability. It also needs to impose disclosure standards for commissions and other material 
information, thereby allowing the public more effectively to compare insurers and their 
co-operating institutional agents. 
d. Conglomerate and integrated regulation 
In contrast to the international trend towards convergence of financial institutions 
and integrated financial regulation, China is still adopting separate operation and 
separate supervision of banks, security houses and insurers. Nevertheless, with the 
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competition in the financial sector and the WTO accession, the business of these 
financial institutions has become overlapping. For example, Ping An and CPIC have 
been organised as financial holding groups controlling separate non-life, life, securities 
and trust subsidiaries. On the other hand, enterprises in other sectors are actively setting 
foot in the insurance area. For example, China International Trust and Investment Corp. 
(CITIC) and China Everbright, the two domestic financial giants, have set up life joint 
ventures with Prudential of the UK and Sun Life of Canada respectively. The new law 
does not refer to supervision of these financial groups. It predicates that the strategic 
alliances and convergence between insurers and enterprises in other sectors will 
become yet more intense. This raises the question of proper co-ordination between the 
PBOC, the CIRC and China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). 
e. Premium rate deregulation 
Rate deregulation under the new law, which shifts the rate-setting burden from 
regulators to insurers, and establishes prior approval and file-and-use systems, reflects 
a functional transition for the regulator. With the appearance of the market economy 
embryo, China's authorities have realised that the government should not interfere in 
the economic operations of insurers, since their performances are best judged by the 
market, and their survival or demise should also be determined by the market. 
Accordingly, the CIRC needs to alter its function from a controller to a supervisor. 
However, because of the current market and legal conditions, China needs to adopt a 
gradualist policy for rate deregulation. 
China has long been practising strict rate regulation characterised by statutory rates 
and a prior approval system. This regulatory model has been proved to have many 
shortcomings. Unified statutory prices are rigid and not necessarily compatible with 
different insurers' conditions. Statutory premium rates in most cases appear to be higher 
than rates would be in a natural equilibrium, thus resulting in either extra profits, or, in 
a few cases, artificially low prices. These pricing irregularities hindered insurers' 
initiatives to compete with each other healthily, and led to the whole industry becoming 
less competitive and less competent. Therefore, China needs to build a competitive 
pricing system - market-based pricing, which can only work effectively in a well- 
functioning competitive market. Moreover, market-based pricing requires a set of 
standards and rules (including prudential regulation) to assess premium rates and 
ensure that they are not excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory. 
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The key concern with market-based pricing in China! s insurance sector is over the 
conflict between the urgent need for rate deregulation and the defacto immaturity of 
those preconditions required for rate deregulation: China! s insurance market is still far 
from maturity, and lacks complete competition. In addition, the current rate standards, 
prudential regulation and market performance regulations need improving. These 
require China to gradually libcralise rate controls while actively creating the required 
conditions, including, most importantly, a competitive insurance market, and a set of 
rate standards together with rate approval and filing rules and procedures. " Other 
essential elements to ensure that competitive pricing works effectively include 
prudential regulation to indirectly force insurers to make appropriate pricing decisions, 
and regulation of market performance to monitor insurers' actual pricing and other 
marketing behaviour. 
f Market performance regulation andprudential regulation 
With 12 (art. 127-129,131,134,136,139-143, and 149) of the 38 new articles relating 
to the market conduct of insurers and insurance intermediaries, the new law shows that 
China is adopting a regulatory strategy that focuses on both prudential regulation and 
market performance regulation. In contrast to the trend in some developed countries, 
which focuses on prudential regulation, this strategy suits China's current conditions 
that the insurance market is still immature and not healthily competitive. An emerging 
economy, such as China, must pay close attention to market performance regulation 
when stressing prudential regulation. This is highlighted by the need for consumer 
protection mainly due to the scarce insurance knowledge of consumers and the problem 
of imperfect infon-nation disclosure by insurers. 
Nevertheless, regarding prudential regulation, China still needs to make further 
efforts. The new law lays down only principles on prudential regulation, so the CIRC 
needs to set out concrete rules for the implementation of those principles. Furthermore, 
to strengthen prudential supervision, China needs to improve the current early warning 
system, enabling it more effectively to predict insurers' solvency problems. Another 
important issue that needs to be addressed is the establishment of a clear market exit 
system, which at present, China still lacks. It is suggested that China needs to set out 
" It was reported that the CIRC is considering to draft "Regulations for premium rates", see supra note 
"Wu DingFu speaking on the new Insurance Law" at <http: //www. chinainsurance. com> October 30, 
2002. 
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clear rules and procedures for dealing with insolvent insurers. One urgent issue on this 
matter is that, to protect policyholders from losses resulting from insurers' insolvency, 
China needs to establish insurance guarantee funds and special bodies responsible for 
managing these funds. 
g. Other important issues to be addressed 
The new law has left some important issues relating to the development of insurance 
business to be addressed. In the revision process, both the CIRC and legislators agreed 
to shelve revising provisions of contracts because of the complexity of the subject. 
They envisaged to solve the problem through publication of judicial interpretations 
which seems not a appropriate way given the need for amendments rather than for just 
interpretations. ' Besides the contract issue, in the authoes opinion, the following four 
issues are also Yet to be addressed. 
Firstly, some competition issues arising in the insurance industry need to be 
addressed. With the development of the insurance market, different kinds of co- 
operation between insurers are emerging, such as the sharing of information on losses, 
jointly insuring large risks, agreements on standardised policy terms and conditions, 
and jointly setting premiums rates and commissions. For example, in 2000, five 
insurers in Guangzhou signed an agreement to work together to offer insurance against 
accidents to flight passengers, " and also in Guangzhou, major non-life insurers 
colluded their auto insurance commissions to avoid price-cutting wars in 2001. ' 
In developed countries, some kinds of co-operation between insurers are considered 
to be pro-competitive. For example, the sharing of loss statistics is justified because 
this collective measure can avoid individual insurers being short of loss statistics 
necessary for the proper rating of risks. It makes reserve calculations possible and helps 
reduce the risk of insolvenCy. 7' However, such co-operation may also help unfair 
competition if the loss statistics are not available on fair, reasonable and non- 
discriminatory terms to all existing and potential insurers. Jointly insuring large risks 
' See "New Insurance Law reveals some vacuums" Guoji Jinrong Bao (International Finance) Oct. 3 1, 
2002. 
" See "Five insurance companies unite in offering accident insurance" China Daily November 26,2000. 
7" See "Opening auto premiums in Guangdong insurance market entering into war era" Jinji CanKao 
(Economic Reference) December 25,200 1. 
71 "Competition and related regulation issues in the insurance industry" OECD, DAFFE/CLP(98)20 p2 I- 
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may enable insurers to sufficiently diversify risks, but it may purposely limit new 
entrants. Both agreements on standardised policy terms and conditions and jointly 
setting premiums rates and commissions may involve in con-competitive transactions. 
China promulgated the Countering Unfair Competition Law in September 1993, and 
is intensely drafting on antimonopoly law at present. However, there exist, to a certain 
extent, some weaknesses in the Countering Unfair Competition Law. For example, 
anti-competitive transactions, which could happen in insurers' co-operation, are hardly 
covered by both the Law and the new Insurance Law. It remains to see whether the 
government addresses these issues when drafting new stipulations. 
Secondly, overlapping regulatory duties need to be addressed. Normally, though 
each government department has specific administrative duties, some departments may 
have duties that overlap with other departments. Sometimes, these overlapping areas 
may create loopholes in regulation and supervision. Regarding insurance regulation, 
the Industrial and Commercial Administrations (ICA) of PRC and the CIRC often get 
confused about such overlapping duties as the market performance regulation of 
insurers and insurance intermediaries, and anti-trust behaviour. For example, officials 
from the ICA often view auto insurers' designation of automobile repairers as a kind of 
unfair competition. Sometimes this confusion even leads to disputes between officials 
of the two departments. ' It predicts that the CIRC will run into even bigger confusion 
when insurers'market performance comes to be tightly monitored. 
Thirdly, there is a need to allow mutual insurance to provide coverage for those risks 
that existing insurers are unwilling to insure. Mutual insurance is a common 
organisational form seen widely in insurance markets around the world. According to 
Swiss Re., mutuals are on average more cost-efficient than stock companies in the non- 
77 life industry. One main advantage of mutuals is that mutuality merges the functions of 
customer and owner, eliminating the need for stockholders whose priorities sometimes 
conflict with those of policyholders. Although there has been a trend towards life 
insurance dernutualisation in developed countries in recent years, mutual ownership 
still plays a prominent role in insurance industries. Of the world's 50 largest insurers, as 
7' See Beying Gongshang Guanli (Beying Industrial and Commercial Administration) 2001, No. 5., also 
"Insurance regulation should follow the preference of specific laws" <http: //www. chinainsumace. com> 
May 24,2001. 
" See Swiss Re. Sigma No. 4/1999. 
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measured by assets, 21 were mutuals; and they wrote an estimated two-fifths of world- 
wide premiums in 1997. " 
Although mutuals were not permitted in the 1995 Insurance Law, and nor under the 
new Law, some mutual insurance schemes do already exist in China. For instance, 
roughly Rmb4bn of employees' mutual assistance fund is held by the All-China Trade 
Union, and more than Rmb2bn of security insurance fund by PetroChina, but none of 
these funds is under the supervision of the CIRC. These facts showed that not only 
there is a de facto need for mutuals but also blurring supervisory duties of the two 
mutuals exist between the CIRC and the actual administrators. 
Fourthly, the new law omitted to deal with the issue of self-regulation by both 
insurers and the insurance industry. In developed countries where there is a tendency 
towards liberalisation in the insurance markets, regulatory frameworks are developing 
towards comprising not just governmental macro-control but also industry self- 
regulation, firms'micro-self-control and public monitoring. The IAIS, Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision (BCBS), and the International Organisation of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO) recommend marrying the micro- and macro-prudential aspects 
of financial supervision. " 
The quality of both firms and industry associations is a key element of an effective 
market economy. China! s insurers currently lag behind their international counterparts 
in terms of the quality of risk management, business skills and the quality of services. 
The insurance industry's role of self-regulation is far from decisive. However, the new 
law missed out these essential problems. It suggests that China take solid measures to 
speed up the construction of a modem enterprise system, and in particular to promote 
the shareholder restructuring of state-owned insurance companies. Meanwhile insurers' 
internal control systems, including internal audit systems, need to be improved. China 
also needs to draw on the experiences of industry self-regulation in developed 
countries, such as the UK, to enforce self-regulation of the insurance industry as an 
important complement to government regulation. In addition, mass media monitoring 
also merits regulators' attention. 
Id. 
See Principle 3, "Corporate Governance and Internal Control" in "Insurance Core Principles 
Methodology", IAIS, Oct. 2000. The similar principles also can be seen in Core Principlesfor Effective 
Banking Supervision DCBS, and Objectives and Principles ofSecurities Regulation IOSCO. 
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1.6 Concluding remarks 
Over the last half-century, China! s insurance industry and insurance regulatory and 
supervisory systems had undergone a long and tortuous process. During the period of 
the first thirty years, the industry and systems struggled with ups and downs, while they 
developed vigorously in the last two decades and now enjoy healthy prospects. 
The Chinese insurance industry is playing an increasingly important role in the 
national economy and demonstrating huge potentials. The future development of the 
industry will largely depend on the ability of insurance firms to ever strengthen their 
competitive power, in the face of many challenges (e. g. technical advances, 
competition from other financial institutions and overseas insurance firms, more 
informed consumers) and the changing socio-economic environment. To build an 
effective, efficient and stable insurance sector that supports the needs of the country's 
socio-cconomic development, China must improve its insurance regulatory and 
supervisory systems. The strategies for the short-term and medium-terin actions should 
aim to achieve the following objectives: protecting insurance entities' (especially 
policyholders) legitimate rights and benefits in the market; strengthening the financial 
resilience of insurers and safeguarding the stability of the market; increasing the 
industry's overall competitive ability in the post-WTO environment; combining market 
disciplines with government regulation and supervision, and balancing the fairness and 
efficiency of the market. To better integrate into the global market, China needs to 
actively adopt best practice in the world, especially the IAIS's principles, standards and 
guidance, by taking into account China's realities. In addition, China needs to adapt the 
systems to changing conditions. 
Considering that the new Insurance Law only set out principles on many aspects of 
regulation and supervision, and left many issues to addressed, it suggests that China set 
out detailed rules to implement the principles and carry out researches on those not (or 
not fully) covered issues. The following five chapters will respectively address issues in 
the five selected aspects which appear urgent in the improvement of regulation and 
supervision of insurance in China. 
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Chapter 2 
China's insurance sector: issues on opening up 
and liberalisation 
2.1 Introduction 
China's entry into the WTO is a tremendous event for insurance industries. The 
General 4greement on Trade in Services (GATS), a main WTO multilateral 
agreement in the services sector, covers insurance services. ' The WTO accession, 
which provides blueprints for further opening up of the Chinese insurance market, 
means China must follow common international rules and fulfil certain stipulated 
obligations. Meanwhile it also brings China corresponding rights and interests. 
Although market access liberalisation is inevitable, obstacles still exist. Nevertheless, 
the essential issue to be addressed for China to date is no longer whether or not to 
open its insurance market, but how to deal with the liberalisation, especially, how to 
create a legal environment which enables China to promote the bcneficial and abolish 
the harmful regarding the liberalisation while honouring its commitments to the VvrTO. 
Furthermore, a bigger issue, which is far beyond the issue of market access 
liberalisation, is how to deal with whole range liberalisation of the insurance sector. 
This Chapter critically examines the liberalisation process, competition issues and 
relevant legal framework in China's insurance sector in the context of the WTO 
accession and the international convergence of regulatory standards and practices. The 
main points are: as a member of the WTO with an aspiration to develop a modem and 
viable insurance sector, China has to liberalise its insurance market and build a 
suitable legal infrastructure consistent with emerging international regulatory 
' The Annex on Financial Services to the GATS defines insurance and insurance-related services, 
including: direct insurance, both life and non-life; reinsurance and retrocession; insurance 
intermediation, such as brokerage and agency; and services auxiliary to insurance, such as consultancy, 
actuarial risk assessment and claim settlement services. 
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standards and WTO requirements. Meanwhile, as a transition economy, China needs 
to deal with the liberalisation in a cautious manner, given a primary development stage 
of the insurance industry. 
Section 2.2 of the chapter reviews the efforts to define the liberalisation in the 
insurance markets, and then focuses on market access liberalisation by reviewing 
literature and practice thereof These are followed by discussions on their implications 
for China. Section 2.3 focuses on insurance market opening up and liberalisation in 
China. It reviews the process of opening up, and outlines the provisions concerning 
insurance in GATS as well as China! s commitments. It then discusses the 2001 FFIC 
Regulations, a specific regulation concerning foreign direct investment (FDI) in the 
insurance sector. This is followed by analyses of the combined policies of opening up 
and local protection adopted by China. Section 2.4 observes the situation of unhealthy 
competition seen in the market, the underlying factors, and counteractions taken by the 
regulator. The basic message is that the regulator needs to take a solid and systematic 
approach to whole range liberalisation of the Chinese insurance sector in order to 
cultivate a competitive and efficient market. The chapter ends with addressing the 
issue of making regulatory arrangements to properly balance local protection, 
liberalisation, competition, and regulation. 
2.2 Liberalisation in insurance markets 
2.2.1 Defining the term "insurance liberalisation " 
The term "insurance liberalisation" covers two concepts. The first concept mainly 
refers to market access liberalisation, i. e. the removal of restrictions on insurance 
market entry for foreign providers. Some analysts applied this notion. For example, 
Cloney Gordon categorised five kinds of markets when characterising international 
insurance market trends in the decade before the mid-1990s. They included socialised 
markets, nationalistic markets, protected markets, transitional markets, and liberal 
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markets! A liberal market is charactcriscd by non-discrimination, market access, 
national treatment, and transparency. Gerry Dickinson noted that "insurance market 
liberalisation means allowing a greater internationalisation of the national insurance 
market by allowing foreign-owned enterprises greater access to the national insurance 
market through establishment or acquisition of a local operation and gradually selling 
cross-border, and by allowing local consumers (companies or individuals) to buy 
insurance in markets overseas. "' 
The second notion, more fundamental in nature, relates to pro-competitive reform 
(or more commonly known as the process of deregulation) which denotes the 
lessening of domestic regulation. Skipper et al suggests that "a liberal insurance 
market is one in which the market, subject only to economically justifiable 
government restrictions, determines the eligibility of insurers, products, premiums, 
and sale manners. "" This notion emphasises that insurance market liberalisation should 
be directed towards market-oriented disciplines, which means reducing unnecessary 
government interventions. The OECD holds a similar opinion. 5 It states that the 
liberalisation requires: 
"(1) genuine market access; (2) adherence to the concept of national and non- 
discriminatory treatments; (3) a suitable regulatory framework and adequate 
prudential rules; (4) open and ongoing dialogue among regulators and all 
market participants, transparent markets, and (5) a transparent regulatory and 
supervisory process; and fair competition and de-monopolisation. " 
2 Cloney Gordon "US insurance experience with emerging markets" Comments presented in New 
Delhi, January 30,1995. According to him, a socialised market has no private insurers, while a 
nationalistic market has no foreign insurers. A protected market allows some degree of foreign 
involvement. However, there are market access restrictions, national treatment inconsistencies and a 
lack of transparency, for example, restrictions as to the percentage of foreign ownership of an insurer. 
In a transitional market, the government makes efforts to render the market more competitive, but still 
faces the problems seen in protected markets. 
' Gerry Dickinson (200 1) "Overview of the Chinese insurance market and its challenges" 2nd Experts 
Meeting on Insurance Regulation and Supervision organised by the CIRC and OECD, 200 1. 
' See Harold D. Skipper, Jr., C. V. Starr, and J. Mack Robinson (2000) "Liberalisation of insurance 
markets: issues and concerns" Insurance and private pensions compendium for emerging economies 
OECD Book 1,1: 6)b 
' To facilitate and guide actions of member countries and non-member countries, it sets out five 
principles for the liberalisation of insurance markets. See "Framework for insurance market 
liberalisation" Insurance Committee Secretariat OECD 1999. 
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However, it is still unclear what constitute a "liberal insurance market", and so are 
the scope and procedure of the insurance liberalisation, although in practice the 
liberalisation has been going on world-wide for many years. One underlying factor 
behind this is further insurance market liberalisation, a part of the liberalisation of 
trade in services, remains a sensitive issue in the GATS 2000 round negotiations. The 
purpose of GATS is liberalisation, aiming at increasing international trade in services 
including insurance by removing unnecessary restrictions and internal government 
regulations that are barriers to trade between countries. ' The experience of insurance 
negotiations at the WTO, however, would suggest that many developing countries 
appear reluctant to liberalise their insurance sectors in a radical way! Various 
political, social, and economical reasons are behind this, which include most notably 
infant-industry protection, inefficient prudential regulation, the costs of adjustment, 
and national security considerations. Furthermore, even 'liberalised countries" have 
difficulties on how to decidedly liberalise their insurance markets further. For 
example, insurance in the USA is regulated at the state level, resulting in a patchwork 
of regulation which is difficult and costly to penetrate from outside! 
Some non-government organisations (NGOs) proposed frameworks for the 
liberalisation. One important is the Working Document on "Pro-competitive 
Regulatory Principles for Insurance" drafted and adopted by the Financial Leaders 
Working Group-Insurance Evaluation Team in July 1999 to contribute to setting the 
agenda for the GATS 2000 round negotiations. The proposal underlines the strong 
feeling in both the European and the US insurance industry that an essential element 
of insurance market liberalisation must be "the development of pro-competitive 
' Art. XIX, GATS commits governments to "achieving a progressively higher level of 
liberalisation ... [and] increasing the general level of specific commitments undertaken by Members. " 
See <http: //www. wto. org> for more details. 
' For example, Chile, Colombia, Egypt and Venezuela restrict the right of establishment by an 
economic needs test. Access is also restricted in many countries by the imposition of limitations on 
foreign equity holdings. This applies, among others, to Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Singapore, 
Thailand and the Philippines. For details, see Ilisaya Ishii (1999) "Liberalisation of international 
insurance operations: comparative tables" OECD. 
' See Susan Randall (1999) "Insurance regulation in the United States: regulatory federalism and the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners" Florida State University Law Review Spring, 1999. 
Also see "Regulatory Initiatives of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners" United 
States General Accounting 0jf1ce Washington, DC 20548, July 6,2001. 
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regulatory principles". ' It recognises the role of regulation, but stresses the important 
features of pro-competitive regulation, which cover such areas as regulatory 
transparency, solvency and prudential questions, insurance monopolies and fair market 
practice, and the importance of independent regulatory authorities. 
The proposal claims that, regarding transparency, regulations should be publicly 
available, and changes in them be the subject of prior consultation. Regulatory 
decisions should be explained and should be justifiable, and the regulators taking them 
should be free of arbitrary or non-transparent political control. It also suggests that 
prudential regulation focus on the soundness of insurance companies and their 
directors and controllers. Product and price approval should be avoided, as these tend 
to favour existing patterns of trading and may restrict a new comer's ability to compete 
on product-specification or price. In particular, the proposal suggests that market 
access and the right of establishment allow freedom in the forms of commercial 
presence (branch, subsidiary, and JV). Majority shareholdings in joint ventures (with 
the prospect of 100% holdings) must be allowed. National treatment must allow 
genuine freedom for foreign insurers to compete for the same business on the same 
basis, and with the same privileges, as long-established domestic companies., ' 
The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) advocates these opinions. It asserts 
that "regulators should focus on solvency and prudential requirements to ensure a 
stable market while, in most cases, allowing competition to determine the most 
effective products and price. Transparency and fair enforcement of regulations are also 
important aspects of a pro-competitivc regulatory framework that is conducive to 
equal competition amongst foreign and local firms. "" 
' "Pro-competitive Regulatory Principles for Insurance" p2. A similar proposal, the "Insurance- 
Proposed model schedule & best practices"(October 2001), was raised by the Association of British 
Insurers (ABI) as part of a private sector initiative. See <http: //www. abi. org>. This proposal was 
supported by the insurance trade associations in EU, US, Japan, and Canada. It provides a proposed text 
for the use of WTO Members in scheduling commitments under the framework of the GATS, and lists 
obligations that VvrTO members should undertake in relation to their insurance markets as well as best 
practices in insurance supervision. 
For details, see Annex of the "Pro-competitive Regulatory Principles for Insurance" 
"T'he liberalisation of trade in insurance services" ICC, 2000. 
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2.2.2 Review of liberalisation of insurance market access 
Liberalisation of access to the services (including insurance market) is generally 
considered to have many benefits. According to the WTO, services liberalisation 
demonstrates its rationale by having six benefits. Firstly, it can spur competition and 
hence raise economic performance. Secondly, it helps exporters and producers in 
developing countries capitalise their competitive strength through providing access to 
world-class services. Thirdly, liberalisation leads to lower prices, better quality, and 
wider choice for consumers, which all lead to consumer savings. Fourthly, libcralised 
services markets have seen greater product innovation. Fifthly, libcralisation leads to 
greater transparency and predictability. Finally, FDI, encouraged by liberalisation, 
facilitates technology transfer. " 
There are a number of theoretical studies on the rationale and phase of liberalising 
insurance market access. For example, Skipper argues that greater foreign insurer 
participation in emerging markets can bring the markets many benefits, including 
improvements in customer service and value, increased domestic savings, and 
transfers of technological and managerial know-how. It also can result in additional 
external financial capital, improvements in the quality of domestic insurance 
regulation, and the creation of beneficial domestic spillover, e. g. additional 
employment. " Gerry Dickinson summarises the scheduling of the market access 
liberalisation. It normally moves through the following stages: removal of obligatory 
cessions to state-run reinsurers/pool, freedom of cross-border reinsurance business, 
acquisition of minority holdings in the form of joint ventures, acquisition of majority 
holdings, establishing local subsidiaries, establishing branch offices/agencies, and 
cross-bordcr sale of insurance products. Individual countries may undergo these 
11 "GATS - fact and fiction", also see "The WTO in Brief, 10 Benefits of the WTO Trading System and 
10 Common Misunderstandings about the WTO" The WTO, 200 Lat <http: //www. wto. org> 
" Harold D. Skipper "Foreign insurers in emerging markets: issues and concerns" Centre for Risk 
Management and Insurance, Georgia State University, Occasional paper 97-2. Also see Harold D. 
Skipper (2001) "Insurance in the General Agreement on Trade in Services" The AEI Press, Publisher 
for the American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D. C., "Emerging markets: the insurance industry in 
the face of globalisation" Swiss Re. Sigma No. 4/2000, "Insurance in Latin America: growth 
opportunities and the challenge to increase profitability" Swiss Re. Sigma No. 2/2002. 
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various stages in different sequence and timing. " 
However, so far, there has been no thorough and independent assessment of the 
exact impact of GATS on services carried out by a respected body. " Empirical 
evidence about the practical effects of insurance liberalisation, especially within 
emerging markets, is also scant. In practice, liberalisation process, the reasons for it, 
and the consequences of it differ from region to region and country to country. 
Meanwhile, clearly, there are problems and concerns about liberalisation of insurance 
market access in both developed and developing countries. 
a. Liberalisation in developed countries: experiencefrom the EU 
In the EU, the main objective of libcralisation is to create a single insurance market 
(SIM) for the whole of the EU, thereby to achieve a greater choice of products for 
customer who can then buy the most suitable insurance contract, and more 
competition between insurers. "' Many forces driving this change are common to the 
insurance industry globally, viz. globalisation of markets, technical advances, and 
GATS/WTO Negotiations on Services. " Besides these, two distinctively European 
forces have been the EU initiatives to create the Single Market and the single currency 
(Euro) for European Monetary Union (EMU) countries, which have acted as a major 
"' Gerry Dickinson's presentation to the UNCTAD conference - "Emerging markets in globalising 
economy" Malaysia, 1999. 
" Ten developing countries appealed for proper assessment on Trade in Services. They argued that 
assessment is particularly important given both the failure of developed countries to open their service 
sectors in areas of interest to developing countries and the threat posed to developing country service 
suppliers from foreign competition. WTO (2001) Assessment of trade in services - communication 
from Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, India, Kenya, Pakistan, Peru, Uganda, Venezuela and 
Zimbabwe (Document code: S/CSS/W114) 
" "Liberalisation of insurance in the single market- an update (October 12,1997) The EU, at 
<http: //europa. eu. int/conmi/intemal 
- 
market/en/fmances/insur/> 
" "Liberalisation and competition in the service sector: Experiences from Europe and Asia" Joint 
analytical report The Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the OECD Development Centre June 2002. 
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catalysts for further restructuring of the EU. " Three generations of Insurance 
Directives have formally set up the freedoms of the establishment, and free movement, 
of insurance services. However, the consequences of liberalisation are largely 
discouraging although satisfactory in some Member States. '9 The Single Market 
Review"' identified that there were substantial regulatory/technical barriers to the 
effectiveness of SIM in the area of personal or mass risks, in particular concerning 
cross-border restrictions on the marketing of financial services, and of conditions for 
sales. Rees, Kessner, and Klemperer reached their conclusions that, although EU 
policy towards SIM had been set out, there has been no sign of the growth of a single 
market in insurance products, and they did not expect there to bC. 21 Bechmann, et al. 
reached similar conclusions in a recent study. 22 According to Bechmann, et al., a 
survey" among a few leading players in the European insurance market identifies two 
groups of obstacles to the integration of SIM: policy induced obstacles and natural 
obstacles. 
The EU experiences indicate some important lessons. Firstly, liberalisation has not 
been conducted with a concerted focus on competition. The Single Market has 
11 "Euro 1999 Report on progress towards convergence and the recommendation with a view to the 
transition to the third stage of economic and monetary union" European Commission March 1998, also 
Andrew Crockett "Managing change in the European financial system: lessons from experience" Joint 
BundesbankIBIS conference on recent developments in financial systems and the challenges for 
economic policy Frankfurt Septem 2000. 
" For example, Cummins and Rubio-Misas observed the restructuring and performance of the Spanish 
insurance industry during the period 1989-1998.71ey concluded that there is substantial evidence to 
show that deregulation and consolidation have had beneficial effects on efficiency in the industry 
through the merger & acquisition (M&A) and the exit of inefficient firms. "Deregulation, consolidation 
and efficiency: evidence from the Spanish insurance industry" Working paper 02-01 Financial 
Institutions Center Wharton (200 1) 
" The single market review series Sub-series 11- Impact on services Volume I. - Insurance European 
Commission (EC) 1998. 
` Rees R, Kessner E, Klemperer P, et al. (1999) "Regulation and efficiency in European insurance 
markets" Economic Policy (29), October 1999. On examination of the British and German markets, 
they concluded that there had not been any growth in "cross-border" trade and neither had there been an 
influx of new entries from abroad into the profitable German market. 
' Rainer Bechmann, Carsten Eppendorfer & Markus Neinike (2002) "Financial integration within the 
European Union: towards a single market for insurance" Ruhr-University, Bochum. 
" Conducted by the Centre for European Economic Research in 2001 (ZEW, Mannheim, Germany). 
See id. 
68 
arguably been more an exercise in hannonisation than in market access, thus not 
substantially increasing competition. Therefore, it is important to give EC competition 
laws a wide scope of application as a strong impetus towards the liberalisation 
process. " A second lesson is that the EU's gradualist approach to insurance 
liberalisation has both advantages and disadvantages. The approach makes the 
transition period less painful by providing a breathing space for adjustment and allows 
Member States to accommodate differences in the liberalisation process to ensure their 
participation. However, it is considered to be hazardous, costly, and inconclusive in 
bringing the full results of liberalisation, which may impair the process and make it 
more susceptible to political "hijacking". " 
b. Liberalisation in emerging economies 
The first phenomenon observed is that few empirical studies on the exact benefits of 
liberalisation for emerging economies are available to date. The main reason may be 
the short period of liberalisation so far. For example, the markets in China and India 
remained largely untapped until the end of last century. This may result in the absence 
of sufficient and representative data. Meanwhile, it is difficult to individualise the 
benefits of liberalisation because liberalisation usually exert its influence together with 
other important factors, e. g. globalisation, insurance innovation, technical changes, 
and economic cycle. This makes an assessment a complex work. 
The second phenomenon is that, for developing/transition countries, liberalisation of 
insurance market access often has its impetus largely from external pressures, 
especially the pressure of major international insurers who actively push the 
liberalisation forward through GATS, rather than from internal needs. This is mainly 
because developing countries are not major exporters, but the main importers, of 
insurance service. They have many concerns about the impact of liberalisation. For 
example, in Russia, policymakers and insurance industry representatives expressed 
their concerns over greater access to the insurance market for foreign entities. These 
concerns are the "threat of a potential 'domination' of the national market by foreign 
insurance companies, insufficient contributions to the local insurance industry and the 
economy as a whole, outflows of capital, and only minor transfers of technological 
"' See "European Commission" Part I "Competition Law and enforcement issues", and Part 11 
"Implementation of the single market programme in the insurance sector" in Competition and related 
regulation issues in the insurance industry OECD Dec. 1998 DAFFE/CLP(98)20 p 189-200. 
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and managerial know-how. "" Some concerns are realistic. For instance, in Hungary 
and Poland, which are deemed to have reached the highest level of EU compliance in 
the insurance industry, " the foreign insurers' market share amounted to 90% of the 
insurance markets" In Thailand, foreign insurers controlled nearly half of the total 
direct premiums in the life insurance sector by mid 2001. The Thai authority therefore 
delayed bills that would allow foreigners to increase their stakes in insurance 
companies to 49% from 25%, because small local insurers complained that they could 
not cope with fully free competition in short term. 29 
The third phenomenon is that major international insurers are profit-seeking 
organisations, and therefore act in their own interests. It would be na7fve to think that 
their impetus of accession to developing /transition markets has been driven by 
anything but self-interest. Generally, their expansion to developing/transition countries 
serves several basic aims. Firstly, major North American and European insurers have 
very high levels of capitalisation" while the competitive nature in their local markets 
has left only a little more space for them to make profits. Naturally, they expand into 
many under-served markets in developing countries in order to make more efficient 
Supra note 17. 
"Summary record" of Roundtable on insurance in Russia Moscow May 2000, OECD. In addition, 
Harold D. Skipper discussed in details the issue of concerns over liberalisation of insurance market 
access, see "Foreign insurers in emerging markets: issues and concerns" Certer for Risk Management 
and Insurance, Georgia State University, Occasional paper 97-2. 
11 According to Swiss Re. Sigma No. 1/2001, countries in central and eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Czech 
republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Romania ) applying for 
EU membership provide free market access for foreign investors who can acquire majority stakes in 
local insurance companies or set up their own subsidiaries, but none of them allows foreign insurers to 
sell policies via branch offices. These countries have introduced EU capital adequacy standards, and 
made great efforts to comply with the three sets of EU Directives. 
21 Esther Baur, Ulrike Birkmaier and Marco Rustmann (2001) "The economic importance of insurance 
in Central and Eastern Europe and the impact of globalisation and e-business" Economic and Social 
Council, United Nations, TRADE/2001/15. 
2' "Free-market drive faces setbacks" <http: //www. siamfuture. comnbaiNews> March 26,2001. 
Thailand committed to the WTO to carry out a three-phase liberalisation. The first stage was the 
granting of new licences with foreign equity participation up to 25% in 1997.16 non-life and 12 life 
insurance licences were issued. In the next two stages, the foreign ownership ceiling were increased to 
49% and then 100%. 
30 See Swiss Re. Sigma No. 1/2000 "Solvency of non-life insurers: balancing security and profitability 
expectations" 
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use of capital. Secondly, insurance is based on the spread of risks; major foreign 
insurers can significantly diversify their risk base by expanding into markets in 
developing economies. Thirdly, along with their existing international customers 
operating in developing/transitional countries, major foreign insurers necessarily 
extend their services to these countries. However, the basic motivation for their 
expansion into, for example, India and China, is to seize the sizeable potential of the 
markets. This will logically drive them to vie for market share with local insurers, and 
sometimes to insure selectively for those risks which are lucrative rather than for the 
public benefit. 
The fourth phenomenon is that, while the assumed benefits to emerging insurance 
markets have not been well demonstrated or documented yet, a large number of 
studies show that some countries experienced significant problems with 
inappropriately designed liberalisation in other financial areas. For example, Chile 
liberalised the capital account for domestic banks in 1980, after its reform of the 
domestic financial market in 1975-77. Debates on its subsequent financial crisis 
pointed emphatically to the factors, such as capital account liberalisation, the lack of a 
prudent regulatory framework for domestic banks, lack of macroeconomic prudence, 
and over-enthusiastic lending by foreign banks. " Regarding the South Korean 
financial crisis in 1997, a survey by IMF/World Bank and South Korean experts 
reveals that financial liberalisation in South Korea widened risk-taking opportunities 
by allowing Korean financial institutions to both borrow from and lend to institutions 
outside Korea. The liberalisation also created additional disincentives for managing 
risk by intensifying competition and eroding bank franchise values. Furthermore, 
weak prudential regulation allowed bank portfolios to become riskier, especially in 
terms of increased liquidity risk, reflecting maturity mismatches between dollar- 
denominated assets and liabilities. The liquidity crisis, which followed the 
reassessment of the South Korean economy by international lenders in late 1997, 
triggered a full-blown financial crisis because of the absence of an effective 
international lender of last resort. 32 
" Gerard Caprio Jr., Isak Atiyas and James Harrison (1996) Financial Reform - Theory and Experience 
(I st ed. ) Cambridge University Press 
" Kevin Amess and Panicos 0. Demetriades "The South Korean Financial crisis: lessons for financial 
liberal isation" Department of Economics, University of Leicester. 
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2.2.3 Implicationsfor China 
From the preceding discussion, we can see that no formal definition of insurance 
market liberalisation exists so far, even within the scope of GATS. One implication of 
these is that there is no general prescription as to how to initiate a process of insurance 
liberalisation. The situation varies from country to country, and it is difficult to 
generalise the best practice. Different countries had different satisfactory solutions to 
regulation and supervision. Insurance liberalisation is not a one-off action but a 
gradual process, " and it is perhaps always carried out with recognition of national 
self-interest, not at the behest of foreigners. Emerging market economics need special 
consideration for pace of liberalisation due to their particular economic and financial 
situation. " Insurance regulatory and supervisory systems of a particular country have 
to be tailored to local condition, economic needs, political and management cultures, 
and the outlook prevailing in the country. Furthermore, the systems need to be adapted 
to changing conditions. 
Another implication is that, if liberalisation of insurance service is to have its 
desired impact on the developing countries, it must be accompanied by adequate 
prudential regulation and supervision. Liberalisation for its own sake does not 
necessarily produce the desired results. This was clearly illustrated by the disastrous 
financial liberalisation experiments carried out by some countries, e. g. ý Chile and 
South Korea. The importance of prudential regulation is also acknowledged in a 
number of important documents. For example, the GATS explicitly recognises "the 
right of Members to regulate, and to introduce new regulations on the supply of a 
services within their territories in order to meet national policy objectives, and given 
asymmetries existing with respect to the degree of development of services regulations 
in different countries, the particular need of developing countries to exercise this 
right. "' The OECD Codes ofLiberalisation, which establish rules of libcralisation for 
the governments of its Member countries, set out exceptions (to liberalisation) for 
reasons of public order and security. " 
33 A number of govenuncnts in both developed and developing countries, e. g. the EU Member States 
and Thailand, Malaysia, adopted a gradualist approach to insurance market liberalisation. 
"' "Guidance on insurance regulation and supervision for emerging market economies" IAIS 1997. 
""Preamble", GATS. 
" "Overview to the OECD Codes of Liberalisation" OECD June 2002. 
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Emerging economies, e. g. China, particularly need to highlight prudential regulation 
and supervision in their process of liberalisation, because they are normally less 
prepared than the developed countries to tackle the complicated issues of international 
finance. " Risks connected with operations in an emerging country are therefore 
normally higher; hence, prudential requirements are needed to be increased. As recent 
experience in emerging economies has demonstrated, liberalisation can have dramatic 
effects on the developments of domestic financial markets. Without the support of a 
prudential regulatory and supervisory framework, any disturbance in the process of 
insurance libcralisation could be amplified, lead to insurers' collapse, and eventually 
trigger the instability of financial system. 
2.3 Insurance market access liberalisation in China 
WTO and GATS principles and rules aim to encourage market economy, free trade 
and the reduction as much as possible of the government's interference in economic 
activities. In this sense, the WTO accession will be a great force driving China to 
further open and liberalise its insurance market. This section reviews the process of 
opening up the insurance market, outlines the provisions concerning insurance in 
GATS as well as China! s commitments. It then provides comments on the 2001 FFIC 
Regulations, and analyses of combined policies of opening up and protectionism 
adopted by China. 
2.3.1 Observations on the market access liberalisation process before WTO accession 
a. Gradually opening up 
Like those of other economic sectors, the basic objectives of opening up China's 
insurance market are to maximise China's benefits and facilitate China's long-term 
economic growth. Given once the extremely underdeveloped nature of China! s 
insurance industry, the Chinese authority adopted a gradualist approach to 
11 Goldstein, M., et al, (1997) "11c case for an international banking standard" Washington: Institute 
for International Economics. Also see Goldstein, M. and P. Turner (1996) "Banking crisis in emerging 
economics: origins and policy options" Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Economic Papers No. 
46, and Hellmann T., K. Murdock and J. Stiglitz (2000) "Libcralisation, moral hazard in banking and 
prudential regulation: are capital requirements enough? " American Economic Review Vol. 90, No. 1 
p147-165. 
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liberalisation of insurance market access, ensuring that the level of foreign 
participation matches the step of growth of the industry. The first overseas insurer 
entering into the market in 1982 was Ming An, a Hong Kong based Property insurer, 
who was permitted to operate in Hainan and ShenZhen. It was until ten years later that 
the first foreign insurer, the US American International Group (AIG), which was 
initially founded in Shanghai in the early 20' century, was granted to establish 
operations in China. By the end of 1999, only 17 licenses were granted to foreign 
insurers (see Table 1.6). 
b. Stringent restrictions on market access 
Subject to the gradualist strategy, the Chinese authority established a number of 
stringent requirements on foreign insurers' accession. Foreign insurers must abide by 
both general requirements for all FDI (e. g. feasibility studies, market research, official 
assessment and approval, and foreign exchange control, etc. ), and requirements for all 
insurers operating in China (set out in the Insurance Law and associated regulations"). 
In addition to these, they were also subject to both explicitly and implicitly specific 
requirements. For example, the 1992 Shanghai Measures set out that a foreign insurer 
can apply for a license to conduct business in Shanghai if it has: engaged in insurance 
business for over 30 years; a representative office in China for minimum two 
consecutive years; 39 and total assets in excess of US$5bn. "o Foreign insurers were also 
subject to restrictions on business organisations, locations and business scopes. 
Foreign insurers (except AIG) wishing to sell life insurance must form a JV with a 
government-approved Chinese partner, with share not exceeding 50% of the JV. They 
used to be restricted to operating in Shanghai or Guangzhou both designated by the 
authority as experimental areas for the opening up. They were further restricted to 
specific business scope. For example, non-life insurers can only serve customers who 
were foreign-investcd companies, and life insurer were not allowed to sell group 
policies which constituted a major portion of life business. Further, both life and non- 
life insurers were not allowed to conduct reinsurance business. All foreign insurers 
For example, provisions on assets and liabilities, solvency, investment. 
Ile establishment of representative offices by foreign insurers was governed by the 1996 Measures 
for the Administration of Resident Representative 0jr1ces in China of Foreign Institutions, which was 
replaced by the 1999 Measures for the Administration of Representative Offices in China of Foreign 
insurance Institutions (CIRC). 
'0 The 1992 Shanghai Measures, Art. 5. 
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were also required to cede 30 % of premiums to China Re., while only 20% required 
for domestic insurers. 
Regarding implicit requirements, the Chinese authority highlighted applicants' 
images and records of commitments to China. Rccognising the importance of building 
up their images and relationships ("guan xi") with the Chinese government, foreign 
insurers trying to gain a license in China one after another made insurance-related or 
unrelated contributions to China to smooth their way into the Chinese market. For 
example, they provided Chinese insurers with personnel training and education, 
organised seminars, and donated to universities and museums, etc. In addition, the 
Chinese government also appeared to use licensing as a means to gain political 
advantages. For example, AXA-UAP was granted approval to establish a JV in 
Shanghai in May 1996 following French President Jacques Chirac's official visit to 
China. 
c. Speeding up the liberalisation 
The requirements of the WTO negotiations and pressure from the international 
insurance community drove China's government to expedite the pace of opening up. 
Since November f999 when the Sino-US WTO deal was made, China has speeded up 
the licensing of foreign firms, and gradually loosened geographic and operational 
restrictions, thereby allowing foreign firms more access to the market. By the end of 
2001,38 licenses had been issued to insurers in II different countries (including 9 
branch licenses for AIG, and 2 branch licenses each for Royal & Sun based in the UK, 
and AXA in France). Of the 38 licenses, 12 are for property and casualty insurers and 
26 for life insurers. Most of them had already started to do business in China, 
primarily in Shanghai, while the remaining licensees are preparing for starting 
operation (see Table 1.6 and Table 2.1). The Chinese government added Shenzhen and 
Foshan in 1999, Tianjin and Dalian in 2000, Beijin, Dongguan, Suzhou and Jiangmen 
in 2001, to the list of opening areas. 
Table 2.1 The number of licenses granted to foreign insurers during 1992-2001 
1992 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 20 2001 
21223238 15 
2.3.2 Chinaýg obligations and commitments regarding insurance 
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As a member of the WTO, China has to keep its commitments and fulfil its 
41 
obligations laid down by the WTO. China's basic obligations include: not to 
discriminate amongst different foreign insurance providers (MFN)42 or amongst 
foreign and domestic insurance providers (National Treatment); 4' and to ensure 
regulatory transparenCy. 44 
Under the Final Schedule of Services Commitments, the Chinese government has 
"' Concerning the main responsibilities that the members should observe in their insurance industry, the 
GATS (1994) and the Results of the Financial Services Negotiations under the GA TS (1997) set out the 
following principles: Market access, National Treatment, Transparency, and Most Favoured Nation 
Treatment (MFN). 
China's WTO commitments are documented in its (1) Protocol on the Accession of the People's 
Republic of China (Protocol), which contains the terms of membership that China negotiated and 
aff"irms China's adherence to the WTO agreements; (2) the Report of the Working Party on the 
Accession of China (Working Party Report), which contains additional commitments and provides a 
narrative on the results of China's negotiations; and (3) annexes containing market access 
commitments, which primarily cover individual tariff lines for goods and schedules for various service 
sectors. 
"' The GATS generally provides for MFN treatment in trade in services. It requires signatory members 
to avoid discrimination among trading partners. As most countries, especially developing countries, 
insist on conditional MFN treatment commensurate with their different insurance development levels, 
along with the economic development goals and opening modes, the GATS allows for a ten year 
exemption subject to conditions. The exemptions are subject to negotiation. The ten-year exemptions 
further contains a transparency requirement that calls for the publication of all relevant statutes and 
regulations, and are normally required to be reviewed after five years. 
" This provision contains the obligation to treat foreign insurance firms and their domestic counterparts 
in the same manner. This obligation is limited to the member's schedule of commitments. In addition, 
the GATS also provide the possibility of different treatment being accorded as long as the conditions of 
competition are not modified in favour of the domestic insurance firms. Art. XVII, the GATS. 
" Id. Art. 111, and see "Concluding remarks" of the chapter. 
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made a wide range of commitments with respect to market accesS; 45 most of them 
concern GATS mode 3 ("commercial presence" in China) . 
4' Regarding cross-border 
supply, except for international marine, aviation and cargo insurance, reinsurance, 
large commercial insurance, and reinsurance brokerage, China has made no pledges. 
Regarding consumption abroad, China has pledged no limitation except for insurance 
brokerage. Regarding the presence of natural persons, China has made no pledges 
except for the trans-sector horizontal commitment (Le. general pledge for sectors 
including insurance). 
Regarding commercial presence, China's commitments are wide-ranging and very 
significant. Firstly, China has accepted that licences are awarded only based on 
prudential criteria' without "economic needs" test or quantitative limits on licenses. 
Secondly, it agrees to phase out existing geographic restrictions on all types of 
` Ile intention of the market access provisions in WTO is to progressively eliminate various types of 
measures that restrict foreign service suppliers' access to domestic market. The GATS prohibits 
limitations on: the number of suppliers; the total value of service transactions or assets, including 
cconomic-needs tests; the total number of service operations or the total quantity of service output, 
including econon-&-needs tests; the total number of naturalised persons who may be employed; the 
types of legal entities through which a service supplier may supply a service; and participation of 
foreign capital. This list is not exhaustive. See Art. XVI, the GATS. 
Ile obligations regarding market access to certain service sector are listed in the membees schedule 
of commitments. For detailed commitments of each member, see Ilisaya Ishii (1999) "Liberalisation of 
international insurance operations: comparative tables" OECD. 
" Instead of a definition of a service, the GATS defines trade in services according to the mode of 
supply of an international service. There are altogether four modes, including: services supplied from 
one country to another ("cross-border supply" - mode 1); consumers or f irms making use of a service in 
another country ("consumption abroad" - mode 2); foreign companies setting up a commercial presence 
to provide services in another country ("commercial presence" - mode 3); and individuals travelling 
from their own country to supply services in another ("presence of natural persons" - mode 4). 
" In order to qualify a license, an foreign insurer must meet three conditions: (1) more than 30 years of 
experience in a WTO member economy; (2) a representative office for two consecutive years in China; 
(3) Tbird, total assets at the end of the previous year should be no less than US$5bn. Regarding 
qualifications for insurance brokerage houses, in addition to the aforementioned requirements for 30- 
year operation and two consecutive years of a representative office, the applicant should have more 
than US$500 million of assets at China's WTO entry, US$400= in the first year after the entry, 
US$300mn in the second year, and US$200mn beginning from the fourth year. 
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insurance operations during the first three years after accession. " Thirdly, upon 
accession, foreign life insurers are permitted to hold 50% equity share in a JV. At 
WTO entry, foreign non-life can hold a maximum 51% ownership of a JV, and can 
establish a wholly owned subsidiary within two years after accession. Foreign 
insurance brokers can reach 50% equity share in a JV brokerage upon accession, and 
should be able to establish proprietary subsidiaries by December 2006. At WTO entry, 
foreign insurance/reinsurance companies are allowed to provide reinsurance services 
with no geographical restrictions in non-life and life insurance in the form of branch, 
JV or proprietary subsidiary. Fourthly, regarding the expansion of business scope, at 
WTO entry, foreign non-life insurers are able to provide master policies and insurance 
of large commercial risks"' without geographical restrictions, and to provide all-round 
coverage to indigenous Chinese entities within two years. Foreign life insurers arc 
allowed to provide individual (non-group) life coverage upon accession, and to 
provide health insurance, group insurance and pension/annuity insurance services 
three years after accession. Fifthly, the 20% cession of Chinese and foreign direct 
insurance companies to Chinese reinsurance companies phases out by a quarter 
annually beginning from the first year after WTO entry. However, foreign insurers 
insurance companies are not allowed to engage in third party liability insurance and 
public transport vehicle and commercial vehicle driver's/carrier's liability insurance. 
2.3.3 Post-WTO market access liberalisation 
"' At WTO entry, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Dalian, Shenzhen and Foshan are opened to foreign entrants. 
In the second year after VV70 entry, the opened cities extend to Beijing, Chengdu, Chongqing, Fuzhou, 
Suzhou, Xiamen, Ningbo, Shenyang, Wuhan and Tianjin. In the third year, China will totally lift 
geographical restrictions. 
"' Insurance of large commercial risks is defined as the coverage of large industrial and commercial 
enterprises. The coverage will be treated as large commercial insurance, if. (1) at China's WTO entry, 
annual premium from the enterprise exceeds Rmb8OO, OOO and the amount of investment surpasses 
Rmb200nm; (2) in the first year after WTO entry, the annual premium exceed Rmb600, OOO and the 
amount of investment surpasses Rmb I 80mn; and (3) in the second year, annual premium should exceed 
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Since the WTO accession, China has made substantial efforts to deliver its 
commitments required of a WTO-member. Assessment reports by some entrusted 
bodies such as the Office of the US Trade Representative and the US Chamber of 
Commerce made generally positive comments on China! s implementation of its WTO 
commitments. They also made recommendations about further steps that China needs 
to take to fully comply with its WTO commitments. 50 
In insurance area, China also made great efforts to improve its regulatory and 
supervisory system, amending or abolishing law and regulations that are not 
compatible with or contradict the basic principles of the WTO and the commitments 
made by China. It revised the 1995 Insurance Law mainly for the WTO consistency 
(see Chapter I for detailed discussions), and issued several new regulations and rules. 
For example, on September 17,2002, the CIRC promulgated the Administrative Rules 
on Business Scope and Operational Capital Required to Establish Reinsurance 
Companies, which directs to honour its promise of opening the reinsurance market up 
to domestic and foreign competition immediately upon its accession to the WTO (See 
note 66, Chapter 1). As part of the continuing efforts to liberalise and streamline its 
supervision of the growing industry, in the late 2002 the CIRC scrapped 58 
administrative approvals which were introduced in recent years as part of various 
regulations. This move was followed by a scrapping 28 other approval requirements 
months later. In the first year after the WTO accession, six foreign insurers were 
approved to enter China, and 16 foreign insurance institutions started operation. To 
promote competition, auto insurance and aviation accidental insurance began to apply 
file-and-use rate and term regulation. 
2.3.4 FFICRegulations 
Promulgated in the wake of the China's insurance service commitments made 
during its accession to WTO, the long waited FFIC Regulations is apparently to fulfil 
the commitments. The regulation covers the procedures and requirements regarding 
registration, supervision, liquidation and liability, as well as business scope, for 
Rmb400, OOO and the amount of investment surpasses Rmb I 50mn. 
-' See "First step: A U. S. Chamber report on China's WTO progress" U. S. Chamber September 2002, 
<http: //www. amcham-china. org. cn> and "2002 report to Congress on China's WTO compliance" The 
Oj, rice ofthe US. Trade Representative November 2002. <http: //www. ustr. gov> 
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FFIC. " It in fact superseded the 1992 Shanghai Measures which had governed the 
activities of foreign insurers in China since 1992. Compared with the 1992 Shanghai 
Measures, the FFIC Regulations made various issues regarding the application 
procedures clearer. 
Firstly, the regulation reaffirms criteria for obtaining licenses, " which are consistent 
with the WTO commitments and the criteria in the 1992 Shanghai Measures. " 
Secondly, the application procedures are simplified. Foreign insurers are no longer 
required to be invited to apply by the CIRC. This is a major improvement over the 
licensing system that had existed in China for the previous decade. The licensing 
process, which is the same for all three FFIC forms, can be divided into three 
consecutive steps: (1) the filing of pre-licensing information called an "initial 
application", " and then, if accepted (the CIRC shall decide whether to accept or deny 
within six months); (2) the filing of an official application, " and then, if approved (the 
CIRC shall approve or deny within sixty days); (3) registration of the CIRC approved 
entity with the State Administration of Industry and Commerce. The establishment of 
explicit time limits for reviewing the application is another improvement over the 
previous, sometimes arbitrary, review process. 
Thirdly, subject to CIRC approval, a FFIC may be licensed to engage in property 
insurance such as casualty, liability and credit insurance, or in life insurance such as 
life, health, accidental death and dismemberment insurance. Within the verified scope, 
a FFIC may also engage in insurance of large commercial risks and issue master 
policies. While one FFIC is not allowed to engage in both property insurance and life 
" FFIC are defined to include JVs, wholly foreign-owned enterprises, as well as PRC branches of 
foreign insurance companies. Art. 2, the 2001 FFIC Regulations. 
Art. 8, the 2001 FFIC Regulations. 
Supra note 40. 
The initial application requires submission of basic corporate information as well as information on 
the Chinese JV partner, if one is required. Foreign insurers are also required to submit a "feasibility 
study" for the proposed insurer. 
" Once the CIRC accepts the initial application, a company has up to one year (with a maximum 
extension of three months) to form the proposed foreign-funded insurer. Upon completion of the 
formation, the company is required to submit an official application which includes extensive 
information about the new entity. Some of the information required include: a list of investors and 
respective contributions, a capital verification certified by a designated Chinese auditor, a three year 
business plan and reinsurance program, and premium rates and contract forms. 
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insurance business simultaneously, they may engage in reinsurance of risks that they 
are authorised to insure. Life insurance, however, can only be written through a JV. 
While the promulgation of the FFIC Regulations is an active step forward in 
clarifying the licensing process, some articles of it drew complaints from foreign 
insurers. For example, the registered capital threshold of Rmb200mn (US$24mn) for 
an foreign insurer's mainland branch is claimed too high, placing an excessively heavy 
burden on foreign insurers. " In addition, the regulation leaves the CIRC the discretion 
to increase capital requirements. Moreover, an applicant needs to show that regulatory 
authorities in its home jurisdiction have consented to the application to establish an 
insurance company in China. This requirement seems questionable as obtaining such 
a consent would be likely difficult in most jurisdictions. " Furthermore, the regulation 
prohibits composite insurers, a market access limitation that does not appear in the 
WTO guidelines. 
There are other questionable or vague issues. One important is that such licensing 
items as business scopes, customer scopes, and foreign investment percentages, have 
to "be approved by the CIRC in accordance with the relevant regulations". However, 
there is no indication in the regulation to what these regulations are. It would be 
problematic for foreign insurers to identify which of the relevant regulations are in the 
existing Insurance Law and its supplementing regulations, or regulations yct-to-be 
issued. Another issue is that the regulation requires a notice in writing with reasons of 
stipulated decision to be issued by the CIRC upon denial in licensing process. This 
appears in violation of the WTO obligation to provide tribunals or procedures to 
review such a type of decisions. Regarding whether foreign brokers, agents and 
actuaries can establish themselves in China, the regulation is silent, although China! s 
WTO commitments open the brokerage business to 50: 50 joint ventures without a 
mention regarding agencies or actuaries. The 2001 Brokerage Regulations are also 
silent on foreign brokerage access, except saying that if any laws, treaties or 
administrative regulations to which China is a party specify differently, then those 
laws, treaties or administrative regulations shall govern. These leave the licensing 
procedures of brokerages unclear. " A similar situation exists for actuaries. By 
contrast, the 2001 Agency Regulations specifies that they are applicable to foreign 
"Another progressive move" Chang Tianle Shanghai Star, July 2,2002. 
Andreas Lauffs and Jeffrey Wilson (2002) "China moves forward on foreign investment in 
insurance" Baker & Mckenzie (China) 
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funded insurance agency institutions. In summary, the above questionable and vague 
rules need to be revised in the future. 
2.3.5 Yhe combination ofpolicies: opening up andprotectionism ý 
Although greater freedom for foreign insurers has been enshrined in principle, in 
practice, protectionism is still manifested in many ways. For instance, the CIRC has 
open-ended discretion on any approvals; the complicated licensing process remains in 
effect. Foreign insurers have to apply for separate permits to set up branches in 
different cities. Capitalisation requirements are high. With few Chinese companies 
able to tie up that much capital, foreign insurers simply cannot enter the marketplace 
in terms of setting up a 50-50 JV with a Chinese company. Some foreign insurers 
have sought to tap the market not by starting a JV or waiting for a licence, but by 
buying into domestic insurers. "' However, foreign stakes in domestic insurers are 
limits to 25 % of total shares with each individual foreign insurer restricted to a 
maximum 10% of total shares, caps that were in effect before WTO membership and 
are not scheduled to change. 
In fact, China has chosen combined policies - allowing foreign access while 
purposely controlling new entry and liberalising in a gradualist manner. An ostensive 
reason is that China would like highly competitive foreign insurers to help strengthen 
the weak domestic insurance rather than to drive their domestic rivals out of business. 
Furthermore, in deeper analyses, the possible reasons could range from the objectives 
of opening up, infant industry argument, concerns about both financial stability and 
the important position of the insurance industry in the economy, to the inadequacies of 
domestic regulation. 
Firstly, it is necessary to understand the purposes of opening up the insurance 
market and the forces driving insurance liberalisation. China's goal in pursuing trade 
For example, there is not a single license issued to foreign insurance broker in China yet. 
The New China Life Insurance Co Ltd became the country's first insurer to sell shares to foreign 
enterprises. Five foreign institutions, including International Finance Corp, Zurich Financial Services 
Group and MeiJi Life Insurance Corp, bought a 24.9% stake in New China. Consequently, New 
China's net assets increased from US$75.9mn to more than US$192.8mn. The insurer is also said to 
have received advanced technology and management know-how from the five foreign shareholders 
who were given a chance to enter the relatively closed Chinese market at a reasonable price. China 
Daily, August 31,2000 
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liberalisation is to transform its domestic economy; joining WTO builds on China! s 
two-decade reforms rather than for membership's sake only. China's leaders believe 
foreign competition is essential to encouraging economic rationalisation and faster 
productivity growth. The insurance sector is sharing similar views. China would like 
foreign capital to help strengthen its weak domestic insurers. Foreign insurers may 
serve as a vehicle for capital inflow, transferring technology and know-how, ' as well 
as higher standards of transparency and self-regulation. However, China's authority is 
sensitive to the impact of foreign competition on China's domestic insurers, financial 
stability and the economy. Choosing the combined policies rcflccts the government's 
attempt to strike a balance between the benefits and costs of foreign access in the 
market. 
Secondly, there is a perceived need for the government to protect the domestic 
insurers from immediate fiercer competition because of the infant industry argument. 
Despite the impressive growth, China's insurance market still has many features of a 
under-developed market. Tables 2.2-2.6 demonstrate the gap between China and 
certain countries. China ranked 16' (17' in 1998) in the world when measured by 2000 
premium dollars (non-life 150' and life 180'), 73"' (78h in 1998) measured by 2000 
insurance density, and 61'h (66h in 1998) measured by 2000 insurance penetration. 
Table 2.2 Total Dremiurn volumes In US$ 2000 
country Ranking Premiums(US$ 
M) 
Real growth 1999/2000 
M 
Share of world market 
M 
us 1 865,327 3.5 36.41 
Japan 2 504,005 0.2 20.62 
UK 3 236,960 -14.5 9.70 
China 16 19,278 0.79 
------- 
0.4 
Tndia 23 9,933 0.41 -2.6 
Source: Swiss Re, Sigma No. 6/2001 
' One notable benefit concerning technology transfer is operational transformation in the life insurance 
business. Chinese domestic insurers used to focus on corporate business through sales staff. The 
personal sales agent system of AIG introduced a new distribution approach to the domestic insurers. 
This facilitated the domestic insurers' transformation of limited operational targets to the simultaneous 
development of both group and personal business through personal sales agents. Another obvious 
benefit relating to indirect technology transfer is, through foreign insurers' contributions and the 
introduction of foreign qualification examinations (e. g. Loma, CPCO, the quality of insurance 
professional training and education in China has been improved. Except for these, other benefits of 
technology transfer appear uneasily identifiable. 
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T2hlp 2-1 T. ifp inenranep nrpmhtm vnitimpe In MCWifill 
country Ranking Premiums(US$ 
M) 
Real growth 1999/2000 
(%) 
Share of world market 
(%) 
us 1 442,373 3.7 29.08 
Japan 2 402,484 0.1 26.39 
UK 3 179,742 -4.7 11.82 
China -1 ý 12,049 0.4 0.79 
India 20 7,595 -2.7 0.5 
Source: Swiss Re, Sigma No. 612UUI 
T2hIp 2-4 Nnn-life. Inviranop. nrPrnium vnhimi-c In TPRO. 2000 
country Ranking Premiums(US$ 
M) 
Real growth 1999/2000 
M 
Share of world market 
M 
us 1 422,954 4.5 46.85 
Japan 2 102,521 0.2 11.11 
Germany 3 67,465 -11.9 7.31 
China 15 7,228 0.4 0.78 
India 29 2,338 -2.3 0.25 
Source: Swiss Re, Sigma No. 6/2001 
Tahle 2-lq In-urance den. vitv! Premiumq nor canita In 11,912000 
Country Ranking Total business_ Life Non-life 
Switzerland 1 4,153.9 2 583.3 
_1,570.6 Japan 2 3,973.3 3 165 .I 808.2 
UK 3 3,759.2 3 028.5 730.7 
China 73 15.2 9.5 5.7 
India 78 9.9 7.6 2.3 
Source: Swiss Re, Sigma No. 6/2001 
Table 2.6 Tnqurance nenetration! Premiumq In O/a of GDP 2000 
Country Ranking Total business Non-life Life 
South Africa 1 16.86 14.04 2.83 
UK 2 16.78 12.71 3.07 
South Korea 3 13.05 9.89 3.16 
India 52 2.32 1.77 0.55 
China 61 1.79 1.12 1 0.67 
Source: Swiss Re, Sigma No. 6/2001 
The insurance market is small, mainly due to both the low per capita GDP and the 
lack of public awareness. While considerable advances have been made in the 
development of human resources, the market still lacks qualified personnel with 
technical and specialised skills and robust risk management. Local insurers are often 
undercapitalised. In comparison, any one of the foreign-funded companies approved to 
enter China has high-quality staff with a hefty amount of capital, rich experiences, and 
effective management system. All these advantages enable them to challenge local 
insurers in product development, sales, client services, and enlisting talents. It fears 
that without barriers and tariffs, inefficient and under-developed local firms are 
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inferior to immediate competition from foreign rivals. "' 
Thirdly, the China's view of insurance development is driven by strategic 
considerations, not just adherence to liberal economic values. It is frequently argued 
that as finance including insurance industry provides important services to an 
economy, it is therefore best owned and controlled by domestic interests. More 
sophisticated foreign entrants, pursuing different objectives, could come to dominate 
the industry to the detriment of national objectives. Furthermore, China's domestic 
insurers do have their incomparable advantages in scale of service network and 
understanding of market situation; there has to be a process for foreign insurers to 
adapt to the Chinese market. Given these factors, Chinese insurers are expected by the 
government to restructure or learn-by-doing, eventually become internationally 
competitive, and take a lion's share of the market unpredictable potential, if provided 
with protected markets. In fact, the combined policies are considered as one of the 
successful factors for the rapid development of local firms in the last two decades. 
Fourthly, with the shift from once a closed and monopolistic market to an opening 
and competitive market, China needs to adapt its regulatory framework to new 
environment, and improve its monitoring and supervisory capacity. Among the areas 
for prior actions, issues of prudential regulation and insurers' corporate governance are 
acquiring significance (See Chapter 3,4). 
2.4. Competition issues in the Chinese insurance market 
Chinaýs insurance market is suffering from the lack of sufficient, effective and 
orderly competition. This section observes the situation of unhealthy competition (for 
the insufficient competition of the market, see Section 1.3.3, Chapter 1) seen in the 
market, and counteractions taken by the regulator. It also analyses the underlying 
factors of the incomplete and unhealthy competition. 
Z4.1 Rampant unhealthy competition and crackdowns 
"' A survey conducted by Horizon Research in the late 2000 showed that 51 percent of the respondents 
in the main large cities of China favoured foreign insurers over native Chinese insurers although most 
of them had had little experience with foreign insurers. The reason for this appeared to be mistrust and 
specifically a fear that Chinese insurers might defraud thern. It fears that the biggest challenge to 
Chinese insurers posed by the increasing presence of foreign insurers is in winning sufficient consumer 
confidence ultimately to gain business. 
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As we discussed in Chapter 1, China's insurance market is highly concentrated. 
However, incomplete competition does not necessarily mean a lack of fierce and 
unhealthy competition. In fact, the rapid growth in recent years has been accompanied 
by a surge in regulatory problems, requiring successive overhauls by the government. 
The unhealthy competition witnessed in the market shows the following common 
types: 
Some insurers and intennediaries operate illegally, i. e. without official approvals, 
and abuse the legal system by illegally setting up branches and shops, appointing 
senior management staff without approvals, and "fronting" for foreign finns. " 
Some firms use administrative means to prevent fair competition and monopolise 
the market, which is strictly prohibited. For example, some insurance institutions 
joined with iocal government departments to designated insurers to monopolise 
students'and children's safety insurance (SCSI) and prevent fair competition. Some 
insurance institutions even through the departments forced customers to buy SCSI or 
other insurance products. " 
Some firms' sales personnel promote products untruthfully and vaguely, misleading 
consumers. For example, they bragged about insurance coverage and functions rather 
than giving an honest description about the insurance. Some offered low premiums but 
"' Fronting occurs when a foreign firm lacks a license to do business in China and forms an alliance 
with a domestic firm. The foreign firm is then able to offer insurance policies in the name of the 
domestic firm, and receives a portion of the premium. It was reported that by the end of 2000, among 
the 10,000 senior management staff in various insurance institutions, 20 percent were appointed 
without approvals. At the same time, of 10,000 insurance institutions registered in China, 4 percent, 
namely 400 institutions, were set up in breach of regulations. "China Rectifies Insurance Market" 
Renmin Ribao (People's Daily) July 20,2001. In 1999, the CIRC overhauled illegal foreign-funded 
insurance intermediate activities. Sedgwick Insurance & Risk Management Consultants (China) Ltd. 
was suspended from trading for operating unlicensed businesses among other things. The suspension 
was lifted in October 1999. In Septem 1999, Jardine Insurance Brokers Ltd. 's Beijing representative 
office was ordered to close for allegedly transacting unauthorised insurance business. See Business 
Insurance Crain Communications, Inc. October 25,1999. It was also reported that some Hong Kong 
based agents were penalised for selling policies in the mainland, which was forbidden. South China 
Morning Post October 5,2000. 
"' The CIRC, therefore, warned that it would severely punish those who continued to engage in such 
improper competition. See "Announcement on Rectifying and Standardising Students' and Children's 
Safety Insurance Business" The CIRC 2000, and "China - CIRC prohibits students', children's insurance 
monopolies" Zhongguo Gaige Bao (China Reform News). August 15,2000. 
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hollowed out coverage by vague language. Some overstated the investment potential 
of insurance products. To lure customers to purchase policies, some concealed parts of 
obligations that buyers had to perform, or purposely glossed over the possible defects 
with an ingratiating attitude. 64 
Some insurance lines are plagued by various irregular activities. For example, to 
secure a larger market share in the auto insurance market, some firms engaged in such 
malpractice as offering excessively high commissions to agents, providing customers 
with high interest kickbacks by means of refunds or gifts, or illicitly granting no- 
accident discounts. They also competed with rivals by offering rock-bottom 
premiums, or providing exorbitantly high returns to policy buyers. " To obtain large 
amount transactions such as blanket contracts and construction insurance, some 
companies decreased their bidding premiums below approved scopes, or provided 
coverage extensions that exceed approved terms. These resulted in the firms' inability 
to make repayments when policies matured. In the group insurance market, some firms 
provided high returns and high commissions, expanded their scopes of coverage, and 
assisted consumer companies in raising funds in an effort to attract as many clients as 
possible. Some sales personnel illicitly individualised group insurance contracts in 
order to get higher commissions than they can get from the group contracts. "" 
In recent years, the CIRC has made great efforts to tackle the rampant unhealthy 
competition. " However, these efforts have not turned out to be fully effective. Market 
chaos resulted from unhealthy competition became a chronic and stubborn "disease". 
Renmin Ribao (People's Daily) March 16,2001 
According to the China's Insurance, 4ssociation (CIA). 
<http: //www. chinainsurance. com > May 25,2001 
" For example, in January 1999, the newly established CIRC launched an overhaul on the aviation 
personal accident insurance market, requiring insurers to use standardised policies printed by the CIRC. 
Later that year, the CIRC carried out a series of overhauls on the motor vehicle insurance market, group 
business, part-time agents, and illegal foreign-funded insurance intermediate activities. The CIRC 
comprehensively cleared and standardised insurance clauses, putting over 2,000 effective clauses on 
file, and abolishing 151 clauses; renewed the licences of 244 insurance companies and their branches; 
and examined 2,030 high-level managerial personnel of insurance companies. In 2000, the CIRC took 
up a sharp crackdown on illicit market activity, mainly targeting fake insurance policies circulating in 
parts of the country and sharp discounts on policies sold by insurance agents. See Karby Leggett 
"China launches insurance sector crackdown before WTO entry" Dow Jones International News April 
28,2000. In 2001, the CIRC launched another nation-wide clean-up campaign in China's insurance 
market. For details, see China Daily July 15,2001. 
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Experience showed that tightening the regulations of market performance was not 
enough to restrain the chaos, and restricting market access to avoid presumed 
excessive competition did not provide a proper remedy for the "disease". Solutions 
that deal with the root causes of the problems should be developed. 
2.4.2 Regulatory controls on the Chinese insurance market 
China imposes many restrictions on the insurance business; some of them do not 
help create a competitive and effective market. This section presents some of 
characteristics of the Chinese insurance regulatory framework. 
a. Control ofownership andforms ofbusiness 
The 2002 Insurance Law provides for only two types of insurance companies: 
companies limited by shares Ooint-stock companies) and wholly state-owned 
companies. " The provisions of corporate structure set out in the Company Law also 
apply to insurance companies. "' The 2002 Insurance Law also indicates the possibility 
of other investment forms, such as mutual insurers, but only in the future". There arc 
four vehicles for foreign investment: JV, joint-stock limited companies, subsidiaries 
and branches of foreign insurance companies. " The existing system also lays down 
explicit requirements relating to change of control. For example, a change of 
shareholders involving more than 10% of voting shares must be approved. ' 
"' See the 2002 Insurance Law, Art. 70. 
"' The Company Law (1994) provides for the establishment of limited liability companies and joint- 
stock companies. A wholly state-owned company is a form of limited liability company established by 
a single investment from a state-authorised investment organisation or state-authorised departments. 
'0 The 2002 Insurance Law, Art. 15 6. 
" Supra note 51. The primary laws and regulations that provide for JVs and branch offices are 
respectively: the Law on Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures (July 1979, Yd revision in March 2001) 
and its relevant implementing regulations, and the Foreign Investment Enterprise Law (April 1986,2"' 
revision in November 2000). The Provisional Regulations on Several Issues Concerning the 
Establishment ofJoint stock Limited Companies with Foreign Investment (Foreign-invested Joint Stock 
Regulations, January 1995) regulate joint-stock investment. 
' The 2002 Insurance Law, Art. 82. It also lists other changes that must be approved or examined by 
the authority. 
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China prohibits insurers from operating also in other business areas, and bans an 
insurer from offering both life and non-life insurance policies at the same time. " 
Insurers are further restricted by law from operating outside the scopes and territories 
of business approved by the CIRC. ` The permitted scope of reinsurance business is 
the same as for primary insurers, in other words, reinsurance in both property and life 
insurance at the same time is not permitted. When approved, insurers may reinsure out 
to other insurers, and accept risks from other insurers (but not to/ from related parties). 
b. Barriers to entry 
The existing legal system has explicit requirements for the establishment of 
insurance companies and branches in the process of licensing. For the setting up of a 
company, it requires minimum registered capital, " special expertise, suitability of 
owners, reliable management, elaborate business strategies, and a business site and 
facilities. " To establish a new branch, or a sub-branch, or upgrade a sub-branch to a 
branch, an insurance company needs to meet the precondition that its premium income 
growth reaches certain amounts, " and get an approval from the CIRC. In fact, China 
executed a strict licensing system based on the economic needs teSt, 78 and stringently 
restricted both domestic and foreign investors from entry into the market. At present, 
the CIRC bars the door with a strict approach of case-by-case approval. 
" This restriction has been circumvented by establishing two separate insurance companies, with one 
for life insurance and one for property insurance. For instance, Ping An has set up a holding company 
to possess subsidiaries engaging in life insurance and property insurance, respectively. AIG is presently 
the only foreign insurance company that has different arms engaging in life insurance and property 
insurance under different subsidiaries in China. 
"' The 2002 Insurance Law, Art. 92. 
7' Art. 73 of the 1995 Insurance Law provides for a minimum registered capital of Rmb200mn that 
must be fully paid up. Later, the 1996,4dministration Regulations increase the minimum registered 
capital. It provides for no less than Rmb500mn paid-in capital for an insurance company that carries 
on insurance business on a nation-wide basis. For an insurance company including a branch of a 
foreign insurer that carries on insurance business within a designated territory, its registered capital is 
no less than Rmb200mn (Art. 7, the 2001 FIX Regulations). 
71 See the 2002 Insurance Law, Art. 72-75; the 1996 4dministration Regulations, Art. 5,13-17; the 
2000 Insurance Company Regulations, Art. 6-16; and the Provisional Regulations on Eligibility of 
Senior Management in Insurance Institutions 1999, the CIRC. 
Seethe 1996,4dministration Provisions, Art. 5- 10. 
The 1995 Insurance Law, Art. 71, and the 1996,4dministration Regulations, Art. 4. 
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c. Barriers to exit 
The main legal basis for sorting out firm exit is the Bankruptcy Law 1986 for 
general enterprises and several judicial annotations. The Insurance Law, the Company 
Law, the Civil Procedure Law and several insurance regulations also provide scattered 
rules for handling insolvency and liquidation. Under the 2002 Insurance Law, an 
insurance company may merge, or de-merge, or dissolve as specified in its articles of 
association, if approved by the CIRC. A life insurer is not allowed to exit by 
dissolution. An insurer must go through mandatory liquidation when it is divided, 
merged, dissolved, or deprived of its license, or becomes insolvent. There are sets of 
specific substantive and procedural provisions for liquidation designed to protect the 
interests of policyholders. Firstly, a life insurer has to transfer its existing business 
together with the portfolio reserves to another life insurer before being able to exit the 
industry. The CIRC may order a selected life insurer to accept the transfer if the deal 
can not be reached voluntarily between the insurers. " Secondly, assets cannot be 
repatriated until all continuing insured risks are provided for. 
However, the insolvency system in China is underdeveloped, especially in the 
regime of SOEs. In fact, most insolvent SOEs have been dissolved or merged into 
other SOEs under administrative arrangements since China first passed the Enterprises 
Bankruptcy Law in 1986. This was mainly due to the government concern over social 
stability and employees' benefits. Moreover, concerning insurance company 
insolvency, China has not yet passed the secondary legislation of the special 
insolvency procedure for insurance companies as specified in the 2000 Insurance 
Company Regulations (Although, there has been so far no report of insurance 
company failure). Additionally, China has not established insurance guarantee funds 
as countries such as the UK and the US (most states) have done (see Chapter 4). 
d Control ofprice andproducts 
China had long implemented unified tariff system for major risks, especially in non- 
life insurance. Under the 1995 Insurance Law, premium rates and the basic insurance 
clauses for the principal types of commercial insurance risk must be set by the 
"insurance authority". Premium rates and basic clauses for other types of risk, 
although left to the discretion of insurers, need to be reported to the "insurance 
" The 2002 Insurance Law, Art. 88. 
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authority" together with the required documents for the record. " Under the 2000 
Insurance Company Regulations, the CIRC is given a wide range of powers for 
regulating policy provisions and rates. " 
The stringent control on products and prices is a "double-edged sword": while 
assurnedly promoting the fair and safe development of the insurance business, it 
results in stagnation in the innovation of insurance products and services. This leads to 
the unwelcome phenomenon of "cloning". To achieve a functional transition for the 
regulator from a controller to a supervisor and reduce the government interference 
with insurers' operations, the 2002 Insurance Law establishes prior approval and file- 
and-use systems. However, regulations for implementing the new systems still need to 
be formulated. 
e. Control ofmarketing and distribution 
The existing system lays down a number of stipulations on fair competition and 
how insurers arc to conduct their business. For example, insurers may not appoint 
insurance agents to develop business on its behalf unless the agents have been 
approved by the CIRC. Neither may they accept insurance business introduced by 
insurance brokers that have not been approved by the CIRC. Insurers arc prohibited 
from engaging in unfair competition including vicious pricing, and illegal advertising. 
It is also illegal to fabricate and disseminate false information to harm competitors, or 
to use judicial or administrative powers to pursue a monopoly or obtain commercial 
advantages. However, there are no detailed provisions that oblige insurers and their 
staff to properly disclose important information when they are doing insurance 
business with clients. 
The 1995 Insurance Law sets out a general framework for regulating insurance 
agents and brokers (remains unchanged in the 2002 revision), which is supplemented 
by the 2001 Agency Regulations" and 2001 Brokerage Regulations". Generally, 
'* The 1995 Insurance Law, Art. 106, the 1996Administration Regulations, Art. 43,44, and the 2000 
Insurance Company Regulations, Art. 69-75. 
See section 6.3.1, Chapter 6. 
The Regulations repealed the Interim Regulations for the Administration of Insurance Agents (by 
PBOC, Nov. 30,1997) which repealed the Provisional Regulationsfor the Administration ofInsurance 
Agents (by PBOC, Feb. 2,1996). 
" It repealed the Regulations on the Administration ofInsurance Brokers (by PBOC, Feb. 16,1997). 
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brokers, agents and loss adjusters" are required to be licensed and registered with the 
authorities. They are also required to have professional certifications, to deposit 
guarantee funds with the authorities, and to insure against professional liability risks. 
f Control offund investment 
Insurers' investment is restricted to fixed deposits with banks, the purchase of 
government, financial or state-level corporate bonds, and other forms of investment 
prescribed by the State Council. They can only indirectly invest in the stock markets 
via mutual funds (see Chapter 5). 
2.4.3 Impairment of incomplete and unhealthy competition 
Incomplete and unhealthy competition adversely affects market performance in 
many ways. Firstly, it disturbs the market order and damages the competition 
environment. As we saw in the auto insurance market of China, tight rate and term 
controls caused incomplete competition between insurance firms. Under the umbrella 
of extra profits derived from rate regulation, many insurers spared no expenses to 
compete for market share. As a result, the market was flooded with various irregular 
activities, e. g. illegitimately refusing to fulfil contractual obligations, unsustainable 
low price wars between insurance firms. 
Secondly, it tarnishes insurance firms' reputations and reduces their credibility. 
Over the past years, China's mass media repeatedly reported complaints about 
insurance. " Many of the reported cases revealed that insurers refused to fulfil their 
contractual obligations in order to keep low compensation ratios. This directly 
damaged their images. A survey organiscd by the DRC in 2002 showed that about 
40% of the respondents in China! s fifty main cities expressed their dissatisfaction with, 
or lack of trust in, domestic insurance companies, based on their own experience or 
opinions. " Cases also disclosed the fact that some insurers lacked creditability because 
of paying unreasonably high commissions, sometimes above 50% of first year 
received premiums in life insurance. 
The 2001 Administrative Rules on Insurance Appraisal Institutions CIRC. 
For example, in 2000, insurance disputes listed among the top ten complaints recorded by the China 
Consumers Association. See Renmin Ribao (People's Daily) March 16,200 1. 
" Note 48, Chapter I 
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Thirdly, blind competition certainly increases costs and erodes insurers' profits and 
solvency, consequently increasing risks in the insurance industry. That is mainly 
because most kinds of blind competition involved in low price wars which increased 
companies' cost (see Chapter 6). Additionally, that consumers lost their trust in 
insurance industry due to unhealthy competition makes them resort to insurance less 
than when they have a strong confidence. 
Fourthly, it restrains the industry's incentive for innovation. Unhealthy competition 
on the one hand drew insurers' attentions and absorbed their main resources from 
carrying out healthy competition; on the other hand, activities such as infringing upon 
copyrights of insurance products dampened owner insurers' enthusiasm of innovation. 
In addition, insurers' decreased efficiency curbed their ability to promote innovations 
in products and services. 
Fifthly, it increases regulatory costs. Since insurers do not have incentives to 
comply with laws and regulations, regulatory authorities at all levels have to take 
much time, energy and resources in supervising every market action of insurers. n 
summary, all above harmful effects act negatively on the long-term development of 
the industry. 
2.4.4 Roots ofincomplete and unhealthy competition 
The incomplete and unhealthy competition in Chinaýs insurance may be attributed to 
many factors, among which, four stand out: regulatory restrictions on complete 
competition, the homogeneity of products and services, the quality of insurance 
companies' management, and underdeveloped supervision on destructive competition. 
Firstly, it is rooted in the market itself that is dominated by oligopoly and lacks 
complete competition. The fundamental characteristics of this market are a lack of 
sufficient competitors, a lack of market access and exit mechanisms, and many 
controls on price, products and investment. On the one hand, tight government control 
of market access works as an invisible umbrella that protects suppliers (most of them 
are state-owned insurers or insurers with state-owned companies as majority 
shareholders) from a complete and effective competition. On the other hand, since the 
exit mechanism is not well established, insurance companies naturally do not feel the 
pressure of free market competition. This has led to the proliferation of high-risk 
insurance policies. Tight control of both price and term tempts twisted and covert 
93 
price competition between the insurers seeking for a larger market share. Investment 
control drives insurers to exploit extra profits through keeping compensation ratios 
lower. The basic massage from all these is that the regulator needs to take solid and 
step-by-step approaches to liberalisation in order to cultivate an competitive and 
efficient market. 
Secondly, the deficiency of providing competitive products and services attracts 
insurers to launch irregular price competition. By their very nature, insurance products 
are largely homogeneous. In addition, most domestic insurers in China are short of 
skilled staff (for example, there were only 80 actuaries in China by 2000), and 
therefore, they have limited capacity for designing new types of products to satisfy the 
preferences of customers. This results in a proliferation of offering similar products 
and services by insurers. Before 1998, products provided by the former PICC had 
dominated the market for more than a decade. Other insurers provided similar 
products which copied the premium rates, coverage, and terms, of the former PICC's 
products. In recent years, "product copy" prevailed in the market, although innovative 
products emerged periodically. According to the statistics, in 2000, the similarities 
between products and services were as much as 90% amongst more than 2000 
products in the market. " Those insurers that are unable to design successful new 
products are easily attracted to irregular price competition. 
Thirdly, due to underdeveloped risk management (see chapter 3), some insurers 
tend to seek immediate successes and short-term profits. They usually pursue a single- 
minded strategy that accentuates a high percent of premium growth and neglects 
excessive growth risks. 
Finally but not least, the CIRC needs to build its capacity to more effectively 
crackdown unhealthy or destructive competition. Compared with the other two 
financial regulators, viz. PBOC and CSRC, the CIRC has shorter history, not having 
established its nation-wide network until 2001. It is still building its capacity including 
a reliable and stable source of funding and skilled personnel to safeguard its 
effectiveness. Furthermore, as most of the CIRC staff are from the former PICC, 
regulatory neutrality is a crucial issue facing the CIRC. Eventually, the guarantors of 
the stability of the insurance sector must be sound prudential regulation and 
supervision rather than costly restraints on competition. 
" See CIRC China Insurance, 41manac 2001 
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2.5 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter, we provided a review of insurance libcralisation which basically has 
two conceptual meanings. By observing practices in the world, there is no general 
prescription as to how to initiate a process of insurance liberalisation. Insurance 
liberalisation is perhaps always carried out in a gradualist manner with recognition of 
national self-interest, and adapted to their particular conditions, perceptions, economic 
needs, and changes thereof. Furthermore, to have its desired impact on the developing 
countries, it must be accompanied by adequate prudential regulation and supervision. 
China adopted a gradualist approach to liberalisation of insurance market access in 
the last decade, and is carrying out policies combined opening up and protectionism. 
These are seemingly driven by objectives of opening up, infant industry argument, 
concerns about both financial stability and the important position of the insurance 
industry in the economy, and the inadequacies of domestic regulation. On the other 
hand, the Chinese insurance market suffers from incomplete and unhealthy 
competition which not only coexists with the infancy of the market but also hinders 
the development of the market. The problems are partly blamed to both unnecessary 
and underdeveloped regulation. To develop a modem and viable insurance sector, 
China has to liberalisc its insurance market and build a suitable legal infrastructure 
consistent with emerging international regulatory standards and WTO requirements. 
Meanwhile, given a primary development stage of the insurance industry, China needs 
to deal with the liberalisation in a cautious manner and make appropriate regulatory 
arrangements to properly balance local protection, liberalisation, competition and 
regulation. 
In this concluding section, it is worth examining some of the major regulatory 
issues related to the arrangements in the transition to market-bascd insurance 
regulation, including honouring WTO accession commitments, improving regulatory 
transparency, gradually liberalising the market to nurture competition, strengthening 
regulation, and actively participating in WTO negotiations. 
a. Honouring WTO accession commitments 
It is obvious that China will make full use of the exemptions in GATS and 
constraints beyond the scope of China's WTO agreement to nurture the country's 
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fledgling insurance industry and protect its state interests. " There had been some 
disagreements in China over the liberalisation of the insurance sector during the 
multilateral negotiations between China and WTO members on China's WTO 
accession. Debates both inside and outside China still rage over whether China will 
honour its commitments after WTO entry, as domestic protectionists exert their 
pressures. Although Chinaýs insurance sector is undergoing ambitious liberalisation as 
a result of internal reforms and WTO consistency, the pace and scope of liberalisation. 
will depend on both cautious regulation and commercial realities. 
As a member of the WTO, China has to keep its commitments and fulfil its 
obligations. Further opening up will challenge the various limitations on foreign firms, 
thus sparking the conflict with local protective policies. Therefore, China must correct 
any over-protective measures. Backsliding is unwise and could be costly. According to 
GATS, failure to honour a commitment could lead a country to being challenged by 
another WTO member. It will then be up to the WTO dispute settlement proceeding, 
and ultimately, face sanctions taken by the WTO. It may also invoke trading partners' 
retaliatory actions and lose the trust of other members. In addition, long term highly 
protective strategies for domestic insurers will discourage them from increasing 
efficiency, lowering costs, and promoting innovation, and lead them to losing 
competitive edge. Further, as China is aiming at building Shanghai a financial ccntre 
in Asia, China can promote and consolidate its insurance regulatory reform efforts in 
the process of WTO compliance. In the long-term, the adoption of best regulatory 
practices or adhesion to international standards may help China overcome regulatory 
hurdles in foreign markets. 
b. Improving regulatory transparency 
One important commitment that China made is regulatory transparency, a notable 
issue on the potential changes in China's insurance regulation. Transparency, set forth 
in the WTO and GATS as one of the basic criteria governing the trading system, 
requires Members to publish both legislative and subordinate measures before they are 
cnforccd. In addition, GATS requircs an annual notification of ncw or changcd 
" For example, foreign life insurers keen on entering China's health insurance market had been 
excluded from the national health insurance scheme unveiled in 2000. Their opportunities over the 
next five years will be limited largely to individual life insurance policies and extra benefits or special 
features that are added to a basic policy to meet a client's specific needs. See "China: no room to 
grow? " Business China The Economist Unit Ltd June 19,2000. 
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measures. For administrative decisions, WTO agreements require uniform, impartial 
and reasonable administration, as well as a review mechanism and an opportunity to 
appeal. 
The WTO's transparency requirements focus on "publication and administration" 
which seem narrow in scope. " In comparison, in the view of some academics, " 
governmental proposals, " and international organisations' documents, transparency 
apparently exceeds the WTO's requirements. The International Monetary Funds 
(IMF)'s Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial 
Policies'2 (the IMF's Code) provides governments with useful guidelines. As defined 
by the IMF, transparency in monetary and financial policies "refers to an environment 
in which the objectives of policy, its legal, institutional, and economic framework, 
policy decisions and their rationale, data and information related to monetary and 
financial policies, and the terms of agencies' accountability, are provided to the public 
in a comprehensible, accessible, and timely manner. "" 
Transparency has become a main target of regulatory reforms that many 
governments are undertaking in pursuit of effective and efficient regulations. The main 
philosophy of transparency is that it promotes understanding of decisions and actions 
when they are made accessible and visible, as the reasoning behind the decisions 
" In addition, the WTO is criticised for a lack of transparency in its negotiations and decision-making. 
For example, the critics claim that its major decisions are formulated in informal, small group meetings 
which are dominated by the U. S. and EU whose negotiating proposals are not publicly available. See 
GA TS campaign update May 2002, World Development Movement. 
" For example, in the view of Charles R. Irish (2001), transparency also includes concern for the 
quantity and quality of information about business and financial activities. "Transparency, the WTO, 
and China: a special presentation at the China Economic Forum" University of Wisconsin Madison, 
Wisconsin, USA. (November 2001). 
" For example, "Principles of good regulation" Better Regulation Task Force, The Cabinet QJJ1ce 
Publications & Publicity Team. UK October 2000 asserts that to be a transparent regulation, the 
following criteria should be met. "The case for a regulation should be clearly made and the purpose 
clearly communicated; proper consultation should take place before creating and implementing a 
regulation; penalties for non-compliance should be clearly spelt out; regulations should be simple and 
clear, and come with guidance in plain English; and those being regulated should be made aware of 
their obligations and given support and time to comply by the enforcing authorities with examples of 
methods of compliance. " 
Available on the IMF web site at <http: //www. imf. org/extemaVnp/Mae/ýfVcode/index. htm> 
Supporting Document to Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial 
Policies Part 1, Appendix III "Glossary of Key Terms" IMF 2000. 
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becomes known. In turn, it makes decision-makers and executives accountable for 
their actions and decisions. As part of the development of internationalisation in 
insurance regulation, insurance regulators are increasingly urged to adopt "a 
transparent regulatory and supervisory process", " with transparent regulatory 
structures. On regulatory transparency, China has made a series of commitments 
which also govern the insurance sector. " Many observers view the WTO accession as 
a further impetus to increasing regulatory transparency in China. 96 
It is crucial that China's insurance regulation catches up with the global trend 
towards increasing transparency. However, achieving this is perhaps unlikely in the 
short term in the light of the difficulties facing China's legal reforms. The current 
regulatory system of China mainly depends on administrative actions. Both the 
transparency and fairness of administrative decision-making, and judiciary 
independence (in matters such as judicial procedures, adjudication and enforcement of 
decisions on cases by local courts or arbitrators) have long been criticised. Regarding 
the insurance regime, regulations permit considerable bureaucratic discretion. The 
regulator used to take a domestic-supplier-biased stand partly due to the regulatory 
"Principle one", The Core Principles MIS (1999) 
China's transparency commitments mainly appear in Paragraph 2, Protocol and Working Party 
Report. Firstly, before implementation and enforcement, laws, regulations and other measures 
pertaining to or affecting insurance should be published and readily available to other WTO Members, 
individuals and enterprises, upon request. In emergent situations, laws, regulations and other measures 
shall be made available at the latest when they are implemented or enforced (Protocol paragraph 
2. C. I. ). Secondly, China agreed to implement a variety of "transparency and prior notification and 
comment" measures at the national and sub-national level regarding insurance-related laws, regulations, 
and measures (Protocol paragraph 2. C. 2. ). Thirdly, China agreed to apply and administer "in a uniform, 
impartial and reasonable manner" all its insurance-related laws, regulations and other measures applied 
or administered by both the central government and the governments at the sub-national levels 
(Protocol paragraph 2. A. a. ). Fourthly, China agreed to establish or designate and maintain tribunals, 
contact points and procedures for the prompt review of administrative actions related to trade laws, 
regulations, and measures (Protocol paragraph 2.1). 1. ). China also agreed to ensure such judicial review 
should be "impartial and independent" of any agency entrusted with administrative enforcement. 
Finally, China will publish in the official journal, by appropriate classification and by service where 
relevant, a list of all organisations that are responsible for authorising, approving or regulating services 
activities whether through grant of license or other system of approval, including organisations to 
whom the national authorities delegate such authority (Working Party Report paragraph 332. ). 
" See Biddulph, Sarah (200 1). "Through a glass darkly: China, transparency and the WTO'l Australian 
Journal ofAsian Law, 3(l). 
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personnel who are mainly from the former PICC and other financial institutions. 
Administrative orders, which are not fully publicised, usually substituted for 
regulatory and supervisory rules. " Public consultation on new regulations is not often 
appropriate. For instance, either short comment periods or limited and unequal 
commentators often hinder the consultation. Procedures for applying regulations are 
not always straightforward and non-discriminatory. Overlapping responsibilities exist 
among regulatory authorities. 
Having committed to abide by the WTO principle of transparency with accession, 
the regulator needs a shift from a local-supplier-biased stand to a more neutral stand. 
This requires China to further clarify the CIRC's roles, responsibilities, objectives and 
procedures of formulating and implementing regulation and supervision, as well as 
public availability of information on CIRC's regulatory and supervisory activities. It is 
also essential to systemise both the assurance of the integrity by the CIRC and its 
accountability. 
c. Gradually liberalising the market to nurture competition 
In China today, the question about insurance liberalisation is rather how best to 
design liberalisation strategies for succeeding under new environment than whether or 
not to liberalise. This involves the contents, sequence and speed of liberalisation. 
In the past years, the CIRC encouraged domestic insurers to open more branches, 
granted a number of licenses to domestic companies and intermediaries, and allowed 
certain domestic insurers to operate outside their designated geographical areas. " It 
also encouraged state-owned insurers to go through diversifying their ownership by 
accepting foreign shareholders or becoming listed firms. All these measures contribute 
to fostering competition, although some seem to encourage the preoccupation of 
domestic firms. On the other hand, some approaches to liberalisation seem rather 
radical and unbalanced. For example, in an effort to address shortfalls of rate 
regulation in auto insurance sector, the CIRC swiftly replaced statutory rates withfile- 
and-use rates. However, the market is still far from maturity and lacks complete 
competition. Both rate regulation and related systems, e. g. prudential regulation and 
market performance regulation, are not well constructed. Under such conditions, the 
" For example, the CIRC only posted very limited regulatory texts on its website. 
" For example, "China eases restriction on project insurance" Dow Jones International News March 3, 
2000. 
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initiation of the rate deregulation in the auto insurance market inevitably led to 
irrational price wars and collusion between insurers (see Chapter 6). On the contrary, 
the efforts of liberalising investment are too cautious to meet the urgent needs for 
broadening investment channels (see Chapter 5). 
Generally, insurance liberalisation needs to take into account the state of the market 
development, conditions of insurance institutions, supervisory capabilities, the 
financial system as a whole, and the outlook prevailing in the country. Given the 
fledgling stage of Chinaýs insurance industry, the infrastructures of liberalised markets 
taken for granted in developed countries can not necessarily be expected ready 
immediately in China. Therefore, China should carry out liberalisation gradually to 
ensure a smooth transition to a liberalised environment. In the short term, China needs 
to further the market access liberalisation and the ownership reform, while urging 
insurers to strengthen corporate governance and improve internal risk control. 
Investment channels need to be greatly broadened, and meanwhile, it is desirable for 
China to adopt a rather strict and detailed investment regulation to protect 
policyholders against the investment risks facing insurers. To succeed the current rate 
deregulation, required conditions need to be created. 
d.. Strengthening regulation andprudentialcarve-out 
The strengthening of the regulation and supervision in parallel with a gradual 
liberalisation is essential for improving the efficiency of China's insurance market. 
Liberalisation without attendant regulations and supervisory measures merely fosters a 
chaotic market. " After the WTO accession, growing domestic and international 
pressures require the regulatory environment to be further developed towards internal 
consistency, completeness, transparency, and fairness. Especially, liberalisation of 
market access, rate setting and investment implies increased prudential regulation 
requirements. This also raises the issue of how properly to deal with the interrelation 
between liberalisation and prudential regulation, or in other words, how sensibly to 
use the principle ofprudential carve-out. 
Prudential carve-out is one of the most sensitive issues under the GATS. The 
principle allows a member to take prudential measures "for protection of investors, 
depositors, policyholders or persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a financial 
" "Guidance on insurance regulation and supervision for emerging market economies" IAIS, 1997. 
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service supplier, or to ensure the integrity of the financial system"" regardless of any 
other provision of the GATS. As a compromise of reaching the GATS, the prudential 
carve-out is broadly worded, and neither a definition nor an example of it is provided 
in the Annexes on Financial Services of GATS. 
Prudential carve-out is particularly important for China because of both the weaker 
risk management within local insurers and its lower quality of prudential regulation 
than those in developed countries. However, China should avoid abuse of the 
principle, e. g., using it to screen protective measures. Abusive applications are subject 
to WTO dispute settlement procedures and thus potentially to a decision by a dispute 
settlement panel of WTO. In addition, abusive behaviours can stain China's 
determination to honour WTO commitments and to build a modem insurance systern. 
Therefore, actively adapting China's domestic regulatory and supervisory systems to 
both international standards and best practice in the world is a recommendable 
strategy. 
e. Actively participating in the TUO negotiations 
The structure adopted by GATS and the principle of more participation of 
developing countries mean that future GATS negotiations would surely be influenced 
by China's accession. In the past, China had always insisted on the balance of rights 
and obligations on the issue of acceding to the WTO. A new round of financial 
services negotiations initiated in 2000, which probably leads to further insurance 
market liberalisation. As a WTO member, China is taking part in the negotiations, and 
has raised its proposals that stress the interest of the developing countries. "' As a 
powerful voice in the international community, China could join the power of 
developing countries to address their desires more effectively in the future. 
Art. XXIX, the GATS Annexes. 
The proposals were put forward at the third ministerial meeting of the VY70 in December 2,1999. 
See "China raises five proposals for next round trade talks" <http: //www. chinaonline. com> December 
2,1999. 
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Chapter 3 
Effective and efflcient insurance regulation and 
industry perspectives 
3.1. Introduction 
Effective and efficient insurance regulation can hardly be realised without the co- 
ordination of both insurers and insurance industries with regulatory authorities. The 
financial crisis that hit the East Asian economies in 1997 highlighted the significance 
of good corporate governance and best business practices to many countries in the 
world. The significance was further evinced by the tragedy of corporate governance in 
the US in the recent years. ' There is a growing recognition around the world that 
insurers' good corporate governance and transparency and active self-regulation within 
insurance industries are crucial to effective and efficient regulation and supervision. 
This chapter probes how China! s insurance regulation and supervision can be 
improved by the implementation of greater corporate governance, information 
disclosure by insurers and self-regulation by the insurance industry. It draws on 
concepts from some developed countries and international practices where have seen a 
major shift in this direction. The structure of the rest of the chapter is as follows. 
Section 3.2 deals with corporate governance of state-owned insurers in China. It begins 
with a review of the conceptual framework and importance of corporate governance, 
followed by descriptive analyses of major shortcomings of the insurers' corporate 
governance. It then examines two current reforms to transform China's outdated and 
state-owned insurers into credible firms, shareholding restructuring with private and 
foreign participation, and listing. Finally, it presents some recommendations on the 
improvement of corporate governance. Section 3.3 deals with how to further improve 
information disclosure by insurers, and section 3.4 describes the current situation of 
self-regulation in the Chinese insurance industry and discusses measures to enhance the 
' Starting from 2001, a series of well-known US companies exposed serious problems, resulting in crises 
in the US securities markets. For example, Enron which went into insolvency involved in manipulating 
energy market and creating complex outside partnerships that kept billions in losses of balance sheet. 
While Andersen engaged in lax oversight of client books and criminally shredding of legal documents, 
Worldcom inappropriately accounted for US$ billion in expenses and inflated profits. See "flow corrupt 
is it? " Business Week May 13,2002 and "The wickedness of Wall St" The Economist June 8,2002. 
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importance of industry associations' roles in the whole framework of insurance 
regulation. 
3.2. Corporate governance of state-owned insurers and effective and efficient 
insurance regulation 
ZI Corporate governance: the conceptualframework 
Corporate governance is of universal concern nowadays and has caused many 
debates. ' As proposed in the OECD "Principles of Corporate Governance", corporate 
governance refers to the relationship between the management, board of directors, and 
shareholders as well as other interested parties? The IAIS in its "Insurance Core 
Principles Methodology" provides insurance regulators with essential criteria for 
assessing the corporate governance of insurance companies, together with their 
regulatory framework. ' Corporate governance mechanisms may be broadly classified as 
internal and external mechanisms. The former refers to relationships between directors, 
supervisors, managers and sometimes employees; the latter, the main mechanism, 
chiefly refers to relationships between the firm and shareholders, creditors and 
government. For a commercial insurance company, corporate governance relates to the 
mechanism by which the owner as well as creditors and the government exert control 
over the company. It is the combination of any correlation of functions between various 
subjects such as decision-makers, insider shareholding, board membership and 
characteristics such as size of the board, the number of external independent directors, 
audit committees, audit quality, chief executive officer (CEO) tenure, and remuneration 
2 Corporate governance is a topic of debates; there are many examples of corporate governance codes, 
guidelines and commentaries. Some of the known examples are: Cadbury Report in the UK, Dey Report 
in Canada, General Motors Board ofDirectors Guidelines in the US, Australian Stock Exchange Listing 
Rules, Code of Best Practice (Hong Kong Stock Exchange), and Practice for Corporate Governance 
(Korea), etc. 
3 According to 1999 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, "Corporate governance is the system 
by which a corporation is directed and controlled. The corporate governance structure specifies the 
distribution of rights and responsibilities among different participants in the company, such as, the 
board, management, shareholders and other stakeholders, and spells out the rules and procedures for 
making decisions on corporate affairs. By doing this, it also provides the structure through which the 
company objectives are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance. " 
4 See INS Core Principles Methodology (2000) p20-22. 
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committees. It also involves in the separation of these functions, which requires to 
clearly define accountability and responsibilities of the subjects, and put checks and 
balances on the firm from both outside and inside. 
3.2.2 ny does corporate governance matter in insurance regulation? 
Corporate governance is being increasingly recognised world-wide as a key to 
establish a healthy corporation capable of exercising effective internal control and risk 
management and coping with radical competition and rapidly changing markets and 
technology. Likewise, good corporate governance of insurance firms is considered by 
insurance regulators as one of the preconditions for effective and efficient insurance 
regulation. ' There are several factors bringing corporate governance to the forefront of 
insurance regulators' concerns today. 
a. Increasingfocus on good corporate governance offirms 
Diversification is vital to the survival of corporations in today's business 
environment. Unlike corporations in the early 1900's, most of which were family- 
owned businesses with limited diversification and therefore vulnerable to competition, 
modem corporations require separation of ownership and management because of 
diversification and expansion. Diversification has brought professionals onto the 
management board, and required outside capital which has hastened the need for good 
corporate governance as outside investors demand openness and transparency in 
corporations' operations. More importantly, massive changes, especially in technology 
and modemisation, have spurred the need for outside capital and the use of 
professionals as management. The development of capital markets, which has provided 
a means for obtaining outside capital and created public minority shareholders, also 
increases the involvement of investors in the ownership of corporations. 
b. The characteristics of insurance companies 
Firstly, insurance inherently involves the taking of risks, and insurers are exposed to 
various risks. Risk management involving assessment, measurement and active 
management of risks must be the primary responsibility of an insurer. This highlights 
the importance of insurers' internal control and risk management. Experience suggests 
5 IAIS Core Principles Methodology (2000) p48 
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that good corporate governance could help improve the prudential management of 
insurers, and sometimes even constitute a precondition for effective internal control and 
risk management in insurers. Secondly, the nature of the insurance business gives rise 
to significant information asymmetry that underpins governance problems. Thirdly, as 
important institutional investors, insurers play an important role in the governance of 
other institutions. Insurers may act as holders of equity stakes with voting rights to 
influence the strategy of the institutions in which they have invested, and monitor their 
performance. 
c. Management risks in insurance companies 
We have seen from experiences in the past decades that many insurance companies 
failed due to the lack of sound risk control and adequate risk management practice. 6 
Some cases showed that the risk of collapse was heightened where poor corporate 
governance practices prevailed. ' Perhaps the majority of insurance failures have been 
due to lapses in corporate governance. ' Moreover, evidences suggest that excellent 
corporate governance practices enhance the individual insurers' perfon-nance and 
improve their ability to access capital. This is generally because the framework 
established focuses the board and management on the insurers' objectives and keeps 
them accountable for their actions. 
Deregulation 
' David F. Babbel and Anthony M. Santomero examined ostensible causes of insolvent insurers in the 
US in the decade leading up to the mid 90's, and suggested that inadequate risk management practices is 
the underlying factor in all of these insolvencies, despite the numerous and disparate causes. see "Risk 
management by insurers: an analysis of the process" Financial Institutions Centre, Wharton 96-16 
7 For example, in the UK, the management and sales forces, including Equitable Life, systematically 
mis-sold personal pensions (many of them with with-profits products) for many years, creating niisery 
for many savers, and the regulatory response was clearly too slow. The authority estimated through the 
pensions review that around I Yz million investors would, in due course, receive somewhere around f 12 
billion in compensation for the mis-selling. The case raises serious concerns over the breadth of 
discretion retained by insurers, the lack of transparency over the exercise of that discretion and the 
potential for conflicts of interest. John Tiner, FSA managing director, said: "Governance is at the heart 
of many of the concerns about consumer detriment in with-profits products, as we have seen in the case 
of Equitable Life. " See Issues paper 5: "Governance of with-profits funds and the future role of the 
appointed actuary" 
8 Catherine Prime "T'he actuary and insurance regulation" The 2' Global Conference of, 4cluaries Delhi, 
February, 2000. 
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A deregulated environment normally gives rise to greater potential for risks by the 
removal of constraints on management, and provides incentives for insurers to 
undertake new activities. This could have given insurers an incentive to increase their 
risk-taking. On the other hand, deregulation does not simultaneously provide for 
enhanced corporate governance mechanisms in the newly deregulated environment. 
Therefore, to avoid the replacement of old regulation with new regulation, both 
regulators and other stakeholders of insurers have to rely on reliable corporate 
governance, as they may have little experience of how to assess performance in the new 
environment. This raises higher requirements for insurers to adopt good practice of 
coxporate govemance. 
c. Transition of insurance regulation mode 
During the 1990s, prudential regulation for insurance industries appeared gradually 
to gain universal acceptance. Prudential regulation, however, is hardly adequate or even 
effective, without importance accorded to good corporate governance and the 
monitoring of the governance. Appropriate regulation should provide a relaxed and 
level playing field for an insurance industry and focus on ensuring that insurers are able 
to demonstrate that they run a strong corporate governance regime. Under this regime, 
insurers manage operational risks well and conduct their affairs in such a way as to be 
prudent risk managers. 
Efficiency in governments and regulators, ensuring that individual insurers are 
adopting excellent corporate governance practice, has a number of attractions. Many 
regulators came to realise that maintaining market confidence does not imply zero 
failure which could use up an excessive proportion of regulatory resources. They aim 
at ensuring an incidence of failure of regulated firms and market is as low as consistent 
with maintenance of competition and innovation in the market. 9 Corporate governance 
is therefore increasingly seen as a mechanism which supports the objectives of the 
regulators responsible for protecting the confidence in insurance market, encourages 
insurance innovation, and enhances overall industry performance. 
See "A New Regulator for the New Millennium" Financial Service Authority UK. January 2000. p5- 
11. 
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3.3.3 Corporate governance in China's state-owned insurers 
By 2001, there were 25 state-owned insurance companies in China, with 5 solely 
state-owned companies and 20 shareholding state-owned companies in which majority 
ownership is in the hands of a few state investors (see Table 1.5). 
a. Reforms on state-owned insurers'restructuring 
In the last two decades, state-owned insurers were through continuous restructuring. 
During 1980-1993, China's economic reform focused on removing the impact of the 
traditional planned economy on enterprises, which was achieved by increasing the role 
of the market and granting enterprises more autonomy in doing business independently. 
As a state-owned monopolistic enterprise, the former PICC underwent a series of 
reforms such as delegation of enterprise authority, allowing to retain profits earned over 
the pre-set targets, substituting taxation for profit turning in, and performance 
contracting. All these increased both the insurer's decision-making autonomy and 
economic incentives. However, problems such as the ambiguity of property rights 
inherent in state ownership, politically appointed management and soft budget 
constraints still remained. 
Since 1993, the Chinese government has focused its efforts on introducing a modem 
enterprise system" into state-owned enterprises (SOEs) by implementing the 1994 
Company Law. Under the Law, a company must adopt a corporate governance 
structure, comprising a shareholders' general meeting, a board of directors and a board 
of supervisors, and the manager. A company's investors constitute the shareholders' 
general meeting, the power organ of the company, which appoints the board of 
directors as the primary source of direction of management and the board of 
supervisors for internal corporate monitoring of directors and senior officers. The board 
of directors appoints the manager who is responsible for day-to-day operation. " 
" Firstly adopted by the Decisions on Some issues in Establishing the Socialist Market Economic 
System, Tbird Plenum of the Fourteenth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCCP), November 
1993, a modem enterprise system was defined as one characterised by clearly clarified property rights, 
designated authorities and responsibilities, separated functions between government and enterprise, and 
scientific management. The concept was reaffirmed by Some Important Decisions on the Reform and 
Development ofState Owned Enterprises, Fourth Plenum of the Fifteenth CCCP, September 1999. 
11 Art. 102,112,126, and 119 of the 1994 CompanyLaw. 
108 
The modem enterprise system reform spread into the insurance industry as well, with 
newly established insurers overwhelmingly adopting the shareholding structure, which 
remain under majority state ownership and control. " The solely state-owned insurers 
including the former PICC, meanwhile, went through a corporatisation process with 
aims to further separate government administration from business management and 
plant sound corporate management within the insurers. " 
Required by the CIRC, every insurer, according to the Principles Guiding the 
Construction of Insurance Companies'Internal Control System issued by the CIRC in 
1999, worked out or completed its internal control system fitting for its own features. 
This reform brought some changes to once three no states: no specific rule of internal 
control for insurers to comply with, no active compliance with existing laws and 
regulations by insurers, and no serious redress for rule-breaking conducts. "' 
b. Major shortcomings ofstate-owned insurers I corporate governance 
Despite fairly stringent legal requirements for building a modem enterprise system, 
major shortcomings in corporate governance in the state-owned insurers can be 
identified in practice. Firstly, both solely state-owned insurers and state-owned 
shareholding insurers still see the pervasive government control and interference which 
mainly take the forms of ownership control and management appointment together with 
party control. These insurers are either directly owned by the government or owned by 
government controlled entities. Many senior managers, appointed by the government, 
look for promotions in the government hierarchy as their ultimate career goals. 
Secondly, while failing to solve ambiguities of property rights, the corporatisation 
creates an agency problem. " The government ownership results in the absence of real 
shareholder interest in the insurers. The exercise of the state ownership, vested in 
12 For example, the Shanghai Municipal government is the major owner of China Pacific Insurance. 
13 See Ma Yongwei "A review of the insurance market in China in 1998" China Insurance Almanac 
1999. 
14 See Ma Yongwei "A review of the Insurance Market in China in 1999" China Insurance Almanac 
2000. 
15 According to principal-agent theory, conflicts can occur when a "principal" has difficulty in 
monitoring and controlling the behaviour of his/her "agent" and the agent's interests differ from those of 
the principal. 
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departments of the central government or local governments (Tiaokuai), " often appears 
to be ineffectual and in a dysfunctional manner due to increasing management 
autonomy and ambiguous residual risk bearing. 
Thirdly, the insurers maintain weak economic incentives due to the lack of the power 
to compensate their staff independently, which exacerbates the agency problem. The 
determinants of senior officers' money incomes are usually connected with their 
relative administrative positions, and the insurers' geographic location and ownership 
characteristics. 
Fourthly, the phenomenon of "insider control" exists in many insurers, preventing 
them from making significant improvement on internal control and risk management. 
The chairman of the board of directors and CEO are usually appointed by the 
controlling shareholder (one of the state agents), notified to other shareholders. Other 
board members are appointed by other major shareholders in proportion to their 
shareholding, but discussed beforehand with the controlling shareholder. The 
shareholders' general meeting and the board of directors normally represent the same 
side when an insurer is controlled by one or two major shareholders, and, even worse, 
the two bodies in some cases are mainly composed of the same people. CEO is usually 
free from the supervision by the board of directors. The board of supervisors is 
generally weaker than the board of directors. Although the board of supervisors has the 
power to supervise actions of directors and officers, it has no power to stop or correct 
such actions directly. Instead, it can only report to the shareholders' general meeting. 
In particular, the interests of stakeholders are not adequately protected because of the 
lack of effective mechanisms that could provide checks and balances such as 
independent supervisors and independent subcommittees for regulatory compliance, 
auditing, remuneration and nomination. 
Fifthly, the standards of transparency and disclosure are low, making the monitoring 
and control by outsiders and minority shareholders difficult (See section 3.3). 
" Previously, the management appointment power in the branches of the former PICC was shared 
between central and provincial governments. The provincial governanents were stripped of the power 
through corporatisation, thus reducing provincial governments' meddling in the decision-makings of the 
insurer. 
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Sixthly, incompetent and improper risk management has been a major problem facing 
most Chinese insurers. In the last decade, it was not rare for most insurers to stop at 
nothing in order to increase their premium income and promote their market share. 
They usually relied on extensive expansion through illegal competition, e. g. cutting- 
price wars, recruiting unqualified personnel, sales of insurance policies with high 
interest 'kickbacks', instead of internal risk management and good co-ordinated 
development with their fast growth. Low level of risk management is the part of 
sources that led to weak profitability and low efficiency seen in the Chinese insurance 
industry, and remains the most important issue on prudential regulation. 
Seventhly, the insurers' corporate governance was further weakened by inadequate 
external disciplines. For example, under the CIRC's strict licensing system in the past, 
insurers with primarily private investment were rarely approved" while insurers with 
foreign investment were under tight controls. This resulted in insufficient competition 
from foreign and private insurers, eroding the stimulus to state-owned insurers' 
improvement on corporate governance. 
Although state-owned insurers have been through continuous change, we still see in 
most of these insurers well-known weaknesses that are symptomatic of defective 
corporate governance. These weaknesses are evidenced mainly by the high operation 
costs, low profitability, low capital adequacy ratios, some malpractice at all different 
managerial levels due to lax internal risk control, large amount of negative interest 
driven losses and non-performance loans. The regulator thus has taken a number of 
initiatives to deal with these problems. Currently, there are two broad approaches to 
state-owned insurers' restructuring: shareholding reform with private or foreign 
'7 China Minsheng Insurance Co., the first private insurance insurers, led by the All China Federation of 
Industry and Commerce (ACFIC), established in 2002. The company is primarily funded by private 
companies which make up 90 percent of its 21 shareholders. Zhongguo Xngji Shibao (China Economic 
Times), April 22,2002. 
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participation, " and listing. " Both focuses on ownership restructuring or divestiture, 
aiming at improving the insurers' corporate governance by diversifying shareholders, 
introducing advanced technology and management, and increasing capital bases. 
c. Advantages and shortcomings of current initiatives 
Ownership restructuring is particularly crucial in the case of China where state- 
owned insurers are significantly less capitalised than required by their rapid growth, as 
listing enables the public financing while shareholding attracts extra capital from 
investors. The potential gains from public listing are large as a lot of the costly 
monitoring arrangements to ensure good corporate governance can be "delegated" to 
securities markets. The listing imposes a set of standardised disclosures that help 
mitigate information asymmetries, hence facilitating monitoring. It links managerial 
performance with incentives (e. g. via stock options) thus creating better management 
motivations. Empowering employees through ownership helps align their interests with 
management and shareholders. For the shareholding reform, introducing apolitical 
shareholders (either foreign or private) with board representation that seeks to 
maximise firm values could possibly improve corporate governance. 
Without addressing the imbedded problems of the state majority and government 
intervention, ownership restructuring alone could be just a means of procuring capital 
and not sufficient to create efficient insurers. According to the existing reforms, the 
State retains its majority, whatever restructuring modes are. Regarding the listing 
reform, broadly two modes are initiated: partly listing and fully listing. For the former, 
as the cases of PICC and China Life show, a state-owned insurer sets up a new stock 
company limited by transferring a portion of the insurer's assets and liabilities to this 
new company, and then lists it. As a result, the majority of this subsidiary is still held 
by the parent insurer (holding company), which could become the breeding ground 
" See note 59, Chapter 2. 
19 For example, the State Council was reported to had already approved reform plans for PICC and 
China Life who wanted to restructure by spinning off their key portions into international subsidiaries 
designed to sell stock. Both insurers expected that overseas flotation would fund their expansion and 
allow them to introduce better management. See "Insurance giants step up shareholding reforms" China 
Daily November 11,2002. 
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for opaque corporate governance. " For the latter, showed in the case of Dazhong 
Insurance Co Ltd, " a state-owned shareholding insurer is fully listed but the majority of 
the listing company is still in the hands of the state shareholders. Regarding the 
shareholding reform, the case of New China Life showed that the state-controlled 
holders retained their majority, as foreign shares are restricted to 25% of total shares. 
All these kinds of ownership structure appear to be ways of keeping the state majority 
and avoiding full privatisation. 
d. Recommendationsfor strengthening corporate governance 
Experiences show that ownership restructuring or divestiture alone is seldom enough 
for performance improvement, " although it is a necessary step in the process of state- 
owned insurers' restructuring. Developing corporate governance arrangements needs a 
comprehensive approach to dealing with the existing shortcomings and the 
requirements for improving insurers' conducts and strengthening public confidence in 
the insurance industry. The main objectives of the arrangements are to nurture the 
development of insurers who seek maximising value subject to meeting their financial 
and other legal and contractual obligations, to ensure the insurers' accountability, and to 
strengthen insurers' regulatory compliance and their co-operation with the regulator, 
thus reducing regulatory costs. To these ends, the CIRC needs to set out basic 
principles and guidelines of good corporate governance, and monitor the design and 
implementation in individual insurers. Drawing upon international and domestic 
practices appropriate to China! s economic and social conditions and insurance 
20 For example, as Zhang and Stoyan suggest that in China's securities markets, the relationship between 
listed subsidiaries and parent companies are fraught with governance problems (e. g. connected-party 
transactions, loans from listed companies to their state-owned parents, and fbiagling the financial figures 
by, for example, juggling profits between the two operations) and pose a major hurdle to better 
performance. See Zhang Chunlin and Stoyan Tenev (2002) "Corporate governance and enterprise 
reform in China: building the institutions of modem markets" The World Bank, April. 
" "Insurance companies run for leading listing" <http: //www. chinadaily. com. cn July 30,200 1. 
22 See Chapter 3, Bureaucrats in Business: The Economics and Politics of Government ownership A 
World Bank Policy Research Report, September 1995. 
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market realities can help do these. " Here, we select several issues acquiring the 
CIRC's special attention. (1) ownership and corporate independence; (2) 
responsibilities and accountability; (3) internal control and risk management; (4) 
disclosure and transparency (see section 3.3); and (5) the neutrality of the regulator. 
Ownership and corporate independence 
Diversification of state-owned insurers, capital structures is a central element of the 
current strategy towards the creation of a modem enterprise system. However, 
ownership reforms could be politically sensitive and controversial. Theoretically, 
whoever owns, private or the State, the structure of large or majority shareholder (with 
the state majority shareholder as a typical case) itself is not necessarily negative to 
governance. " The successes and failures seen in both private majority companies and 
state-owned companies evince this. Furthermore, it was not rare that individual cases of 
corporate privatisation failure occurred in both transitional countries" and developed 
countries. In addition, it can hardly be expected that in the near future, the Chinese 
authority will relinquish its majority ownership in the major national insurers, although 
it may gradually reduce its ownership. Therefore, the CIRC will have to develop a good 
corporate governance system within the current state-dominated domain. To these ends, 
2' For example, in January 2002, the CSRC and the State Economic and Trade commission (SETC) 
jointly released the Rulesfor Corporate Governance ofPublic Companies. The rules reflect international 
practices and address such issues as shareholder rights, procedural requirements of shareholders' 
meetings, related transactions, conduct of controlling shareholders and independence of the company 
from them, election, duties, and meetings of the directors and structure of the board, independent 
directors, specialised committees of the board, board of supervisors, assessment and incentives, hiring 
and compensation of senior management, interested parties and duties of disclosure. Significantly, the 
rules confirm that shareholders may bring civil lawsuits to protect their lawful interests. Another 
document available for reference is the Guidelinesfor Corporate Governance of Commercial Banks (for 
comments), released by the PBOC in 2002. 
2' It is widely agreed that the multitude of stakeholders either internal or external influences the 
operations of fii-rns, while it is highly debated which influence affects negatively or positively. 
Therefore, shareholder structure may not be the key issue of corporate governance which "is the process 
by which corporations are made responsive to the rights and wishes of stakeholders" Demb A. and 
Neubauer F. F. (1992) "The corporate board: confronting the paradoxes" Long Range Planning, Vol. 25, 
NO, p9-20. 
21 See John Nellis "The World Bank, privatisation and enterprise reform in transition econon-dcs: a 
retrospective analysis" OED Background paper, Centre for Global Developmentý Ile World Bank, 
Washington, D. C. 
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three major points are maintaining an adequate independence of state-owned insurers; 
balancing interests between powerful state majority and minority investors; and 
appropriate managerial incentives. 
Firstly, the insurers' fiduciary duties demand them to operate with an adequate 
degree of corporate independence from their related parties. Meanwhile, there must be 
an effectual and functional expression of the State's legitimate interest in the corporate 
governance of insurers in which it holds an ownership stake. To ensure the corporate 
independence, government interference in the insurers must be further reduced with a 
compromise between the principle of party control and the necessity of allowing the 
insurers to exercise their enterprise autonomy. The State interest is preferably pursued 
in a manner that is compatible with the development of competitive insurance market 
and not at the expense of other forms of insurers. It is necessary to address the risks 
associated with overlapping interests under complicated group structures (including 
state holding companies), related-party transactions, and the effects of multiple gearing 
on the financial strength of insurers. Secondly, focus should be on ensuring the 
equitable treatment of all shareholders including minority and foreign shareholders. All 
shareholders should have the opportunity to obtain effective redress for violation of 
their rights. "' Thirdly, state-owned insurers need to be empowered an incentive 
mechanism that ties the management's performance to its compensation. 
Responsibilities and accountability 
The government needs to strengthen regulations of the responsibilities and 
accountability of both the boards and the senior management, especially in the presence 
of state majority. In addition to the current corporate governance framework laid down 
by the 1994 Company Law, 2002 Insurance Law and other related laws and 
regulations, the important elements of the new regulations include the follows: 
A clear specification of the fiduciary duties of directors needs to mandate, together 
with corresponding penalties for any violation of these duties. This is a necessary 
provision to provide a sound basis for the enforcement of prudential requirements on 
insurers and to support shareholder activism. It also needs to mandate the monitoring of 
management by the board of directors, and place the responsibility for the prudential 
operation of each insurer on its directors and management with penalties and financial 
liabilities for false statements. 
21 See (ii) Equitable treatment of shareholders, the OECD "Principles of Corporate Governance" 
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The board of directors in each insurer establishes independent board committees to 
exercise governance over certain activities. " Typically, the committees may include 
audit, investment, prudential regulation compliance, reinsurance, nominations, and 
remuneration committees, whose members are appointed by the board. To strengthen 
the independence of the audit, nominations, and remuneration committees, the 
members of these committees should comprise independent non-executive directors. 
To ensure the equitable treatment of minority shareholders, it is necessary to 
mandate appointments of independent directors, maximum limits of directorships and 
penalties for non-compliance. In addition, allowing cumulative voting directors is 
worth being implemented. 
The 2002 Insurance Law (Art. 85) requires that "a solely state-owned insurer shall 
have a board of supervisors, which comprises representatives from the (CIRC) relevant 
experts, and employees of the insurer. Said board of supervisors shall exercise 
supervision with respect to solvency. " To strengthen the roles of the board of 
supervisors, this provision could extend to all insurers with state majority. It must 
ensure that the board of supervisors has the power to investigate independently the 
events in which directors and managers possibly harm the insurer's interests, and to 
decide the external auditor to audit the insurer's accounts. 
Insurers' fiduciary duties and public duty of trust owned to policyholders require 
adequate safeguards against unfair practices by the insurers. Therefore, good corporate 
governance should contain provisions for fair trade practices and conducts. 
Internal control and risk management 
Recent corporate governance reform initiatives in the UK and elsewhere have begun 
to turn corporate governance requirements into risk management controls that are 
deeply rooted within firms. Boards and senior executives have been made responsible 
for poor risk management. " Meanwhile, the regulation of financial firms, and 
especially of banks, has evolved to put new emphasis on formal risk management as a 
27 See Corporate Governance: essential and additional criteria. MIS "Insurance Core Principles 
Methodology". 
2' For example, "Internal control: guidance for directors on the Combined Code" (the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, April 1999) provided guidance of internal control for 
listed companies. 
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regulatory requirement, ensuring the standardisation of risk assessment and reporting 
and that all kinds of risks arc managed right across a firm. " 
The adequacy of internal control and risk management systems is an essential part of 
good corporate governance in insurers whose business is fundamentally about 
managing risks. This importance is rccogniscd by the CIRC. Its Principles Guiding the 
Construction of Insurance Companies' Internal Control System sets out principles 
which reinforce internal control by integrating multifaceted and multi-lcvcl control 
activities that form an inherent part of an insurer's daily operations. " lIowcvcr, it does 
not emphases risk management given that the link between internal control and risk 
management is not clearly drawn. Therefore, it is necessary to complement the 
Principles, ensuring that insurers establish risk management systems together with 
internal control that are able to detect and continually assess risks that could materially 
impair the insurer's ability to meet its corporate objectives and rcsponsibi Ii tics. The 
focal point of the replenishment is to mandate board of directors' rcsponsibi Ii tics of 
ensuring that principal risks arc idcntiricd and appropriately managed. It is also 
desirable to set up a functional unit within an insurer with the responsibility of 
implcmcnting risk management systems. Its tasks may include identification of risks, 
development of measurement systems of risks, establishment of policies and 
procedures to manage risks, and reporting of results of risk monitoring to both senior 
management and the board. These tasks can be carried out by integrating into the 
insurces solvency regulatory compliance. 
Ncutrality of the rcgulator 
While strengthening co-operation with the regulated, the CIRC needs to avoid cithcr 
a state-owned insurer favourcd or an industry-bias stand. Capture theory suggests that 
regulation may be afTectcd by the interests of the rcgulatcd industry, and, what is 
worse, be capturcd for the industry's private interests rathcr than for promoting public 
interests. " One of the CIRC's important policy objcctivcs is to promote market 
cfficicncy and innovation, thereby hastening the rapid growth of the insurance matkct. 
" This trend can be seen in the original Basic Capital Accord of 1988 and in the latest Basle 11 proposals 
that offer an explicit capital charge for bank operational risks such as rraud and system railurcs. 
" For example, proper segregation of duties in critical operational areas, application controls over 
management inrormation systems, an effective accounting function, and rectification of internal control 
deficiencies, etc. 
" See A. I. Ogus (1994) Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Meoq. Oxford University Press, p57. 
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This objective could be compromised, if regulation or deregulation is prone to certain 
insurers' capturing requirements, which could also impair consumer protection. 
3.3 Transparency and Information disclosure by Insurers 
Insurer's transparency and disclosure of information involve the timely disclosure of 
adequate information concerning an insurces financial and operating performance and 
its corporate governance practices. High standards of disclosure and transparency 
enable stakeholders to effectively monitor the insurces opcrating and financial 
performance and management, thus facilitating cffcctivc and cfflcicnt rcgulation and 
supervision. This section addresses the significance of transparency and information 
disclosure, the present status in the Chinese insurance industry and some measures 
necessary for improvement. 
3.3.1 Significanceoftransparcncy 
Transparency aims to protect stakeholders, cspccially consumcrs, by redressing the 
market imperfections that arise from asymmetrical and complex information as well as 
the market power of insurers. It facilitates a clear undcrstanding of insurers' true 
underlying financial condition and management, and cspccially assists consumers in 
making a well-informed purchase based on a proper assessment of both the quality and 
relative prices of diverse and often complex insurance products and services, and the 
risks that insurcrs cntail. 
a. Infonnation asymnietry 
The information asymmetry prevents the markct cconomy from functioning 
cffcctivcly, which means that public disclosure rules, as parts of regulation, arc 
essential. This problem is particularly acute in insurance markets where there arc two 
basic kinds of information asymmetry. One is that policyholdcrs (the "agents") have 
hidden personal infon-nation about their own lcvcI of risks, which insurcrs (the 
"principals") can not completely grasp. This kind of information asymmetry usually 
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results in adverse selection" and moral hazard. " Insurers generally solve this type of 
problem by devising sets of contracts in a manner that obliges the agents indirectly to 
impart their risk level, thereby capacitating the insurers to treat the different risk groups 
independently. " Another kind of information asymmetry relates to insurers who have 
their own infon-nation which is not directly discernible to the insured or other 
stakeholders. Unlike durable commodity transactions, e. g. buying a car, or a property, a 
risk assessment of an insurer is a critical element in the decision to purchase insurance 
products. This is because consumers essentially buy 'promises' and therefore need 
assurance that the promises can and will be fulfillcd in the future. Other important 
information influencing policyholders' purchasing decisions includes information about 
products, e. g. product pricing, coverage, exclusions, and information about 
compensation. Policyholders are at a disadvantage, as against insurcrs, regarding this 
information. The main goal of information disclosure by insurcrs is to solve this second 
type of problem. 
b. Complexity of information 
Insurance is a complex business, and so it is difficult for consumers, especially retail 
consumers, to make informed purchase decisions. " On the one hand, insurance 
products arc complex in terms of their risk/rctum prorile, premiums and benefit 
structures, early exit penalties and taxation consequences. Moreover, the structure, size 
31 4dverse selection occurs when high-risk individuals are more likely to purchase insurance than low- 
risk individuals. In a seminal article, co-authored with Michael Rothschild. Stiglitz observes that if 
insurance buyers know more about their own health than do insurers, then buyers who know their risks 
are greater than average will purchase more insurance when its price is based on average risk. Buyers 
who know their risks are less than average will purchase less insurance. 711is sequence of events is 
termed "adverse selection. " See Rotschild M. and J. Stiglitz (1976): "Equilibrium in Competitive 
Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information. " Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 90,629-649. 
" Moral hazzard occurs when having an insurance policy causes the insured to expend less effort to avoid 
losses and4 under certain circumstances, intentionally cause losses. For example, this could happen if a 
homeowner could insure a home for more than its market value and gain financially from its loss. 
" For example, Insurers seek to avoid adverse selection through accurate risk classification and pricing, 
and decline to sell insurance to risks for which they cannot determine or charge an adequate premium. 
" Retail consumers of insurance services often lack sufficient knowledge, experience or judgement to 
decide what information they need. Tlicy also require greater protection than do other users of insurance 
services. Conversely, financially sophisticated participants in wholesale markets can reasonably be 
expected to apprehend their own informational needs. 
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and complexity of an insurance industry make it impossible for most consumers to 
adequately assess the 'institutional risk' of insurers. On the other hand, retail 
policyholders do not always have the ability or resources to asscss insurers' financial 
stability and to understand the infonnation disclosed by insurcrs. 
c. Bargaining power and nialpracticc 
The superior bargaining power of insurers, who are naturally in a position to exploit 
(their) vulnerable customers, can prejudice the interests of consumers. For example, the 
unsophisticated consumers can be victims of misrcprcscntation or fraud. ThcY may also 
suffer from bad advice due to either inadequate staff training within insurers or to 
undeclared conflicts of interest on the part of persons selling a product or service. Even 
allcr a purchase, policyholders may still entail increased risks causcd by insurers' 
malpractice. It is difficult and costly for consumers to properly assess an insurcr's 
financial strength in relation to its prices and quality of service. Information asymmetry 
and impcrfect control mechanisms could cause some insurers to incur greater financial 
risks than would be optimal for policyholders and society. 
d. Corporate governance 
Disclosure and transparency are among the fundamcntal principles of good corporate 
governance. The OECD principles prescribe that "the corporate govcmancc framework 
should ensure that timely and accurate disclosure is made on all matcrial matters 
regarding the corporation, including the financial situation, pcrforinancc, owncrship, 
and governance of the company" . 
36 For a wcll-govcmcd insurcr, good transparcricy 
enables stakeholders effectively to monitor its financial situation and managcmcnt. 
e. Afarket-oriented regulatory mode 
Markct-oricntcd regulatory mode needs market disciplines which further require an 
appropriate balance of information between participants. 111-informed markets do not 
generally produce optimal outcomes. Conversely, appropriate information which 
allows stakeholders to assess insurers' activities and the risks inherent in those activities 
help improve market cfficicncy. The objectives of insurance regulation arc to ensure 
that markets arc sound, orderly and transparent; users arc treated fairly; the price 
formation process is reliable; and markets arc free from misleading, manipulative or 
" Section IV. Disclosure and Transparency, supra note 3. 
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abusive conduct. 37 To address potential market failure arising from inadequate 
disclosure of information, regulators must ensure that insurers make effective 
disclosure thereby facilitating informed choices, effective competition, and efficient 
and effective regulation. 
3.3.2 The present situation ofdisclosure practices 
Interests in the public disclosure of information by insurers and intermediaries, 
which have reached an unprecedented level in China, stem mainly from the emergence 
of innovative life insurance products and the enthusiasm of insurers for listing. First, in 
recent years, insurers launched some innovative products charactcrised by investment 
features, and, naturally, consumers were attracted by the returns available on the 
investments. However, by taking advantage of imperfect and non-standardised 
information disclosure, some insurers and intermediaries mislead their consumers. 38 
This triggered the CIRCs promulgation of a set of rules, including the Tentative Rules 
on Investment-linked Insurance Management, the Tentative Rules on Information 
Disclosure Management of New Life Insurance Products, and the Announcements of 
Certain Items ofNew Life Insurance Products. These Rules mandate the disclosure for 
"new life products" (profit-sharing policies, universal policies, and packaged 
investment policies including unit-linked life products and with-profits life products), 
aiming to provide meaningful information to consumers by effective meanS. 3' 
The second cause, that insurers are increasingly keen to be listed on the stock 
exchanges, means there must be more transparency in insurers' activities than that they 
remain non-public insurance companies. This lead to the CSRC's issuance of two 
specific regulations related to public disclosure by listed insurers, the 2001 Special 
Rules on Contents and Forms of Prospectus by Insurance Companies, and the 2001 
Special Rules on Notes of Financial Statements of Listed Insurance Companies. These 
Supra note 5. 
See "On establishing insurance information disclosure system" Zhongguo Baoxian (China Insurance) 
No. 6,2001. 
" According to these rules, life insurers are liable for ensuring the objectiveness, truthfulness and non- 
material omissions in their product disclosure. The main component of the disclosure is the required 
product prospectus containing mandatory contents (material information) provided to consumers. For 
investment-linked products, insurers also must monthly publish the unit value of a policyholdees 
investment account, in addition to providing the prospectus. 
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two stipulations set out financial information and business risks which listed insurers 
have to disclose. 
China recognises two systems of disclosure: voluntary disclosure and compulsory 
disclosure. Disclosure by insurers is primarily made through the voluntary efforts of 
insurers who disclose basic information through their sales representatives, agents, 
product pamphlets and websites. To promote accurate and voluntary disclosure, the 
Chinese insurance association (CIA) and some regional associations issued codes of 
conduct including disclosure standards. Compulsory disclosures, like those in the 
developed countries, are divided into public disclosure and non-public disclosure. 
Public disclosure involves listed insurers' obligations to disclose information (annual 
and quarterly reports, prospectuses and ad hoc information) required by the CSRC's 
two specific rules for listed insurers who may emerge soon. Non-public disclosure 
refers to non-listed insurers' disclosure obligations, which constitutes the main body of 
the current regulatory framework of disclosure. 
At present, China lacks an integrated and comprehensive legal framework of 
insurers' disclosure. "O In addition to the above-mentioned three regulations issued by 
the CIRC, the 2002 Insurance Law, which leaves the disclosure provisions in the old 
version untouched, addresses insurers' disclosure. It only sets out two kinds of 
obligations. One is the disclosure of terms and conditions of insurance policies. Art. 17 
of the Law prescribes that an insurer shall explain the details of the terms and 
conditions of the insurance contract to a proposer. However, there is no stipulation of 
legal penalties for non-compliance with the provision, leaving a loophole for disputes 
between contractual parties. " Art. 18 states that terms and conditions concerning 
exclusion of an insurer' liabilities shall not be effective until being clearly explained by 
the insurer. Another is the reporting duty of insurers (see "reporting system" in Chapter 
4), which requires insurers to file financial reports among others with the rcgulator. " 
However, there is no mandatory public disclosure for the reports. In the past, the CIRC 
published abstracts of the reports in its almanacs which are accessible to consumers 
' The sketchy disclosure system derived from the era of the planned economy. During the former PICC 
monopolistic times, disclosure as an administrative conduct was largely unregulated. 
"' This is a controversial issue. In the UK, the requirement of utmost good faith has long been said to 
apply to both parties to the insurance contract, which requires disclosure, but burdens on insurers seem 
not significant in practice. For detailed discussion, see John Birds "Chapter 6", AfOdern Insurance Law 
(5th ed. ) Sweet & Maxwell 2001. 
" Insurance intermediaries have a similar duty required by relevant regulations. 
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through a purchase. However, information disclosed through this way does not appear 
comprehensive, timely and affordable for individual consumers. In summary, so far, 
except those for "new life products", there are few explicit requirements concerning the 
contents and means of insurers' public disclosure of insurance products and prices as 
well as insurers' financial and operational conditions. 
The weak disclosure system promoted an opaque market difficult for stakeholders, 
monitoring, and resulted in practical drawbacks. For example, the large amounts of 
negative interest margin loss and non-performing loans incurred to insurers are an 
"open secret", leaving to observers' wild estimates due to the lack of transparency. 
Inaccurate and intentionally deceptive product and price information is a material factor 
of unhealthy competition (see Section 2.4, Chapter 2). " 
The reliability of insurers' information is frequently distorted due to accounting and 
auditing malpractice. For example, the role and effectiveness of internal audits and 
financial officers in practice are often circumscribed by the excessive powers of CEO 
who has the authority and means to influence the reports of accountants and internal 
auditors. In addition, as in western countries, external auditors "qualify" their audits" 
and perform audits largely on the basis of information provided by their clients who 
could mislead or cheat, leaving external auditing under such circumstances 
meaningless. What is worse, false auditing conducted by certified public accountants is 
frequently reported in recent years. 
In addition, despite the regulatory efforts on disclosure, the utility of the disclosure is 
in question due to many factors that make it difficult for consumers to understand 
disclosed information. Firstly, the Chinese insurance market, being in a primary stage 
of development, largely comprises non-professional consumers. They tend to have 
relatively little knowledge and prior experience with insurance products. Secondly, 
insurance information remains uneasily accessible for most of ordinary consumers due 
to scarce amounts and complexity of infonnation. Sometimes, only experts can 
decipher the information disclosed by insurers to assess the insurers' financial and 
operational condition accurately. Thirdly, insurance intermediaries who are still lag 
"' According to a survey of insurance markets in 50 China's cities, 26.2% of respondents repressed their 
dissatisfaction with sales representatives' explanations of prices and terms of insurance contracts. Note 
48, Chapter I 
" Certified public accountants (CPAs) are obliged under the "Independent Auditing Standards for 
Certified Public Accountants" (issued by the Chinese Association of Certified Public Accountants) to 
express an opinion based on their audits. 
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behind the rapid development of the insurance market rarely provide public 
professional assessments on insurers' financial strength, management quality, products, 
and prices. Especially, no formal insurance rating institution so far exists in China; few 
law firms and public accountants provide the services concerning insurance regulation 
compliance. Fourthly, regulatory requirements sometimes appear not specifically 
relevant to the essential points of effective disclosure. For example, the comprehension 
of comparative price and terrn information tends to be decisive to a consumer's 
purchase, "' but few of such effective ways are required by the regulator. 
3.3.3 Suggestionsfor improving transparency and information disclosure 
Compulsory disclosure subjecting insurers to public scrutiny, which is necessary to 
guarantee stakeholders/policyholders' right to know the quality of the insurers, will 
serve as a binding force pushing insurers towards more standardised and efficient 
management. To strengthen insurer transparency and corporate governance, the CIRC 
needs to draw up the Provisional Rules on Information Disclosure by Insurers to 
provide an integrated and comprehensive regulation for standardised information 
disclosure by insurers. "' 
Several selected issues regarding the proposed regulation are pointed out. Firstly, in 
line with international practice, the quality of disclosure by insurers should be 
measured by a set of standards, including relevance, timeliness, accessibility, 
comprehensiveness, reliability, comparability, utility, and consistency. " Secondly, 
regarding the contents of disclosure, it is essential to focus on two categories of 
information: product information and solvency information. " The relevant suggestions 
"' "Informed consumers: a review of product information at the point of sale" (FSA November 2000) 
Suggests that "comparative information tables" provided by insurers could be an effective way of 
disclosure. 
' By comparison, as a substantial step towards improvement of corporate governance, the PBOC 
released the Provisional Regulation for Information Disclosure by Commercial Banks in May 2002, 
which can be drawn on by the CIRC. 
See IAIS "Guidance paper on public disclosure by insurers" 200 1. 
At present, consumers are showing their focal interests on product information and insurers' claim 
handling performance because of their perceived importance of such information. Supra note 43. 
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in the IAIS guidance on this respect can be used as a reference. " Thirdly, improving the 
utility/effectiveness of product disclosure is important, otherwise the disclosure can 
hardly be cost-effective. To this end, it is essential to obtain baseline data about 
policyholders' exposure to and awareness of the disclosure, comprehension of 
important information, and their ability to use the disclosure correctly. This facilitates 
examining effectiveness of the existing measures (e. g. the effectiveness of 
prospectus"), and finding the ways to increase the relevance of disclosure. 
In practice, consumers' financial knowledge and ability to bear costs arc very limited. 
Considering the current situation that the increasing complexity of insurance products 
has created a need for consumer protection measures based on consumers' limitations, 
it is constructive to introduce CAT system implemented in the UK. " CAT is an 
acronym for the three aspects of financial product standards: charges, access (minimum 
transaction unit and other conditions of use), and terms (interest rate and other contract 
terms). If required standards are met (or exceeded in the consumer's favour), products 
are given the CAT stamps. CAT standards are intended to promote fair and suitable 
product purchases, and not to ensure optimal product purchases. The introduction of 
CAT into China would enable consumers to purchase insurance products with 
reasonable confidence. 
Making the full use of intermediaries' positive roles is vital for improving the 
effectiveness of disclosure by insurers. Experiences from developed countries show 
that credit rating business is a major contributor to insurance market efficiency, 
bringing about important reductions in information costs and providing the basis for 
returns by the intermediaries and end-users. " Other intermediaries such as insurance 
"' Briefly, insurers should disclose the information about their financial position, financial performance, 
risk exposure and how they are managed, how information is prepared, and basic business, management 
and corporate governance information. Supra note 47. 
-" In the UK, a research shows that most consumers do not use a Key Features Document (KFD) for 
shopping around, or only skim them; and those who do read KFDs often have difficulty understanding 
the material and in some cases misunderstand it. See "Informed decisions? how consumers use Key 
Features: a synthesis of research on the use of product information at the point of sale" FSA, November 
2000. 
5' In December 1998, the UK Treasury established the CAT standards, a governmental seal of approval, 
which were first applied to a new savings plan introduced in April 1999 called Individual Savings 
Accounts (ISA). Paul Johnson "CAT standards and stakeholders - their role in financial regulation" 
Occasional Paper Series 11, FSA of the UK, September 2000. 
' "Credit Ratings and Complementary Sources of Credit Quality Information" (Basel: BIS, 2000). 
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brokers, law firms and certified public accountants are playing a growing role in 
analysing the condition of insurers and providing useful information to the 
public/consumers choosing an insurer. However, in this area China lags far behind the 
US where insurers are rated by not only general rating agencies (e. g. Moody's, and 
Standard & Poors) but also rating agencies that spccialise in specific insurance 
businesses (e. g. A. M. Best). " The CIRC needs to encourage reliable activities of both 
rating institutions" and brokers (either foreign or domestic) and regulation compliance 
services provided by law firms and other institutions. 
Educating consumers is conductive to improving their abilities of understanding of 
risks, assessing and assuming risks, thus lifting the effectiveness of disclosure. It is 
crucial that consumers be educated insurance knowledge on every opportunity from the 
universal education all the way to various kinds of knowledge dissemination made by 
the regulator and the insurance industry. 
3.4 Self-regulation of insurance industry 
As part of its policy commitment to rectify and regulate the order of the market 
economy, the Chinese government affirms to "give full play to the role of industry 
associations" and encourages the improvement of industrial self-rcgulation 
approaches. " According to the CIRC, "a combination of government regulation, 
industrial self-rcgulation and internal control of firms marks a modern insurance 
regulatory SyStCM.,, 56 This section tries to probe how the insurance industry's self- 
regulation, which is still in its primary stage of the development, can be improved to be 
a useful means of effective and efficient insurance regulation and supervision. This 
53 A. M. Best (www. ambest. com) is a global specialist covering the insurance sector, while the top three 
of the global rating agency industry, Moody's (www. moodys. com) Standard & Poors 
(www. standard&poors. com), and Fitch IBCA (www. dcrco. com), also provide rating information of 
insurance industry. 
5' As profit-making entities with inherent conflicts of interest (that derive from raising income by 
charging clients on whom they rate), rating firms are reasonably subject to regulation. 
Premier Rongji Zhu "Review of Domestic Work in 2001" 
" Insurance Association of China set up" People's Daily November 16,2000, 
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issue is addressed by mainly referring to the analyses from the "Industry Self- 
Regulation in Consumer Markets"(hereinafler "Self-regulation report"). " 
3.4.1 Basic issues on seýf-regulation 
"Self-regulation occurs when those regulated design and enforce the rules 
themselves. "" However, there is no consensus on the definition that entirely covers the 
terms and instruments referred to as self-regulation. " While it can be narrowly 
understood as law formulated by private agencies to govern professional and trading 
activities, ' many forms of self-regulation have involved the State with various 
functions. "' Based on whether a public body involves or not, self-regulation can be 
divided into two categories: spontaneous private self-regulation (without governmental 
involvement) and self-regulation as a delegation of a State. As Julia Black argues, a 
dcfinition of self-regulation needs to address primarily three issues: the notion of "self', 
"regulation" and role of the state. "' The tenn "self' can be used to refer to an individual 
or as a collective. " It can include professional groupings, occupational groupings, 
industry groupings, business communities or a combination of different groupings 
5' In 2000, the Minister for Financial Services & Regulation, Commonwealth of Australia released the 
"Industry Self-Regulation in Consumer Markets" which analyses the market circumstances where 
industry self-regulation is likely to be most and least effective. 
"' Haufler, Virginia. (2001) "A public role for the private sector: industry self-regulation in a global 
economy" Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Washington, D. C. pg. 8 
59 The term self-regulation covers a wide variety of schemes. For example, the UK National Consumer 
Council, quoted in the Better Regulation Task Force report (2000). identifies eight different categories: 
unilateral codes of conduct; customer charters; unilateral sector codes; negotiated codes; trade 
association codes approved by the Office of Fair Trading; recognised codes; official codes and guidance; 
and legal codes. 
' See Anthony Ogus (1997) "Self-regulation", Encyclopaedia of Law and Economies: Literature Review 
9400. 
" Maxwell, John W., Thomas P. Lyon and Steven C. Hackett. Seýv-regulation and social weývare. - the 
political economy of corporate environmentalism The Journal of Law and Economics Vol. 43 (Issue 2) 
2000, p584. 
" Black, Julia (1996) "Constitutionalising self-regulation" The Modern Law Review Vol. 59 (Issue 1) 
1996, p. 26 
" Id. 
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involved in a common activity bridging their differences. " According to "Self- 
regulation report", the term "regulation" can be an array of options to address specific 
problems and objectives, including codes of conduct, industry service charters, 
guideline and standards, industry-based accreditation, and complaint handling schemes. 
It also comprises enforcement including imposing an appropriate sanction on violators. 
The state's role can vary from as an outsider to a participant. 6s 
As identified in "Self-regulation report", the need to stay competitive within the 
domestic and international marketplace has seen the momentum shift towards 
impleincriting alternatives to formal government regulation and legislation. Industry 
self-regulation is acknowledged as one of the most effective alternatives. " Effective 
self-regulation tends to promote good practice and target specific problems within 
industries, impose lower compliance costs, and offer a quick and low cost mechanism 
of dispute resolution. It can also avoid often overly prescriptive regulation and allow 
industries quickly to adapt to changes in the market, technologies and consumer 
expectations. 
" Gunningham, Neil and Joseph Rees. "Industry self-regulation: an Institutional Perspective" Law and 
Policy Vol. 19 (Issue 4) 1997 p370-380 
" In the "Study to identify best practice in the use of soft law and to analyse how this best practice can 
be made to work for consumers in the European Union", experts from the EU suggest that, to encourage 
and support process of soft law (including self-regulation) application, the EU could exercise one of the 
following functions: catalyser (impetus, launching of initiatives); facilitator (provision of equipment, 
moderator of discussions); supporter (moral supportý labels, approval of projects); organiser 
(establishment of permanent structures for meetings, assistance to consumers' organisations, reform of 
the method of representation); negotiator (participation as party to European agreements); and legislator 
(establishment of frameworks for European soft law). 
" See Appendix D "International policy on industry self-regulation" to the "Self-regulation report" 
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3.4.2 Improving seU-regulation by the insurance industry 
The first insurance industry association in China emerged in Shanghai in February 
1994, which was forined by the Shanghai branches of the former PICC, Ping An, China 
Pacific and AIG, to co-ordinate and self-regulate the market. Later, this practice spread 
over the country with local insurance industry associations seen in 32 cities and 
provinces by 1999. The Insurance Association of China (IAC), a national organisation, 
made its debut in November 2000. 
Almost all insurance associations share the following common characteristics. In 
nature, an association is normally a spontaneous private self-regulation and non-profit 
society legal person registered with a pertinent Civil Services Department6' under the 
Regulations for the Management of Societies Registration. It is subject to both the 
regulation and supervision of Civil Services Departments and business guidance of the 
CIRC. The main objectives of the associations are to abide by laws, regulations and 
insurance policies, observe social moralities, maintain the insurance market order, 
promote a healthy and stable development of the insurance market, and serve for the 
economic prosperity and the stability of people's livings. "' They are funded by the 
subscriptions of members. The organisational structures vary among the associations. "' 
The main difference between various associations is the status of their members. The 
members of a local association are usually local branches of insurers or insurance 
intermediaries, while those of the IAC are usually corporate level insurers and 
insurance intermediaries as well as local insurance associations as collective members. 
During the past years, the associations have worked under their guidelines for 
strengthened self-discipline and for close exchanges and co-operation among members, 
thereby enhancing the public understanding of and trust in the insurance sector and 
improving management within the sector. Their missions carried out include": 
" For example, the IAC registered with the Civil Services Department of the PRC, while the Shanghai 
insurance association, as a provincial level association, registered with the Civil Services Department of 
Shanghai municipal government. 
Art. 1, Articles of Association, Sichuan Insurance Association, 1999. 
For example, the IAC is organised around four main policy committees, including non-life, life, 
intermediaries, and actuary committees, together with a secretary department of the association. Articles 
of Association, IAC. 
" "The general secretary of the IAC addressing the issue on misleading sales" Zhongguo Baoxian Bao 
(China Insurance News) April 25,2002. 
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(1) formulating self-discipline covenants, guild standards, and disciplines, for 
implementing the CIRCs regulations and rules; 
(2) implementing laws, regulations and rules related to insurance business, 
standardising market conducts of firms in accordance with law and self-regulation 
agreements and guidelines, and keeping the market order; 
(3) mitigating and handling disputes between either members or insurance contractual 
parties, and disciplining defaults of members; 
(4) providing a kind of protection to members and policyholders, and representing the 
collective interests of the insurance industry to speak out on issues of common 
interest and to inform and suggest the regulatory authorities on public policy issues; 
(5) facilitating closer exchanges and communication among members, strengthening 
the industry's solidarity and the co-ordination among the members, and promoting 
exchanges between Chinese insurers and their foreign counterparts so that its 
members can learn from the advanced technologies and management expertise of 
foreign firms and take a more active role in international competition; 
(6) conducting market surveys, disseminating insurance knowledge among consumers, 
publishing circulars and booklets, organising conferences and seminars among 
members, and enhancing professionalism of staff through training and education; 
(7) carrying out designated activities of insurance agent supervision, including 
accreditation, operation monitoring and taking disciplinary actions; and 
(8) appraising and rewarding advanced staff. 
Despite these efforts, the development of the insurance associations is still in its 
initial stage. The following arc some priorities for further display of their functions as 
sclf-rcgulation bodies. Firstly, according to the "Sclf-rcgulation report", consumer 
groups play an important role in developing and maintaining the relevance of self- 
regulation. Experience shows that scif-regulation organisations may use their powers 
to benefit their members in ways which are not consistent with the public interest, for 
example, impeding competition on the supply side of the market. " It requires 
institutional structures capable of controlling this phenomenon. So far, the associations 
only have firms (or local insurance associations) in the membership which is not linked 
to the importance of consumers' attachment. Therefore, it suggests an increased 
consumer input by allowing consumer groups or representatives' membership as an 
instrumental factor in determining the priorities and work of the associations. 
" For detailed discussion on disadvantages of self-regulation, see supra note 59. 
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Secondly, insurance firms' tariff transparency needs to be greatly increased. The 
tariff transparency is closely connected with the success of information disclosure and 
corporate governance. Although there are a few formal obligations relating to the tariff 
transparency, the associations could take active actions on the matter. For example, 
they can provide facilities (e. g. websites or publications) that enable consumers to 
know in advance prices and terms of insurance products and make tariff comparisons. 
Thirdly, it is necessary to increase government involvement. In some countries, 
there are statutory requirements for certain insurance firms to be members of insurance 
associations. ' Such an institutional arrangement could help strengthen the authority of 
an insurance association although rent-seeking may inhere in the delegated self- 
regulation regime. In practice, the voluntary membership of the insurance associations 
in China proved difficult for effective discipline on their members, needless to say on 
those non-members who are beyond the associations' authority. The regulators could 
consider providing the associations with certain regulatory incentives, for example, 
statutory memberships of the associations, promoting self-regulation through 
guidelines, directories and information disclosure via the Internet. The CIRC and the 
Civil Services Department also need to co-ordinate in guiding and monitoring 
insurance self-rcgulation. "' 
Fourthly, the dispute settlement function needs to be strengthened. Fairly, promptly 
and professionally handling consumers' complaints is a key influence of the 
effectiveness of self-regulation, because it help strengthen consumers' confidence in the 
industry. " China's existing legal framework regarding the settlement of contractual 
disputes has some drawbacks. First, the Insurance Law and the ldministration 
Regulation set out time limits for settling claims. An insurer who fails to determine the 
amount of payment within 60 days of receipt of a claim must make an initial minimum 
payment based on available information, and pay the balance when the insurer make a 
" For example, the Malaysian Insurance Act 1996 requires all life insurance/life reinsurance companies 
to be members of the Life Insurance Association of Malaysia (LIAM). 
" For example, in Shanghai, the municipal government set up an insurance development and planning 
institute to help the industry grow smoothly and make the city a major financial centre in the Far East. 
' "Self-regulation report" p7l-78. 
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final determination. 75 However, there is no provision for penalty where an insurer takes 
a long time to make a final determination, or intentionally repudiates to fulfil 
obligations by not making a final detennination. 76 Second, the disputes of insurance 
contracts are usually settled through courts or arbitration; the disputes between the 
insurance regulator (and its agents) and the regulated are dealt with through 
administrative procedures, and if it fails, then through administrative litigation 
procedures. Although there is a Division of Complaints in the CIRC, it only accepts 
administrative complaints from regulated firms or consumers other than controversies 
involving insurers and policyholders. Third, although the insurance associations accept 
consumers' complaints, they only discipline the default insurance firms by such 
measures as advising the involving firms, circulating a notice within the industry, or 
advising the regulator on necessary penalties. In summary, there is no proper process of 
contractual dispute settlement within the CIRC or the associations. Disputing parties 
have to resort to courts or arbitration. " Such a scenario sometimes proves time- 
consuming and costly for insured. The CIRC needs to build a streamlined, cffective and 
user-friendly complaint handling and dispute-solving system. It may contain an internal 
complaint review process within insurance firms, and an insurance ombudsman (or it is 
" The 2002 Insurance Law, Art. 24-26. The Law also stipulates that an insurer must reach a settlement 
agreement with the insured or beneficiary within 10 days or the time limit specified in contract if there is 
one. The insurer who fails to do so is obliged to pay compensation for any losses suffered by the insured 
or the beneficiary. 
' By contrast, South Carolina in the U. S. has well established rules that punitive damage may be 
recovered for fraudulent breach of contract. For example, West v. Service Life &I lealth Insurance Co., 
66 S. E. 2d 816 ( S. C. 195 1), and Yarborough v. Bankers Life & Caas. Co., 81 S. E. 2d 359 (S. C. 1954). 
" To facilitate quickly solving contractual disputes of insurance, the CIRC decreed that an insurance 
policy must contain an arbitration clause. The Notice of Drawing Arbitration Clauses in Insurance 
Policies, the CIRC, August 1999. 
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advisable to set up a dispute resolution scheme in the associations"), supplemented by 
arbitration and court systems. 
Fifthly, self-regulation could be extended beyond the association regime. The 
regulators can use mass media and consumer protection organisations as useful means 
to promote self-regulation by the insurance industry. 
3.5 Concluding remarks 
This chapter probed how China's insurance regulation and supervision can be 
efficiently and effectively improved by the implementation of market-based approaches 
that shift some of responsibilities for supervision to both insurers and the insurance 
industry and promote insurers' transparency. At present, many shortcomings are 
identified in the corporate governance of state-owned insurers, including the lack of 
adequate corporate independence, the agency problem, weak economic incentives, the 
"insider control" due to deficient governance structures, incompetence of risk 
management, and inadequate external disciplines. In addition, China lacks an integrated 
and comprehensive legal framework of insurers' disclosure. The reliability of insurers' 
infori-nation is frequently distorted by accounting and auditing malpractice. The utility 
of insurers' disclosure is in question due to many factors that make consumers difficult 
to understand disclosed information. The self-regulation by the insurance associations 
has a short history and is still in its primary stage. The suggestible measures, therefore, 
include better corporate governance within insurers, particularly through the current 
wave of listing and shareholding reforms on state-owned insurers, reinforced 
information disclosure by insurers, and enhanced sclf-regulation by the insurance 
industry with appropriate involvement of consumers and regulators. 
"A formal alternative dispute resolution (ADR) scheme administered by Insurance Enquiries & 
Complaints Ltd (IEC) in Australia is an example of the development of an approach to self regulation in 
the general insurance industry. The scheme is a national two-tiered dispute resolution service involving 
the provision of advice as well as the resolution of disputes. The first tier consists of an enquiry and 
advisory service undertaken by Consumer Consultants (CC) who receive calls from consumers and 
policyholders and liaise with insurers to resolve disputes. If a dispute is unresolved after review by the 
insurer through its internal dispute resolution process, it is referred by the policyholder to a second tier 
for determinations by the Claims Review Panel, Referee or Adjudicator. Ile determinations are binding 
on member firms but not on consumers, who have recourse to the legal system if they are dissatisfied 
with the determinations. See IEC Submission to Taskforce on Industry Self- Regulation, Australia. T'he 
Ombudsman Scheme in the UK shares some similarities with the ADR scheme. 
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Chapter 4 
Some selected issues on prudential regulation in China 
4.1 Introduction 
Prudential regulation, ' also referred to as solvency regulation or financial 
regulation, along with market regulation, traditionally constitutes one of the two most 
important areas of insurance regulation. The commonly applied model of prudential 
regulation is to establish certain financial prudential standards, monitor insurers' 
compliance, intervene in non-compliance, and provide remedies to certain 
policyholders from guarantee funds when insurer failure occurs. Generally, the 
solvency position of an insurer depends at least on sufficient technical provisions, 
sound investment assets corresponding to the technical provisions, and a satisfactory 
solvency margin. These elements are considerably intertwined. The important kinds of 
financial prudential standards usually consist of: (1) rules directing technical provisions 
including types of provisions and valuation methods, (2) rules governing asset 
diversification and valuation, and (3) capital regulation. Rules for reporting and on- 
site/off-site inspections, and the administering of guarantee funds are also major 
components of prudential regulation and supervision. 
The rationale for prudential regulation generally derives from the anxiety that, due to 
running risk business, insurers have inherent difficulties of honouring their promises to 
policyholders, and, if they fail, the consequences can be severe. Meanwhile, consumers, 
especially individual consumers, face difficulties in assessing the financial condition or 
creditworthiness of the insurer they deal with. Prudential regulation as "one of the most 
important elements in the supervision of insurance companies" is "to maintain efficient, 
fair, safe and stable insurance markets for the benefit and protection of policyholders". ' 
Moreover, some economic theories can be used to demonstrate the essentiality of 
prudential regulation. As the problem of information asymmetry exists in insurance 
transactions, it may benefit insured that governments use minimal regulation relying on 
' For an explanation of the tenn, see "Financial (prudential) regulation" in Glossary of Insurance Policy 
Terms OECD 1999, p30-33. 
I "Principles on capital adequacy and solvency" IAIS 2002. p I. 
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information disclosure by insurers' or private rating services" as a supplement or an 
alternative to regulation. Insured may be able to benefit from use of monitored 
conditions in contracts or through mutual insurance. ' Majority of individuals, however, 
can hardly fully understand the complexity of the information released by insurers or 
rating services. In addition, insurers may use their market power to take advantage of 
insured's inferiority in contracting. " All these understandings further underpin the 
rationale for prudential regulation. 
Generally, the greater the detail and degree of prudential regulation, the more secure 
the insurer, and thus the more stable the insurance industry. However, too stringent 
regulation or over-regulation is highly likely to stifle competition and insurers' 
innovation, thereby lowering consumer choice and value. Balancing these competing 
public interests has been proved very difficult, but regulators still need and have been 
striving to strike this balance by weighing these interests in certain economic and social 
circumstances. 
Over the last decade, state insurance departments in the US, co-ordinated by the 
National Association of Insurance Cominissioners (NATC), directed their efforts at 
strengthening financial regulation by establishing higher capital standards, expanding 
financial reporting, improving monitoring tools, and accrediting insurance departments. 
However, within the recent years, there have been pressures to slow and even reverse 
some of these initiatives, to cater for deregulation appeals by insurers. In the EU, 
prudential provisions contained in Directives are expected to have a dramatic change 
under the Solvency IIproject. In the dimension of international co-operation, some 
international organisations, e. g. IAIS, OECD, are making their endeavours to provide 
blueprints and guidelines for harmonising nations' prudential regulation restructuring. 
All these regimes provide China with instructive experiences. 
This chapter aims to examine some selected issues on the restructuring of China's 
prudential regulation and supervision by drawing experiences from the EU and other 
3 In contrast to practice in continental countries of the EU, the UK regulators largely rely on information 
publicity to regulate insurance industry. Such an approach seems to expand gradually its adoption in the 
world. 
See Section 3.3.3, Chapter 3. 
See Mayers D. and Smith C. W. Jr (1981) "Contractual provisions, organisational structure, and conflict 
control in insurance markets" Journal ofBusiness 54, p407-434. 
' Robert W. Klein "Restructuring regulation for developing insurance markets" Centre for Risk 
Management and Insurance Research, Georgia State University, 1999. p3-4. 
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regimes. It initially presents observations on current trends of prudential regulations in 
some regimes. Section 4.3 examines the basic situations of solvency in the Chinese 
insurance industry, focusing on analyses of deficiencies existing in the industry. 
Section 4.4 then provides an overview of the framework of prudential regulation and 
supervision in China, and comments on the current system. Section 4.5 discusses the 
issues on early warning system and section 4.6 deals with the issues concerning the 
establishment of policyholder protection fund (PPF) system in China. The chapter 
concludes with some recommendations. 
4.2 Some observations on prudential regulation In selected regimes 
With ever increasing liberalisation and deregulation in both developed and 
developing countries in recent years, prudential regulation has become even more 
important world-wide, gradually turning into the core task of insurance regulation and 
supervision. In addition, with the development of insurance industries and the progress 
of information technology, prudential regulation has been endowed with some new 
concepts and new forms. Although regulatory models vary in different countries, 
prudential regulation around the world is undergoing a transition from material 
regulation mode into a solvency-oriented mode characteriscd by changes towards a 
risk-dealing, comprehensive, synergetic, jointly functioning, dynamic and 
internationally harmonised domain. 
a. Risk-dealing approach 
The first trend evident around the world is the incorporation of the various risks that 
insurers face into prudential regulation and supervision. The risk-based capital (RBQ 
and Basel capital adequacy model arc two typical examples of this trend. RBC is a 
regulatory model developed as a tool for measuring the solvency and capital adequacy 
that a financial institute needs to support its overall business operations. The NAIC of 
the US fon-nally adopted RBC model laws in December 1993 and has applied them to 
US insurers since 1995. ' Its objective is to address the drawbacks of the fixcd-ratio 
model by incorporating (at least what is considered to be) all of the risks confronting an 
' Based on reviews performed as part of the NAIC Accreditation Program, 47 of the U. S. insurance 
jurisdictions have adopted substantially these laws in their state laws, regulations or bulletins. See "Risk- 
Based Capital general Overview" NAIC <http: //www. naic. com> 
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insurer into solvency regulation, ' rather than just a few risks which the EU model 
incorporates. ' The NAIC RBC approach contains two main components: (1) a risk- 
based capital formula, which establishes a hypothetical minimum capital level that is 
compared to an insurer's actual capital level, and (2) a ratio of total adjusted capital to 
authorised control level risk-based capital and consequential action levels for 
regulators to correct insurers' impairment. The common risks identified in the NAIC 
models include asset risk - aj)ltliates, asset risk - other, credit risk; underwriting risk, 
and business risk. 'O Separate RBC model laws apply to life insurers, property/casualty 
insurers and health insurers respectively, which reflect the differences in the risk 
profiles facing these different insurers. " Although both strengths and criticisms exist 
in the US RBC system, " the RBC concept has been gradually introduced into other 
countries where regulators and insurers adopted various RBC approaches into their 
solvency regulation and risk management. " 
8 According to the NAIC, the stated objectives of the NAIC RBC requirements are to provide a standard 
of capital adequacy that: (1) is related to risk, (2) raises the safety net for insurers, (3) is uniform among 
states, and (4) provides authority for regulatory action when capital falls below the standard. See "NAIC 
Property-liability Risk-Based Capital Formula Exposure Draft"(1 993) for details. 
" For a comparative study of the NAIC RBC model and the EU fixed-rate solvency model, see Chapter 
10, and Appendix 10.2 of the 2002 KPMG Solvency Study. 
" For a detailed description of NATC RBC system, see N. D. Hooker (1996) "Risk-based capital in 
general insurance" B. A. J. 2,11,265-323, and Sholorn Feldblurn "NAIC Property/Casualty Insurance 
Company Risk-Based Capital Requirements" 1997 <http: //www. actuaries. ca> 
" For details, see "Comparison of the NAIC Life, P&C and MCO RBC Formulas summary of 
differences" American Academy ofActuaries Febuary 2002. 
12 See J. David Cummins Scott E. Harrington Robert Klein "Insolvency experience, risk-based capital 
and prompt corrective action in property-liability insurance" Wharton 95-06, "1995 RBC results - 
property/casualty" compiled by NAIC staff NAIC Quarterly April, 1996 - Volume 11, Issue 2, "1997 
P&C RBC industry results" by Mike Barth, NAIC Staff NAIC Quarterly April, 1998 - Volume IV, Issue 
2, and J. David Cummins, Martin F. Grace, and Richard D. Phillips (1997) "Regulatory solvency 
prediction in property-liability insurance: risk-based capital, audit ratios, and cash flow simulation" 
Journal of Risk and Insurance 66: p417-458. 
" For example, Japan introduced a solvency margin ratio that is similar to the US RBC formula to serve 
as an early warning system. See, "Fact book non-life insurance in Japan 1999-2000" The Alarine and 
Fire InsuranceAssociation ofJapan Inc. In the UK, some insurers and Lloyds use RBC as a tool of risk 
management. In Belgium, some insurers calculate RBC as a base of the return on equity (ROE) 
calculation. Malaysia and Singapore are doing studies on the introduction of RBC systern. See 
"Insurance regulation changes in Singapore" Tillinghast-Tower Perrin September 2001. 
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The new proposals of capital accord put forward by the Basel Committee of Banking 
Supervision, Bank of International Settlement ("Basel")" is expected to make a huge 
impact on insurance prudential regulation in the near future, " typically on the Solvency 
IIproject of the EU. " Based on three inter-reinforcing "pillars", "Basel" is seeking a 
more risk-sensitive, flexible approach to bank capital requirements than the approach of 
1988 Capital Accord. The first pillar develops and expands on the standardised 1988 
rules of minimum capital requirements, " and allows banks to use their own internal 
risk management systems to determine the appropriate capital level if they meet certain 
qualifying standards. The second pillar is the supervisory review of capital adequacy 
which will seek to ensure that a bank's position is consistent with its overall risk profile 
and strategy, or will trigger an early supervisory intervention. The third pillar is the role 
of market discipline, including high disclosure standards and increased transparency, in 
promoting bank capital adequacy. 
The basic objectives of Solvency Ilproject which is in a process are "to try and better 
match solvency requirements to the true risk encountered by an insurance undertaking 
and also to encourage insurers to improve their measurement and monitoring of the 
" See "Overview of The New Dasel Capital Accord" Consultative Document Issuedfor comment by 31 
May 2001 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
See Alan McNee "The next generation of insurance regulation" Erisk August. 200 1. 
In 1999, the EU Insurance Committee decided to adopt a two-stage approach to the issue of insurance 
capital adequacy. The first stage -Solvency I project- was to introduce some improvements to the 
existing solvency margin, which resulted in the adoption by the Council of Ministers of the EU in 
February 2002 of two Directives to amend the solvency margin requirements for life and non-life 
insurance undertakings (in Directives 73/239/EEC and 79/267/EEC). The second stage - Solvency 11 
project- exercises a wide-ranging review of, among the other things, the rules governing the assets and 
liabilities of insurers, the matching of assets to liabilities, reinsurance arrangements, sophisticated 
approaches to solvency margins, and the implications of accounting and actuarial policies. T'he project 
will take several years, and at the end, the EU Commission will consider further improvements to 
insurance prudential regulation by introducing a new Directive. 
" International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards (1988) sets out the details 
of the risk-based capital framework. The document outlines how different asset classes (both on and 
off-balance sheet) are weighted according to their riskiness. There are five weights . 0%, 10%, 20%, 50% 
and 100%. OECD-government debts or cash, for example, have a zero or low weight; loans by banks get 
20% while loans fully secured by mortgages on residential property 50%. All claims on the private 
sector or on banks incorporated outside the OECD with a residual maturity of over one year are 
weighted 100%. 
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risks they incur". " These objectives parallel with those of the "Basel" new proposals of 
capital accord, indicating the EU's implementation of the "Basel" new proposal. " The 
EU Member States are planning their own implementation. For example, the FSA of 
the UK requires each financial company to establish risk management systems to carry 
out an internal assessment of the level of capital they require to meet their plan, taking 
account of the risks to which they are exposed. " Meanwhile, a supplementary capital 
assessment (SCA) is an additional tool that the FSA may require when it has specific 
concerns. " It seems possible that an insurer will have to demonstrate at all times that it 
has capital equal to the highest among: its own assessment results, the FSA's bespoke 
capital requirements in the supervision manual, and the EUs solvency margins. 
b. A comprehensive approach 
A second trend is to handle insurers' solvency in a comprehensive manner dealing 
with all the factors on which the overall financial position of an insurer depends. Jean- 
Louis Bellando" claims that a comprehensive regulatory and supervisory approach to 
solvency needs to consider four aspects: a solvency ratio, a triple test of balancc sheet 
soundness, " operating conditions (which are essential to an insurees prospective 
solvency), and outside forces affecting an insurees financial health. The Solvency II 
project of the EU is undertaking extensive studies on many complex issues concerning 
insurance prudential regulation. The eight issues addressed in the EC commissioned 
study by KPMG in 2002 include: risks and risk models; technical liabilities; asset 
valuation; reinsurance; alternative risk transfer arrangement and advanced risk 
reduction techniques; the impact of future accounting changes; use of rating agencies 
is "Insurance solvency margin rules-frequently asked questions" at 
<http: //europa. eu. int/conun/intemal_market/en/finances/insur> 
" See "Consideration on the design of a future prudential supervisory system" Paper for the Solvency 
Subcommittee, EC, 2002. 
2' "UK implementation of the new Basel and EU capital adequacy standards" 2002, and "Integrated 
prudential sourcebook" 2001, the FSA of the UK. 
21 Consultation Paper 136: "Individual Capital Adequacy Standards" the FSA of the Ur- 2001. 
2' See Jean-Louis Bellando (2000) "Assessing the financial health of insurance undertakings to protect 
the insured from the risk to which these firms are exposed: solvency rules" OECD p7. 
" The test checks that technical provisions are adequate, the provisions are covered by quality assets of 
at least equivalent value, and equity capital exceeds a minimum standard. Id. 
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and market mechanisms; and comparative analysis of solvency margin methodologies. 
24 
c. A synergetic approach 
A third trend in prudential regulation and supervision is that, instead of trying to do 
everything with their own staff and budgets, regulators use professionals (auditors, 
actuaries, rating agencies, etc. ) to assist them in ensuring insurerst ongoing compliance 
with prudential standards. To safeguard and ensure the compctencc and reliability of 
these professionals, regulators enforce professional standards, monitor professional 
practice, and penalise malpractice in the professions. The existence of professional 
standards backed by an effective disciplinary regime allows regulators to rely on 
professionals to have an unbiased perspective on an insurer's prudential situation, and 
achieve their regulatory goals in an efficient way. 
Many jurisdictions have long been requiring external or statutory auditors" to 
examine and certify insurers' published financial statements or even attest the truth of 
the statements . 
2' The Australian solvency regime requires the independent auditor to 
attest the appropriateness of risk management procedures and statutory conduct 
compliance . 
2' To ensure the reliability and integrity of auditors, which was highlighted 
by the collapse of Andersen (the US), many OECD member countries require auditors 
to produce the evidence of compctcncc and reputability, being independent of insurers, 
and taking third party liability insuranCC. 21 
Actuaries arc experts in valuation and management of financial risks, and have 
traditionally the role of unique discretion over liability calculation, rcscrving and profit 
21 See "Study into the methodologies to assess the overall financial position of an insurance undertaking 
from the perspective of prudential supervision" KPUG (2002 KPMG Solvency Study) commissioned 
by EC, May 2002. 
25 In Singapore and Malaysia, auditors have to be appointed by the supervisory authority. 
2' For instance, the EU Directive 95/26/EC reinforces the obligations of statutory auditors by requiring 
them to rapidly advise the supervisory authorities of any factor, or decision concerning the undertaking 
that might constitute a breach of the regulations orjeopardise the continuity of the business. 
" "Prudential Supervisory Requirements for General Insurers" implemented from July 2002, The 
Australian Prudential regulatory Authority (APRA) 
211 See "Insurance regulation and supervision in OECD countries, Asian economies and CEEC and NIS 
countries" OECD 1999. p24. 
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distribution. " As observed by Catherine Prime, " in maný developed countries the role 
of Actuaries has changed to a membership of a synergetic team charged with 
compliance with prudential regulation requirements. The appointed actuary system, 
introduced in the UK in 1974, clearly expects actuaries to act as front-line controllers of 
prudential financial management. " Most OECD countries require by law that life 
insurers appoint actuaries, although in practice the tasks of an actuary vary. They 
mainly involve the oversight of actuarial aspects of the insurers' whole operation, and 
continuous responsibility for keeping within prudential requirements. Although such 
duties may be slightly adjusted in certain regimes in the future, " the issue of the 
reinforcement of actuaries' role within insurance prudential regulation brought attention 
to both insurance regulatory regimeS3' and actuary communities. 34 
Rating agencies" play an important role in the infrastructure of the modem financial 
system, and fit into the scheme of banking prudential supervision in a number of 
countries. " By providing professional analyses of and judgements on financial 
institutions' performance and solvency situations, they improve the effectiveness of 
29 See Chris Daykin (1999) "The role of the actuary in the supervision of insurance" Part 1: 3)b, Book I 
in Insurance andprivate pensions compendiumfor emerging economies OECD. 
" Catherine Prime "The actuary and insurance regulation" presented to the 2nd Global Conference of 
Actuaries 
Delhi, February 2000. 
" See supra note 85 for a description of roles of appointed actuaries. 
32 According to "Future role of actuaries in the governance of life insurers" (the FSA of the UK, 2001), 
the FSA proposed to abolish the appointed actuary role for all companies that do not write with-prof its 
business. For with-profits companies the role of the appointed actuary is to be restricted to one of 
advising the company on the use of its discretion with regard to with-prof its business. Anewposition, 
head of the "actuarial function", is to be created to advise board of directors on actuarial matters. Ile 
board will take full responsibility for setting the mathematical reserves, which become subject to audit, 
and for the production of a financial condition report (FCR) which would be made available to the FSA. 
3' The IAIS in its "On solvency, solvency assessments and actuarial issues" (Mar. 2000) suggests that 
actuaries can play a dominant role in a prudential regulatory framework stressing risk management 
systems of an insurer. 
3" Phillip Booth (2000) "Actuarial issues related to the regulation of pension schemes and life insurance" 
OECD. 
31 See Chapter 3, Note 52. 
36 In 2000, of the 12 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision countries, II used credit rating agency 
information in one way or another in the financial regulation activities. See "Credit Ratings and 
Complementary Sources of Credit Quality Information" Basel: Bankfor International Settlements (BIS), 
2000. 
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information disclosure and reduce information costs, thus enhancing market efficiency. 
With the influence of the Basel new capital accord, the role of rating agencies is 
expected to spread into the insurance prudential regulatory regime. 
dA joint approach 
A fourth trend is the joining of efforts of both regulators and individual insurance 
firms. The IAIS explicitly points out that "a sound supervisory system has to combine 
capital adequacy and solvency regimes with requirements for risk management systems 
for risk reduction and mitigation". " The growing interest in the joint approach is due to 
the deregulation environment and the importance of enterprise risk management. One 
regulatory objective in deregulation environment is to optimise the balance between 
market efficiency and regulatory soundness, so that market forces become the main 
determinants of insurers' transactions. Meanwhile, insurers' risk management systems 
have been unfavourably highlighted by many studies on the causes of insurers' failures. 
For instance, one main identified cause of insurance insolvcncics in the EU refers to 
"operational failure related to inexperienced or incompetent management"38 To secure 
their financial stability, insurers must establish risk management systems that are 
comprehensive, cover all risks to which they are exposed, and are appropriate to the 
complexity, size and mix of the insurers' operations. Meanwhile, regulatory 
requirements should be seen as the lowest standards that they should follow in their 
efforts at risk management. 
A regulatory framework supports the joint approach by both rccognising and 
enforcing risk management system within individual insurers, and encouraging and 
mandating public transparency about insurers' operations. The second pillar of the New 
Capital Accord and the "Integrated prudential sourccbook" of the FSA, the UK, as 
mentioned before, both advocate the establishment of risk management systems within 
insurers with certain regulatory incentives and mandates. The Australian solvency 
regime requires directors and the management of all insurers to evidence the 
development and continued monitoring of internal risk management systems. In 
addition, the Australian actuaries association suggests the creation of a position of 
" "Background" and "Principle 10" in "Principles on capital adequacy and solvency" The JAIS, 2002 
" An EC Working Group publication on "Solvency of insurance undertakings" (The Muller Report) EC, 
1997. 
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prudential risk manager with clear statutory roles within an insurer. " This could be a 
way to facilitate the joint approach whereby some of the responsibility for prudential 
regulation is transferred to the insurers, and to ensure insurers' fulfilment of their 
responsibilities of prudent operation. Further, the third pillar of the New CapitalAccord 
stresses transparency and market discipline to bring the power of market discipline into 
play. 
e. A dynamic approach 
A fifth trend is timely supervision of insurers' financial positions. The potential 
consequences of failing to monitor risks in a timely manner, and therefore failing to act 
on early warning signals, has been highlighted by many cases, e. g. the failure of 
Barings. "' The failure was identified as due to losses incurred by unauthorised and 
concealed trading activities and a serious failure of controls together with managerial 
confusion within Barings, that made early notice of the rogue trading unachievable. 
Therefore, a prudential regulation system must give sufficient warning of impending 
problems to allow timely intervention by regulators. Beginning in 1993 for life insurers 
and in 1999 for non-life insurers, the Canadian federal regulator has required the 
appointed actuary of an insurer to complete an annual Dynamic Capital Adequacy 
Testing (DCAT) report. The report is compiled by projecting financial results and 
capital adequacy on expected scenarios (including on the insurees business plan, and 
various adverse scenarios) for a few years into the future so as to get a dynamic 
prediction of the insurer's future solvency. " 
f International harmonisation 
The IAIS, although a relatively new organisation compared to "Basel" and the 
International Organisation of Securities Commissions (TOSCO) for securities 
supervision, has made great efforts to promote the han-nonisation of insurance 
prudential regulation around the world. It issued several papers setting out principles, 
39 Kent Griffm (1999) "The continuing evolution of financial services regulation and the role of the 
actuarial profession" The Prudential Regulation Taskforce of the Council of the Institute of, 4ctuaries of 
. 4ustralia. 
' See David Llewellyn (1999) "Some lessons for regulation from recent bank crises" Institute for 
Development Policy and Management, University of Manchester. 
"' "Dynamic capital adequacy testing " Committee on solvency standards for financial institutions, 
Canadian Institute of Actuaries, December 1998. 
144 
standards and guidance notes relating to the prudential regulation and supervision of 
insurance. "' The IAIS is seeking to extend its work on prudential issues, given the 
importance and complexity of this topic. The OECD has been working on efforts to 
compare solvency regulations across jurisdictions for the purpose of harmonisation. " 
The International Actuarial Association (IAA) and the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) have also been closely involving in the development of rules 
relating to insurance capital adequacy. Furthermore, in preparation for the foreseeable 
greater convergence between financial institutions in the future, "Basel" and the MIS 
are seeking to largely harmonise the prudential regulation for banking and insurance. 
4.3 Prudential situation of China's insurance industry 
The purpose of this section is to consider the prudential situation of China! s 
insurance industry. " It presents the findings from financial tests plus some qualitative 
analyses that focus on the solvency margins and relevant elements of prudential 
conditions such as capitalisation, profitability, expense ratios and investment 
pcrfon-nance. While the analyses are basically concerned with the four major national 
insurers mainly based on their statutory financial filings during 1996-2000, the results 
may represent the generic nature of the industry in the same period. "' The data, which 
has been used in this section, is mainly drawn from the China Insurance Almanac 
1998,1999,2000, and 2001.46 
" Formulating principles and standards on solvency is the domain and one of the greatest challenges of 
the IAIS. In 2002, it adopted Principles on CapitalAdequacy and Solvency, viewed by the IAIS as "an 
essential building block in the development of more detailed standards relating to capital adequacy and 
solvency. " It elaborates 14 principles for evaluating the solvency of life and non-life insurance 
undertakings. The paper is also relevant to reinsurers. 
" For example, Viviane Leflaive (2001) "The supervision of insurance solvency: comparative analysis in 
OECD countries", and Jdrg Vollbrecht (2000) "Insurance regulation and supervision in OECD 
countries" OECD 
" The prudential situation here means circumstances relating to insurers' solvency, including capital 
adequacy and solvency margins, return on investment, underwriting profitability, etc. 
" The four insurers are PICC, China Life, CPIC, and Ping An. During 1996-2000, they managed to 
maintain an average 95 percent of the market share in the whole industry in terms of premium income. 
' These yearbooks have been compiled by the CIRC annually since 1998, which mainly contain the 
financial statements filed by all insurers in China to the CIRC. 
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4.3.1 The general situation 
The main problem in the Chinese insurance industry is that, having experienced a 
high-speed development in the last two decades, the industry as a whole is revealing a 
state of insufficient solvency. " This has all along drawn the attention of regulators and 
experts. "' The typical solvency margins of the four major insurers demonstrates this 
problem. It is also incidentally evidenced by these four oligopolies' features such as the 
low level of capitalisation and the low operation profitability in both underwriting and 
investment (Chapter 5). Moreover, life insurers especially suffered huge losses due to 
negative interest margins (Chapter 5); and insurers, especially state-owned insurers, 
usually have a low profile corporate governance and risk management (Chapter 3) 
which make up essential issues on prudcntial regulation. 
4.3.2 The solvency situation 
As Fang Huang and XiaoTang Yu calculated, in 1997 the industry had a 32.69% 
insolvency rate measured against the solvency margins required by the 1995 
Insurance Law and regulations. "' Although this figure can not be verified in this paper 
due to the unavailability of the detailed data, the solvency problem can be partly 
demonstrated by an estimation of the weak solvency of PICC and China Life. For 
example, in 1999, PICC just met the solvency requirements, while China Life had a 
141.3 7% insolvency ratio (see Table 4.1). This could suggest that the Chinese insurers, 
especially the major state-owned oligopolies, suffered from insufficient solvency. 
47 Chengming Li (2002) "On fast growth risks and related management and regulation" Zhongguo 
Baoxian Bao (China Insurance News) May 20,2002. 
"Worrying amid Fast Growth" Zhongguo Baoxian Bao (China Insurance News) November 20,200 1. 
Fang Huang and XiaoTang Yu (2001) "Realistic options of ways to substantiate capitals of the 
Chinese insurance companies" Shanghai Baoxian (Shanghai Insurance) No. 2 2001, p9-11. The 
calculation is illustrated in the following table: 
Items Amounts (Rmb mn) 
1. Total Assets 167,271.66 
2. Deductibles 3,077.83 
3. Admissible Assets(I -2) 164,193.83 
4. Equity 18,41 . 94 
5. Actual Liabilities (14) 148,852.72 
6. Capital Adequacy (3-5) 15341.11 
7. Solvency Margin -22,792.19 
8. Insolvency -7,45 . 08 
9. Insolvency ratio 32.69% 
*Calculated separately according to the prescriptions of the Law and the regulations. 
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Table 4.1 An estimation of solvency situations Of PICC and China Life In 1999 
Items PICC (Rmb mn) China Life (Rmb mn) 
1. Total Assets 46,667 1311507.12 
2. Admissible Assets (estimatedL 43 123.3 125,853.94 
__ 3. Liabilities 37,361.3 127243 16 
4. Capital Adequacy (2-3) 51762 
5. Solvency Margin 5,701.2 3,357.85 
6. Actual Solv ncy 60.8 -4,747.07 
L7. Insolvency Ratio 141.37% 
4.3.3 Low level ofcapitalisation 
Firstly, the reported statutory equity funds of the four major insurers had experienced 
a continuing growth during 1996-2000 (see Chart 4.1), but it was realised wholly by the 
increase of paid-in capital rather than surplus from operation earnings. The aggregate 
equity rose from Rmbll, 618.74mn by 1996 to Rmb23,486.21mn by 2000, or by 
102.14% in nominal terms. The decisive component of this growth is that PICC and 
China Life supplemented their paid-in capitals by Rmb6,600mn and Rmb3,800mn 
respectively. Altogether, the paid-in capital of the four insurers increased by 
Rmb 12,300mn, while the aggregate equity increased by just Rmb I 1,867.47mn, which 
means that the growth of the aggregate equity was entirely due to the increase of paid- 
in capital. Secondly, it notes that the capital base had increased less than the increase of 
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I-ISk' CXPOSUrc (see Table 4.2), which COLIld harden tile poor sok ency SItUatiOll. Hm-cily, 
the levcls of' capital isation (equity in percentage of' total asscts) of' dic 1'01,11- IIISLIrcrs 
11LICtuated slightly in the period (sce Chart 4.2). 
Fable 4.2 Preminin Increase vs. Equity Increase 
Chart 4.2 Equity/total assets of the four 
major insurers 1996-2000 
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The feature of' low capitalisation can be further LIC11101"Istrated hy a comparison of . the 
,cI 
'S ilon-litc capitalisation hctwcen PICC ( 17.42`() in 1998) and that of' an averag 
insurer (34.64(Vo in 1998")). In addition, most global primary insurcrs that enicred file 
Clllncsc market usually posscss I'lir morc equity than that of' the wholc (Imicse 
instirancc industry. The low capitalisation sugocsts that Ilic Cluticse donicstic insurers 
own insufficicni, financial resoul-CCS to SLII)I)01-t CITeCtIVC COTIIJ)Ctlt loll \\'Itll ý\Cll- 
enclowcd f'orcign ctitrants. Thc gencsis of' this situation mainly pcs hack to the 
insurers' low lcvcI of' initial capital, SLIStZ1111CCI 11CLjCCt 01' CiII)INII SLIIII)ICIIICIlt, MId hild 
operation results. 
4.3.4 Low level qfsolvcn(ýv ratios 
As shown in Chart 4.3, the solvenci- reaios (equity funds CXJ)I*CSSCd XS I I)CI-CCIltal-le Of' 
net I)rcllllLll]IS) Of the four major ilISLII-Cl-S during 1996-2000 ranged fi"oni 14.87",, to 
. Swina Nol/2000 
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I,,, 1'ý97 1 ,,. H II" "-, 2000 
17.80%. These figures are below the average ratios of above 50% in the UK, the US, 
Germany, and France in 1996, and wen below that of over 110% in the UK in 1998 
(see Chart 4.4). While accurate comparisons between the countries may be impossible 
due to such incomparable elements as different accounting systcnns and regulations, 
there are clear gaps between the Chinese insurers and their Counterparts in the 
developed countries fii terms of solvency ratio. This to some extent evinccs the Chinese 
insurers' insufficient solvency. 
Chart 4.4 The average solvency ratio In some ivestern countries 
160 
ISO 
140 
130 
Germany -- Germany (at market values) .... UK 
France us 
Sources: Swiss Re. Sigma Nol/2000 
4.3.5 Weak profitability 
This is another main contributory factor to, the insufficient solvency. The industry 
has in general a low-profile profitability. As shown in Table 4.3, the four major 
insurers' average profitability (net profit in a percentage of total assets) during . 1996- 
2000 ranged from 1.48% at the highest to 0.96% at the lowest. Among the them, China 
Life is the worst performer with profitability rates never exceeding 0.57 % (in 2000) 
during the five years, showing very weak profitability. This is well below the average 
level of 2.1% for the life insurance industry in the world. " Clearly, as the Chinese 
insurance industry is unable tomake encouraging profits, its solvency problems thus 
can not be solved by surplus generated from its profits. The fact that the four major 
" "Accounting and financial reporting in life and health insurance companies" Loma 1999. 
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insurers increased their equity only by supplementing paid-in capital during the period 
highlights this problem. " 
A high expense ratio, insignificant investment returns, and unfavourable taxation are 
among the main causes of weak profitability. As shown in Table 4.4, the average 
operating expense ratios of the four insurers ranged from 17.33% to 26.51%, with 
PICC exceeding 30% in 1997 and 2000. These figures are higher than figures in some 
countries. For instance, the operating expense ratios of 1999 in Korea were 8.65% for 
the life industry, and 14.85% for the non-life industry. " As labour costs in China are 
comparatively low, such levels of expense ratios could imply inefficiency on the part of 
the Chinese insurance industry. 
Regarding operational performance, the four insurers maintained average positive 
profitability during 1996-2000 (see Table 4.3). However, they achieved this mainly 
through keeping low loss/payment ratios that ranged from 40.87% to 56.05%, which 
were considerably below those of western insurers, normally above 70%. " Low loss 
ratios do not necessarily mean a good operation because overpricing can also result in 
them. Conversely, as insurers' compensations or payments to policyholders typically 
display the functions of insurance business, low loss ratios may hint that policyholders 
are not fully compensated by insurers as prescribed in policies. If so, that will 
negatively affect insurers themselves. Actually, the Chinese insurance industry has long 
been operating by a paradigm of keeping loss ratio as low as possible to make profits in 
an environment in which investment has been strictly restricted. This operational 
strategy could impair consumers' enthusiasm for purchasing insurance products. 
Most of the Chinese insurance industry's profits have been generated by positive 
underwriting results, because investment revenue in a percentage of total revenue is 
insignificant, e. g. ranging from only 2.6% - 5.35% for the four insurers during 1996- 
2000 (see Table 5.2). Furthen-nore, the deficiency of investment is also demonstrated 
by other facts (see section 5.4.1, Chapter 5). For example, investment results (net 
investment revenues/net premium incomes) of the four insurers in 1996-2000 
" In recent years, the CIRC encourages state-owned insurers to increase their capital by shareholding 
and listing reforms. However, the fundamental solution of the insufficient solvency should rely on the 
improvement of proritability. 
53 See Annual Reports (FY1999) of Life Insurance Association and Non-Life Insurance Association in 
Korea. 
"' See Sigma No. 5/200 1, p8, and No. 4/200 1, p20. 
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fluctuated between 2.4%-3.84%. By comparison, the investment results in the US and 
Canada (five year averages during 1996-2000) were 18.8% and 16.5%, and 24.6% and 
15.7% for the UK and Gen-nany (five year averages during 1995-1999). " The 
insignificant investment performance severely impairs the Chinese insurance industry's 
profitability. 
Major state-owned insurers also suffered from heavy taxation. For example, until 
January 1997, an enterprise income tax at a rate of 55% calculated on a consolidated 
basis was levied on the former PICC and its three subsidiaries. This was a harsh 
restriction on their capitalisation through profits. The uniform business tax rate based 
on the premium income for the insurance industry increased in 1997 from 5% to 8%, 
and returned to 5% in 2003. The premiums of many long-term saving contracts issued 
by life insurers are not exempted from this tax. By comparison, most developed 
countries levy up to 5.15% business tax on insurers, and exempt certain life insurers 
16 from the tax. 
4.4 Current framework of prudential regulation and supervision 
In China, the 2002 Insurance Law, associated regulations and rules have addressed 
most of the issues involved in prudential regulation and supervision, mainly including 
the valuation of assets, restrictions on investment, the adequacy of technical provisions, 
solvency margin control, and solvency supervision (financial reporting and monitoring, 
as well as intervention measures). Consistent with China's WTO accession 
commitments, the framework for the prudential regulation and supervision is 
undergoing a significant transition from material regulation mode into a combination of 
solvency and market performance regulation mode. 
4.4.1 Solvency margin and capital adequacy 
Under the existing regulatory framework, each insurer is required to maintain a 
solvency margin commensurate with the scale of its business. An insurees actual 
Sigma No. 5/200 1, p8. 
For example, life insurers in the UK, Germany, and Italy are exempted from premium tax; the tax in 
most states in the US range from 2% to 3%, and France taxes 5.15% (mutual health benerit societies are 
exempted). 
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solvency is the value of admissible assets less admissible liabilities at the end of the 
insurer's accounting year. " 
China has taken three steps in insurance solvency and capital adequacy legislation. 
As the first step, the 1995 Insurance Law for the first time stipulated the requirements 
of capital adequacy that "an insurance company shall possess the solvency margin 
corresponding to its scale of business, " and "the balance of the actual assets of an 
insurance company, less its actual liabilities, may not be lower than the amount 
prescribed by the financial supervisory body"" Furthermore, the law imposed two main 
ratios relating to capital adequacy. One is that premiums retained by an insurer engaged 
in the property business in any year can not exceed by more that four times the sum of 
its monetary capital and common reserve. Another is that the liability of an insurer for 
each unit of risk (the largest loss that could conceivably be caused by a single insurable 
accident) can not be more than 10% of the sum of its paid-in capital and common 
reserveS. 59 
As the second step, the 1996,4dministration Regulations stipulated that an insurer's 
actual solvency is the value of actual assets less actual liabilities at the end of the 
insurer's accounting year. The regulations also issued instructions on how to calculate 
the minimum solvency requirements for life and non-lifc insurers, 60 and set out 
administrative intervention in insurers that fall below the minimum solvency marginS. 6' 
As the third step, the 2000 Insurance Company Regulations rcctified the solvency 
calculation in the 1996,4dministration Regulations and stipulated new standards. " The 
new regulations introduced some calculation methods for solvency margin 
requirements taken from the EU Third Insurance Directives, making the calculation 
under the new methods more complete and reasonable than that prescribed at the 
second stage. Such methods include using retained premiums, average annual 
compensation payments and fixed rates to calculate solvency margins (See Table 4.5). 
37 Art. 82, the 2000 Insurance Company Regulations. 
Art. 97, the 1995 Insurance Law. 
Art. 98,99, the 1995 Insurance Law 
Art. 50,5 1, the 1996 Administration Provisions. 
Id. Art. 52. 
Chapter 6, the 2000 Insurance Company Regulations. 
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Table 4.5 Solvency Margin Rules of China and EU 
China I EU 
For non-life insurance companies, the required solvency margin shall be the h4eher oftwo bases: 
For a premium basis 
18% of that part of retained premiums less tax 18% of gross premiums written up to 
on premiums in the given accounting year up to EurolOmn and 16% of gross premiums written 
RmblOOmn and 16% of the part in excess of in excess of Euro I Omn. 
RmblOOmn. 
For a claim basis 
26% of that part of the average annual 26% of gross claims (averaged over the last 
compensation payments made in the previous three years or over seven years for some natural 
three years that is less than Rmb70mn, and 23% perils insurances) up to Euro7mn, and 23% of 
of the part in excess of Rmb70mn. 
- 
gross claims of that part in excess of Euro7mn. 
For life insurance companies, the required so v margin shall be: 
4% of the life insurance liability reserves at the 4% of gross technical provisions (actuarial 
end of the accounting year for ordinary life reserves). For businesses without investment 
insurance business and 1% of the life insurance risk but expense risk, 0.1% of gross technical 
liability reserves at the end of the accounting provisions plus 0.3 of the capital risk (mortality 
year for investment-linked business; risk), with a lower for term insurances under 
0.1% of the insurance amount for fixed-tenn five years. 
life insurance risk where the insurance period is 
less than three years, 0.15% of the insurance 
amount where the period is between three years 
and five years, 0.3% of the insurance amount 
where the period is greater than five year and 
Ljor other types of risk. 
Although China in principle adopted the EU's solvency margin system (before the 
implementation of the Solvency I project), there are some substantial differences 
between the two regimes. Firstly, the minimum solvency margin levels for both life and 
non-life businesses are higher in China. " In addition, the EU rules require different 
minimum solvency margins between non-life and life businesses, plus various margins 
for different classes of non-life companies, reflecting their inherent underwriting 
riskiness. China, in contrast, has no such variations. Secondly, the EU model grants 
reduction of solvency margin for reinsurance. " Although this approach is reasonable as 
primary insurers often use reinsurance to shift their risks, China does not introduce it. 
This is mainly because there was no individual reinsurcr before China Re., the 
monopoly of the reinsurance market, was incorporated in 1998. 's Thirdly, the 
definitions of the actual solvency margins between the two regimes arc not the same. 
" Note 75, Chapter 2. In the EU, the minimum guarantee funds of non-life insurance companies 
(equivalent to "the paid-in capital in China"), for example, vary from EuroO. 2mn to EurolAmn. 
" For non-life insurance, the reduction could be a maximum of 50% (net claims incurred to gross 
provisions claims incurred) of ceded reinsurance, art. 16, the First Non-Life Insurance Directive, while 
for life insurance the reduction could be a maximum of 85% (net technical provisions to gross technical 
provisions) of ceded reinsurance. Art. 19, the First Life Insurance Directive. 
6S Note 37, Chapter 1. 
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The EU defines the types of admissible capitals for calculating actual solvency 
margins, " while China uses "admissible assets less admissible liabilities" method. The 
factors that make the results of actual solvency margins different are that the EU model 
allows the admissible capital to include some items, e. g. subordinated loans and certain 
percentage of unpaid capital, which are not allowed according to the Chinese 
Accounting law and rules. "' The second and third differences make the actual solvency 
margins bigger by using the EU model when the two models are applied to a same 
insurer. Finally, with the Solvency Iproject, the EU significantly modif icd its solvency 
margins for both life and non-life insurance business. Certain standards in the old 
system that China followed had been significantly raised, including: (1) a 50% higher 
required solvency margin applies for certain categories of non-life business which have 
a particularly volatile risk profile (marine, aviation, and general liability); (2) the 
thresholds for calculating non-life solvency margin have been increased from 10 
million Euro for a premium basis in the old version to 50 million Euro in the new 
system, and 7 million Euro for a claim basis to 35 million Euro, and both new 
thresholds will be indexed in the future; " and (3) supervisors have increased powers to 
intervene early to take remedial action where policyholders interests are threatened, for 
example, in a situation where an insurer currently satisfies solvency requirements but 
its financial position is deteriorating rapidly. By 2002, the Chinese authority had not 
made clear whether it would modify its system correspondingly. 
4.4.2 Assets 
For the purpose of calculating capital adequacy, the CIRC firstly set out assets 
valuation and admissibility standards in the Administrative Provisions for Insurance 
Companies' Solvency and Supervisory Indexes (200IRegulatory Indexes) which was 
" Art. 18, Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Directive 
7912671EEC. (COM(2000)617 final version). 
"' According to Chapter 5, the 1999 Accounting Standards for Insurance Companies, the statutory 
accounts of an insurer' equity include paid-in capital, capital reserve, statutory reserve, and retained 
earnings. 
"" Regarding the solvency margin requirements for non-life insurance undertakings, see Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Directive 7312391EEC. 
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repealed by a new version, the 2003 Regulatory Indexes. " According to the 2001 
Regulatory Indexes, the general picture is that all assets held by insurers are admissible, 
except a few inadmissible classes, e. g. loans and bonds issued by non central state 
enterprises that insurers are prohibited from investment. The percentages of 
admissibility differ among various items (see Table 4.6). Regarding valuation 
standards, the provisions stipulate that market value applies to assets where there is 
appropriate information on the market value of the assets; otherwise the cost value or 
amortised value is applicable. "" 
Regarding asset regulation in the 2001 4ssets Illustration, at least three kinds of 
problems can be identified. Firstly, the valuation standards are not explicit enough, 
giving rise to ambiguities both in terms of the application by individual insurers and the 
compatibility of statutory returns between insurers. For example, except for quoted 
equities and investment funds that are explicitly stipulated to use market value, there is 
no specified valuation method for other asset classes. This, on the one hand, could 
gives rise to the situation where individual insurers calculate their assets by choosing a 
method favourable, within the three prescribed methods. On the other hand, insurers 
could use different methods to calculate the same categories of assets, resulting in 
incompatible information for regulators. For example, some insurers could use market 
value on their office buildings, whereas other insurers may calculate at amortised value. 
The second kind of problems is that some provisions arc legally contradictory. 
According to Art. 48 of the 2001 4ssets Illustration, "all assets acquired in violation of 
current laws or without the approval of the regulators arc inadmissible". This is 
reaffinned by Art. 3 1, which prescribes that bonds issued by enterprises other than 
" The new version contains six chapters, twenty two articles, and six appendixes, including: general 
provisions; solvency margin and regulations; solvency indicators for non-life insurance companies and 
life insurance companies respectively; screening criteria for these indictors; standards for admissible 
assets; standards for assessing the reserves of non-life insurance companies; and instructions for 
applying the regulatory ratios and criteria. 
70 Art. 8, Illustrations on Assets Admissibility Standards for Insurance Companies Appendix I of the 
Administrative Provisions on Insurance Companies'Solvency and Supervisory Indexes CIRC 2001 (the 
2001 Assets Illustration ). 
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Table 4.6 Asset Admissibility 
Assets Admissibility Admissibility Explanations 
(2001 Rules) (2003 Rules) 
Cash 100% 100% 
Questionable deposits (with 
attached conditions, e. g. 
Deposits in banks collateral deposits, or unable 
or in other financial 100% 100% to withdraw at expiration) and 
institutions deposits in troubled banks or 
in other financial institutions 
(in regulators' receivership or 
liquidation) are not 
admissible. 
For short-term investments 
in government bonds, 
applying lower cost or 
market; Confined only to government 
Bonds 100% For short-term investments bonds and central state 
in financial bonds and enterprises' bonds. 
enterprise bonds, applying 
lower cost or market minus 
reserveforpossible losses, 
For long-term investments in 
financial bonds and 
enterprise bonds, applying 
amortised cost minus 
reservefor possible losses. 
Policyholder loans 100% 100% 
Other current 40% Inadmissible 
assets* 
0, Compensation paid in advance 
Receivables 30%, 100%** 0,30%, 70%, 100%*** and deposited guarantee funds 
are 100% admissible 
For short-term investments, 
Quoted equities 100% applying lower cost or 
market minus reservefor 
possible losses; 
For long-term investments, 
applying amortised cost 
minus reserveforpossible 
losses 
Unquoted equities 90% -- 
Investment 90% 
securities funds 
Confined only to government 
Convertible bonds 90% bonds and central state 
enterprises' bonds. 
Investments in real 90% 
estates 
Business fixed 0,30%, Net cost minus reservefor 
assets 40%, 80%, possible losses* 
90%**** 
0,40%, Deposits of capital guarantee 
Intangible assets 50%, 100% 0,100% 
I 
funds: 100%, long-term 
amortised expenditures- 0. 
*For example, prepaid expenses, materials, etc. 
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"Premium receivables and other receivables with a maturity of 6 months or less are 100% admissible 
while those with maturity above 6 months up to one year are 30% admissible, and those above one year 
are inadmissible. 
***Premium receivables for primary insurance with a maturity of less than one year are 100% after 
allowance for doubtful debts. Premium receivables for reinsurance with a maturity of less than 3 months 
are up to 100%, for those with a maturity between 4-6 months are up to 70%, between 7-12 months are 
up to 30%, above one year are 0. 
**** Office building: 90%, equipment: 80%, buildings in construction: 80%, transportation equipment: 
40%, electronic equipment: 30%, fixed assets in disposal: 0. 
***** The admissible values of total fixed assets are up to 50% of the sum of paid-in capital, capital 
reserve and retained profits. 
****** Land lease costs: 50%, other long-term assets: 40%. 
central state enterprises are not admissible because of the legal restrictions. " However, 
in contradiction, Art. 37 admits investments in real estate which are also prohibited. 
The third kind of problems is that the admissibility of certain assets is unreasonable 
because of their features. For example, prepayments in "other current assets" arc 
admissible at 40 percent of accounting value. However, such prepayments arc prepaid 
expenses which are recorded as assets under the principle of inatching inconies with 
expenses. Admitting such prepayments will distort the solvency position because they 
are by nature no longer capable of fulfilling insurers' contractual liabilities. 
The 2003 Regulatory Indexes substantially modified assets valuation and 
admissibility standards (see Table 4.6). A distinct progress is that it clarifies the 
standards of asset admissibility by setting forth three principles: conformity, prudence, 
and legitimacy. " Generally, assets that can be used at an insurces will to fulfil its 
obligations to policyholders are admissible in terms of solvency. The CIRC provides a 
(not detailed) list of admissible assets and inadmissible assets. Those outside the list 
deem inadmissible. An asset shall be treated as inadmissible if it can not be sufficiently 
proved admissible. An insurer shall take into account all possible risks and losses 
thereby preventing an asset from being overvalued, if uncertainties exist on the asset. 
Both investments in violation of laws, regulations, and the CIRC's rules, and all non- 
investment assets (e. g. materials, and prepaid expenses) are inadmissible. 
By clarifying valuation methods for various bonds, equities, and fixed assets (see 
Table 4.6), the 2003 Regulatory Indexes rectify the first kind of problems mentioned 
above, the valuation ambiguities in the old version. However, the last two kinds of 
problems remain. In addition, given the stringent restrictions on insurers' investment 
7' Similarly, Art. 17 stipulates that loans to enterprises arc inadmissible due to legal restrictions on this 
kind of investments. 
" Appendix 5, "Illusions on Assets Admissibility", the 2003 Regulatory Indexes CIRC. 
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(see chapter 5), the existing framework of asset regulation does not contain some 
essential stipulations that are commonly seen in developed countries and other regimes 
to control various asset risks. These stipulations usually include: a detailed list of 
admissible (or inadmissible) assets for solvency; " the assets covering the policy 
liabilities shall take account of the type of risk written and are to be "diversified and 
adequately spread"; "' maximum proportions of the total assets are allocated on various 
categories of assets and on an any one investment; 75 and asset-liability matching in 
terms of duration, and currency. 
4.4.3 Liabilities 
a. A general description 
The major laws and regulations governing liabilities include: the 1995 Insurance 
Law (Art. 93-96,1 00)", the 2000 Insurance Company Regulations (Art. 76,77), the Rules 
for Insurance Companies' Financial Standards (1999, Art. 47, Sec. 14), the Rules for 
Insurance Companies' Accounting Standards (1999. Chapter 3- 2161,2162,2171, 
2201-2203,2211), the Rules for Actuaries (the CIRC, 1999), and the Illustration on 
Admissible Liabilities (Appendix 6 of the 2003 Regulatory Indexes). 
Insurers must set aside sufficient technical provisions that enable them at all times to 
meet all their commitments under their insurance contracts. The 2000 Insurance 
Company Regulations (Art. 76) clearly specify that "technical provisions of an insurer 
must be real and adequate". The 1995 Insurance Law and regulations specify the 
setting up of various types of reserves and associated calculation methods. Four types 
of reserve funds and their calculation standards are defined as follows: 
- Portfolio reserve for insurance business other than 
life insurance (unearned 
premium reserve) Non-life insurers are obliged to set aside no less than 50% of the 
retained insurance premium of the current year to the reserve. 77 The insurers can 
71 also choose one standard among " 1/8", " 1/24" and " 1/365" methods. 
7' Art. 21, the Third Direct Non-life Insurance Directive, and art. 21 the Third Direct Life Insurance 
Directive. 
74 Id. Art. 20. 
73 Id. Art. 22. 
These provisions are reaffirmed by 2002 Insurance Law. 
The 1995 Insurance Law, Art. 93, 
The Illustration on 4dmissible Liabilities 4ppendix 6 of the 2003 Regulatory Indexes. 
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Porýfolio reserve for life insurance (life assurance reserve) Life insurers are 
required to allocate the full value of the effective life insurance policies to the 
reserve. 
Outstanding loss reserve"' It is, under the 2000 Insurance Company Regulations, 
split into provisionfor notified outstanding claims (according to the claims already 
made, not exceeding 100% of coverage limitations) and IBNR provision (provision 
for claims incurred but not reported by the balance-sheet date. It requires the 
allocation of funds not to exceeding 4% of the amount of payments actually made 
in the relevant year into the provision). Both life and non-life insurers are required 
to set these two reserves. 80 
Equalisation provision Both life and non-life insurers are required to allocate 1% 
of the premium revenues of the current year to equalisation provision, and cease 
the allocation when the amount of the provision reaches 10% of the their total 
assets. The fund of the provision shall be deposited in a commercial bank 
designated by the regulators. " 
In general, technical provisions on non-life insurance in China are less prescriptive 
than on life insurance, as the factors affecting non-life insurers' obligations for future 
claims payments tend to be subjective and variable. With regard to calculation 
methods, China requires that poq/blio reserve for non-life insurance business, 
outstanding loss reserve, and equalisation provision arc calculated by using statistical 
methods, whereas actuarial methods are required for the calculation of provisions for 
life assurance. Actuaries must use the appropriate mortality tables as required by the 
CIRC or choose certain mortality tables prescribed by the CIRC for specific products. 
The interest rates for the calculation of life assurance provision shall not exceed the 
lower between the rates fixed by the CIRC and the assumed rates set by the insurers. " 
b. Comments 
Adequate technical provisions are the cornerstone of sound capital adequacy and 
solvency regime because regulations concerning capital adequacy arc tied in with the 
required level of technical provisions. Technical provisions account for the majority of 
an insurer's liabilities, equalling the insurees contractual obligations to its customers 
" The 1995 Insurance Law, Art. 93,94. 
The 2000 Insurance Company Regulations, Art. 77. 
Ile 1996 Administration Provisions, Art. 32. 
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and other contract beneficiaries. However, as these obligations represent the present 
value of expected future payments, they can not be known exactly and must be 
estimated. Under-provisioning harms an insurees financial positions in at least two 
ways. On the balance sheet, under-provisioning creates a higher level of owners' equity. 
Under-provisioning for claims distorts an insurces judgement concerning the 
equilibrium of its underwriting, which may lead the insurer to taking commercial 
initiatives to bolster sales of certain products that appear to be profitable whereas in fact 
they will eventually incur losses. " Therefore, technical provisions of an insurer have to 
be adequate, reliable, objective, and allow comparison between insurers. " 
The regulations concerning technical provisions in China are largely consistent with 
international practices. According to the EU Directives, each member state is 
responsible for legislating and supervising the compliance with the rules regarding 
technical provisions for an insurees entire business. Meanwhile, the Directives set out 
principles and detailed rules. In the case of life insurance, the 7hird Life Insurance 
Directive lays down a number of principles for the calculation of technical provisions. " 
It stresses that "technical life assurance provision should be calculated by a sufficiently 
prudent actuarial valuation of all future liabilities of existing policies, including 
guaranteed bonuses and surrender values, policyholder options, future bonuses and 
future expenses and commissions, taking credit for future premiums due". The amount 
of non-life technical provision, according to the Third Non-Life Insurance Directive, is 
to be calculated in accordance with rules laid down in the Insurance Accounts Directive 
(91/674/EEC, Art. 19-32) which set out the categories of provisions and disclosure 
The 1999 Rulesfor, 4ctuaries (CIRC, June. 1999). 
Supra note 22. 
Principle 1, Principles on capital, 4dequacy and Solvency MIS 2002. 
"The EU Third Life Insurance Directive Art. 17. 
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86 requirements in financial statements. By comparison, China adheres to the principle 
that technical provisions must be real and adequate. It provides categories of 
provisions, and applies actuarial methods for calculating life assurance provisions and 
statistical methods for non-life insurance provisions. By examining the four major 
insurers' reserve conditions, the technical provisions as a percentage of total liabilities 
continued to increase from 80.47 % in 1996 to 9 1.11% in 2000 (see Chart 4.5 and Table 
4.8). During 1996-2000, the rates of increased reserves exceeded the rates of increased 
net premium revenues in almost each year (see Table 4.7). Both reflect the prudence of 
the technical provision regulations of China and the satisfying compliance by the four 
insurers. However, there are still some concerns over technical provisions. 
Table 4.7 (% of) reserve Increase vs. (% of) net premium Increase 
(four major Insurers 1996-2000 Rmb mn, or %) 
1996 1997 1998 
Total Reserves 86,594.07 123,612.36 159,725.93 
% of Increase 100 142.75 184.45 
Net Pren-dums 65,249.33 95,309.30 117,474.95 
% of Increase 100 146.07 180.04 
1999 2000 
203,714.39 257,807 
235.25 297.72 
129,924.55 141,877.37 
199.12 217.44 
86 Similarly, all OECD countries have regulations for the setting-up and calculation of technical 
provisions and appropriate supervision. See "Insurance solvency supervision: compilation of country 
reports" OECD Insurance Committee Secretariat Insurance and private pensions compendium for 
emerging economies Book 1, Part 2: 3), 2001. 
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c. Outstanding loss reserve 
The existing rules seem not precise. For the provision for notified outstanding 
claims, it does not make clear whether the allocation of funds is based on a case by case 
approach adopted, e. g. by the EU. " It is also not clear how to deal with claim handling 
expenses. Expenses that are attributed to claims, e. g. the costs of using external loss 
adjusters to assess the claims (direct expenses), or the administrative expenses of the 
claims handling (indirect expenses), should be included into the reserve. " In addition, 
it also has no provision on how to deal with IBNER (incurred but not enough reported 
claims). For the IBNR provision, the standard of "not to exceeding 4% of the amount of 
payments actually made in the relevant year" also seems unsound. Although a simple 
percentage standard is easy to follow, it is static and can not match prudent 
requirements in a changing environment. According to Art. 56, JAD (the EU), IBNR 
provision is generally set up on a prudent basis with an attempt to ensure no adverse 
ran-off. In contrast, some member states of the EU in practice adopt "best estimate 
basis" which use different statistical methods to determine the provision. " For 
example, insurers in Spain, required by regulatory authorities, use at least two different 
statistical methods to compute the reserve, and book the higher of the two results. Due 
to the shortcomings of the existing rules, some insurers in China use outstanding loss 
reserve to manipulate their profits in regulatory returns. Insurers with good operation 
results sometimes over-estimate the reserve in order to hide profits and delay tax 
obligations. Oppositely, insurers with sad profits sometimes undcr-estimate the reserve 
for wangling the trust from shareholders and policyholders. 
d. Provisionfor unearnedpremiums 
A contentious issue involving theprovisionfor unearned prendums is the valuation 
of the provision. The existing method for the calculation of the provisionfor unearned 
premiums only contains time apportionment which is simple to use but may not 
accurately reflect a realistic likelihood of the risk that insurance companies entail. 
Furthen-nore, the existing framework does not make explicit provision for the condition 
'Art. 60, the EU InsuranceAccounting Directive (IAD). 
Id. 
See the 2002 KPMG Solvency Study, p62-69. 
165 
under which a policy-based method or a lump sum method is used. To be prudent, the 
provision in principle must be computed separately for each insurance contract (in 
contrast to the lump sum method). "' Statistical methods, and in particular proportional 
rate method, could be used where "they may be expected to give approximately the 
same results as individual calculations. "" It might be appropriate to take account of the 
risk profile where there is a marked unevenness in the incidence of risk, " as the 
assumption of a temporal correlation between risk experience and premium is not 
appropriate in some classes of insurance, e. g. travel insurance. 
e. Equalisation provision 
In the EU, there are inconsistencies between Member States in establishing and 
maintaining equalisation provision. Equalisation provision, also referred to as (claims) 
fluctuation provision or stabilisation reserve, is usually the amount set aside on the 
balance sheet, in compliance with legal or administrative requirements, to cqualise 
fluctuations in loss ratios in future years or to provide for special risks. The amounts set 
aside for specified types of business (e. g. pollution liability or credit insurance) may be 
referred to as provisions, whereas amounts set aside to cover fluctuations of the entire 
portfolio may be referred to as reserve. " In China, according to the 1995 Insurance 
Law (Art. 96), the purpose of setting up an equalisation provision is "to safeguard the 
interest of the insured and support the stable and sound operation of insurance 
companies. " Therefore, the provision can be seen as a reserve to cover fluctuation of 
insurers' entire portfolio. 
The current equalisation provision has some problems. It fails to differentiate 
characteristics between life and non-life business because of the same rate for 
calculating the provisions of the two businesses. The operation of funds is incfFicient, 
as insurers are required to deposit their funds in designated banks. As some academics 
suggest, the funds seem to provide low capacity of security for insurers' contingent 
" In the 2002 KPMG Solvency Study, it quotes the "Manghetti Report"(2000) that most non-life 
companies in the EU are likely to perform the calculation on a policy by policy basis. Also Art. 57(l), 
the EU Insurance Accounting Directive (IAD) states that "the provision for unearned premiums shall in 
principle be computed separately for each insurance contract". 
9'Art. 57(l) of the IAD. 
See Art. 57(2) of the IAD. 
"On Solvency, Solvency Assessments and Actuarial Issues" An IAIS Issues Paper (Final Version), 
1999, p47. 
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losses, whereas some insurers claim that the funds are over-provisioning. " In addition, 
some insurers treat equalisation provision as a liability both in their statutory accounts 
and regulatory returns while others treat it as an equity, 95 which create incompatibility 
among insurers. Finally, there is no rule on how to use equalisation provision. Some 
academics suggest that it may be used on a whole industry scale in the liquidation of an 
individual insurer or to compensate for huge losses incurred by one or more insurers 
from less-frequent but severe disasters. 
4.4.4 Reinsurance 
Reinsurance performs important functions essential for a healthy insurance market. 
Reinsurance enables insurers to even out their operational results when major, 
exceptional losses occur, control underwriting loss, and manage their assets safely and 
profitably. Furthermore, insurers can use reinsurance to increase the maximum amount 
they are able to cover for most insurance portfolios, without becoming overextended. 
MIS has recognised five primary functions of reinsurance: capacity, expertise, stability, 
financial, and protection. "" From the regulatory stand, ensuring reinsurers' solvency is 
an essential part of prudential regulation. 
Reinsurers' solvency regulation can be broadly divided into two parts: direct 
regulation that deals with issues directly relating to reinsurers' solvency, e. g. reinsurers' 
solvency margins and licensing; and indirect regulation that governs the influence of 
reinsurers' solvency on primary insurers, e. g. admissibility of reinsurance assets for 
primary insurers, and limitations on maximum exposures to reinsurance. " 
Provisions related to reinsurance in China are scattered; there is no specific 
reinsurance law or regulation except the Compulsory Ceding Conditions (CIRC, 1999) 
and its associated Rules for Implementing Compulsory Ceding Conditions (CIRC, 
" See Huang Cidong & Gao Shenpin Baoxianfa X Mangguan Fagui Xinzhu (Alew Annotation on 
Insurance Laws and Relevant Regulations) People's Court Publishing 2000, p802-803, and "On 
solvency and its regulation and supervision in China" Baoxian Yanjiu (Insurance Study) 200 1. No 1. 
" Such incompatibility can be seen in statutory returns in the China Insurance Almanac 1998, 
1999,2000. 
" "Reinsurance and Reinsurers: Relevant Issues for Establishing General Supervisory Principles, 
Standards, and Practices" Reinsurance Working Group, IAIS, 2000 
" See "Study into the methodologies for prudcntial supervision of reinsurance with a view to the 
possible establishment of an EU framework" KPMG, commissioned by EC, January 2002 
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2000). The current reinsurance regulatory framework are basically related to "domestic 
retention" requirements"' and compulsory reinsurance cessions, both seeking for 
building up a strong national reinsurance capability and preventing outflows of 
reinsurance premiums. For example, the 1995 Insurance Law (Art. 101) requires that 
20% of gross premiums (except for life insurance business) received by local insurers 
be ceded to designated reinsurers. In practice, the compulsory reinsurance business has 
long been monopolised by state-owned China Re. the only one domestic specialised 
reinsurer in the market. "' Furthermore, when an insurer needs to reinsure, it must give 
priority to insurers inside China, but the insurer can reinsure with a foreign insurer 
where reinsurance conditions at the foreign insurer are clearly superior. 
There are also provisions governing other aspects of reinsurance. Under the Art. 100 
of the 2002 Insurance Law, an insurer shall reinsure any part of the liability for a 
"single insured event", which exceeds 10% of the sum of paid-in capital and common 
reserve of the insurer. All insurers must submit a compulsory reinsurance cession 
proposal for the next year to the CIRC for approval every year before November VY' 
Approval from the CIRC must be obtained where an insurer reinsurcs with an 
associated insurer. 'O' Licensed insurer may, with CIRC approval, also write inward 
commercial reinsurance. 
Except for the special provisions above, domestic reinsurers are largely subject to the 
same regulatory regime as direct insurers. In addition, there is no explicit provisions on 
both direct and indirect regulation of reinsurers' solvency. 
The reinsurance market in China is still in its initial stage, and faces many problems 
and challenges. The monopoly of compulsory reinsurance business by China Re. 
hampered the upgrade of its reinsurance technology and services, resulting in 
insufficient reinsurance supply and demand. It notes that compulsory reinsurance made 
up 88% of the total reinsurance premiums in 2000, thereby indicating that the insurers' 
cession proportions of commercial reinsurance are insignificant. Furthermore, China 
Re. lacks sufficient capital funds for further development. Both the insurance and 
reinsurance market can not meet the demand for the underwriting of natural disasters. 
The 2002 Insurance Law, Art. 103. 
According to its statutory returns, China Re. reaped a premium income of Rmb 14 bn (US$ I. 7bn) in 
2000, up 21 % from the previous year. Total indemnity paid stood at Rmb7bn (US$843mn) in 2000. The 
insurer's total assets had reached Rmb 15. Ibn (US$1.8 billion) by the end of 2000. 
The 2000 Insurance Company Regulation, Art 87. 
Id. Art. 89. 
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Regarding challenges, the reinsurance market is one of the first areas to open to the 
outside world according to China's commitments to the WTO. The rate of the 
compulsory reinsurance cession is being reduced down to zero. After the entry of 
WTO, Swiss Re. and Munich Re. had been granted to provide life and non-life 
reinsurance services in China without geographic limitations on operation. These two 
factors heat competition in the reinsurance market. 
Overall, given the tremendous growth potential of China's direct insurance market, 
the chances for sustainable growth in the reinsurance market appear to be huge. China 
needs to further the development of the reinsurance market, including allowing more 
foreign reinsurers' access to the market. Compared with direct insurance, reinsurance 
business is international in scope; the emergence of the global reinsurance market is 
already underway which has being fuelled by reinsurance growth in emerging 
markets. " Allowing more foreign reinsurance companies to operate on the national 
market strengthens the ability of locally-owned direct insurance companies to compete 
with their foreign competitors. This is because reinsurance can act as a substitute for 
the capital of a direct insurer, and support the insurer with underwriting techniques. 
Correspondingly, China needs to improve its fragmentary reinsurance regulation, and 
especially, improve reinsurers' solvency regulation. 
4.4.5 Reporting system 
Implementing prudential regulation means establishing a system to monitor insurers' 
regulatory compliance. One of the regulators' main tasks of on-going supervision is to 
check and analyse insurers' regulatory returns (off-site supervision). The 2002 
Insurance Law requires insurance companies to file annual financial reports no later 
than three months after the end of the financial year, and submit a monthly business 
statistics statement of the previous month. "' These documents should be verified by a 
registered accountant approved by the CIRC. 'O' The annual financial reports consist of 
a financial statement, balance sheet, profit and loss account, and a series of statutory 
"' The global reinsurance market was worth US$207bn in 2000. North America and Western Europe are 
still the biggest markets for reinsurance, but the growth rate between 1991 and 2000 was less than 4%. 
However, the average growth rate over the same period was 9% for Asia Pacific Rim, 6.1% for Latin 
America, and 5.2% for central and eastern Europe. Reuter News Service. September 13,200 1. 
"'Art. 119, and 120.2002 Insurance Law 
"' The 1996.4dministration Provisions, Art. 72. 
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reports. The Law also obliges both life and non-life insurers to employ the CIRC 
recognised actuarial personnel and establish an actuarial reporting system. "' In 1993, 
China introduced a thorough reform on the old accounting system that derived from the 
former Soviet Union. The new system is broadly consistent with the International 
Accounting Standards (IAS). In 1999, China enacted two decrees specifically for the 
insurance accounting system: the 1999 Accounting Standards for Insurance 
Companies, and the 1999 Financial Standards for Insurance Companies. These two 
decrees set out detailed accounting principles and a wide range of standards for insurers 
preparing their profit and loss account, balance sheet, and related general ledger 
accounts and sub-ledger accounts. In particular, the 2003 Regulatory Indexes require 
insurers to file annual statutory returns for solvency of previous year before April 30" 
every year. These returns need signatures of insurers' representative of legal person, the 
actuary in charge and the chief financial officer, and the verification by a registered 
accountant. An insurer is obliged to ensure the truthfulness and completeness of its 
returns. 
4.5 Early warning system 
4.5. ]A briefhistory and the current system 
China has been making continuous efforts to establish an early warning system. For 
the purpose of off-site supervision, in 1999, the CIRC issued two decrees aiming at 
establishing an early warning system within reporting procedures; " and previously the 
PBOC tried a similar method in 199820' The 1999 early warning system contained a set 
of financial statements and ratios by which regulators test risks entailed by insurers on 
their financial viability. However, the system was premature, and did not contain the 
intervene measures necessary for regulators to take in response to levels of an insurer's 
risks. In addition, the CIRC did not give priority to the system, because the insurance 
accounting system then had not been fully established. 
"' The 2002 Insurance Law, Art. 119. 
" The Financial Report Forms for Insurance Supervision, the CIRC, March 1999; and the Notice of 
Adjusting Some Items in Financial Reportsfor Insurance Supervision, the CIRC. December 1999. 
` The Regulatory Indicesfor Insurance Industry, the PBOC September 1998. 
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As an experimental effort, the 2001 Regulatory Indexes set up an early warning 
system characterised by containing "a scoring system". '" It consists of three parts: self- 
assessment and report-filing by insurers; verification of the files by the CIRC; and, if 
necessary, the adoption of appropriate intervene measures by the CIRC. 
Firstly, insurers are obliged to follow the provisions of the 2001 Regulatory Indexes 
to compile their solvency returns. The vital parts of the returns are the regulatory 
indicators (a set of ratios) that are the bases for calculating a cumulative score 
presumed to reflect an insurees solvency condition. The ratios differ between non-life 
and life insurers (I I ratios for non-life, and 9 for life, see Table 4.9). Each ratio has a 
given full score, with an upper limit and a lower limit for weighting. Insurers are firstly 
required to calculate their actual ratios, and then to get a weighted score for each ratio 
by following a given calculation method before summing up all the scores to get a 
cumulative score. 
Table4.9 Indicators to Insurers' solvency (2001 Regulatory Indexes) 
For non-life Insurers For life fnsurers 
I Operational Ratios I Change in Long-term Insurance 
I Change in Gross Premiums Written Premiums 
2 Net Premiums Written to Equity 2 Change in Short-term Insurance 
3 Premium Receivables Premiums 
4 Combined Expenses and Commissions 3 Change in Product Mix 
to Net Premiums 4 Combined Short-term Payments to 
5 Payments to Net Premiums Net Premiums 
6 Underwriting Cost Ratio 5 Change in Equity 
11. Financial Ratios 6 Non-I'crforming Assets to Equity 
7 Liabilities to Assets 7 Fixed Assets to Equity 
8 Fixed Assets to Equity 8 Surrender Ratio 
9 Change in Equity 9 Adequacy of Investment Yield 
10 Non-Pcrforming Assets to Equity 
111. Investment Ratio 
II Investment Yield 
Secondly, the CIRC verify the returns. The provisions require insurers file detailed 
calculations, assessment methods, data resources and relevant illustrations regarding 
solvency margins, admissible assets and various reserves. The information assist the 
verification. 
Finally, the CIRC takes certain actions upon insurers' different scores. The perfect 
cumulative score is 100. An insurer holding an 85 cumulative score or above is deemed 
by the CIRC as having sound solvency and operations. An insurer with a score between 
60-84.9 needs the special attention from the CIRC, and is required to present an 
analysis of abnormal ratios together with a proposal of improvcmcnt. An insurer with a 
"' The 2001 Regulatory Indexes, art 4. 
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score below 60 will warrant the attention from the CIRC who may suspend the insurer's 
business or order it to reorganise within a certain period, or may even revoke the 
insurer's license. " The CIRC carries out a solvency assessment on insurers once a 
year. 
By drawing experiences from the US and the EU, and lessons from its own 
experiments, the CIRC is determined to develop a modem early warning system that fit 
to China's realities. In March 2003, the CIRC, by the 2003 Regulatory Indexes, 
replaced the experimental system with a new system which abandoned the scoring 
approach, and instead, simply use a set of ratios to monitor insurers' solvency 
conditions. Under the new rules, solvency margins are the core indexes of an insurces 
financial situation, while the regulatory indexes (I I ratios for non-life insurers, and 12 
ratios for life insurers, see Table 4.10, and Table 4.11) are for assessing and monitoring 
the situation and trend of insurers' solvency. Where an insurer has four or more 
indicators exceeding acceptable ranges, the CIRC shall, in the light of specific 
conditions, decide whether to take the following actions: 
(1) requiring the insurer to present reports that explain the causes of the abnonnality, 
the influence on solvency and the solution thereof, 
(2) launching a full inspection to assess the actual condition and trend of the insurces 
solvcncy; and 
(3) based on the results of the inspection, taking necessary corrective actions. 
TahIP AI (I TntUrainre m nnn-lifo In. mirerr' solvenev (2003 Revulatarv Indore-0 
Indicators (Ratios) Calculation flange 
I Gross Pren-dum Growth Change in Gross Premium/Gross Premium, -10-60 
Ratio prior year 999 (for a period less 
than I year) 
2 Net Premium Growth Change in Net Premium/Net Premium, -10-60 
Ratio prior year 999 (for period less 
I -than 
I year) 
3 Gross Premium Size Ratio (Primary Insurance Premiums + :5 900 
Reinsurance Premiums)/(Admissible Assets 999 (for Admissible 
- Admissible Liabilities) Assets: 5 Admissible 
Liabilities) 
-10-30 
4 Change in Actual Change in Actual Solvency/ Actual 999 (if Actual 
Solvency Ratio Solvency, prior year (%) Solvency of either 
this year or prior 
year :9 0) 
5 Two Year Overall Two Year Expense Ratio + Two Year Loss < 103 
Operating Ratio Ratio (%) 
6 Investment Yield Ratio Net Investment Income/(Cash + Average k3 
Invested Assets) (%) 
" The 2001 Regulatory Indexes, Art. 17. 
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2: 95 
7 Short-term Liquidity Ratio Liquid Assets/Admissible Liabilities (%) 999 (if Liquid Assets 
:ý 0) 
8 Financing Risk Ratio Sold Purchase Back Sccurities/(Paid-in :5 50 
Capital + Cumulative Reserve) (%) 
9 Premium Receivables Premium Receivables*/Premium Income :58 
Ratio I M) 
10 Admissible Assets- Admissible Liability/Admissible Assets :5 go 
Liability Ratio 
II Asset Admissibility Ratio Admissible ValueNalue in Accounts 2t 85 
*Premium Receivables with a maturity of less than I year. 
Tnhip d-I I Indiratnre tn life In-urorclsolvenev (2003 Repulatorv Indo-res) 
Indicators (Ratios) Calculation Range M 
I Change in Long-term Change in Long-term Insurance Gross -10-80 
Insurance Premiums Premium/ Long-term Insurance Gross 999 (for a period less 
Premium, prior year (%) 
_ I 
than I year 
2 Change in Short-term Change in Short-term Insurance Net -10-60 
Insurance Net Premiums Premium/ Short-term Insurance Net 999 (for a period less 
Premium, prior year (%) than I year) 
-10-30 
3 Change in Actual Change in Actual Solvency/ Actual 999 (if Actual 
Solvency Ratio Solvency, prior year Solvency of either 
this year or prior 
year: 5 0) 
4 Change in Product Mix Sum of Absolute Change of Premium in :58 
Various Products/Number of Products 
5 Admissible Assets- Admissible Liability/Admissible Assets (%) :5 go 
Liability Ratio 
6 Asset Admissibility Ratio Admissible Value/Value in Accounts 85 
7 Two Year Short-term -565 
Insurance Payment Ratio 
8 Adequacy of Investment Net Investment Income/Retums Required 125-900 
Yield by Technical Provisions of Enforceable 
Long-term Life and Ilealth insurance 
9 Surplus Relief (Residue of Allocated Reinsurance Cost - -25-25 
Reinsurance Cost)/(Admissible Assets - 999 (for Admissible 
Admissible Liabilities) Assets :9 Admissible 
I 
Liabilities) 
Sum of Change in Each Investment Item 
10 Change in Asset Mix Net Admissible Value in Proportion of <5 
Total Value of Cash and Investment 
Portfolios 
II Financing Risk Ratio Sold Purchase Back Securities/(Paid-in :5 50 
Capital + Cumulative Rese e) (%) 
12 Surrender Ratio Surrenders/(Long-term Insurance <5 
Provision, prior year + Long-term 
Insurance Premiums) 
4.5.2 Comments 
The main purpose of an early warning system is to predict an insurces insolvency. 
The system should provide essential information related to an insurces financial 
conditions and operational effectiveness, and whereby regulators can give special 
attention to the insurees problems at an early stage. This results in regulators' further 
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investigation into the insurer followed by appropriate corrective measures to avoid the 
insurer becoming insolvent. Therefore, the merit of an early warning system depends 
on the accuracy of its predictions and related costs. It is important to recognise that the 
early warning system is a supplement to, rather than a replacement for, other forms of 
financial monitoring, e. g. on-site inspection. 
Fewer early warning systems are seen in insurance regulation over the world than in 
banking regulation which has adopted many varieties of the systems. "' in the US, the 
NAIC is operating two early warning systems for the US insurance industry: the 
Insurance Regulatory Information System (IRIS), '" and the Financial Analysis and 
110 See Ranjana Sahajwala and Paul Van den Bergh "Supervisory risk assessment and early warning 
systems" Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Working papers No. 4, December 2000 Bankfor 
International Settlements (BIS) 
... The NAIC adopted IRIS in the 1970s. It contains a series of 12 fmancial ratios (differing among 
property-casualty, life and health insurers) relating to the detection of actual or potential insolvency. For 
details, see Peter M. Lencsis (1997) Chapter 6, Insurance regulation in the United States an overview 
for business and government Quorum Books. Also see Robert W. Klein (2000) "Regulating insurer 
solvency in a brave new world" Working paper Centre for Risk Management and Insurance Georgia 
State University p43-52. 
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Surveillance Tracking System (FAST). "2 Japan introduced early warning measures for 
insurance industry in 1998. It is increasingly recognised that insurance regulators can, 
and should, draw experience from banking regulation on the issue of early warning 
systems. 
Regarding the system in China, data including statutory returns of insurers are not 
publicly available so far for examining the capacity of the system. Nor is there any 
available breakdown of its costs. Even so, judged on a theoretic basis, several issues 
regarding the effectiveness of the system can be raised. 
Firstly, it is generally recognised that financial ratios are not sufficient on their own 
to identify the complex nature of risks undertaken by financial institutions"' among 
which insurers entail particularly complex risks. "" A wide variety of both qualitative 
and quantitative information relate to risks and management thereof, for example, 
management and corporate strategy, industry risk, business review, operating 
performance, investments, capital adequacy (including reinsurance adequacy and 
reserve adequacy), liquidity, and financial flexibility. This requires both objective 
judgements, Le. numeric analyses, and subjective analyses and opinions, when 
assessing an insurer's risks and financial conditions. The subjectivity requires and 
allows regulators to incorporate non-ratio methods into their early warning systems. In 
financial regulation (mainly banking regulation), one category of such methods is the 
supervisory rating systems which help identify institutions' risk profiles based on either 
on-site or off-site examinations. A widely-known example of this category is the 
112 FAST was introduced by the NAIC in 1989. It consists of a series of financial ratios (differing in 
numbers and nature among property-casualty, life and health insurers) to help monitor insurers' financial 
conditions and identify those insurers requiring further regulatory attention. For detailed description, see 
id. In addition, Grace Martin F., Scott E. Harrington and Robert W. Klein, (1998) "Risk-Based Capital 
and Solvency Screening: Hypotheses and Empirical Tests" Journal of Risk and Insurance, 65, and 
(1998) "Identifying Troubled Life Insurers: An Analysis of the NAIC FAST System" Journal of 
Insurance Regulation, 16, which provides empirical research results claiming that FAST is a reasonably 
effective system for early warning purposes. 
Supra note 6, p 17-18. 
For detailed discussion on insurance risks, see "Report of solvency working party" International 
Actuaries Association (IAA) February 2002. 
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CAMEL rating system. "' Another category is comprehensive risk assessment systems. 
This approach makes a comprehensive and detailed assessment of the risk profile of a 
financial institution as a whole. One example is the Risk Assessment, Tools of 
Supervision and Evaluation System (RATE)"' in the UK, which was introduced by the 
Bank of England and currently used by the FSA. These methods arc more risk-focused 
than the financial ratio method, reflecting the worth of qualitative factors in detecting 
and assessing risks. As on-site examinations arc required for these methods, they 
facilitate formal links between supervisory bodies and institutions. In summary, 
combining these methods with financial ratios enables regulators to conduct a more 
structured supervision with a greater emphasis on formal risk assessment. China's early 
warning system is characteriscd by assessment of financial ratios based on off-site 
examinations. It is therefore desirable to increase the elements of supervisory rating 
systems and comprehensive risk assessment systems, in order to make more accurate 
risk assessments of insurers. 
Secondly, there are some shortcomings in ratio selection. "' Some ratios arc not 
really significant or relevant enough for their inclusion in the system. For example, for 
non-life insurance, the index of Investment Yield Ratio (see Table 4.10) may not be 
significant enough, because the percentage of investment assets in non-lifi: insurers is 
very low. Therefore, even a satisfactory Insurance Yield may not contribute greatly to 
"'Me CAMEL rating system was introduced by the US supervisory authorities for on-site examinations 
of banking institutions in the 1980s. It is used by three US supervisory agencies, i. e. the Federal Reserve 
System, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC). Under this system, each banking institution subject to on-site examination is 
evaluated on the basis of six (initially five) critical dimensions relating to the financial condition, 
operating soundness and regulatory compliance of the banking institution. These are Capital, Asset 
Quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity and later-addcd Sensitivity to market risks. For details, see 
Rebel A. Cole and Jefferey W. Gunther (1995) "A CAMEL Rating's shelf life" Financial Industry 
Studies, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, December 1995, p13-20. 
"' The RATE is applied to all UK-incorporated banks and the UK branches of non-EEA banks. Its 
objective is to increase the effectiveness of supervision by making it risk-focused. It decomposes a bank 
or banking group into significant business units and assesses each unit for nine evaluation factors of the 
business risk profile. Scores are assigned for each factor. A final assessment or score for the bank or the 
group comes by consecutively aggregating individual scores and assessment results of units from lower 
level to higher level. For details, see UK FSA "Risk based approach to supervision of banks" June 1998. 
117 It notes that some ratios seem to reflect the industry's realities. For example, the inclusion of 
"Premium Receivables" could help alleviate the severity of premium receivables, a long standing 
problem in China's insurance industry. 
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an insurer's total profit. A replacement with a new concept Investment Yield Ratio (= 
Investment ProfulTotal Pre-tax Profit) may be more significant because the new ratio 
reflects not only the size of investment profit but also the proportion of the profit in an 
insurer's total profit. Another example is Gross Premium Size Ratio (Table 4.10). 
Under art. 99 of 2002 Insurance Law, "the current year net premium of an non-life 
insurer may not be more than four times the sum of its paid-in capital and cumulative 
reserve. " By its definition, the Gross Premium Size Ratio, although has a purpose 
similar to the provision for controlling premium size, is not closely relevant to the 
provision. In addition, some significant ratios are excluded from the system. For 
instance, no Two Year Overall Operating Ratio is for life insurance, which is unable to 
detect life insurers' operational efficiency. Moreover, adequate technical provisions for 
liabilities are crucial to insurers' solvency. Some ratios such as Outstanding Claim Test 
(=Provision for Claims/Claims Paid) and Unearned Premium Adequacy (=Unearned 
Premium ProvisionlNet Premium) arc useful to detect the adequacy of these provisions. 
However, there is not any ratio for technical provisions. Nor is there any ratio for 
reinsurance, e. g. Reinsurance Ratio (= reinsurance RecoverieslReinsurance Expense), 
or Premium Cession Rate (= Outward ReinsurancelGross Premium), which reflect an 
insurer's prudence. Moreover, the numbers of ratios arc noticeably less than the 
numbers of FAST. 
Thirdly, some elements of certain ratios are questionable. For example, regarding 
Two Year Overall Operating Ratio, the measure used to calculate expense ratio are 
incorrect. The denominator should be Net Earned Premium rather than Net Written 
Premium because the latter improperly relates a given ycars expense to the real 
revenue earned for that year. Anther example is Short-terin Liquidity Ratio (Table 
4.10). Normally, the ratio in accounting practice is calculated by Liquid 
AssetslAdmissible Liabilities, which reflects a firm's capacity of discharging its liquid 
debts. It is meaningless to relate liquid assets to total admissible liabilities because the 
to total admissible liabilities contain long-term debts. 
Fourthly, some acceptable ranges assigned to ratios also prove to have 
shortcomings. For example, the acceptable ranges for Gross Premium Growth Ratio 
are -10% - 60% (Table 4.10, for life insurance, the upper range of Change in Long- 
term Insurance Premiums is even as high as 80%, see Table 4.11). The 60% annual 
premium growth rate seems very high, measured against either those in developed 
countries or even those in the history of the Chinese insurance market. An insurer with 
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excessive growth entails special risks if it is poorly co-ordinatcd in terms of risk 
selection, pricing, and financial resources sufficient to supporting the growth. "' 
Currently, one main problem facing most Chinese insurers is high-speed growth of 
premium income accompanied by a gradually reducing profitability. The main reasons 
behind this are the ignorance of excessive growth risk, one-sided policies on business 
growth, and neglect of efficiency. To solve the problem, the regulator needs to provide 
proper incentives. It recommends that the CIRC reduce the upper ranges (in both non- 
life and life insurance) to, for example, 40%, making the indictors sensitive to the alert 
of the excessive growth risk. 
Fifthly, the current early warning system is based on the annual account data. This 
may distort insurers' real situations due to the time lag. Generally, only if insurers are 
examined at frequent intervals and their financial conditions generally remain stable, 
can relevant ratios be accurate indictors of potential problems. Therefore, to make the 
results close to reality, examinations need to be carried out in an appropriate frequency, 
for example, twice a year. 
At last but not at least, in order to be a useful tool for regulators, the parameters of an 
early warning system should be capable of predicting insolvency. To achieve this, 
regulators may focus the parameters on those failed companies, or more closely, focus 
on conditions which could lead to insolvency. "' However, this will not be easy for 
China. As China has a relatively short-term data collection, and no insurer fails so far, 
the current parameters may be determined by the CIRC's experience. However, the 
CIRC needs to adapt indicators and acceptable ranges to changing conditions. 
"' Viviane Leflaive (2001) "The supervision of insurance solvency: comparative analysis in OECD 
countries" OECD, p16. 
"' Klein R-W. and Barth M. M. (1995) assert that solvency monitoring systems should focus on those 
companies that "have dashed into the street" rather than those that "have been hit by a car". They suggest 
that the parameters should be identical to the conditions which could lead to insolvency. See "Solvency 
monitoring in the twenty-first century" Journal ofInsurance Regulation, 13: p284-285. 
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4.6 Policyholders Protection Funds 
This section provides an overview ofpolicyholdersprotectionfunds (PPF) including 
their main benefits and drawbacks, and discusses the necessities of establishing such a 
system in China. 
4.6.1 Overview ofpolicyholders protection funds 
PPF (or Insurance Guarantee Funds) may be defined as funds/systems which will be 
triggered when an insurer has either fallen into a critical condition which may result in 
its inability to pay the claims already filed or those to be made later, or has actually 
gone into liquidation. The system can either pay claims directly (or through a separate 
company or organisation) to the policyholders based on the fund collected from 
insurers or from the government; or it can inject necessary money into the failing 
insurer or into a separate insurer which has agreed to take over the portfolio of the 
failing insurer. "O Although detailed provisions differ among countries due to different 
national conditions, there are common characteristics: coverage, eligibility of 
claimants, funding, compensation, and organisation of administrating the funds. 
PPF are prevalent among OECD countries. It has been reported that at least 21 
member countries of OECD have one or more such funds. "' Funds also exist in some 
Asian countries and regions (Brunei, Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong, Macao, Malaysia, 
Philippines, and Singapore) and some economies in transition (Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Estonia, Latvia, Romania, Slovenia, and Ukraine). "' 
In recent years, there seems a trend in the world towards the creation or renewal of 
PPF, mostly triggered by the failure of insurers, or otherwise driven by the convergence 
of financial service sectors. This is especially so where insurance merges with banking, 
as banks are usually equipped with a deposit insurance scheme. For example, in 2001, 
the UK enacted a single Financial Services Compensation Scheme that fully replaced 
"' See Insurance Regulation and Supervision in OECD countries, ASIAN Economies and CEEC and NIS 
Countries OECD, 2000, p197. Also see "Policyholder Protection Funds" Glossary of Insurance Policy 
Terms OECD (2938) 1999 p54. 
121 Viviane Leflaive "The Supervision of insurance Solvency: Comparative Analysis in OECD 
Countries" OECD 2001. 
122 Id. 
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eight separate compensation arrangements of the financial industry including 
insurance. "' 
The main benefit of PPF is the payment of compensation to customers of failed 
insurers. It is generally recognised that the four interacting elements (market conduct 
regulation, an ombudsman scheme, prudential regulation, and PPF) constitute an 
organic framework of insurance regulation and supervision in modem society. Among 
them, market conduct regulation focuses on insurers' market performance while an 
ombudsman scheme deals with contractual disputes between insurers and 
policyholders. Prudential regulation serves to secure the safety of insurers in advance. 
However, some insurers will always fail, especially under the current environment of 
deregulation and fiercer competition, no matter how solid the prudential regulation is. 
PPF is expected to serve as the final safety net for policyholders, especially for 
individuals and non-professional policyholders who face considerable information 
asymmetry and have limited ability sufficiently to verify the credibility of an insurer. 
Moreover, individuals and non-professional policyholders are deemed the most 
vulnerable to losses in the event of insurers' bankruptcy. 
It is also said that the existence of PPF could increase consumers' confidence in 
insurance industry, not only when policyholders get compensation from the funds, but 
also when no claims need to be made. The development of the insurance industry is 
built on the public confidence in the industry which assumes risk transfer and 
mitigation through "favourably unlimited consumers' participation. " Naturally, 
consumer awareness of the existence of the funds, or the comfort derived from the 
belief that they will be protected in the event of insurers' failure, will encourage 
consumers to participate in the insurance business, so benefiting both the industry and 
consumers. 
PPF is also considered helpful for developing a dynamic and pro-competition 
insurance market. Some argue that the funds on a broader scale have been proposed by 
promoters of deregulation as a means of softening the impact of insolvency which they 
expect to result from increased competition. 124 Without such a safety net, the authorities 
would be inclined to place stringent regulations at any cost to minimise or prevent an 
insurer's failure, as such a failure could cause widespread suffering to policyholders and 
"' Financial Services Compensation Scheme FSA of the UY, 2001 
IN See Werner Pfennigstore Chapter 7 Public Law of Insurance International Encyclopaedia of 
Comparative Law note 985, p 143. 
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a shock across society. This could result in depressed competition and hinder the 
development of insurance market. 
Australia currently has no PPF, as debate about on the merits of the funds is 
continuing. The mechanism levies mandatory guaranty funds on all insurers, regardless 
of their insolvency risk. This has been criticised for creating moral hazard and adverse 
selection among policyholders and insurers when PPF increase the security of 
policyholders. Firstly, as contributions will eventually be paid by consumers, the 
implicit cost of this protection to consumers in fact shifts insolvency losses to them. 
This will reduce buyers' incentives to purchase insurance from financially strong 
companies, and so reduce their incentives to avoid high-risk insurers through exercising 
care in selecting insurers. In addition, it seems unfair to force the policyholders of 
soundly managed insurers to subsidise those who choose to deal with unreliable 
insurers. Secondly, this implicit cost is not adjusted according to an insurer's financial 
risk, if insurers must pay a uniform rate against their premiums regardless of their 
prudence. This could increase the temptation for insurers to engage in irresponsible 
risk-taking, leading to higher insolvency and resolution costs. It may also increase the 
temptation for insurers to engage in irresponsible price wars. Thirdly, the burden of 
financing the PPF may impair the solidity of some insurers. Fourthly, such a 
mechanism tends to induce regulators to postpone corrective action against financially 
impaired insurers. "' In order to minimise the moral hazard and adverse selection 
incentives and to improve policyholders' and insurers' incentives to act prudently, some 
proposals have been put forward for injecting proper economic incentives into the 
systems. These proposals can mainly be categorised into two kinds: risk basedpricing 
(RBP) of guaranty funds"" which aim at fairly pricing insurers according to an actuarial 
assessment of their respective insolvency risks; and imposing certain costs on 
policyholders. "' 
4.62 Yhe needs to establish a policyholder protectionfund in China 
See supra note 119, p 143. 
See W. R. Feldhaus & M. M. Barth, "Risk-based pricing factors for property and casualty insurance 
guaranty funds" CPCU Journal 45,1992. p239-249. 
"' For example, a partial payment that requires policyholders to share losses with the funds so to 
encourage them to make a prudent selection of insurers. See supra note 123. 
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Should China set up PPF in the current wave of strengthening insurance regulation 
and supervision? There have been few researches on this question. It may be a 
reflection of the fact that no insurer has failed so far in China. However, it needs to 
consider whether an insurer's failure is possible and how to sort out policyholder 
protection in case of an insurer's bankruptcy. Certainly, China needs to establish PPF 
for the reasons as follows: 
Firstly, it is to nurture and maintain public confidence in the insurance industry. 
There is a widespread recognition that China insurance has a huge potential, but this 
requires sound public confidence in the insurance business as a prerequisite. However, 
as surveys revealed, one of the main obstacles to the development of the industry is low 
consumer awareness. "' Public confidence in insurance can not be built up without great 
consumer awareness of the insurance business (On the other hand, low awareness also 
indicates consumers' scarce insurance knowledge). In addition, being in a primary stage 
of development, China's insurance market largely comprises consumers vulnerable to 
losses. These consumers certainly require the guarantee of PPF because they could 
easily lose their confidence if they suffer losses from insurers' failure. 
Secondly, it is necessary to mitigate the insolvency risk of the Chinese insurers. As 
demonstrated in section 4.3, over recent years, some insurers have faced serious risks of 
insolvency. The majority of the insurance industry has a low profile of profitability, 
capitalisation, diversity of products, competitive advantage of prices, and internal 
managerial competence. In addition, the industry has grown by 34.4 %a year in the last 
two decades, with a rapid increase of new entrants. It believes that insurcrs will entail 
greater risks if they grow excessively and can not support this growth with sufficient 
financial resources. Although Chinese consumers have not seen an insurce failure so 
far and might not believe that such an event would happen in the future, they have 
witnessed a series of failures in financial services, which they would not have believed 
a decade ago. In the last years, a number of financial institutes in difficulties were 
closed 
"' See China Daily March 4,1999, and note 48, chapter 1. 
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in China. "' It is inevitable that some insurers will fail in an increasingly competitive 
market, especially because there always be a certain number of events covered by 
insurance policies, which could be unpredictable or can not be avoided. 
Thirdly, it is a requirement for changing public opinions on the safety of insurance 
business. Chinese used to view insurance as a state-run business because it was run by 
the state under the monopoly of the former PICC before 1985 and is still controlled by 
an oligopoly of the five giant state-owned insurers. Most consumers are used to 
believing that insurers are "too big to fail". This has been fuelled by the tradition of 
implicit full guarantees by the government on the insurance business, and the fact that 
insurers have indeed never failed. The reform of state-owned insurers and opening up 
have meant that the unitary state ownership of insurers has been changed into a 
multiple ownership containing stock ownership, foreign branches, and joint ventures 
besides the state ownership. Even private capital is allowed to invest in insurance 
sector. The government simply no longer provide the same safety net as it used to. 
Thus, it has to move from the implicit full guarantee tradition to the new regime of the 
limited safety net provided by PPF. 
Fourthly, it is necessary to protect policyholders by PPF under the current insolvency 
procedure of insurance companies. The importance of PPF is inversely linked with the 
level of privileges to policyholders in insolvency procedure. In principle, it may not 
necessarily introduce the funds if the interests of policyholders are well protected in the 
procedure. "' in China, there is neither an explicit definition of closure of insurance 
companies and nor sufficient protection of policyholders' interests in the relevant 
procedure (section 2.4.2, Chapter 2). According to insurance law, where a life insurer is 
closed down or declared bankrupt, its life insurance contracts and reserves must be 
transferred to another life insurer. The CIRC designates a life insurer to take over these 
contracts and reserves, where no transfer agreement can be reached between the 
12' For example, during 1997-1999, one commercial bank (Hainan Development Bank) and three 
international trust and investment companies (China 4gribusiness International Trust and Investment 
Company, China Venture Technology Investment and Trust Company, and Guangdong International 
Trust and Investment Company) became insolvent. In addition, 23 urban credit co-operatives and 18 
rural credit co-operatives were closed during the same period. All these institutions were in the 
authority's receivership or were dissolved after liquidation. Some local governments provided sums for 
compensating depositors' losses from insolvent institutions. 
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insurers. "' However, the law does not clarify how to compensate the taking-over" 
insurer when it receives insufficient reserves. In liquidation, policyholders are not 
secured creditors. Those policyholders who have already made claims on their policies 
are in third position in repayment order, after the repayment of expenses involved in the 
bankruptcy and the wages and social security premiums owned to the staff of the 
insurer in liquidation, but in front of the General Bureau of Taxation. "' The repayment 
of policyholders may be on apro rata basis where there are insufficient assets. "' Given 
the insufficient policyholders protection in the existing insolvency procedure, China 
needs to establish PPF. 
In practice, in dealing with the closure of Guangdong International Trust and 
Investment Company, the Guangdong provincial government provided the liquidation 
board with a loan of Rmb780mn for compensating depositors who were natural persons 
for their losses. However, this was a political decision, not based on an explicitly legal 
provision. This triggered appeals for the establishment of deposit insurance in China. 
As convergence of financial services has already emerged in China, it needs PPF to 
ensure fair competition between the banking and insurance sectors, if deposit insurance 
is introduced. 
Fifthly, it is a requirement of the changing style of insurance regulation and 
supervision after the WTO accession. With gradually relaxing the restrictions on 
licenses, business scope and geographic coverage, more and more foreign insurers are 
gushing into China, stimulating ever fiercer competition. All insurers will operate 
under the rule of market economy: the survival of the fittest. Moreover, China's 
insurance regulatory and supervisory authority is in the process of transferring from its 
rigid regulatory style, cultivated in the era of the planned econonly, to a more pro. 
competition, transparent, risk-based, and prudential-focusscd style. Competition is 
expected to be pronounced in the new legal environment. How to protect the interests 
of policyholders, especially non-professional policyholders of insurers eliminated by 
the mechanism of market economy is an important issue facing the authority. China 
should set up PPF as important part of market exit systems. 
130 For example, Germany grants policyholders a secured claim on the assets of the failed insurance 
company corresponding to the technical provisions over against any claims lodged against the insurance 
company. Accordingly, Germany has a PPF that only covers motor liability. 
131 The 2002 Insurance Law, Art. 88. 
132 Id. Art. 90. 
133 Id. Art. 89. 
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4.7 Concluding remarks 
China is upgrading its prudential regulation and supervision. This mission should 
follow a clear strategy that keeps track of the trends in the world and draws lessons 
therefrom in the light of China's realities. China needs to adopt a risk-dcaling, 
comprehensive, synergetic, joint, and dynamic approach to its upgrading cffort. In 
accordance with the discussions in the preceding sections, some suggestions and 
recommendations are presented as follows: 
a. Strategies of improving solvency situation 
In the last two decades, the Chinese insurance market has achieved more than most 
foreign markets ever have. It is likely that the market will kecp its momentum of rapid 
growth in the near future, given the new impetus provided by widespread domestic 
structural reforms and China's accession to the WTO. However, inadequate capital 
obstructs the further development. "" Effective solutions could include allowing more 
new market entrants and improving the existing insurers' solvency situation through 
shareholding and listing to attract foreign and private capital. However, realistically, in 
the short-term and medium-term it can hardly expect that the authority will allow major 
state-owned insurers to substantially transfer their shares to foreign competitors, or in 
domestic stock markets. This is due to concerns about protecting the national industry 
and the volatility of the stock markets. Moreover, healthy operating pcrformancc is 
vital, otherwise insurers will incur new capital shortages. Therefore, the most 
appropriate solution to the solvency problems for local insurers is to improve their 
efficiency by adopting comprehensive measures to tackle cvcry aspcct of their 
deficiencies, with focuses on improving internal risk managcmcnt systems and 
corporate governance. On the role of insurance regulation and supcrvision, the 
authority needs to create an appropriate legal environment for guiding and facilitating 
insurers' efforts. To this end, ajoint approach to prudential regulation and supervision, 
that relies more on insurers' internal controls and corporate govcmancc and the 
insurance industry's self-regulation, is worth encouraging. This approach should be 
accompanied by the supervisor's monitoring. 
"" It has been predicted that the Chinese insurance market will grow at a 30-50% annual rate to 2005, 
and needs extra capital of Rmb I OObn. See supra note 49. 
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b. Upgrading solvency margin, assets, provisions, reinsurance and reporting systems 
With the adoption of a more modem model, that is, inter alia, largely harmonised 
with the EU solvency criteria, the Chinese prudential regulation has been improved. 
However, according to a study of the Solvency IIproject, there are some shortcomings 
in the EU solvency model, leaving it not to meeting all the necessary criteria prescribed 
in the IAIS "Principles on capital adequacy and solvency". "' Like the EU model, 
China's solvency margin system does not adequately rcflcct the full range of insurers' 
risks. China needs to trace the trend of insurance solvency reform in the EU, carry out 
researches on the possibility of adopting RBC system, and appropriately adapt its 
system to changes. 
With the gradually easing of restrictions on investment, China should consider to 
replace the direct control of investment channels with widely applied asset regulatory 
measures, e. g. a detailed list of admissible/inadmissible assets, diversification and 
spread, asset-liability match, etc. (see chapter 5 for discussions on main problems of 
insurers' investment and issues on improving investment regulation) 
Regarding the upgrading of the current provision system, it suggests that China need 
to take the following measures. Firstly, notified claim reserve needs to be calculated 
case by case. Both IBNR and IBNER should use "best estimate basis" which use 
appropriate statistical methods to determine the provisions. Secondly, for provisionfor 
unearned premiums, China needs to make provisions for the use of analytical methods 
based on risk profile, so as to allocate premiums appropriately over a period of risk for 
those classes of business that are not suitable for time apportionment. Thirdly, 
equalisation provision needs to differentiate insurers with various risk profiles. It 
suggests that different rates be adopted, which are based on an insurce solvency 
situation indicated by the early warning system. In addition, special kinds of 
equalisation provision need to be set up for those business lines with volatile risks, 
such as catastrophe insurance and credit insurance. 
"' According to the 2002 KPMG Solvency Study, the existing solvency rules are based on simple fixed 
ratios which provide for safety margins that do not adequately reflect the full range of risks to which 
insurers are exposed. A number of implicit capital requirements are imposed through the prudent 
valuation of assets and liabilities which make it difficult to assess the true financial position and compare 
the financial strength of companies located in different Member States. There are also inefficiencies in 
the setting of technical provisions, with high degree of subjectivity involved. 
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One particular challenge is to build up actuarial capacity within both the CIRC and 
insurers, and develop essential actuarial standards for the insurance industry. The 
supervisory personnel need to work closely with actuaries and auditors, as joint 
participants in prudential oversight of the industry. 
As defined by the MIS in the "Insurance Core Principles", the insurance supervisor 
must be able to review reinsurance arrangements to assess the degree of reliance placed 
on these arrangements and to deten-nine the appropriateness of such reliance. From the 
point of strengthening indirect regulation of reinsurers' solvency (which is closely 
linked to insurance prudential regulation), a number of issues need to be addressed. For 
example, firstly, like the EU rules, insurers should be given credits for their reinsurance 
on solvency margins. To ensure the quality of the credits, certain supervisory 
requirements are needed. For example, a ccding insurer must hold a collateral contracts 
to secure its reinsurer's obligations on the reinsurance or constitute a trust fund if 
reinsurance is not ceded to a reinsurer licensed in the home country of the insurer. 
Secondly, as proposed by the MIS, "' insurers' solvency margin requirements should 
take into account the relative riskiness and diversity of reinsurance, in deciding 
whether, and to what extent, reinsurers, assets should be allowed to count towards an 
insurer's statutory solvency requirement. Thirdly, to reduce the rcinsurcr default risk, it 
is essential to ensure diversification of reinsurance through limitations on the amount of 
credits that can be taken for reinsurance with any one reinsurcr. In addition, the CIRC 
may restrict insurers from use of "unapproved reinsurers. " Fourthly, to prevent insurers 
from overdue exposures to reinsurance, the CIRC needs to impose limitations on 
maximum exposures or issue guidance on what are appropriate maximum exposures. It 
is also important to improve the direct review of reinsurance arrangements. At present, 
the CIRC only issued standards for compulsory reinsurance cession arrangements. With 
the coming termination of the compulsory reinsurance cession, insurers should be 
encouraged to cede their risks to commercial reinsurance. To this end, the new 
standards for commercial reinsurance arrangements and relevant regulatory vcrification 
need to be formulated. 
The forthcoming Accounting Standardsfor Insurance Undertakings prepared by the 
IASB, which will greatly influence insurance accounting practice, including valuation 
of assets and liabilities, need China's special attention for upgrading its reporting 
system. 
"" "Principle IV in "Principles on Capital Adequacy and Solvency" IAIS, 2002. 
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c. Improving the existing early warning system 
In the light of the analyses in section 4.5, it suggests that China need a risk-based 
approach to improving the existing early warning system by cmphasising risk 
management within insurers. 
China needs to incorporate a variety of non-statistical measures (qualitative 
assessments) into the existing early warning system. The qualitative assessments 
should include analyses of an insurer's business strategies, with an aim at evaluating its 
competitive strengths and/or weaknesses. On the strategic front, firstly, the rcgulator 
needs to examine the strategic positioning and focuses of the insurer, how the insurer 
intends to reach its goals, how it measures its achievements, and whether its plans make 
sense in the light of industry dynamics and the management team's capabilities. 
Secondly, the quality and credibility of an insurees senior management team is an 
important determinant of how successful that the insurer will be in going forward. 
Regulators need to look into the management's operational skills, Le. their ability 
successfully to execute their chosen strategies, their internal control systems, how tile 
insurer organises its planning process, and how the process is related to managing and 
measuring its performance. Thirdly, regulators also need to look into the management's 
risk tolerance, e. g. how various types of balance sheet risk (from investment and 
underwriting operations, and from choosing a particular capital structure) arc measured, 
controlled, and balanced. This would include a detailed understanding of the 
management's risk tolerance and guidelines for maintaining levels of solvency or 
solvency ratios. 
Other upgrading measures include increasing the numbcr of ratios and rcplacing 
insignificant ratios with material ones, rectifying the meaningless clemcnts of some 
ratios, modifying acceptable ranges for some ratios to ensure more close to insurers' 
actual risks, and increasing the frequency of regulatory returns. Regarding the 
improvement of ratio selection, China should add some ratios corrclating to an insurces 
solvency, especially those reflecting dynamic changes of the solvcncy, to the currcnt 
ratio list. This helps increase the comprehensiveness of the early warning systcm. For 
example, it is reasonable to accept ratios on reinsurance and on technical provisions. 
Both return on revenue and return on assets are important indicators in an analysis of 
an insurce overall performance. Regarding investment, asset divcrsirication (by assct 
class, sector, maturity, issuer), portfolio liquidity, and asset valuation ("hiddcn" asset 
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values: market values versus book values) are important indicators for measuring the 
quality and diversification of investment. The growth rate of premium needs to be 
analysed generally over a five-year period, and ideally, in total and by line of business. 
Regarding the timeliness of information, besides annual regulatory returns, regulatory 
returns relating to solvency could be submitted on a half a year basis in both electronic 
and paper forms. 
d. Some issuesfor establishing a policyholderprolectionfund in China 
China should establish PPF according to its realities and by drawing lessons from the 
experience of foreign countries. The system should be designed carefully to minimisc 
known drawbacks, particularly the moral hazard and adverse selection, and to provide 
member insurers with incentives for sound management. 
PPF should be closely co-ordinated with financial regulation and governmental 
intervention to protect better policyholders' interests. It widely rccogniscs that timely 
and appropriate intervention in the troubled insurers is a more effective and cfficicnt 
way to safeguard the interests of policyholders. This is the reason that some 
jurisdictions allow PPF to be used to support govenimental intervention. When drafting 
the Insurance Law, the legislators clearly recogniscd that it might better protect the 
policyholders of life insurers by keeping continuation of contracts. Therefore, the law 
stipulates the voluntary or compulsory transfer of insolvent insurers' valid contracts and 
reserves to sound insurers. However, the law does not make clear how to compensate 
the "takc-ovcr" insurers when they receive insuflicicnt reserves. It is desirable for 
China to remedy this defect by making PPF available for alleviating "takc-ovcr" 
insurers' undue burdens. The funds may also be available for other kinds of 
governmental interventions such as financing the reconstructing of troubled insurers. 
On the compensation, two key issues need to be addressed. Firstly, the system should 
be designed to share failure costs between policyholders and insurers to restrict moral 
hazard and encourage consumers to avoid high-risk insurers. The safety incentives 
could be improved by making policyholders share a great portion of insolvency costs, 
because this might force them to take insurers' financial risk into greater account when 
deciding on the right insurance purchase. This, in turn, may improve insurers' 
incentives with respect to risk taking. However, such measures should be carefully 
balanced with the sustainability of Chinese consumers. Secondly, it is advisable to set a 
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maximum level and reasonable standards of compensation to avoid imposing an 
excessive levy on member insurers for unrealistic compensation. 
PPF should be designed to protect those who are least able to protect themselves. 
Therefore, it is advisable to concentrate compensation on policyholders of natural 
persons, non-professional policyholders, and small businesses. Further, the funds 
protection might be greater for individual insurance consumers and less for commercial 
buyers who are expected to be better able to protect their own interests than individuals. 
In consideration of the financial difficulties facing insurers in China, it is advisable 
to use combination prc-funding and post-funding method"' for levying contributions so 
as to avoid funds abuse and minimisc impairment of insurers' solidity. The system 
should have principles to guide the funds operation managed by insurers. Contributions 
should be levied on a strict basis of matching the funds to compensation and other 
necessary operation costs. 
China should consider risk-based pricing of PPF to enhance incentives for insurers to 
control risk. Actuarial pricing of insurers' insolvency risks will be imperfect, but it is 
likely to be better than pricing of PPF that is not based on risk. If insurers had to pay 
higher guaranty funds premiums because of high-risk strategies, they would reflect this 
additional cost in the price or benefits of their products. Consumcrs would havc to 
evaluate whether the PPF surcharge included in an insurer's price was justified by the 
economic value they derived from the insurer's products. This would cffcctivcly 
internalise the cost of risk to its beneficiaries and eliminate the cxtcrnalisation of this 
cost to policyholders of low-risk insurers and the public through flat-rate pricing of 
guaranty fund coverage. The risk-bascd pricing could use results of the CIRC early 
warning system. 
To demonstrate state support for PPF, China should grant the funds with tax 
deductions and other effective measures, for cxamplc, govcrnmcnt loans and 
government guarantees. It is advisable to treat contributions as cxpcnscs thus cligiblc 
for tax deductibility of corporate taxes. 
"' The PPF in Norway uses this method. The member companies are required to set aside a contribution 
each year (named as "provision for the guarantee arrangement") under statutory criteria until the 
accumulated sum reaches a prescribed level. The individual companies retain and manage the 
contribution before the board of funds is called for payment. The board may levy to make up the 
def iciency. 
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The system could establish an independent organisation responsible for running the 
funds, set out well-structured corporate governance framework for the organisation, and 
make clear the relationship between the CIRC and the organisation to avoid 
unnecessary interference from the regulator. 
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Chapter 5 
Issues on insurance investment regulation in China 
5.1 Introduction 
The Chinese insurance industry has made great progress during the last two decades. 
However, it has been suffering from severe investment dericiency in terms of volume 
of and return on investment, which threatens insurers' solvency and their further 
development. The problem can be traced back to a number of causes, including strict 
restrictions on insurers' investment channels long imposed by the government, various 
immature markets, and unsophisticated insurers' investment skills. How to looscn 
government restrictions and create an appropriate legal environment for rational 
insurance investment are the issues to be addressed urgently on improving China's 
insurance regulation. The main purpose of this chapter is to discuss and answer the 
issues by looking at the realities of China and referring to experiences and Icssons from 
developed countries. These experiences are drawn mainly from three documents 
published by OECD, namely, "Selected Principles for the Regulation of Investments by 
Insurance Companies and Pension Funds"(2000), "Insurance Regulation in OECD 
Countries, Asian Economies and CEEC and NIS Countrics"(2001), and "Comparative 
Tables on Insurance Regulation and Supervision in OECD Countries (Paratte Report 
2001)". ' 
The chapter starts with a brief review of roles of insurcrs' investment, investment 
risks and the related regulatory issues. It then provides an overview of the rcgulatory 
framework governing insurers' investment in China, together with a brief overview of 
the development of insurers' investment. It goes on to discuss the main problems in the 
investment to demonstrate the urgent need for relaxing restrictions on the investment 
and improving investment regulation. The interaction between insurance funds and 
capital markets is an important issue on further broadcning invcstmcnt vehicles in 
China. This study highlights that a sound intcraction bctwccn the two scctors can 
hardly archive in the absence of insurers' efficient investment management and 
supportive infrastructure and effective regulation in the both scctors. It then discusses a 
set of issues related to creating a legal environment for insurers' cffcctivc portfolio 
'These documents are available at <http: //www. oecd. org>, visited on October 20,200 1. 
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management and risk control and at the same time safeguarding the soundness of the 
Chinese insurance sector. The chapter concludes by presenting some recommendations. 
5.2 The roles of insurers' investment and related regulation 
Investment is an integral part of insurance business, and its functions and critical 
importance to both insurers and the economy in general cannot be neglected for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, investment is an essential aspect of insurance business. 
Insurers can be seen from one respective as "liability-driven financial intcnnediarics". ' 
They borrow money (premiums) by issuing insurance policies and pay the lenders 
(policyholders) sums of money (claims) if pre-spccified events occur. Like banks, 
insurers have to invest their funds that are made up with premium income and the 
capital funds, otherwise they could not realise the increment of the funds and avoid the 
possible devaluation of the funds due to inflation. Secondly, the role of investment is 
being strengthened with the growing trend towards higher investment component in 
insurance products than ever before. ' This is especially the case with the benefits of 
invcstmcnt-linkcd insurance products depending directly on the investment 
performance of insurers. Furthen-nore, with the convergence of different financial 
services, the distinction between some financial products is blurring. Consequently, 
insurers, by their superior investment performance, have to compete effectively with 
other savings instruments such as bank deposits, government bonds, unit trusts and 
mutual funds. Thirdly, investment earnings are essential for determining insurers, 
profitability; good profitability enables insurers to give better returns to their 
4 policyholders and shareholders. Fourthly, favourablc investment returns enable 
insurers not only to make up underwriting losses but also to be competitive in pricing 
' For the importance of insurance investment, see generally "The economics of insurance". Swiss Re. 
2001, p7. 
3 See Chapter 9, "Life insurance" in "Institutional investment in the United Kingdom: a review" The 
Myners Report 2001. 
' For example, according to the analyses by Swiss Re. Sigma, 5/2001, net investment results are the 
critical factor for the profit margins in seven major non-life markets including the US and the UK (See 
Table I Profitability decomposition of major non-life markets). The seven markets had "net investment 
results" ranged from 12.4% - 24.6% of net premiums whereas "underwriting result" ranged from 
-14.1% - 3.3% of the net premiums. All the seven markets had positive profit margins mainly 
determined by favourable investment results. 
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products, ' thereby improving their competitiveness and position in markets. Fifthly, 
besides the price competitiveness and profitability improvement, good investment 
performance enables insurers to generate more net assets over the liabilities of reserves. 
With adequate net assets, insurers will be able to level out the fluctuation in investment 
earnings caused by cyclical business movements and take advantage of investment 
opportunities, thus achieving higher investment returns. Sixthly, as major institutional 
investors, insurers' investment activities have important macroeconomic consequences. 
Insurers not only play important roles in financial markets, ' but also facilitate economic 
prosperity through the optimal allocation of insurance funds among sectors of the 
economy. ' By observing the experience in OECD countries, we can see that a country 
with a developed and efficient insurance market normally enjoys active investment by 
insurers and great contributions of the investment to both insurers themselves and 
economic prosperity of the country! 
Insurers run certain risks when they invest funds. Generally, the more the yields are 
likely to be, the more risks insurers are likely to take. Many studies have described in 
3 See J. D. Cummins & F. Grace (1994) 'Tax management and investment strategies of propcrty/liability 
insurers' in Journal ofBanking and Finance, vol. 18, No. 1. p. 43-72. 
' For example, by 200 1, the UK insurance industry had about f 1,1 47bn invested in company shares and 
other assets in the UK and elsewhere. Ile majority of its investments were in shares, amounting to over 
a fifth of all UK companies' equities. 
UK Insurance Industry's Total Insurance Investment Holdings 2001 
UK public sector securities (including gilt) - 
L146bn 
Overseas public sector securities f49bn 
UK ordinary stocks and shares L391bn 
Other UK company securities EI 12bn 
Overseas ordinary stocks and shares L145bn 
Other overseas company securities f49bn 
Unit trusts L77bn 
Property f6lbn 
Other investments fI 16bn 
Total Ll, 147bn 
Resource: Key Facts 2001 The Association of British Insurers. 
7 Damian Ward and Ralf Zurbruegg (2000) " Does insurance promote economic growth? Evidence from 
OECD countries" The Journal ofRisk and Insurance, 2000, Vol. 67, No. 4, p489-506. 
' See "Insurance Regulation in OECD Countries, Asian Economics and CEEC and NIS Countries". and 
"Comparative Tables on Insurance Regulation and Supervision in OECD Countries (Paratte Report)" 
OECD (200 1). 
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detail the risks including investment risks that insurers are exposed to. 9 However, a 
consensus on risk classification remains to be reached. Jean-Louis Bellando catcgoriscs 
six types of investment risks, namely, depreciation risk, liquidity risk, interest rate risk, 
risk of mismatched assets and liabilities, valuation risk and risks arising from 
transactions involving financial derivatives. " Inappropriately dealing with investment 
risks can lead insurers to losses, and in extreme cases, to insolvency. We can learn 
lessons from experiences in many developed countries. For instance, as A. M. Best 
revealed, 39 of 640 insurers that became insolvent in the US during 1969-1998 did so 
because of overstated assets. This was the fourth most common cause out of a total of 
ten causes that triggered insurers' insolvency. " Alternatively, concentrating on 
mortgage and real estate investments were the causes of the downfall of the US Mutual 
Benefit Life. The UK Equitable Life's failure to identify the possibility of a $2. lbn 
shortfall from guaranteed annuities triggered its threc-ycar long crisis. " The series of 
Japanese life insurers' collapses between 1997 and 2001 just showed how inappropriate 
investments seriously impaired both individual insurers and even the stability of the 
financial system of the country. " 
The role of insurers' investment and the harmfulness of investment failures evince 
the importance of regulation. The general philosophy that insurers must remain in a 
sound financial condition to protect the interests of policyholders has led governments 
to impose restrictions on insurers' investment. The distinct purposes often mentioned 
for investment regulation arc: to protect policyholders by seeking to minimise the 
chances of insurers' bankruptcy due to investment failures; to strengthen the financial 
stability of insurers and the economy as a whole; to direct the flow of insurance funds; 
* For example, the "Muller Report" (the EU 1997) presents a detailed classification of risks for life and 
non-life insurance companies. Also, the "2002 KPMG Solvency Study" (see Chapter 4) gives its view of 
risk classification. 
Note 22, Chapter 4. 
See A. M. Best "Insolvency: will historic trends return? "(1 999) 
See Ian Glick QC and Richard Snowden (200 1) "The Equitable Life Assurance Society joint qpinion 
of Ian Glick QC and Richard Snowden for the Financial Services Authority" FSA, the UK. 
" it was reported that eight Japanese insurers failed during 1997-200 1. In addition to low interest yields 
and falling equity and property values, significant volumes of non-perfonnancc loans and an undue 
concentration of assets were blamed for the insurers' failures. See Michael Freeman and Masahiko 
Fujiki "Why some Japanese insurers are failing" Financial services Tillinghast-Towcrs Perrin 2001/3 
p6-9. 
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and to keep insurers' shareholdings in other sectors within fixed limits. " The 
investment regulation that is in place in almost all jurisdictions usually covers portfolio 
composition and spread (or asset diversification and spread), matching of assets and 
liability, asset location, currency matching, and liquidity. " At international level, the 
OECD states that "Investment regulation should ensure that both security and 
profitability requirements are respected. It should promote the diversification, spread 
and liquidity of investment portfolios as well as the maturity and currency matching of 
assets and liabilities although some temporary dispensations to the last principle may 
be necessary. Regulations might include a list of admitted assets on which ceilings 
may be set and requirements on the way in which investments should bc valued. "" 
IAIS Insurance Core Principle No 6 provides similar guidelines on this matter . 
17 
However, over-regulation could impair the efficiency of insurers' investment. This 
introduces a long-standing issue, i. e. how to create an equilibrium between 
governmental regulatory functions and efficient investments by insurers. 
5.3 Overview of insurers' investment in China and Its regulatory framework 
5.3.1 Stages of insurers'investment development in China 
Looking at history, insurers' investment in China has approximately evolved three 
phases since 1980 when China restored the domestic insurance service: " 
- First phase (1980-1987) During this period, all insurance funds were required to be 
deposited with banks, with earned interest turning over to the treasury; therefore there 
was no real meaning to investment for insurers. 
- Second phase (1987-1995) In this period, investment was limited. For example, in 
1988, the investment amounted to Rmb58Omn, 8.23% of total insurance funds, while 
14 See Investment Regulation in "Glossary of insurance policy terms" OEEC, No. 1938 (1999) 
15 See G. M. Dickinson and E. Dinenis (1996) "Investment Regulations of Insurance Companies Across 
the OECD" in Policy Issues in Insurance Investment, Taration and solvency OECD, Gerry Dickinson 
(2001) "Principles for Investment regulation of Pension Funds and Life Insurance Companies" OECD. 
Also supra note 8. 
" OECD, Principle No. 13 in "Twenty Insurance Guidelines for Insurance Regulation and Supervision in 
Economies in Transition" 
17 IAIS "Insurance Core Principles Methodology ". October 2000. 
" See generally, Wang Xujin (2001)" Consummating the insurance investment environment and 
relaxing the control" Zhongguo Baoxian (China Insurance) No. 5,200 1. 
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total premiums registered RmblO. 95bn. However, the investment then was oflcn 
imprudent. Insurers invested in lots of areas, including real estate, securities and trusts, 
and even lent money like banks, because the economy was growing, and there was no 
explicit investment rule to follow except caps of investment amounts. This blind 
investment led to massive non-performance properties. " 
- Third phase (1995-now) This is a period of gradual standardisation. Since October 
1995 when the Insurance Law was promulgated, China has passed a series of insurance 
regulations. In line with fast economic development in the period, the insurance 
premium income industry-widc has grown swiffly. Because investment channels 
remained narrow and seven successive interest rate cuts by the central bank caused rate 
pressures on insurers, the regulators have since 1996 adopted a series of measures 
gradually to loosen restrictions to counter these problems. Such new investment 
channels as bonds, securities investment funds (SIFs) appeared one aftcr another, 
resulting in a fast growth of insurers' investment. 
However, insurers are still suffering from severely deficient investment in terms of 
investment vehicles, and volume of and return on investment, mainly due to strict 
restrictions on insurers' investment. They are also suffering from immature investment 
markets and unsophisticated investment skills of themselves. Therefore, it is urgent to 
relax restrictions on insurers' investment and improve investment regulation for 
heralding the improvement of investment efficiency. 
S-3.2 Regulatory restrictions 
The 1995 Insurance Law and associated regulations imposcd strict rcstrictions on 
insurers' investment in order to curb disorderly investment by insurcrs. Art. 104 of the 
law restricted investment by insurers to fixed deposits with banks, the purchase of 
govcrmnent or financial bonds, and other forms of investment prescribed by the State 
Council. These stipulations were replicated in the 1996 Insurance Regulations . 
2' The 
most obvious reason for these restrictions was the disorder rcgarding insurance 
investment at the time the law and regulations were drafled. Investment by insurcrs 
began as early as 1984 when the former PICC dominated the market. However, for 
'9 It was estimated the total amount of non-performance properties reached hundreds million yuan. See, 
Li Gang "Analysis of the utilisation of insurance funds in China " <Iittp: //www. chinainsurance. coni> 
Visited on October 20,2000. 
20 See Art. 33, the 1996 Insurance Regulations. 
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many years before the insurance law was drafted, the former PICC carried out its 
investment by the principle of "promoting underwriting through loans to consumers". 
This led many branches of the former PICC to lending to their clients in the situations 
of Four Nos - no knowledge of investment markets, no feasibility research, no 
professional investors, and no guarantee for the loans. A large amount of these 
investments became doubtful or bad debts. " 
Another reason why investment was restricted was simply to keep money in deposit 
accounts. These money were parts of resources used by the government to support 
industries, as it arranged every loan to state enterprises (via "aggregate credit plan") 
according to the requirements of the planned economy. Oppositely, insurcrs'invcstmcnt 
would reduce the resources. As the role of the state "credit plan" is diminishing along 
with the economic reform, maintaining the stability of the financial situation is 
highlighted. For fear that insurers' investment failures will aggravate the financial 
instability already seen in banking and trusts, the authority still required insurers to 
deposit most of their cash with banks. However, the strict restrictions set out by the 
1995 Insurance Law under the specific situation then arc out of date with the changing 
enviro=ent. 
In contrast to above national statute and regulation, the 1992 Shanghai Atcasurcs, 
considering the requirements of the opening up policy and the international practice, 
allows insurance companies with foreign investment to invest in the further areas: 
- corporate bonds (to a maximum of 10 per ccnt of their total invcstmcnt fund); 
loans (to a maximum of 30 percent of their total investment fund); 
shares (to a maximum of 1ý per cent of their total investment fund). " 
China also restricts insurance investment through imposing restrictions on the extent 
and ways of certain insurance funds that insurers can use. The 1995 Insurance Laiv 
laid down a number of provisions on the placement and management of "insurance 
funds" that were defined as a combination of an insurance company's monetary capital, 
security bond, working capital, various reserves, common reserve, provident fund, 
undistributed surplus, equalisation provision, and other funds stipulated by the State., ' 
For example, as prescribed in the 1995 Insurance Law, each insurance company shall 
allocate 20 per cent of the total amount of its registered capital to a "security bond" to 
Supra note 19. 
Art. 31,1992 Shanghai Measures. These provisions demonstrate the differentiation regarding 
investment regulation between foreign-funded insurers and domestic insurers, which still exists so far. 
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be deposited in a bank nominated by the Supervisory Authority for the purpose of 
repaying the debts of the company on a liquidation. " Each insurance company also 
shall allocate 1% of its premium to an cqualisation provision to be deposited in a 
nominated bank. " 
5.3.3 Gradually loosening restrictions 
Under continuous appeals for lifling investment restrictions in the insurance 
industry, the government has been steadily liberalising its policies: 
- Initially, the PBOC gave insurers permission to enter the intcr-bank credit market to 
engage in bond trade in 1998. This marked a big step forward in opening new 
investment channels for insurers and unifying the money market, although the 
authority impose certain trading limitations. " While insurers can purchase 
negotiable instruments in the market, they were ineligible for trades such as 
purchase-back and loan. 
- Then in 1998 the Ministry of Finance, for the first time, distributed Rmb6bn 
treasury bonds to several insurers. The bonds were 5 years duration with 5.68% 
annual interest rate, and were prohibited to circulate in the market. 
- As limited investment tools and the central bank's consecutive interest rate cuts had 
brought increasing insolvency risks to domestic insurers, the authority enacted rules 
allowing the insurers access to bonds. In July 1999, the State Council authorised 
that insurers could apply to the CIRC for pcn-nission to purchase Statc-lcvcl 
corporate bonds of AA+ rating or above, and trade in these bonds in the Shanghai 
and Shenzhcn Stock Exchanges. Under the new regulations, these insurers can 
spend no more than 2 per cent of their total assets on bonds, with any one purchase 
not exceeding 10 per cent of the bonds issued at any given time. " 
2' Art. 24, the 1996 Insurance Regulations. 
Art. 78, the 1995 Insurance Law. 
Note 8 1, chapter 4. This provision that has no matching provision in the 1995 Insurance Law derives 
from the 1985 Provisional Regulations on theAdministration ofInsurance Enterprises. 
26 China Daily November 18,1998. 
27 China Daily July 25,1999. By the end of Sep. 1999, only three kinds of accessible bonds were issued 
respectively by the Ministry of Railways, China State Power Corporation and China Yangtze 71ree 
Gorges Project Development Corporation. 
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- In October 1999, the CIRC was authorised by the State Council for the first time to 
allow certain insurers to enter the stock markets indirectly by purchasing security 
investment funds (SIFs). Insurers can spend up to a ceiling of 5 percent of their 
assets through the funds. Meanwhile, the CSRC distributed newly issued bonds in 
certain proportions to insurers who were allowed to trade in these bonds in the 
secondary markets. 
- In 2000, the CIRC allowed insurers to invest more in securities . 
2' The CIRC raised 
the ceiling for insurers' securities investment twice in the year and declared that it 
would raise the ceiling in future according to insurers' asset quality and structurc, 
risk management ability and operating performances. 
- In 2001, the CIRC differentiated between investments from accounts of investment- 
linked products and those from non-invcstmcnt-linkcd products. For instance, it 
allowed Ping An, New China Life and Manulife-Sinochcm Life to invest up to 
100% of premium income from their investment-linkcd products with a 
requirement of setting up separate investment accounts corresponding to various 
investment-linked products. On the other hand, strict restrictions still applied to 
investment relating to accounts for non-invcstmcnt-linkcd products. Meanwhile, 
more insurers were permitted to invest more in securities. " 
5.3.4 The 2002 revision ofInsurance Law: restrictions rentain 
With the gradual liberalisation of investment restrictions by the authoritics, insurers 
had been allowed to invest directly into the intcr-bank market and indirectly in the 
stock markets via mutual funds. The new law (art. 105) correspondingly affirmed these 
changes. Except for these slight changes, insurers arc still not allowed to establish 
special investment companies which could help invest their large quantities of idle 
funds. The types of investments other than bank deposits, government bonds and 
financial bonds must be approved by the State Council. The legislative step is 
apparently not as big as expectations of domestic insurers who have long called for die 
removal of stiff investment restrictions. 
2" According to Zhongguo Zhengquan Bao (China Securities news) June 5,2000. China Pacific is the 
first insurance company approved by the regulators to raise its securities investment to 15 per cent of its 
assets. 
" For instance, Ping An, Axa-Minmetals Assurance were given permits to invest up to 15 % or their 
assets in securities investment funds, compared to the former 10 %. People's Daily January 3,200 1. 
200 
5.4 Main problems regarding insurers' Investment 
At present, there is an urgent need to improve insurers' investment scale and 
investment efficiency, which further requires to relax restrictions on insurers' 
investment and improving investment regulation. This is demonstrated by a number of 
problems, mainly including: the rapid growth contradicting with dericient investment, 
the inefficient investment via SIFs, the interest-drivcn loss in insurers, and pressures 
from the fast growth of investment-] inked products. 
5.4.1 Rapidgrowth vs. deficient investment 
China's insurance sector has been growing rapidly in the recent years, but this trend 
is tarnished by its inefficiency of investment which erodes insurcrs' solvency and 
obstructs its future progress. According to the CIRC, premium income of the sector was 
predicted to grow roughly 12% a year to total Rmb280bn (US$34bn) by 2005, bringing 
premiums up from 1.5% of GDP in 2000, to 2.3% in 2005 and 3% in 2010. The actual 
growth in recent years has been even faster than these predictions (see Section 1.3.1 b. 
Chapter 1). 
Along with the overall development of insurance business and the gradually 
broadening investment vehicles by the authority, the amounts of investments owned by 
insurers have steadily increased in the last few years. As shown in Table 5.1, during 
1999-2002, both total investments and total investments in percentage of total assets 
showed a steady growth in line with the increase of total assets every year. Within the 
category of other investments, government bonds had been occupying the first place 
while investment via SIFs had grown fast. However, in terms of the distribution of 
assets, about 46.6% of total assets were deposits in batik by 2002, and deposits in bank 
in percentage of total assets grew every year, while government bond; in percentage of 
total assets decreased annually. These results indicate that the invcstmcnt channels 
comparatively shrank as total assets swelled. Meanwhile, investments via SIFS kept 
low, only 4.73% of total assets by 2002. In addition, it was reported that the return on 
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investments of China's insurance sector just recorded 3.59%, 4.3% and 3.14% 
respectively in 2000,2001, and 2002,30 showing the lean investment profitability. 
Table 5.1 Investments and total assets of China's Insurance sector (Jan. 1999- Dec. 2002 Rmb bn. ) 
Jan. 1999 Dec. 1999 Dec. 2000 Dec. 2001 Dec. 2002 
I. Deposits In banks 69.044 92.597 123.538 193.059 302.626 
% of total Investments 56.43 50.95 48.66 52.99 54.72 
% of total assets 35.55 36.61 42.04 46.6 
2. Other Investments 53.3 89.141 130.322 171.258 250.406 
Government bonds 41.086 67.848 95.595 79.582 110.784 
% of total Investments 33.58 37.32 37.65 21.84 20.03 
Investment via SIFs 0 1.479 13.353 20.899 30.777 
% of total Investments 0.81 5.25 5.73 5.56 
% of total assets 0.56 3.95 4.55 4.73 
3. Total Investments 122.344 181.738 253.86 364.317 553.032 
% of total assets 69.78 75.24 79.34 85.15 
4. Total assets na 260.409 337.389 459.134 649.407 
Resource: The CIRC website 
By examining the situations in thefour major nationals (PICC, China Life, Ping An, 
and CPIQ, we can get a keen insight into the features of insurers' other investinent 
(note: investments except deposits in banks). As shown in Table 5.2, during 1996-2000 
the investments by the four major nationals displayed the following salience. Firstly, 
other investments amounts had grown sharply and successively. It amounted to 
Rmb97,872.41mn at the end of 2000, an increase by 409.05% over 1996 which was 
just Rmbl9,226.33mn. Secondly, accompanying with the growth of the investment, 
investment revenues had a clear growth. It recorded Rmb5,441.99mn at the end of 
2000, increasing by 245.91% over 1996 (Rmbl, 573.21mn). T'hirdly, long-term 
investment had increased in terms of both amount and percentage. Long-term 
investment that consists of goverru-nent bonds and corporate bonds reached 
Rmb7l, 594.29mn by 1999 compared with just Rmbl, 379.47mn by 1996. The long- 
term investment in percentage of other investments rcaliscd a glaring increase from 
7.17 % of 1996 to 79.23 % at the end of 1999, which was attributable to the broadening 
of investment vehicles by the government. 
'0 See Hong Wei "Analysis of the forms of insurers' investment" Jinrong Yu Baoxian (Finance and 
Insurance) 2002 No. 9, "T'lie insurance fund average income rate is 4.3%" Shanghai Zhengquan Bao 
(Shanghai Security News) February 5,2002, and Xiaoping Wu "Interaction between the insurance 
industry and capital markets" Zhongguo, Zhengquan Bao (China Securities News) February 20,2003. 
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Table 5.2 Other Investments and relevant figures of the four 
major nationals 1996-2000 (Rmb mn. ) 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Other investments 19,226.33 32,882.66 58,488.16 90,353.68 97,872.41 
Long-term Investments 1,379.47 20,044.33 42,919.00 71,594.29 na 
Revenues from other Investments 1,573.21 2,940.04 4,227.21 4,002.62 5,441.99 
% of other investments 8.18 8.94 7.22 4.42 5.56 
% of total revenues 2.60 3.55 4.32 4.09 5.35 
Total revenues 60,375.51 82,746.98 97,781.06 97,822.15 101,541.69 
Resource: The CIRC China Insurance Almanac 1998,1999,2000,200 1. 
However, at least five main problems existed. Firstly, other investment in percent of 
total assets remained low, e. g. 32.04% in 2000 (see Chart 5.1), although this ratio rose 
slightly every year except 2000. By comparison, an average US insurces ratio was 
87.03% in 1998. This suggests that China need to further cniarge and broaden 
investment channels for insurers. Secondly, the asset leverage (volume of other 
investments in percentage of net premiums) was low either, e. g. 69.55% in 1999. By 
comparison, the asset leverages in major markets in the world were above 150% in 
1999.3 ' This figure also indicates that insurers' investment in China was restrained. 
Thirdly, investment revenues consequently only took up an insigniricant portion of total 
revenues (Table 5.2). It therefore implies that the insurers' profitability heavily rclicd 
on underwriting profitability, driving the insurers to cut down loss ratio or overcharge 
consumers or both. China's motor insurance market particularly evinced the 
implication. " Fourthly, the investment profitability had decreased. This was evidenced 
by the sharp slump of revenues in percentage of investments in 1999 and 2000 (4.43% 
and 5.56%). The mismatching between investment growth and investment revenue 
growth (see Table 5.3) further proved it. As showed in Table 5.4, there existed huge 
disparities on the China side in comparison of certain ratios regarding investment 
performance between China's insurers and their foreign counterparts in selected 
countries. Fifthly, regarding the distribution of the assets of the four major nationals in 
2000, cash and bank deposits, which were not expected to make satisfactory profit due 
to unfavourable interest rate, amounted for 32.04% of total assets. Non-invcstmcnt 
assets including receivables, real estate and other fixed assets, dcfcffcd capital 
Swiss Re. Sigma, 5/2001 p 15, 
See chapter 6 for details. 
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" See Swiss Re, ýipna No. 1,2000, p5. 
34 See Swiss Re. ýipna No. 5,2001, p8. 
35 Note 22. All ratios are foi non-life insurers. 
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establishing SIFs is to exploit the advantage of "expert management" thereby providing 
investors (mainly individuals) with a good investment too], nurture institutional 
investors, and promote the stability and development of the securities markets. 
Insurers made their debut in the securities markets in October 1999. Since then, the 
investment amounts via SIR have been progressing steadily. At the end of 2002, 
insurers purchased a total of Rmb30.777bn (US$3.67bn) in SIFs, more than 20 times of 
that at the end of 1999. The purchase was 4.73 % of the insurers' total assets, 23.67 % 
of the total value of SIFs, and 2.37 % of China! s total stock market value. flowcver, the 
advantage of "expert management" did not fully display because of the immature 
securities markets and the funds' unsophisticated skills. 
Firstly, despite growing quickly, the size of the funds is still too small and therefore 
is unable to assume a leading force in the securities markets. For example, by the end 
of 2002, China had 71 funds, including 54 close-cnd funds and 17 open-end funds. " 
The total fund value stood at Rmbl30bn, which was more than 10 per cent of China's 
two stock bourses' total market capitalisation. In the U-S, the total assct size of mutual 
funds exceeds US$7tr, accounting for 47% of the total stock market capitalisation. 
Secondly, the investment returns of SIFs fluctuated substantially in rcflcction of the 
great volatility of the securities markets. For example, during 2001, the Shanghai Fund 
Index reached a high of 2,245.44 points and explored a low of 1,515.86 points. In the 
first half of 2001, the index rose by nearly 20% while the stock market indices of 
Shanghai rose by 5%. However, in the second half of 2001, the index dropped by 16% 
while the stock market indices dropped by 25%. 3' According to the CIRC, sizcably 
mirroring the fluctuation of the securities markets, insurers' annual return rates from 
SIFs differed sharply, 12%, 20% and -21.3% in 2000,2001, and 2002 respectively. 
Thirdly, the mediocre performance and the lack of fund varictics undermined SIFs' 
acceptance to insurers. For instance, there were about 10% discounts on closc-cnd fund 
prices in 2000, " although the SIFs enjoycd income tax concession and stamp duty 
exemption, and the transaction fees for closed-cnd SIFs only represent one-third of 
those for stock transactions. This made SlFs' expertise doubtful. On the other hand, 
most existing funds are closc-crid, which do not like open-end funds that allow 
investors to withdraw and enter any time they like. Because of the liquidity of assets, 
' Since the Tentative Provisions of Securities Investment Fund took cffect in November 1997, tile 
experiment of China SIF has been advancing. See China Daily February 26,2003. 
" Shanghai Stock Exchange Fact Book 200 1. 
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insurers are reluctant to join in close-end funds. In addition, the numbers of SIR are 
only dozens, leaving insurers few options to diverse investment risks. As a result, by 
2002, insurers invested only 4.73% of their total assets into the securities markets, 
much less than 15%, the percentage permitted by the government. 
5.4.3 Interest-driven loss in insurers 
Operational loss driven by the negative interest margin is one of the major concerns 
of both the regulator and insurers. China! s life insurance sector cxpcricnccd a peak of 
business expansion in the mid 1990's, and most life insurers had sold large quantities of 
savings products which offered a guaranteed return as part of cut-throat competition 
strategies. During 1996-1999, the PBOC cut basic interest rates seven times. " The raid 
fall in interest rates significantly affected the assumed interest rates that life insurers 
used to calculate premium rates of long term policies. For example, at the end of 1998, 
the average assumed interest rate was 7.8% (9% for the highest, and 4.5% for the 
lowest), which was much higher than 3.78%, the official rate. Since fallcn rates were 
below the assumed rates, the consecutive rate reductions created a negative margin 
between predicted investment returns and actual returns, and lcfl the life sector with 
very substantial negative spread liabilities. It was reported that the spread in interest 
margin losses alone could have cost the insurance sector as much as US$6.04bn. ' This 
potentially threatens the viability of China's insurance industry. Some economists said 
that the losses could trigger an insurance reimbursement crisis, posing the scvcrcst 
challenge that the industry has to face. "' 
" Shanghai Stock Exchange Fact Book 2000, Shenzhcn Stock Exchange Fact Book 2000. 
39 Reductions of basic interest rates by the PBOC 
Date One year deposit rate 
May 11,1996 9.18% 
Aug. 23,1996 7.47% 
Oct. 23,1997 . 5.67% 
Mar. 25,1998 5.22% 
Jul. 1,1998 4.77% 
Dec. 7,1998 3.78% 
Jun. 10,1999 2.25% 
"Insurance industry could face crises of payment" Zhengquan Shibao (Security Times) April 16,2001. 
Supra note 40. 
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The interest margin losses are not unique to China; similar problem occurrcd during 
the 1990's in the UK (e. g. the case of the Equitable Life) and Japan. Some suggested" 
that the problem in China stemmed from the following factors: unchecked pursuit of 
premium growth and market share; unwise business incentives to focusing on premium 
growth, which had been given to most state-owned insurers during 1995-1998. Further 
factors include managerial deficiencies of all levels for blindly pursuing premium 
growth; a lack of skilled risk managers; and limited investment vehicles for insurers. 
Unlike insurers in many other markets, Chinese insurers arc limited to very narrow 
investment channels. This makes it harder for the insurers to escape through funding 
legacy losses with investment returns. Alternatively, they are cngagcd in high-margin 
new generation products to fuel the losses. However, as we discussed above, the 
sluggish performance of SIFs restrained this effort which was further hardened by an 
inappropriate switch to participating products as described below. 
5.4.4 Pressuresfrom investment-linkedproducts 
China's life insurance industry is catching up with its international counterparts with 
the growing popularity of new-generation products such as profit-sharing and 
investment-linked policies including unit-linked policies and participating policies. In 
2002, investment-linked policies made up 54% of total life insurance premium, and 
40.23% of the insurance industry's total premium income. With the increasing 
popularity of investment-linked products, insurers' investment performance has become 
a crucial factor for their success. 
Prior to the new-generation products, life policies in China were of the traditional 
types, which were priced in line with current interest rates, paying lump sums at the end 
of their terms. Different from traditional insurance products that rcndcr fixed returns to 
policyholders, new products provide flexible returns according to insurers' investment 
returns apart from the traditional functions of savings and protection. Prorit-sharing 
policies pay dividends on surplus revenues as well as guaranteed basic returns. 
Investment-linked products strive to secure policyholders better returns by investing a 
certain amount of the premiums in the equity market rather than relying on interest rate 
fluctuations. These premiums would be managed by experienced investment 
" Feng Wan "On creation and alleviation of margin losses in China life insurance sector" Baoxian 
Yanjiu (Insurance Studies) No. 6,2001; Hong Liu et al "Margin losses: long-term restriction on the 
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professionals within/outside insurers, so a much better return would be expected for the 
policyholders. Policyholders would get annual dividends from the insurers based on 
their annual performance in the financial market. Among investment-link-ed products, 
unit-linked policies enable insurers to invest their premiums into SIR and other 
channels, and render the investment returns after deducting a commission to 
policyholders without guarantee. Participating policies would provide the lowest return 
guarantee and allow the policyholders an access to linking their returns with the 
performance of insurers. 
Ping An in the late 1999 launched the first unit-linked policy in China, while the first 
participating policy was unveiled in 2000 by China Life. Both products were 
immediately embraced by customers amid the scarcity of investment channels. For 
example, Ping An witnessed that its premium income from unit-linkcd policies soared 
from Rmbl. 2bn (US$144.6 million) at the beginning of 2000 to Rmb8bn (US$963.9 
million) by November 2001. It secured 900,000 new customers by November 2001, 
and 40% of its new premiums in 2001 came from unit-linkcd policies. However, with 
the sluggish performance of both China's stock market and SIR in the second half of 
2001, investment returns for unit-linked products gradually thinned out from their 
initial hefty gains. This led the products to stagnancy from the beginning of 2002. 
Consequently, participating products with minimum guaranteed returns enjoyed a 
better market. It was estimated that regarding the new product market share in China's 
life sector during July 2001-June 2002, participating policies, unit-linkcd products and 
others occupied 60%, 20% and 20% respectively. " 
Obviously, with a shift to investment-] inked policies where the benefits ultimately 
paid to policyholders depend directly on insurers' investment performance, investment 
return has become an increasingly important factor in product pricing and business 
success. China's insurers need to improve their investment performance, which allows 
them to design and market competitive products, additionally, thereby helping alleviate 
their legacy of interest margin losses. Beyond this, the insurers also need good 
investment performance to compete with other financial institutions as the distinction 
between financial products is increasingly blurring. 
Chinese insurance industry" Zhongguo Jinji Shibao (China Economic Times) April 23,200 1. 
"' David Campbell (2003) "The insurance market in China" PowerwaterhouseCoopers 2003. 
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5.4.5 Needs for liberalisation and a complete regulatory framework of insurance 
investment 
The safety and effectiveness of insurers' investment arc influenced by both internal 
and external factors. Researches and evidence, on the one hand, link insurers' 
investment performance to firm-specific characteristics such as legal entities and the 
organisational structure, "' financial planning and investment strategies, '45 assct-liability 
management (ALM) and risk managemcnt. 46 On the other hand, they claim that the 
viability of investment performance is tightly related to cxogcnous factors such as the 
overall economic environment, "' investment market conditions, " and related legal 
environment. " 
Regarding legal environment, the Chinese insurance industry is suffering from both 
the strict legal restrictions on insurers' investment activities and the lack of a complete 
regulatory framework directly governing the activities. As we analysed in the above 
sections, the current over-restrictive regulation created an investment bottleneck for the 
industry, obstructed the further innovation of life insurance products, and undermined 
the insurers' profitability and long-term security. In a word, it severely impcdcd 
insurers' ability to generate sufficient returns to sustain the long-term growth. These 
negative effects are further promoted by the delay on establishing a complete regulatory 
framework of insurance investment. As a result, the issue of further broadening 
investment vehicles, advocated by both the regulator and the industry insiders, is 
becoming urgent. 
"See David Camino (2002) "Ownership structure, investment and corporate value of insurance 
companies: implication for management" Presentation at International Insurance society, Inc. 2002 
Annual seminar. Also see Mayers D., Shivdasani, A. and Smith C. W. Jr (1997) "Board composition and 
corporate control: evidence from the insurance industry" Journal ofBusiness 70(l). 33-6 1. 
" See Alberto Franceschetti and Ronald P. O'llanley (1997) "Making the money work: improving 
investment performance in insurance" The McMinsey Quarterly 1997 No. I 116-125. 
' See "Asset-liability management for insurers" Sigma 6/2000, Swiss Re. 
'7 Browne Mark J. and Robert E. Iloyt, (1995) "Economic and market predictors of insolvencies in the 
property-liability insurance industry" Journal ofRisk and Insurance, 62: 309-327. 
Supra note 4. 
"Japanese life insurance industry" Special Comment Moody's Investors Service 2001. 
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5.5 Broadening investment channels and increasing the Institutional Investors' 
role of insurers 
5.5.1 The interaction between insurancefunds and the capital markets 
a. The two contradictory views 
Regarding the scope and speed of the broadening of investment channels, there are 
broadly two opposite views, the conservatism and the radicalism. The conservatism 
insists that the government should gradually open certain markets for insurers in order 
to avoid too risky investments made by insurers who seem not to be experienced 
investors. Its advocates argue that the investment risks facing insurers arc still very 
high, given the immaturity of various markets (especially the highly volatile capital 
markets), deficient investment management of insurers and the imperfect legal 
environment. " In contrast, radical views claim that insurers should be allowed to invest 
in such areas as stocks, real estate, corporate bonds, mortgages and policyholder loans 
subjecting to prescribed quantitative restrictions. " 
b. The appealfor entering capital markets and the legislative caution 
At present, one overwhelming topic around the Chinese insurance sector is that the 
interaction between insurance funds and capital markets should be strengthened. 
Industry insiders and experts have been calling for the securities markets to open up 
wider for insurers to increase investment returns and fend off the mounting payment 
risks in the industry. " They claim that the development of the insurance business 
needs lucrative investment returns from sound capital markets. On the other hand, the 
growth of the capital markets counts on the active participation of insurers as major 
strategic institutional investors. " 
-' See GuoAn Li (2001) "On improving investment efficiency of insurance funds" Baoxian Yanjiu 
(Insurance Study) 2001 No. 12. 
" See HongTao Zhang (2003) "The policy direction of application of insurance funds under the new 
situation" Zhongguo Zhengquan Bao (China Securities News) February 20,2003. 
5' For example, XiaoPing Wu, the vice-chairman of the CIRC called for at the 2003 Forum on the 
Development of The Chinese Insurance a sound interaction between insurance funds and capital markets. 
See Zhengquan Shibao (Securities Times) February 20,2003. 
" See "Economist calls for co-operation between insurance, securities industries" China Daily May 
16,2000. 
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It was reported that proposals tabled before the Standing Committee of the NPC for 
revising the 1995 Insurance Law contained significant reforms, including: abolishing 
restrictions on insurers' investments in securities funds; adopting the practice of many 
other jurisdictions by allowing insurers to invest in securities companies; and 
permitting insurers to purchase bonds issued by large state-owned enterprises. " None 
of them, however, had been accepted in the revision. The result reflects the cautious 
attitude of the legislature towards the libcralisation of insurance investment. 
c. Foreign experiences 
Experiences from the OECD countries and some Latin American countries 
demonstrate that large benefits stem from the interactive process bctwccn institutional 
investors and capital markets. Institutional investors have been growing dramatically in 
the securities markets of most OECD countries over the past two decades. " Insurers 
especially life insurers, pension funds, and mutual funds are the three major 
institutional investors, playing an important role in the markets. " institutional investors 
acted as a countervailing force to the dominant position of commercial banks, and 
competed with other financial institutions, stimulating financial innovation. By 
increasing the demand for long-term financial assets, institutional investors promoted 
capital market modemisation. They also played a major role in enhancing market 
discipline by stimulating transparency and information disclosurc, thus 
strengthening corporate 
"' "China amends Law to further open up insurance industry" Beying Shibao (Beying Time) June 24, 
2002. 
" For example, total institutional assets of the main regions in the OECD area rose from US$3.2tr. in 
1981 (i. e. 38 per cent of GDP), to US$16.3tr in 1991 (90 per cent of GDP), and to more than US$24.3tr 
in 1995 (106.5 per cent of GDP). See Ilans J. Blommcstein (1997) "Institutional Investors, Pension 
Reform and Emerging securities Markets" OECD. 
' See Institutional Investors in the New Financial Landscape OECD (2800) 1998 
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governance. " Hans J. Blommestein highlighted the common factors of the development 
of institutional investors in the OECD countries. The main factors arc ageing 
populations and pension reforms, technological progress in communications and 
information processing, and deregulation of the banking and securities industries. Other 
factors include positive effects of institutionalisation on the development of capital 
market, the importance of the role of professional fund managers, and the necessity of 
appropriate regulation on investments by institutional investors. " According to Vittsa, 
the impact of institutional investors on capital markets may not materialise until a 
"critical" mass of savings has been mobilised. In addition, the impact may also be 
shaped by the relative importance of bank and stock market finance in the economy. " 
d. Formal institutional investors are not playing a substantive role in China 
Despite a rapid growth in terms of the number of listed companies and the scale of 
trade after more than a decade of development, ' China's capital markets still have 
major shortcomings in many aspects. The share price is very high with profit/caming 
(P/E) ratio around 40, compared 25 for S&P 500. The markets frequently sce drastic 
fluctuations of share prices together with extremely rapid turnovers, rampant illegal 
speculations, and various scandals of manipulation and fraud caused by listed 
companies and intermediaries. " Regarding various investment instruments, the 
57 See Dimitri Vittas (1998) "Institutional investors and securities markets: which comes first? " 
Development Research Group The World bank, also Impavido G., Musalem A. R., and D. Vittas (2002) 
"Contractual savings, stock and asset markets" World Bank Policy Research Paper 2490, and Impavido 
G., Musalem A. R., and T. Trcssel (2002) "Contractual savings institutions and banks' stability and 
efficiency" World Bank Policy Research Paper 275 1. 
3' See Hans J. Blornmestein (1997) "Institutional investors, pension reform and emerging securities 
markets" OECD. 
'9 D. Vittas (2001) "Pension reform and capital market development: 'feasibility' and 'impace 
preconditions" Development Research Group The World bank 
60 According to the CSRC, by the end of 2001, there were altogether 1,160 domestic listed companies 
and 66.5 million investment accounts in China's capital markets. 71c total market value topped 
Bmb4,352.2bn (US$525.6bn), accounting for 46% of GDP, surpassing that of South Korea 
(US$306.3bn) and Singapore (US$192.9bn). See "Challenge and development structure and supervision 
of China securities markets" The CSRC, 2002 <http: //www. csrc. gov. cn> 
" For example, in April 2001 Boshi Fund Management and a number of other investment funds were 
penalised by the CSRC with a fine and confiscated illegal incomes totalling Rmb898mn for stock price 
manipulation. Renming Ribao (People's Daily) April 27,200 1. 
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development is extremely unbalanced, hampering effective portfolio management and 
risk control. " 
To tackle the problems, China is set to encourage more institutional investors in 
coming years. The authorities believe that institutional investors would, with their 
professional teams, rational investment behaviour and lower investment costs, stabilise 
the securities market, improve investment portfolios, and help listed firms in their 
corporate governance. " However, the following facts and analyses suggest that 
increasing institutional investors is crucial but not sufficient to the maturity of the 
markets. A sound interaction between insurance funds and the capital markets will be 
unlikely to archive in the absence of insurers' efficient investment management and 
supportive infrastructure and effective regulation in the both sectors. 
In China, formal institutional investors are not playing a substantive role. Firstly, 
individual investors had a lion's share in the stock markets. According to the CSRC, by 
the end of 2001, among total 66.5mn investors' accounts, the institutional investors, 
accounts were about 5-6%, holding 15% of total tradable stocks, and the rest of the 
accounts belonged to individual investors. " Secondly, while formal institutional 
investment sector is tiny, a huge number of informal funds, known as Shnu JUin 
(privately raised funds) are active in the markets, mainly engaging in speculative trades. 
Legally, only qualified investment funds are permitted to collect money from investors 
and make investments. Nevertheless, it was revealed that capitalisation amounts of 
privately raised funds, despite their illegality, were significant with a total size at 
around 
Rmb700bn, about 40% of total tradable stock shares. " Adding Rmb200bn capital 
managed by fonnal funds, the institutional investors' total investments ncarcd 50%, 
12 By 2001, stock dealing accounted for 92% of total amount of trading products (treasure bonds and 
convertible bonds 2%, funds 4%, corporate bonds 2%. In addition, only small amounts of commodity 
futures were trading in the commodities market, while the financial futures were not yet introduced). 
Supra note 60. 
"' For instance, in the late 2002, the government opened the A-sharc market to selected foreign investors 
and announced that it would allow foreign investors to buy previously non-tradable shares of state. 
owned enterprises. 
Supra note 60. 
It is estimated that there are at least 7,000 of these funds operating around the country. The funds vary 
widely in terms of quality, the number of clients and capitalisation; some act as excellent fund managers, 
while others engage in illegal transactions including price manipulation by taking the advantage of 
insider information. Many funds manage the money of 5 to 50 clients, both individuals and firms 
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similar to that in the US (51.8% of total stock shares). This phenomenon appears 
contradictory to many analysts' suggestions that the dominant individual investors who 
usually adopt quick profit-trading strategies cause the volatility of China's stock 
markets. " Thirdly, because about 65% of the total shares are catcgorised as so called 
either state shares or legal person shares which both are non-tradable, " formal 
institutional investors can hold only limited sway. This hardly enables them to 
influence the management of the invested companies, thus providing them with few 
incentives to hold long-term stakes. In addition, the overall performances of listed 
companies which 
(including many state-owned enterprises), and invests mostly in shares. Most of the funds offer returns 
of above 10 percent, and some up to 50 percentý well above the one-year bank deposit rate of 2.25 
percent. See Stephen Green (2001) "The truth about China's stock market" CFO Asia October 26,2001 
" For example, see "Summary record of the meeting" International round table on securities markets in 
China Beijing, 24-25 October 2000, Co-organised by the OECD and the CSRC. 
Share structure In China's securities markets on December 31,2001 
Total Non-tradable Shares 65.3% 
Of which: Sponsoes Shares 59.8% 
State-owned 47.2% 
Sponsor Legal Person 12.7% 
Of which: Private Placement of Legal Person Shares 4.7% 
Of which: Worker Shares 0.5% 
Total tradable shares 34.7% 
Of which: A-shares 25.3% (issued to domestic investors) 
B-shares 3.1 % (initially issued to foreign investors, from 1997 opened to local investors) 
H-shares 6.4% (Trading on the I long Kong Stock Exchange (I I KS E)) 
Source: The CSRC website 
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are mostly SOEs (95% of the total by 2000) are discouraging" and company reports are 
not very trustworthy due to low disclosure standards and limited transparency. "' These 
lead the institutional investors to having the same speculative incentives as other 
investors. What is worse, some institutional investors used their superior capital and 
inside information to manipulate share prices. 70 
Manifold factors constrain China from bringing the role of institutional investors into 
full play. China! s financial sector is still a bank-dominated system, with new credit over 
Rmb600bn annually. The Government essentially remains its view of the capital 
markets as the vehicle for resource mobilisation rather than for raising the effectiveness 
of capital allocation. Through its framework of the aggregate credit plan and state 
investment plans, the government assigns quotas for primary issues of bonds and 
equities, resulting in a limited supply of bonds and equities and unequal investment 
opportunities among investors. These governmental interference, together with the 
domination of SOEs in the stock markets and the state holding of the majority of shares 
which are non-tradable, distort share prices. All these factors root rampant speculative 
investment and price manipulations that arc further promoted by a number of 
regulatory and supervisory problcms. 7' 
's Wang, Xu and Zhu performed a statistical analysis of listed SOES from 1990 to 2000. Tley found that 
the financial performance of SOEs had deteriorated steadily the year immediately berore initial public 
offering(IPO). Selected mean performance statistics of listed SOEs (%) 
Year -1 Year 0 (IPO) 'Year I Year 2 Year 6 
Return on assets 19.6 15.4 9.7 7.4 2.7 
Return on sales 16.6 16.2 13.7 7.8 0.2 
Capital expend itu res/assets 74.3 57.7 43.1 28.2 3.8 
Annual slaes growth 28.7 47.8 22.2 10.5 16.5 
Source: Wang, Xue and Diu (2001), World Bank 
The most notorious case concerned a listed biochemical company, Guangxia, which falsified profits 
for several years to present itself as a fast-growing entity with sophisticated technologies. Ile company 
reported a net profit of Rmb4l7mn, but according to CSRC investigators, had actually lost Rmbl50mn 
in 2000. Shenzhen Stock Exchange Fact Book 200 1. 
70 Supra note 6 1. 
71 For example, China lacks rules and regulations to protect the benefits of small and medium sized 
investors. The markets still need to improve the situation related to information disclosure and corporate 
governance. The means to supervise is in serious shortage since CSRC is not entitled to necessary legal 
inquiry into illegalities, etc. For details, see supra note 60. 
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In addition, with considerably limited investment activities in the past decade, the 
insurance industry lacks experienced and skilled personnel on investment although 
some insurers are clearly capable of learning and absorbing sophisticated tools for 
managing investment risks. Given the volatility of the capital markets and the fact that 
many insurers simply lack any experience of direct investments in the markets, it fears 
that a too rapid liberalisation of investment policy could, without proper and adequate 
regulatory control, compromise the stability and financial health of the insurance 
industry. 
The above analyses highlight that China needs to allow deficit-strickcri insurance 
funds directly to enter the capital markets that would bring more opportunities of gains 
for the funds and nurture the growth of institutional investors. Meanwhile, it is essential 
to create the necessary regulatory framework for this development. Importantly, to 
control risks, the liberalisation should be accompanied by prescribed maximum level of 
securities investment. The quantitative restrictions should be gradually relaxed 
consistent with the increasing maturity of the capital markets and insurers' investment 
management. 
5.5.2 Broadening investment channels 
The author believes that the strategy for opening up capital markets to insurers 
should be applied to other markets. In other words, China needs greatly to broaden 
investment channels while applying quantitative restrictions to control invcstmcnt risks. 
The narrowness of investment channels can lead to incfficicnt investment and hamper 
adequate investment diversification thus unnecessarily increasing risks. Investment 
theories and experience from overseas insurance markets suggest that the broadness of 
investment is compatible with portfolio management techniques, facilitating both 
diversification and mitigation of investment risks, and the optimising of investment 
return. According to a survey by the IAIS, many jurisdictions allow insurers a 
diversified asset allocation although restrictions on the range of assets used to cover 
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technical provisions or solvency margin vary. " Given the sound macroeconomic 
environment, insurers' needs for effective portfolio management, and the cffectiveness 
of quantitative restrictions regarding investment risk control, it believes that there is no 
need to exclude continually the Chinese insurers from major markets such as stock 
market (shares, bonds that are listed on the stock exchanges), corporate bonds, 
mortgages, bank term deposits, real estate, government bonds, policyholder loans, and 
infrastructure. Of course, certain much risky categories of investments may be 
prohibited, e. g. loans without appropriate guarantee, unquoted shares, and derivatives. 
Regarding how to impose maximum levels on categories of admissible assets, 
China's regulator has to take into account constraints and risks of various markets. For 
example, many state-owned enterprises are in serious financial diffliculties. If insurers 
are allowed to allocate their assets heavily on the bonds issued by state-owned 
enterprises, it could jeopardise the financial condition of the insurers. The similar 
situation can be seen in other markets, for example, mortgages, real estate, and so on. 
Therefore, a desirable strategy is applying tight maximum limits on a newly opened 
market and then gradually loosening the limits in consistency with the maturity of the 
market. To restrict the default and liquidity risks of investments and crisure that 
portfolios are sufficiently dispersed, China also needs to impose maximum limits on a 
given asset in a category of assets. 
5.6 Some issues on improving China Insurance Investment regulation 
and supervision 
The purpose of this part is to discuss how the investment issues can be dealt with in 
the restructuring of China's insurance investment regulation and supervision. The 
72 
Corporate bonds 
Government bonds 
Shares 
Mortgages 
Real estate 
Loans 
Cash 
Derivatives 
Unit trusts 
Advances against policies 
Assets used to cover technical 
provisions(range) 
3%-100% 
M-100% 
5-100% 
2.5%-100% 
M-100% 
2%-100% 
0.2%-100% 
3%-100% 
5%-100% 
5%-100% 
Assets used to cover solvency 
margin (range) 
100/0-100% 
10%-100% 
7.5%-100% 
5'Yo-100% 
5%-100% 
M-100% 
2'Yo-100% 
5%. 100% 
7.5'Yo-100% 
5%-100% 
Resource: "Report on insurance supervisory legislation and practice" IAIS 1999. 
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OECD elaborates "Selected Principles for the Regulation of Investments by Insurance 
Companies and Pension Funds" (hereinaller "Selected Principles") for investment rule 
restructuring in both member and non-member states. The following examine and 
discuss most of the principles from the Chinese viewpoints and point out a number of 
critical issues that China should address in order to build a sound regulatory framework 
for insurers' investment. 
5.61 The prior objective of investment regulation: properly balancing safety and 
profitability 
Rules and guidelines usually require that insurers' investment be safe and profitable 
among other objectives. ' For instance, the OECD "Selected Principles" suggests: the 
objectives of regulation of investments "must simultaneously pursue the twin goals of 
the security and profitability of the funds invested; i. e. they must guarantee 
commitment but generate financial income as well. " However, these objectives arc not 
always simultaneously achievable, as they are probably not inherently consistent with 
one another. For instance, safety and profitability can be contradictory per se in the 
view of economists. "' For this reason, a delicate and practical rcquircmcnt is to seek an 
optimal balance of these objectives under specific conditions in a ccrtain period. 
Experiences and lessons from many countries elucidate the importance of this 
requirement. On the one hand, inadequate or too relaxed regulation may fail to prcvcnt 
insurers from taking too risky portfolios to maximisc returns. In the UK, life insurers 
has long enjoyed relaxed "prudent person rules" rather than strict quantitative 
restrictions on their asset distribution. However, as the UK equity markct has been 
plummeting since 2000, they had the bitter experience of investing hcavily in equity for 
7' Namely, diversification, spread, asset/liability matching, liquidity, marketability, currency matching, 
and localisation, etc. For example, the Wisconsin Insurance Code (s. 620.01(t)) states sound investment 
as following: safety of principal and to the extent consistent therewith, maximum yield and growth; 
stability of value; sufficient liquidity; reasonable diversification; reasonable relationship between 
liabilities and assets as to term and nature. Also see EEC Third Mon-life Directive (art. 20). China 
Insurance Law (2002 art. 105) stresses: insurance companies must employ funds in a stable and safe 
manner, and ensure the preservation and appreciation of asset value. 
"' According to investment theories, generally, the more the yields are likely to be, the more risks 
insurers are likely to take. 
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higher yield, which severely impaired the whole industry's solvency. " On the other 
hand, as we discussed in section 5.4.5, unnecessary or excessive regulation suppresses 
insurance development. 
Of course, the objective of insurers' investment should first be safety. China should 
stick to the priori of safety when designing investment regulation system. However, in 
the past, China's authorities unduly stressed the priori of safety, and consequently 
neglected the issue of profitability, resulting in the insurance industry suffering from 
very limited investment opportunities and investment deficiency. As China's insurance 
market is becoming increasingly competitive and the annual growth rate is keeping 
above 30% in 2001 and 2002, together with the pressures from low interest rates, 
insurers are desperate for effective investment to support their survival and 
development. On the other hand, China's insurance industry is facing many challenges 
both internal and external to individual insurers. For example, insurers lack investment 
professionalism, and most importantly, their corporate governance need to be 
strengthened. Various markets are inu-nature and especially capital markets are highly 
volatile. Given these realities, China should adopt a rather strict and detailed 
investment regulation to protect policyholders against the investment risks facing 
insurers. 
A strict regulation approach does not necessarily mean that China should continue its 
existing stiff investment policies. Rather, considering that China's overall economic 
environment is predicted encouraging in short and medium terms, China needs to take 
this advantage, greatly impelling the momentum of the insurance industry development 
and the role of insurers' investment on promoting the whole economic growth. The 
effectiveness of insurers' investment should not be judged only by individual insurers' 
profitability. From a macro perspective, the effectiveness should also contribute to the 
stability of financial system and the economic development. This means the authority 
should provide insurers with greater opportunities by broadening investment channels, 
encouraging diversification of asset portfolios together with certain measures including 
quantitative restrictions on asset portfolios to control risks. 
Furthermore, in order to adapt to the pace of change in the economic and financial 
environment and the liberalisation of the insurance sector, China should gradually 
adopt more flexible investment regulation in the future to allow insurers greater room 
for manoeuvre in the choice of their investment. This should be done under a close 
" "UK Life Insurance Industry" Special Comment Moody's Investors Service December 2002. 
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monitor of risks generated by possible reverse changes in the overall economic 
environment, which could mean a shift to rather strict investment regulation. 
5.6 2 Properly dealing with interrelation between investment and underwriting 
To secure investment performance, it necessarily requires safeguarding underwriting 
business, as these two businesses interrelate closely within an insurer. A research by 
Swiss Re. examined the key factors and latest trends determining profitability in the 
major non-life insurance markets. " It finds that the price (or underwriting cycle) and 
investment performance are the two most important factors shaping profitability. Over 
history, underwriting and investment have been negatively correlated, as strong 
investment results increase capital funds, sofIcning prices. The research also suggests 
that underwriting results be improved as the outlook for equity market is less certain 
and more volatile. One implication of the research is that insurers might not have to 
entail excessive investment risks if they accentuate a positive result of underwriting. 
Chinese insurers used to operate with underwriting as their dominant business and 
investment business as a support. Under this scenario, insurers rcaliscd profits mainly 
through keeping positive underwriting results. Against a background of increasingly 
competitive underwriting conditions, pressures from volatile interest rates, and 
competition from other financial institutions, insurers stepped up to pursue more 
aggressive investment policies. Consequently, asset leverage and investment yield arc 
becoming increasingly determinative in insurers' profitability composition. However, 
given limitations on investment and the interrelation between investment and 
underwriting, the regulator and insurers need to properly balance the interrelation 
mainly through sufficient product pricing. Otherwise, rapid growth risk may drive 
insurers thirsty for investment, thus worsening the existing contradiction between high 
growth and investment deficiency. 
5.63 "Prudent person rules" or quantitative restrictions 
One issue related to balancing safety and profitability is whether China should adopt 
a "prudent person" approach to investment regulation. Generally, there arc two different 
approaches to insurers' (and pension funds) investment portfolio rcgulation: pnident 
'Sigma No. 5/2001 
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person Iman rules (or qualitative rules), and quantitative restrictions. "The former, a 
kind of "soll control", can be generally defined as: an investment standard by which 
"the trustee may invest in a security if it is one which a prudent man of discretion and 
intelligence, who is seeking a reasonable income and preservation of capital, would 
buy. "" In a broad outline, the approach entrusts insurers with discretion in their 
investment decision-making and focuses on the investment behaviour of insurers, 
although the details of the prudent person rules vary in expression from one country, 
sector or company to another. " The latter, in contrast, is an approach of setting 
quantitative limits on the investment portfolios of insurers. 
Quantitative restrictions approach is believed to have the main disadvantage of 
inflexibility that hardly allows insurers to change rapidly in response to changing 
economic circumstances. Therefore, it makes insurers difficult or impossible to manage 
their investment portfolios efficiently. " Assumcdly having the flexibility of protecting 
policyholders with minimum interference in insurers' investment", prudent person 
rules approach is enjoying an increasingly acceptance. Gerry Dickinson observed that 
"there has in recent years been some change in the investment regulations of life 
insurance companies away from detailed quantitative restrictions on asset choice 
towards more general guidelines, commonly rcfcffcd to as prudent-nian rules. "" The 
OECD "Selected Principles" also suggests that to reduce the number of quantitative 
regulations, the authorities could incorporate prudent-pcrson principles into invcstmcnt 
regulations when they deem adequate. 
China should be cautious when considering the introduction of prudent person 
rules. Several reasons are behind this. Firstly, in the EU, what clemcnts that should be 
included in a prudent person rules system is still in discussions. " The currcnt EU 
investment rules in insurance are said to be a "prudent person rules" approach togcthcr 
7' See Viviane Leflaive (2001) "The Supervision of insurance solvency: comparative analysis in OECD 
countries" OECD p20. 
See "prudent man rules" Black's LawDictionary (5th ed. ) West Publishing Co. (1979) 
"Selected Principles" OECD. 
0 See Juan Yermo (2000) "Investment regulation of insurance companies and pension funds" OECD. 
' For advantages and disadvantages of an investment approach building on the "prudent person rules", 
see European Commission (2001) Market/2099/01-EN, p7. 
82 See Gerry Dickinson (2001) "Principles for investment regulation of pension funds and life insurance 
companies" OECD p 10. 
" European Commission (2001) Market/2099/01-EN, p7. 
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with quantitative specifications. "' It rests principally on solvency supervision and 
scrutiny of managerial behaviour, e. g. through the monitoring of the corporate 
governance and internal control procedures set by insurers. The principle of prudent 
person rules laid down in art. 20 of the Third Non-life and Life Directives states that 
"the assets covering the technical provisions shall take account of the type of business 
carried on by an undertaking in such a way as to secure the safety, yield and 
marketability of its investments, which the undertaking shall ensure arc diversified and 
adequately spread. " Besides this, there are many quantitative restrictions specifically 
stipulating the allocation of insurers' asset representing technical provisions" and 
insurers' investment portfolios". The "Selected Principles" of OECD also indicates that 
the modalities of the application of current prudent person rules may not be sufficiently 
precise, and the interpretation thereof may vary substantially. 
Secondly, the number of jurisdictions that have applied the approach is still very 
limited. According to OECD and Gerry Dickinson, only the UK, the US and the 
Netherlands have incorporated prudent person rules into their life insurance 
investment. " 
Thirdly, there are rare empirical studies on the comparative effectiveness bctwcen 
the prudent person rules and quantitative restrictions on insurcrs' invcstment. 
Therefore the judgement, that prudent person rules may have better investment return 
and asset allocation than quantitative restrictions have, could be suggestive rather than 
conclusive. In addition, E. Philip Davis revealed that rcgarding the invcstmcnt 
efficiency of life insurers, there was rather little difference bctwccn prudent person 
rules and quantitative restrictions in the average. " 
Fourthly, as prudent person rules is a proccss-focussing approach, it sccms to have 
the disadvantage that regulators may feel difficult to make sure if insurcrs' invcstmcnt 
"' See "Issues paper on investment regulation", Paper No DAFFE/AS (2000)3, Insurance Conunittee, 
OECD 
" The Third Direct Non-life Insurance Directive, art. 21 and the Third Direct Life Insurance Directive, 
Art. 2 1. 
"' The Third Direct Non-life Insurance Directive, art. 22, para. 1 and the Third Direct Life Insurance 
Directive, art. 22, para. 1. 
17 See "Issues paper on investment regulation", Paper No DAFFE/AS (2000)3, Insurance Committee, 
OECD 
88 E. Philip Davis (2001) "Portfolio regulation of life insurance companies and pension funds" OECD, 
P17-26. 
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jeopardises its statutory financial health and an intervention is necessary. " Therefore, 
The prerequisites for successful implementation of the approach could include 
regulatory and supervisory mechanisms that guide and ensure that the corporate 
governance of insurers is robust to produce appropriate investment decision-makings 
and sufficient to monitor the portfolio management function. 
Since China should adopt a rather strict and detailed investment regulation, it is not 
desirable to introduce prudent person rules hastily. Instead, China needs to trace the 
tendency of the system for further liberalisation in the future. 
5.6.4 Differential regulation for assets covering fechnical provisions and assets 
covering capital base 
The OECD "Selected Principles" suggests that "investment corresponding to the 
'free' component of capital/surplus (assets that represent the capital above the minimum 
required) need not be regulated, or at least not in the same manner. " This is the practice 
seen in the EU current framework which differentiates investment regulation bctwcen 
two kinds of assets: the assets covering the technical provisions, and the assets covering 
solvency margin (capital base). For the former, the EU Directives sct out a set of rules 
that contain a list of accepted assets, rules on the spread, valuation, localisation and 
matching of such assets. " Rather, the Directives allow the latter to be invcstcd frccly. 
The justification of this differentiation is that insurers must maintain sufficient and 
qualified assets to cover all underwriting liabilities. The capital base rcprcscnts insurers' 
"own funds" which should not be as constraint as the former in tcn-ns of investment. 
Allowing insurers to allocate the capital base to high yielding investments can reinforce 
the insurers' solvency although the investments may cntai I risks. 
The author believes that OECD suggestions arc recommendable to China. China has 
long been applying the same strict restrictions on total assets without differentiating 
technical provisions base and capital base, thus having promoted insurcrs' stringcnt 
solvency. Allowing the investment of capital funds more freedom could cnlarge 
insurers' opportunities of earning a higher return on their investment of capital funds, 
" See Viviane Leflaive (2001) "The Supervision of Insurance Solvency: Comparative Analysis in OECD 
Countries" OECD p20, and Table 5: Portfolio regulations for pension funds and life insurance 
companies. 
" Supra notes 85,86. 
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thus strengthening their long-tenri financial base. In addition, this approach also 
provides the insurers with incentives to hold sufficient capital. 
Considering that stringent statutory requirements arc imposed on solvency margins, 
the regulator should treat the assets covering the solvency margins more stringently 
than the assets covering other capitals, when adopting the differential regulation. The 
ground of safeguarding insurers' stringent solvency situation may also justify this 
approach. " 
5.65 Integrated approach 
Suggested in OECD "Selected Principles", as part of measures ensuring insurers' 
solvency, investment regulation must be integrated into the overall approach towards 
financial soundness of insurers. As invested assets are attached with risks, many 
countries use asset amount as the basis for determining solvency margin requirements 
in order to cover the investment risk. This is the case in the US and Japan for both non- 
life and life insurance. For example, the US statutory solvency margin is formed by 
cumulative ratios calculated on the basis of insurers' assets. The different categories of 
assets are weighted according to their nature, degree of liquidity and class of credit 
risk. " The solvency margin requirements of the EU model only cover tile investment 
risk for life insurance, which choose ratios based on technical provisions that are 
further reinforced by investment regulation. However, non-life insurance is entirely 
absent from investment risks. China's current solvency margin system is largely similar 
to the EU model. In addition, given that China has no investment regulation for assets 
covering technical provisions, there is no clear interrelation between solvency margins 
and investment regulation for both life and non-lifc insurance. China needs to 
contemplate a reform on this point. 
" One criticism on the E. U. model is the solvency margin should not be given the level freedom with 
other capitals because of its buffer function. See Institutional Investors in the New Financial Landscape 
OECD No. 2800, (1998) p434. 
"' See "Comparison of the NATC Life, P&C and MCO RBC Formulas Summary of Differences" 
American Academy of Actuaries February 2002 
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5.66 Institutional andfunctional approach 
OECD "Selected Principles" suggests that investment regulation incorporate both 
institutional and functional considerations and link these two considerations. The main 
reason for this is that investment should be tailored to an insurer's specific conditions 
and the features of its products, and so is investment regulation. This approach enables 
the regulation to be as closely as possible compatible to characteristics of insurers and 
their funds covered by investments, thereby minimising regulatory distortions of risk 
management. 
China needs to consider applying this principle in three respects. Firstly, due to the 
difference of financial liabilities between life and non-life insurance, it is essential to 
properly set up different investment regulations for the two sectors. " Secondly, 
investment regulation should be risk-bascd and flexible, leaving greater discretion to 
more financially sound insurers. Insurers holding capital and reserves that arc 
significantly higher than the statutory minimum or possessing proven internal 
investment capability can be granted some additional flexibility. For example, these 
insurers can be allowed to invest in certain commonly restricted markets (e. g. stock 
market) or exceed certain ceilings within certain limits subject to prior authorisation, as 
suggested in OECD "Selected Principles". Thirdly, according to OECD "Selected 
Principles", investment regulation must be tailored to product characteristics. The 
CIRC has already allowed insurers to invest up to 100% of funds derived from 
investment-linked products; this differential treatment is worth encouraging. The 
regulator needs to consider further incorporating contractual liabilities (e. g. guaranteed 
minimum rate, profit share, surrender value, maturity, and payment terms) of different 
products into investment regulation. 
" Non-life insurers provide covers against losses stemming from damage to or loss of property and legal 
liability. Their liabilities are mainly short-term and harder to predict than are those of lire insurers who 
cover the long-term events. Therefore, due to the requirement of a high degree of liquidity, non-life 
insurers' investment portfolios are much more bound to investment maximum for asset classes than those 
of life insurers are. See Institutional Investors in the New Financial Landscape OECD 1998, p435. 
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5.6.7 Combining regulatory and insurers'efforts to control risks 
Sound investment regulation has to address the combined cfforts of regulators and 
insurers. Obviously, regulation cannot assure, by itself, the optimal invcstmcnt by 
insurers. On the contrary, insurers' investment decision-making processes, which 
include internal controls and risk management systems, function directly. Meanwhile, 
insurers should be prevented from being unduly vulnerable to shills in external 
circumstances, and from incompetent management making speculative or unsuitable 
investments that endanger policyholder interests. OECD "Selected Principles" suggests 
that regulators encourage and guide insurers to "set up appropriate systems of internal 
controls", risk management systems. The main advantage of such a regulatory approach 
is its directly pointing at these internal determinants, the fundamental factors that 
directly affect investment results. The another advantage is it could reduce regulatory 
costs if such systems function properly. However, given the importance of insurers' 
investment, OECD "Selected Principles" suggests, the regulatory and supervisory 
function should not be delegated entirely to insurers or to scif-rcgulation of insurance 
industry. Besides, only spelling out principles of internal control and sound risk 
management is not sufficient to ensure prudent investment. Therefore, regulators 
should verify the adequacy of insurers' internal systems in due course. To ensure that 
regulators act in a transparent and accountable manncr, standards and common tools for 
the supervision need to be formulated. 
Considering the deficiency of internal control and risk management seen in the 
Chinese insurance industry, the strategy of combined cfforts is typically suitable for 
addressing the problems in China. There is a growing recognition by the CIRC that 
adequate risk management systems should be established within insurers. " Further 
efforts by the CIRC should be the issuance of related standards for establishing these 
systems and for verification of the systems. The MIS "Draft supervisory standard on 
asset management by insurance companies""' describes the essential elements of a 
sound asset management system and reporting framework across tile full range of 
investment activities. It is recommendable to adapt the standard for China's use. 
" For example, in 1999, the CIRC published the principles Guiding the COnstruction of Insurance 
Companies'Internal Control Systems. See section 3.3.3, d, Chapter 3. 
" <http: //www. iais. org> 
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5.7 Concluding remarks 
This chapter discussed the urgent needs for both further relaxing restrictions on 
insurers' investment and improving investment regulation. This is demonstrated by 
discussions on a number of problems, including: the rapid growth contradicting with 
deficient investment, the inefficient investment via SlFs, the intcrcst-drivcn loss in 
insurers, and pressures from the fast growth of investmcnt-linkcd products. At present, 
provisions governing insurers' investment scatter in the Insurance Law and the related 
regulations. The government has been aware of the acute need to have a specific and 
overarching regulation that deals with investment activities. " 
While investment channels need to be greatly broadened, it is desirable for China to 
adopt a rather strict and detailed investment regulation to protect policyholders against 
the investment risks facing insurers, given the current situations of investment markets 
and insurers' management. Taking the opening up the capital markets to insurers as an 
example, it showed that a sound interaction between insurance funds and capital market 
development will be unlikely to archive in the absence of insurers' efficient invcstmcnt 
management and supportive infrastructure and cffcctivc regulation in the both sectors. 
The chapter also discussed a set of issues related to creating a legal environment for 
insurers' effective portfolio management and risk control and at the same time 
safeguarding the soundness of the Chinese insurance sector. Some recommendations 
are made as follows: (1) The core objective of investment regulation should be 
calibrated on properly balancing safety and proritability. (2) To control the rapid 
growth risk that may drive insurers thirsty for investment, it is ncccssary to properly 
balance the interrelation between investment and underwriting. This could be done 
mainly through sufficient product pricing. (3) Given the basic strategy of adopting a 
rather strict and detailed investment regulation to protect policyholders against the 
investment risks facing insurers, it is not appropriate to introduce prudent person rules 
hastily. (4) Regulations for assets covering technical provisions and for assets covering 
capital base should be differentiated by allowing the capital funds more invcstmcnt 
freedom. This could enlarge insurers' opportunities of carning a higher return on their 
investment of capital funds. Further differentiating treatments bctwccn assets covcring 
solvency margin and assets covering other capitals are suggestible. (5) An integrated 
' The CIRC was reported having engaged in drafting a regulation of insurers' invcstmcnt since 2001. 
See Shanghai Zhengquan Bao (Shanghai Securities Arews) December 12,200 1.1 lowcvcr, the drafting is 
still in process so far. 
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approach that incorporates investment regulation into solvency regulation needs be 
adopted to improve the current solvency system for both life and non-lifi: insurance. (6) 
To minimise regulatory distortions of risk management, institutional and functional 
approaches that enables regulation to be compatible as closely as possible to 
characteristics of insurers and their funds covered by investments arc needed. (7) Sound 
investment regulation has to address the combined efforts of regulators and insurcrs. (8) 
As a developing country in which market circumstances are changing rapidly, China 
needs to adapt its insurance investment regulation appropriately to the circumstanccs. 
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Chapter 6 
Rate regulation in China: market-based pricing? 
how? and experience from the US 
6.1 Introduction 
There is a common consensus that the objectives of insurance rate regulation are to 
ensure that premium rates should not be excessive (so high as to lead to exorbitant 
profits), not inadequate (in the interests of solvency), and not unfairly discriminatory 
(price difference should reflect expected claim and expense differences). ' Rcgulators 
used to achieve these objectives through rate regulation in various forms! llowcvcr, 
ensuring the above objectives while encouraging insurers to develop innovative 
products is an issue that regulators in many countries arc facing. In the global 
marketplace, insurance pricing deregulation is becoming commonplace on purpose to 
fulfil the objectives through competitive pricing (or markct-bascd pricing), although the 
deregulation varies in different countries. In the British insurance markct, "the amount 
of premiums is entirely a matter for the insurer and 
1 For example, New York Insurance Law. N. Y. Ins. Law Sec. 2303. 
2 Regulatory approaches to insurance pricing taken by regulators normallY fall within the following 
spectrum of options: 
a. Statuto? y rates The regulators set out fixed rates which certain insurers are required to adopt 
compulsorily; 
b. Prior approval Insurers must receive approval in advance before any changes in pricing or policy 
terms can be made; 
C. Flexible rating Under this approach, companies can increase or decrease rates within a certain range 
without obtaining prior approval; 
d. File-and-use Rates and/or terms and changes thereof must be filed with the regulators, which 
generally will have a certain period (e. g. 30-60 days) to review the filings against applicable statutory 
and regulatory standards before the given rates and/or terms and changes thereof can be used; 
e. Use-and-file Product and pricing and changes thereof can be used immediately as long as they are 
filed with the regulators, but the regulators will revoke the filings after checking and measuring these 
product and pricing and changes thereof against applicable statutory and regulatory standards; and 
f. Competitive pricing Neither informational filing nor filing is required. 
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competition led to the end of agreed tariffs"' in the 1970s. Across the EU, commercial 
insurers are free to compete for large accounts without government oversight. ' Japan 
and South Korea have liberalised price controls in most insurance lines. ' In the US, 
insurance prices are substantially deregulated defacto for many commercial property- 
liability insurance lines while personal line deregulation lags behind. Meanwhile, many 
insurance markets still see rate regulation, a highly debated issue. As rate regulation 
and deregulation concurrently exist in the US propcrty-liability insurance markets, 
especially in auto insurance market, it provide us with a rare opportunity to observe and 
probe how and why these two contradictory and interrelated issues co-cxist. 
Over the past decade, the Chinese insurance industry has undergone regulatory 
reform on its stringent rate regulation. Its objectives arc to accelerate competition 
among insurers thus expanding consumers' options and improving service and the 
quality of products available to consumers, ensure innovative new products reach 
market quickly, and reduce negative effects of rate regulation. Regulatory 
modernisation reshaped the market landscape. Accompanying this backdrop of 
increasing reliance on marketplace dynamics, the CIRC faces a number of questions. 
Should China further deregulate insurance pricing control? How can China propel 
significant reforms in rate regulation to facilitate modcrnising propcrty-casualty 
insurance while minimising destructive competition by insurers so the insurance market 
develops healthily? Experiences of rate deregulation in the US, especially Proposition 
3 John Birds Modern Insurance Law (5th ed. ) 2001. Sweet & Maxwell p156. The British insurance 
supervision has for many years relied on "freedom with publicity". 17herc is no regulatory control over 
premium rates and products. Supervision is focussed on whether the management and control of an 
insurer was "fit and proper" 
4 The EU demolished insurance tariff of both rates and policies by adopting the 77drd Insurance 
Directives in 1993 as its governing law on insurance to foster a genuinely internal marketplace of 
insurance services. It is arguably the least restrictive in the world. 
5 As part of its efforts to stem the financial crisis and alleviate the prolonged economic depression, Japan 
has taken measures to gradually deregulate insurance pricing control since 1996 when the financial 
reform (Big Bang) took effect. For more information, see Wook Jean Kwon and I larold D. Skipper, Jr. 
(1998) "Regulatory changes in the Japanese insurance market" Journal ofinsurance Regulation October, 
and "Japan's insurance market: a sea change" Swiss Re. Sigma No. 8/2000. 
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103 (Prop. 103)' and rate regulation in California, provide us with valuable cases of 
advantages and disadvantages of rate regulation, deregulation and rc-rcgulation. The 
author believes that China should cautiously adopt a comprchcnsivc approach to rate 
deregulation by learning lessons from the experiences in dcvelopcd countries and 
taking into account China's realities and needs. 
This chapter is divided into six main parts. Following this introduction, scction 6.2 
presents some observations and discussions on rate regulation in propcrty/casualty 
insurance in the US with a focus on Prop. 103. in California. Section 6.3 briefly 
describes China's rate regulation, generally comments on the current system, and 
discusses debates on rate regulation reform in China. Section 6.4 focuses on rate 
regulation in China's auto insurance as a typical case, and section 6.5 discusscs whcthcr 
market-bascd pricing fits for the current situations in China. The chapter concludcs 
with some recommendations on appropriate measures needed to escort rate 
deregulation. 
6.2. Some observations on insurance rate regulation and deregulation In lite US 
62.1 Overview ofrate regulation in the US 
In the US, rate regulation is underpinned by many factors, and differs in diffcrcnt 
lines of insurance. At the end of 19" century, destructive price wars between insurers 
caused many insolvencies leaving policyholders without coverage. The insurance 
industry at that time tried in vain to solve the problem of price wars by promoting 
"correct pricing practices". 7 These articulated a movement for closely regulating the 
6 Prop. 103 which applies not only to auto insurance but also to most property and casualty coverage in 
California was approved by voters in 1988. It includes provisions for a rollback of insurance rates, an 
elected insurance commissioner, and recovery of prior approval. According to Prop. 103, prices of auto 
insurance and the profitability of the insurance companies must be determined by the California 
Insurance Department and ultimately by the courts. For the full text of Prop. 103, see 
<http: //www. insurance. ca. gov> 
7 Stephen P. D'Arcy "Insurance price deregulation: the Illinois experience" in Deregulating Property. 
Liability 
Insurance Restoring Competition and Increasing Market ErIciency (Deregulating Property-Liability 
Insurance 2001) J. David Cummins (ed. ) AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulation Studies 
Washington, D. C. 2001. Also see Morrill 'Momas C. (1990) "Nine dramatic decades" Best review June 
1990. 
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insurance business including premium pricing! Rate regulation in the US largcly 
relates to property-casualty lines of insurance, although extensive direct controls on 
rates are also seen in credit insurance and some kinds of accident and health insurance. " 
Contrarily, premium rates for life insurance are oflcn indirectly regulated mainly by 
legal requirements for reserves, expense limitations (e. g. provisions on the maximum 
sales commissions), surplus accumulation limitations, and surplus apportionment 
requirements (e. g. provisions on payment of dividends to policyholders). " 
Regarding rate standards, the common principles contained in the insurance rate 
regulatory statutes in effect in the majority of states are that rates must not be arcessive, 
inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory. A rate is excessive if it is likely to produce 
profits unreasonably high for the insurance provided or if expenses arc unreasonably 
high in relation to services rendered. This induces provisions on what constitute 
reasonable profits and expenses. A rate is inadequate if it does not cover expected 
losses and expenses and is likely to lessen competition or lead to a monopoly. Unfair 
discrimination exists if price differentials fail to reflect equitably the differences in 
expected losses and expenses. " However, these three principles sccm to be qualitative. 
The following essential legal issues have to be addressed whcn applying thcsc 
principles. 
6.2.2 Appropriate profit margins andpremium rates 
When judging the suitability of rates, the concept of appropriate profit margins is 
employed, because rates, as important sources of income, closely relate to prorits. In 
the US, the legal perspective on appropriate profit margins and rightful rates varies 
between states. 
' The US Supreme Court judgement in German 41liance Ins. Co. v. Kansas (233 U. S. 389 1913) held 
that insurance was a business "affected with a public interest", which required governmental 
involvement. In the court's opinion, insurance was often a legal contractual prerequisite for other market 
activities and the average consumer was in a comparative disadvantage in the marketplace due to the 
complexity of the insurance contract. 
9 For instance, "Credit insurance in Texas: better rate regulation needed to protect consumers" A Report 
by the Center for Economic Justice, Texas, the US, April 1998. 
'0 See Peter M. Lencsis (1997) Chapter 7, Insurance Regulation in the United States. Quorum l3ooks, 
London. 
" See supra note 1. 
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In general, the competitive market model is used to deal with this issue. According to 
the NAIC Property and Casualty Model Rating Law (File and Use version, v-775- 1), a 
competitive market is deemed by law to produce appropriate profit margins, and 
therefore rate prior approval for the market is unnecessary. Premium rates and 
supporting documents are to be filed only for the Commissionces information. This is 
called the use-and-file system. The Model Law prescribes different procedures and 
standards for deciding whether a market is competitive or not. Some important 
indicators that are used in making the decision include the number of insurers, their 
market shares and changes therein, the kind and level of information available to 
consumers, and profitability level. Markets are presumed to be competitive unless the 
Commissioner, following a hearing, determines that a reasonable degree of competition 
does not exist in the market and then requires prior approval to be sought. 
Alternatively, a few regulators, legislatures and courts require, in rate approval, a 
direct evaluation of profit margins, which has two approaches: total rate ofrcturn" and 
rate ofoperating return analysis. The former calculates returns on both operating funds 
and capital, and compares insurance returns by line by state with returns in othcr 
industries of comparable risk. One example is Cayarm v. Deukmejian (771 P. 2d 1247 
1989). The Californian Prop. 103 enacted a statutory rate rollback of 20% of premiums 
and did not allow relief from the rollback unless an insurer was threatened with 
insolvency. In the case, insurers challenged the rollback as unconstitutional and 
confiscatory. The California Supreme Court articulated a requirement that relief from 
the rollback must be granted to an insurer if the rollback rates were "inadequate in that 
they did not contain afair and reasonable rate ofreturn. " 
The rate of operating return" excludes investment income on capital or shareholder 
supplied funds as one major difference from total rate of return analysis. For instance, 
in State ex. rel. Commissioner of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Burcau, " the North 
Carolina Courts held that investment earnings from insurance operational funds is 
appropriate in rate making, but by contrast, investment earnings on capital or 
stockholder supplied funds is not appropriate. 
12 Profit margin (under total rate of return) - increased surplus over the year (equal to underwriting 
Profikloss + investment income on current insurance operation + investment income on surpluSY(the 
beginning statuto? y surplus). 
" Profit margin (under rate of operating return) - increased surplus over the ), car (equal to 
underwriting profWoss + investment income on current insurance operation)1earnedpremium. 
14 261 S. E. 2d 671 (1979), affirmed in 269 S. E. 2d 602 (1980). 
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However, practically every state requiring prior approval relies on loss ratios (or, 
equivalently, a combined ratio of losses and expenses), because the loss ratio approach 
avoids many of the troublesome issues derived from a direct evaluation of profit 
margins. For instance, both total rate of return and rate of operating return need to 
define the eligible costs for calculating the margins because profits depend on costs and 
incomes. Otherwise, inefficient (high cost) insurers will be favoured over efficient (low 
cost) insurers if an insurer's actual expenses are used. The direct evaluation approaches 
also raise the issue of whether to base the rate of return on General Accepted 
Accounting Practice (GAAP), Statutory Accounting Practice (SAP), or economic value 
(discounted). in addition, the total rate of return requires an allocation of national 
accounts of insurance groups (such as overhead expenses, investment income, and 
federal taxes) by line by state based on premiums, reserves, or invested assets. As the 
division of these elements needs massive work and subjective judgements, therefore, it 
could produce outdated results which could also be essentially artificial. 
62.3 Risk classification 
"Risk classification"" is a major and complex issue relating to rate regulation and 
deregulation. Debates on territorial rating (basing auto premiums on tcrritorics/zip 
codes) relating to the implementation of Prop. 103 typically rcflcct this complexity. 
Californian Prop. 103 does not explicitly forbid territorial rating. Instead, it orders 
insurers to base premiums primarily upon three "mandatory" factors: driving-safcty 
records, the number of miles driven annually, and a drivces years of driving. 
Meanwhile, with the intention of prohibiting insurers from utilising unrelated and non- 
causal risk classification, it requires other "optional" rating criteria only to be utiliscd if 
it can be demonstrated that such criteria have "a substantial relationship to risk of loss". 
These provisions led to lasting debate and tortuous political and legal battles relating to 
territorial rating. 
In 1989, insurers argued in a lawsuit that basing premiums on driving-safey records 
rather than zip codes would discriminate against bad drivers in violation of Prop. 103's 
requirement that rates be "fair". The case was ultimately dismissed as moot. Latcr, the 
is "Risk classification" or "risk sorting" contains risk selection (insurers' decision on whether or not to 
insure certain risks), and risk differentiation (insurers' decision on to what extent and with what 
premiums to insure certain risks). 
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Californian insurance commissioner, John Garamendi, repudiated a territorial rating 
proposal made by the insurance industry. His decision was based on a survey of 10 
million Californian auto policies, which confirmed that zip-code rating raises rates ror 
good drivers across the state, forcing them to subsidisc bad drivers. When 
Quackenbush took the post of commissioner, he enacted regulations allowing zip-code 
rating; and this led to Spanish Speaking Citizens'Found. v. Quackenbush. " The court 
ruled that the regulations violated the statute by allowing zip code to outweigh the three 
factors specified by Prop. 103. Quackenbush and insurers appealed to the Ist District 
Court of Appeal in San Francisco. In 2000, the court upheld the Quackenbush 
regulations as a "lawful choice among impcrfcct options", and ruled that the voters 
could not supplant territorial rating. " The main arguments deployed in these battles 
were the efficiency and equity of territorial rating. Insurers claimed that the price of 
their policies should be based on risk, and the best determiner of that was the amount 
and scope of accidents where a person lived, not their driving record. However, 
consumer advocates contended that zip-code based pricing which charged city dwellers 
more than those in rural areas not only unfairly pcnaliscd city dwellers but also 
penalised drivers in the rating area with a clean record. 
Risk classification is essential to insurance, but it has some technical, political and 
legal constraints. On the one hand, it is desirable in terms of economics. An essential 
characteristic of insurance is 'risk pooling' in which members of a group with similar 
risks contribute with premiums and share losses that arc incurred by its members. in 
theory, equal premiums only make sense if every member of the pool has the same risk 
of loss, but that is impossible in reality. Risks of each member in most pools vary. To 
make sure that insurance appeals to members with various levels of risk, insurers must 
match the premiums of each member to his/her individual risks. Otherwise, low-risk 
members, who subsidise high-risk members through paying equal premiums, could 
eventually withdraw from the pool, making insurancc business impracticable. On the 
other hand, accurate risk classification" can not be drawn up for several reasons. 
Firstly, the transaction costs and asyninictric inforination prevent the ideal of accurate 
* Case Nos. 796071-6 and 796082.2 (consolidated) Superior Court of Alameda County, filed 1998. 
* Spanish Speaking Olizens'Found. v. Quackenbush, Court of Appcal, First Appellate Distric4 Division 
Four 85 Cal. AppAth 1179 (2000). 
" it means premiums exactly match the risk profile of each member. 
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classification being reached. " Secondly, technological constraints arc still heavy 
although insurers have made cvcr-greater efforts to use actuarial technology to assess 
and predict the uncertainty of risks. Thirdly, the costs of risk classification make the 
classification worthwhile only if its benefits ovcrweigh the related costs. In addition, 
risk classification faces serious moral and legal challenges. For example, use of genetic 
test information in life and health insurance is restricted in the US, '* although some 
believe that the restriction could lead to adverse selection by insured with genetic 
defects. " Similarly, anti-discrimination provisions forbid insurers from basing 
premiums on race, creed, or nationality, etc. 
6.2.4 Rating organisations 
Rating organisations evolved through a winding course and playcd an important roic 
in the insurance rate regulation in the US. Initially, rating organisations (rating 
bureaux) were formed by stockholder fire insurers to prevent "rate and commission 
wars" which had resulted in ruinous competition and many insurcrs' failures. " Tllcy 
were viewed as anti-compctitivc in several states af1cr the US Congrcss passcd tile 
Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890. However, later, in 1910, the Aferritt Conviduce 
established by the New York Legislature to investigate non-lifc insurancc, supportcd 
rating organisations, which in the Commftteeý opinion, hclpcd rclicvc insurcrs from 
fifirate wars" that ultimately impaired the public's intcrcst. This was followcd by burcau 
rates being admitted by statutes in many states. I'lie McCarran-Fcquson Act in 1948 
affirmed state insurance regulation and taxation, exempted the insurance industry from 
anti-trust laws which only apply to insurance business not regulated by state law. T'llis 
enabled rating organisations to continue cffcctivcly setting rates. However, with the 
growing influence of competition, bureau rates, considered as an illegal pricc-rixing 
19 Kenneth S. Abraham "Efficiency and fairness in insurance risk classification" Virginia Law Review 
April 1985. 
2* The Health Insurance Portability and, 4ccountability. 4cl ofthe US. (1998) 
2' Christianson David J. (1996) "Genetic testing: risk classification and adverse selection" Journal of 
Insurance Regulation 15 p75-79. 
2' One example is the National Board offire Insurance Underwriters established in the US in 1866. See 
Marc Schneiberg "Association and inter-firin competition in the American f ire insurance industry" Paper 
presented at the panel on "Associations, Co-opcrative Market Institutions, and Economic Perfornunce. " 
at the Annual Meetings of the Society for the Advancement of Social-Economics, Madison, Wisconsin, 
July 1999. 
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scheme under anti-trust laws, ended in the 1980s and early 1990s; rating organisations 
became "advisory organisations". At present, the Insurance Services Ofl7ce. Inc. (ISO) 
and the National Council on Compensation Insurance, Inc. (NCCI), the two major 
rating organisations, operate nearly nation-wide, while many independent rating 
bureaux, some of which are mandated or created by statutes, acts on a state basis. " 
They provide member insurers with advisory average prospective loss cost? rather 
than advisory rateS21 which they once provided and arc deemed illegal under antitrust 
laws. They also provide newly formed insurers with pricing assistance and policy 
language that the insurers cannot obtain elsewhere, thus enabling them easy entry into 
the marketplace. They also help insurers create special products. All of these factors 
seem to enhance competition in the marketplace. 
6. Z5 Rate deregulation 
Deregulation (on both rates and terms) of commercial lines in the US has bccn 
intensifying in recent years. " It aims to tackle the burdcnsomc regulatory cnvironmcnt 
and excessive costs associated with commercial insurance. " As large companics have 
more information and barging power than ordinary consumers, regulatory reviews of 
rates and forms for commercial lines arc thought unnecessary, restricting insurers from 
competing commercial risks with self-insurance and other alternative markets which 
gradually increased their market share in commercial lines. The deregulation is 
expected not only to enable insurers to respond to the exodus of large commercial risks, 
but also to allow regulators to dedicate their limited resources to solvcncy and market 
performance issues. 
Controversially, the industry also appeals for rate dcrcgulation of personal lines. 
Some academics claim that insurance markets with compctitivc pricing ouipcrform 
" See Peter M. Lencsis (1997) Chapter 7, Insurance Regulation in the United States Quorum Books 
London 
2' Advisory average prospective loss costs are estimates of future claim p3ymcnts, including costs such 
as loss ratios, claims handling and legal defence. 
" Advisory rates contain provision for various expenses, contingencies and profits. 
21 See "Commercial-lines deregulation gains momentum nation-wide" Best Week ProperfylCasualty 
Supplement March 29,1999. 
2' The "White paper on regulatory re-engincering of commercial lines insurance" (NAIC 1997) estimated 
that complying with rate and form filing requirements cost insurers USS lbn and state budgets USS55= 
annually. 
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those with strict rate regulation. Stephen D'Arcy observed that in Illinois, where there 
is no rate regulation, a competitive auto insurance market" has brought many bcncrits 
to both consumers and insurers. For example, overall rate levels arc lower than most 
other states with large populations, high traffic density, and urban areas. Illinois' 
residual market is very small. "' South Carolina, which cnactcd a comprehensive series 
of reforms including competitive pricing in 1997, has seen substantial improvements in 
its auto insurance market. The number of insurers doubled and premiums ror many 
low-risk drivers fell, while the residual market declined substantially. " 
However, competitive pricing also has negative cffccts and has entailed railurcs in 
the US history. Firstly, excessive competition in an open competition market may lead 
to premium levels that are inadequate and threaten the insurers' solvency seen, e. g. in 
the US market at the end of the 19'hccntury. Conversely, impcrrcct price competition, 
price-fixing agreements may lead to premiums which arc excessive and contrary to the 
interests of policyholders. The rollowing description of the overturning of tile 
competitive rating in Caliromia is perhaps a strong proof on this point. 
Prior to Prop. 103 in 1988, California was one of the few states in the US that did not 
require insurers to obtain the regulatory approval for rate changes. " Despite having a 
duty to ensure that insurance rates were "neither excessive nor inadequate", the State 
" In 1998, there were more than 200 insurers underwriting private passenger automobiles, and die top 
ten share was about 64.0% of the market; Iferfindahl/Hirschman Index (11111) was 1137. See "Annual 
Report to the Illinois General Assembly on Insurance Cost Containment* Illinois Department of 
Insurance April 15,2000. 
Supra note 8 
Martin F. Grace, Robert W. Klein and Richard D. Phillips (April 15,2001) *Auto insurance reform. - 
salvation in South Carolina" Georgia State University 
" California enacted the McBride-Grunsky Insurance Regulatory Act, an open competitive pricing in 
1947. Under this Act, insurance companies were not required to file rates for approval except for health 
and life. Illinois and New York adopted a similar approach in 1969, and 1970 respectively. 
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Insurance Commissioner rarely used his price control power. " Moreover, Californian 
law shielded the industry not only from rate regulation but also from competition by 
exempting the industry from antitrust laws. " Thus, neither the free market nor 
government supervision was permitted to moderate the impact of the insurance cycle 
on the economy, although entry and firm rivalry were restricted somewhat by law and 
the state regulated many other aspects of the propcrty/casualty business, e. g. risk 
classification. The competitive market process essentially determined the ultimate 
reasonableness of insurance rates and profits in California, which showed that the auto 
insurance industry in California operated in an "open competition" market. 
Nevertheless, the majority of Californian consumers voted for a sea change as a 
reaction against the skyrocketing prices which had occurred in the competitive pricing 
regime that had existed since 1947, and replaced it with a prior approval regime. " 
There are many (possible) explanations why auto insurance became the target of so. 
called consumer-based regulatory movements in California in 1988. The immediate 
impetus for the Prop. 103 initiative seems to have bccn twofold: partly concern with the 
large premium increases in the years in the mid- to late 1980s, " and partly concern with 
the large disparity in premiums among individuals with prima facie similar risk 
characteristics. "' 
32 See Sugarman, Stephen D. (1990) "CalifOmi3 insurance regulation revolution: the first two years of 
Proposition 103" San Diego Law Review, Vol. 27 p683-714. 
3' See Dwight M. Jaffee and Thomas Russell (1997) " The causes and consequences of rate regulation in 
the auto insurance industry" The US National Bureau of Economic Research Working paper No. 5245 
at 8. 
3' Public outrage at the increases of insurance premiums was evidenced by a poll taken several months 
before the US national election in 1988, which 77% of consumers in California thought that automobile 
insurance companies charged too much, and 45% of consumers blamed automobile insurance companies 
for high insurance rates. 
's Between 1985 and 1988, insurance premiums in California rose dramatically. In 1986 alone, 
automobile premiums in California increased by 22%, while the consumer price index increased only 
3.1%. 
36 Supra note 33, p32-33. 
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Secondly, market-based pricing may partly instigate the underwriting cycle" that is 
in a state of flux between a "hard" market and a "soft" market. During the decade 
leading up to 2001, insurance industries in main developed countries enjoyed the 
longest "soft" market in recent history. Insurers actively competed for customers with 
comparatively low premiums, excellent coverage, and innovative products, and thus a 
"buyees market" existed and premium growth was relatively flat. " This was mainly 
due to the prosperous global/national economics, particularly with respect to booming 
securities markets and favourable inflation and interest rates. " IIowcvcr, since 2001, 
the main developed countries have seen economic growth stagnant, which has driven 
the insurance industries into a "hard" market where the overall condition of tile 
insurance markets or a particular segment of them is negative. The event of 9.11 greatly 
exacerbated the "hard" market. 40 Consequently, customers found out many 
unfavourable events and an cmerging-sacesmarka". For example, coverage, readily 
available and inexpensive in former years became no longer available or available only 
under severe restrictions, exclusion or rcquircmcnts. " Some insurcrs lost thcir 
reinsurance, or had to pay reinsurcs' higher premiums. Some went into rcccivcrship or 
insolvenCy. 42 Many customers found that their premiums had gone up, in sonic cases 
dramaticall . 
4' 
Pricing freedom partly instigates these premium and coverage fluctuations. Modcrn 
insurance companies, unlike traditional insurance which scrvcd as a mcchanism for 
mutual risk sharing, seek to maximise prorits, just like other rinancial institutions. They 
take premiums and set aside part of the premiums as rcscrvcs, which are invested with 
" Cycles are a fact of economic life characterised by high and low periods of profitability for an industry 
or an economy. They have many causes, e. g. economic, social and political changes, or even changes 
in natural environment. 
3' See Robert P. Ilartwig "2001-Ycar end results" Insurance Information Institute, the US. Also see 
"The converging road ahead A. M. Best's top 10 trends" Bestifleck Propert), Icasually Edition. January 
2001. 
" For example, see "T'lic collapse of 11111 and implications for Australian general insurers" Moody's 
Investors service Global Credit research October 200 1. 
'0 See "Implication of the September II teff orist attacks" 7711inghost-Tower Perrin 
"' See "The Equitable Life Assurance Society joint opinion of Ian Glick QC and Richard Snowden for 
the Financial Services Authority" FSA 2001. available at <http: //www. fsa. gov. uk> 
See "Looking back and looking forward" Reinsurance Pricewaterhouxe Coopers October 200 1. 
In the US, premium rates for the coverage of terrorist risk in sonic states roared to 20 times die rates of 
before the 9.11 event. 
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capital to earn additional income. Increasingly, investment returns become the 
industry's principal source of profits while premiums become their principal source of 
investment. When investment markets produce high returns, insurers compete for 
premiums by reducing prices. However, when investment yields arc slipping, the 
industry increases premiums to maintain profit levels. Markct-bascd pricing provides 
insurers with this freedom, and even enables insurers to increase premiums steeply 
which may be unrelated to loss ratios to generate revenue to compensate for losses and 
poor investment outcomes. 
Thirdly, insurers could take advantage of pricing freedom to adopt cost-phis pricing 
to maintain their profit rates regardless of whether their management and risk control 
are good or not. Cost-plus pricing means that f inns set their price by just adding a 
certain pcrccntage for profit on top of aggregate CoStS. 4" The history of Californian auto 
insurance witnessed this situation. By 1988, California's auto premiums soared to a 
level unacceptable for the majority of drivers, and insurers claimcd that high premiums 
were necessary for covering costs. However, between 1975-1984, the entire property- 
casualty insurance industry in the US made a rccord-brcaking profit of US$75bn, and 
profits of the industry increased from 2.4% in 1985 to 16% in 1987; the profits of the 
45 US automobile insurance industry came to US$78bn during 1978-1987. Ideally, 
according to economics, in a competitive market situation, insurers in the long run will 
earn only the same (normal) rate of profit as any othcr busincss in the economy. In the 
short run, insurers' profit levels should closely relate to tlicir rclativc cfficicncy which 
largely depends on the quality of their management and operational pcrformancc. Men 
insurers arc free from using cost-pluspricing to maintain their profit lcvcls, thcy could 
by this means conceal their management deficiencies and hcncc impair any impctus 
towards improvement, and possibly jcopardisc consumcrs'bcncrits. 
Fourthly, markct-bascd pricing could encourage "reverse compoition", a spccific 
form of competition among insurers for the favour of pcrsons who control. or who may 
" John Slornan Economics 3rd ed. Prentice I fall 1997, p20 1. 
`5 Quoted in " Insurance crisis: how insurance companies periodically disrupt the economy and why" 
note 11, NAIC, (1992) "Report on profitability by line by State 1991" and note 12, (Statement of 
William J. Anderson, Director, General Government Division. U. S. General Accounting Office (GAO)). 
"Profitability of the Property/Casualty Insurance Industry: March 13,1986: Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on Oversight of the Committee on Ways and Means, 99th Congress. (1986). and U. S. 
General Accounting Office, "Insurance: profitability of the automobile lines of the insurance industry" 
(Oct. 1989). 
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control, the placement of the insurance with insurers. In certain lines of insurance, e. g. 
credit insurance or auto insurance, insurers usually vie with each other by paying high 
commissions or providing other compensation or services to creditors or auto dealers 
who control the placement of insurance business. Without ratc rcgulation, "rcvcrse 
competition" tends to increase insurance premiums, or prcvcnt lowcring of prcmiums in 
order that greater commissions or other allowanccs may be paid for obtaining such 
business. "" 
6Z6 Strict rate regulation and reforin 
In the US, various rate regulation forms exist in auto insurance markets. Among the 
forms, prior approval (PA) still prevails in most of the 50 states, although there has 
been a trend towards rate deregulation. According to a survey, 11 (see Table 6.1) during 
1972-1998, among the 50 states, 22 states maintained PA, 3 changed from competitive 
rating (CR) to PA, and 5 changed from PA to CR and then return to PA, which means 
that 30 states applied PA by 1998. In contrast, 10 maintained CR, 9 changed from PA 
to CR, and only I changed from CR to PA and then return to CR. " 
Table 6.1 Numbers and changes of prior approval (PA) 
and competitive rating (CR) during 1972-98 In the US 
Total CR 20 Total PA 30 
Maintained CR 10 Maintained PA 22 
PA > CR 9 CR > PA 3 
CR > PA >CR I PA>CR>PA 5 
Source: footnote 47. 
However, strict regulatory price regulation, including prior approval, in a 
competitive insurance industry is thought to have adverse consequcnccs which 
frequently distort market incentives and hann consumers. Two of the main advcrsc 
consequences are price compression and price suppression. Price compression" 
represents restrictions on the factors that insurers use in defining risk catcgorics (risk 
classification). Harrington argued that restricting risk classification in the US, e. g. 
capping property insurance rates in catastroplic-prone areas, or rcquiring unisex auto 
Supra note 9. 
Scott Harrington "Effects of prior approval rate regulation of auto insurance" in Deregulating 
Property-Liability Insurance 
" It believed there was no substantial change to this situation by 2000. See *Testimony or Philip P_ 
O'Connor before the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance & Government Sponsored Enterprises 
of the Financial Services Conunittee of the U. S. I louse of Representatives" June 21,200 1. 
" Supra note 33. 
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insurance rates, may reduce rates for buyers who face the highest premiums but raise 
rates for other buyers. Therefore, such restrictions can not cnhancc the affordability of 
coverage for most insurance buyers. It also erodes the incentives involved in risk 
classification for policyholders to take precautions to control losses incurred by high- 
risk buyers. " In addition, risk classification restrictions impose limits on the 
information insurers can use to assess the risk of loss for different consumers. " 
Price suppression means restrictions on the overall lcvcl of premiums or rates 
applied to particular categories, which keep premiums or rates artificially low. It leads 
to total premium income being less than would be collected under competition, and 
results in a decline in the market value of insurers' equity. " It also leads insurers to 
reducing product quality or even withdrawing from markets where rates arc suppressed, 
thus limiting consumer choices. 
Scott Harrington in his review of the impact of state regulation on auto insurance 
markets finds that laws requiring the prior approval of rates have had little or no impact 
on rate levels over time. Moreover, he claims that there is strong cvidcncc that prior 
approval reduces coverage availability, increases the size of residual markets, and 
increases market volatility for both insurers and consumers. " A study by Klein, Philips 
and Shiu reveals that strict rate regulation can thwart solvency goals by encouraging 
insurers to maintain higher levels of leverage and financial risk. They also rind that 
insurers under stringent rate regulation are relatively small and Icss geographically 
diversified. These insurers are also easily "trappcd" in restrictive environmcnts and 
more vulnerable to insolvency. " 
-' See Scott E. Harrington (2000) "Insurance deregulation and the public interest" AEI-Brookings Joint 
Center for Regulatory Studies washington, D. C. p4243. Also "Insurance rate regulation in die 2014 
century" Journal ofInsurance Regulation 2000 Winter p204-21 8. 
" Wayne T. Brough "Competition serves consumers better than regulation" Issues Analysis 107, 
Citizens for a Sound Economy Foundation. 7be US, October 12.200 1. 
52 See Scott E. I larrington (1992) "Presidential address: rate suppression" Journal of Risk and Insurance 
59, p 185-202 for the discussion on this tcnm 
Id. 
Robert W. Klein, Richard D. Phillips and Wenyan Shiu (2000)" 7be capital structure of firms subject 
to price regulation: evidence from the insurance industry" Wharton/Aon Conference on capitalisation In 
the property-casualty insurance industry. 
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Some academics" discuss two kinds of the regulatory problems that exist in New 
Jersey and Massachusetts, which both have stringent rate regulatory systems. One is 
that state regulation, which prescribes auto insurance risk classifications, severely 
limits rate differentials across territories and yields significant cross-subsidics. This 
results in many adverse consequences. For example, it discourages appropriate driving 
incentives between high-cost drivers and low-cost drivers. " It also imposcs long delays 
on regulatory filings, and invokes a set of ncvcr-cnding political controversies over the 
correctness of the risk classification. Another problem is that the two states rigidly 
control insurers' profits and prevent them from exiting certain lines by threatening to 
expel them from the state if they quit the lines. This has led to severe rate suppression. 
Given the heavy-handed regulatory system, there have been massive company exits 
from the states. Loss costs have increased substantially over the years and premiums 
are high relative to the rest of the country. 
Inefficiency of state departments worsened the effects of anti-compctitivc rate 
regulation. Surveys conducted by the Alliance of American Insurers (AAI) and the 
National Association of Independent Insurers (NAII) revealed that the most serious 
problem identified by their members was slow approval, or even acknowledgement, of 
filings. In some states, it takes up to a year for approving a product, impeding launch of 
new products and competition. Some impediments to cfficicncy are from the 
department red tape culture or excessive regulation. The typical examples include slow 
review, approval and acknowledgement of filings, inadequate, inexperienced and/or 
non-supportive staff, too many and too complicated forms, burdensome requirements, 
rigid rules, multi-layered processes, unwritten standards and "desk drawer" rules, and 
confusing or unclear instructions. 57 
However, some studies on the effects of the Californian Prop. 103 have revealed that 
strict rate regulation could achieve sonic satisfactory results, which conflicts with 
" Jack Worrall "Private passenger auto insurance in New Jersey: a threc-decade advertisement for 
reform" in Deregulating Property-Liability Insurance 2001. 
' J. David Cummins asserts that "drivcrs decide how much and how sarcly they drive based on the 
marginal costs and benefits of driving". Subsidised high-cost drivers will have an incentive to drive 
more and take less care as they do not pay the full marginal costs, while low-cost drivers paying more 
than their marginal costs will drive less than under competitive rating. 
" "Testimony by Robert L. Zeman and Rita Nowak of Alliance Insurers & national Association or 
Independent Insurers before U. S. House committee on Financial Services Subcommittee on Capital 
Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises" Jun. 21,2001. 
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general predictions by some economists on rate regulation. Advocates of Prop. 103 
credit it with having reduced auto insurance rates in California since its passage in 
1988, while rates surged around the US. They also note that California has enjoyed the 
lowest rate change in any state since Prop. 103 and incentives embedded in Prop. 103 
for safe driving helped control loss costs. They suggest that Califomia! s rate regulation 
be a model for other states, considering its remarkable success. " Contrarily, insurers 
and some academics refute these appraisals. They assert that the improvement of 
California! s auto market was a result of a decline in insurers' underwriting cost, which 
occurred for a number of reasons, not just the few positive factors in Prop. 103. They 
include court decisions unfavourable to bad third-party lawsuits, improvements on 
highway and vehicle safety, and fraud fighting efforts. Opponents warn against the 
spread of Prop. 103-type laws and urge further deregulation of insurance pricing control 
in property-casualty insurance. " flowcvcr, neutral observations seem to support the 
positive effects of Prop. 103. According to Dwight M. Jaffee and Thomas Russell, there 
is no evidence of the "traditional" adverse consequences of Prop. 103, such as firm exit, 
an expanding assigned risk pool, or declining industry profit rates. Contrarily, 
Californian prior approval system is quite consistent with declines in premiums and 
increases in profits. ' 
Z7 Implicationsfor China 
The US insurance rate regulation has undcrgone a tortuous evolution; its rate 
deregulation is a long process and one size does not fit all. It evolved from market. 
based pricing in the late 19' century, then rate scif-rcgulation by the industry and 
bureau-rating admitted by statutes in the early 20" century, towards widespread state 
regulation of rates featured by the prior approval model in 1940s. Then in the carly 
1980s, the general deregulation trend in the US cxtcndcd to the insurance industry and 
a competitive pricing model emerged. In the last two decades, prior approval and 
" See J. R. Hunter (2001) "Why not the best? the most efTective auto insurance regulation in the nation* 
Consumer Federation of America and "Testimony of J. Robert Hunter Berore The Subcommitice on 
Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises" The US Congress, June 21.200 1. 
" See "NAMIC urges halt to potential spread of Prop. 103-type laws" hitp: //www. namic. org August 24, 
2001. 
*0 Dwight Jaffee and Thomas Russell "The Regulation of Automobile Insurance in California" in 
Deregulating Property-Liability Insurance 2001. 
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competitive rating co-existed with rate deregulation gaining popularity. This means rate 
deregulation and the competitive pricing model should be appropriately chosen at the 
right time to fit the competition required by special lines of insurance. China's 
regulators need to consider the issues of diversification and gradualism of the rate 
deregulation process. 
The competitive pricing model appears to function well only in a competitive market 
in which there is complete competition. This requires few/low barriers to market access 
and exit, mature insurers with ample data and skills for pricing (or with the help from 
rating organisations), information disclosure to help consumers make well-informed 
purchases, and effective solvency and market-conduct supervision. It also requires 
regulators to monitor the actual level of competition in order to reintroduce strict rate 
regulation when the market is proved no longer competitive, because the market is 
changing and so is the competition. In addition, powerful consumer protection 
organisations help restrain insurers from using their bargaining power to abuse price. 
China' regulators need to consider these preconditions when adopting markct-based 
pricing. Competitive pricing has seen negative effects and failures, which should lead 
to the regulator's caution. 
Appropriate rate standards, statutory rating elements and a filing proccdure are 
required for both strict rate regulation and competitive pricing. The basic cause of this 
is that insurance is a relatively unique product. Unlikc most businesses that know the 
price of their products at the time they are sold, insurance cannot be certain of what 
claims will cost in the future. In addition, on the one hand, there are instanccs where 
insurers may engage in under-pricing (due to excessive price competition), overpricing 
(due to insurcrs'markct power and consumers' lack of information), or cyclical pricing 
(mainly due to underwriting cycles). On the other hand, regulation can distort market 
forces and hann efficiency by suppressing and compressing prices. All these rcquire a 
regulatory and supervisory framework to formalise insurers' pricing behaviour and 
regulators' activities. There are a number of (model) laws and a wealth of expcriencc on 
these aspects in the US, which could be leamt by China's regulators. Two regulatory 
issues worthy of special note are appropriate profit margins and risk classification, 
because China to date has few rules on the issues. 
Strict rate regulation in the US has many shortcomings. Although the rcgulation 
usually tries to hold prices down (price suppression), it is thought to increase 
underwriting costs, ultimately, leading to increases not dccrcascs of premiums, and 
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resulting in cross-subsidies (price compression). It is also thought to create an 
expanding assigned risk pool, or declining industry profit rates, so causing insurers' exit 
from the market, thus reducing insurance availability. "' Although rate regulation in 
China usually holds prices up rather than down, it did see price suppression in a few 
cases and deficiencies in risk classification. On the other hand, the US market also 
shows that strict rate regulation is still working in many states' auto insurance markets, 
and especially, appears to operate satisfactorily in Californian market. The 
comprehensive approach adopted by Prop. 103 and other measures, which have 
contributed to the success of Californian auto insurance market, are worthy of leaming 
by China. 
6.3 Overview of China's insurance rate regulation 
63.1 Evolution ofthe rate regulation 
After the recovery of the insurance business in 1980, China adopted uniform fixcd 
rates nation-wide. When the former PICC maintained a monopoly, its branches at all 
levels around the country applied uniform rates set by its headquarter. AfIcr 1986, the 
two new entrants, Xinjiang Construction Corp Insurance Company and Ping An, 
roughly followed the rates of the former PICC due to their small size and deficient 
pricing skills. Af1cr CPIC emerged in 1991, the PBOC, the insurance regulatory 
authority then, set forth rules reiterating that "all insurance enterprises shall execute 
rates and policies verified by the authority". `2 In fact, the rates and policies applied in 
the whole industry then were merely replicas of those used by erstwhile monopoly, the 
fon-ner PICC. The 1995 Insurance Law (Art. 106) maintained this mode by requiring 
that "the premium rates and the basic insurance clauses for the principal types of 
commercial insurance risk must be set by the insurance authority". The Law also sct out 
that "the premium rates and basic clauses for other types of risk, which although lcf1 to 
the discretion of insurers, need to be reported to the insurance authority togcthcr with 
" Generally, see Deregulating Property-Liability Insurance 2001. Also see Scott E. Harrington 
"Insurance rate regulation in the 20" century" Journal ofinsurance Regulation Winter 2000, p204-218. 
" "On Further Cleaning up, Verifying Insurance Business and Organisations and Strengthening 
Management"(June, 1991) and "On Delivery of National Insurance Policies and Rates for Domestic 
Business" (April, 1994) 
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the documents required for the record. " Under the 1995 Insurance Law, China adopted 
two kinds of rates: statutory rates, and file-and-use rates. 
The 1996,4dministration Regulations further detailed rate regulation: 
- the PBOC has the power to determine, and make adjustments to, the main types of 
risk according to the market situation; 
- the head office of the PBOC shall decide the basic premium rates for the main types 
of risk; 
- insurance companies shall submit their proposed insurance premium rates for other 
types of risk to the head office of the PBOC for record and approval, while 
branches of insurance companies shall submit their proposed insurance premium 
rates for other types of risk to the branches of the PBOC at province level for record 
and approval, and the PBOC shall be deemed to have granted an approval where it 
does not raise objections to the record application within 30 days of receiving it; 
- sub-branches and administrative offices of insurance companies may not propose 
premium rates; 
- insurance companies may apply for a protection period of six months for new types 
of risk, and no other companies may engage in these types of insurance within the 
period; 
- branches of the PBOC at province level may, according to the local situation, 
decide on a premium fluctuation range with maximum of 30 percent above or 
below the unified rates implemented by all insurance companies within the same 
province; 
- all documents related to insurance clauses and premium rates must be in Chinese, 
although, where there is a need, a foreign language may also be used. However, in 
cases of discrepancy between the two, the Chinese version prevails; 
The 1996 Administration Regulations also provided the types of documents required 
for approving rates proposed by insurance companies. 63 
The 2000 Insurance Company Regulations assigned responsibility for rate regulation 
to the CIRC, and made the following supplcments: 64 
- the CIRC may require an insurance company to change its policy provisions and 
premium rates, or to stop using them where they fall into the circumstances 
provided in Art. 69, the 2000 Insurance Company Regulations; "' 
63 The 1996,4dininistration Regulations, art. 40,43,44. 
64 The 2000 Insurance Company regulations, chapter 4. 
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the pre-fixed interest rates in life insurance policies may not exceed the relevant 
standards promulgated by the CIRC. " 
insurance companies must implement uniform policy provisions for the same type 
of insurance, whereas they may formulate premium rates for given areas on the 
local conditions in various areas, " however, such rates may only be implemented 
after approval from the CIRC; and 
- the CIRC may set premium rate standards or a range within which premium rates 
may float based on actual circumstances. 
The CIRC continued to improve rate regulation while increasingly giving insurers 
more flexibility. As for life insurance, it enacted the 2000 Tentative Rules oil 
Administration of Life Insurance Product Filing, requiring insurers to submit their 
designed life products to the CIRC for record, and not to sell these products before 
approval by the CIRC. In order to improve quality of life products, the Rules also 
introduced a system requiring an actuary and a person in charge to be responsible for 
the actuarial matters and legal matters of the products respectively. In the 2000 
Notification on Relaxing Premium Rates of Short-term Casualty Insurance and 
Simplifying Filing Procedure of Short-term Casualty Insurance, the CIRC allowed 
insurers to formulate rates of short-term casualty insurance except personal accident 
insurance in aviation, and to sell the insurance products as soon as they rile with the 
CIRC. 
As for non-life insurance, a great step forward was the 2000 Provisional Measures 
for Administration of Property Insurance Provisions and Premium Rates" which was 
" These circumstances include: they violate prohibitions in laws, regulations or administrative rules; 
they violate the relevant state policies; they are harmful to the public interest; the contents are clearly 
unfair or monopolistic, or infringe the lawful rights of policyholders, insured or beneficiaries; the 
premium rates are lower than cost and constitute unfair competition; the policy provisions or the 
premium rates are problematic, and may endanger the solvency of the insurance company; and other 
reasons recognised by the CIRC. 
" For life insurance, insurers need to use a pre-fixed interest rate to calculate and set premiums of the 
whole policy period. 
" In 1999, the newly established CIRC issued the "Revised Rates and Policies for Motor Insurance". and 
allowed ShenZhen to apply distinctive rates and policies based on the realities of the city. This is for the 
first time the authority allowed regional rates. 
" The Measures repeals the 1999 Notice Concerning the Issue of Filing Property Insurance Provisions 
for the Record and the 1999 Notice Concerning the Issue of Filing Foreign-funded Property Insurance 
Provisionsfor the Record both issued by the CIRC. 
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part of China's overall plan to slowly deregulate the insurance industry. It gave non-life 
insurers free rein in setting their own terms and conditions for certain types of minor 
insurance policies. According to the Measures, the CIRC only sets the basic provisions 
and premium rates for property insurance for the "main types" of risk. " Insurers 
formulate the non-basic provisions and premium rates for the "main types" of risk as 
well as the provisions and premium rates for "other types" of risk, such as public 
liability or burglar insurance, on a "file and use" basis. The measures also set forth the 
filing rules and other rules governing premium rates and provisions of property 
insurance. 
Summarised from the above description, there were three rating systems before the 
revision of 1995 Insurance Law: statutory rates with certain fluctuations for five main 
types of non-life insurance; file-and-use rates for other non-life insurance and most life 
insurance; and use-and-file rates for short-term casualty insurance. The 2002 revision of 
Insurance Law shifted the rate-setting burden from the regulator to insurers, and 
established prior approval and file-and-use systems. This deregulation rcflccts a 
function transition of the regulator. 
63.2 Comments 
China has long been implementing a unified tariff system for major risks, especially 
in non-life insurance. This kind of highly centralised system played an important role in 
protecting policyholders' benefits and maintaining insurance market order in an 
environment where the insurance market was underdeveloped and the consumers, 
consciousness was not strong. However, along with the development of the insurance 
industry, the opening up of and intensifying competition in the market, the system 
appeared showing some obvious drawbacks: 
Although they had the advantages of simplicity, case of application by insurers and 
ease of supervision by regulators, the tariffs were too unified and standardiscd to 
conform. to the actual local situation. Vast in territory, China! s situation is complex with 
diverse geographical environment, climate, economic conditions, and standards of 
safety in different areas. "All at once" tariffs violated the principle that the formulation 
" According to the CIRC, the "main types" of risk include enterprises property insurance, auto 
insurance, employers' liability insurance, investment insurance and fidelity guarantee insurance. 'Me 
PBOC and the CIRC had already specified policies and rates for these insurance types except employer's 
250 
of premium rates should be "adequate, not excessive, reasonable, and fair", thus 
resulting in deficient diversification. 
Tedious tariff examination and approval procedures seemed unable to adapt to the 
needs of service development and market condition changes. To launch a new product, 
an insurance company's branch office must first report and file (via upper offices) to its 
headquarter office who was required to file it with the regulators. This obviously 
affected insurers' enthusiasms for launching new products because they run a risk to 
lose their best marketing opportunity or had to divulge business secrets by the dormant 
procedures. Furthermore, a branch office of an insurer was also required to report and 
file layer after layer before it adjusted rates according to the market and operating 
conditions, making it easy to lose the significance of any price adjustment. 
Unified price is disadvantageous to insurers' healthy development. Practice in China 
proved that stipulated prices were non-nally higher than the prices in a natural 
equilibrium. Insurers, who find it easy to survive under such prices, could lack both 
internal drives and external pressures to improve their management and quality of 
services. As a result, this undennines insurers' overall quality enhancement and hinders 
the optimisation of resources disposition through merger and acquisition, ultimately, 
leading the whole industry to being less competitive. 
The current pricing principles and standards arc largely outdated due to the 
fundamental transition of rate regulation. Most provisions of statutory rates are obsolete 
while the implementation of prior approval and file-and-use systems needs detailed 
provisions. Furthen-nore, the current pricing principles arc fragmented and somewhat 
imprecise. For example, besides provisions in the 2000 Insurance Con1pally 
Regulations, " insurers must follow the principles of "fairness, adaptability and 
stability"" in their pricing activities. However, there is no further regulatory 
explanation of these three principles. According to CiDong Huang and SlicnPing Gao, " 
fairness refers to that premium rates must be basically bascd on risks with 
differentiating premiums by proper risk classification. They also hold that stability 
means that premium rates should remain unchanged for a quite long period. Otherwise 
liability insurance. 
" Supra note 65. 
71 Art. 4, the 2000 Provisional Measures for 4dininistration of Property Insurance Provisions and 
Premium Rates. 
71 Iluang Cidong & Gao Shenpin (2000) Baoxianfa Ji Xiangguan Fagui Xinzhu (New Annotation on 
Insurance Laws and Relevant Regulations) People's Court Publishing, p399-34 1. 
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it will increase insurers' expenses and confuse policyholders in the calculating of 
premiums. However, they did not explain adaptability but proposing two new 
principles: premium rates must be adequate and helpful to loss prevention. " it seems 
there is divergence of views on rating principles. Furthennore, except for fairness 
(which largely relates to "not fairly discriminatory"), the other two statutory principles 
do not seem to exactly reflect basic requirements for insurance pricing. The core 
objectives of rate regulation are to protect policyholders from being overcharged by 
insurers or from contractual defaults by insurers due to undcr-charge that results in 
insurers' insolvency. Therefore, the ultimate standards should include that "premium 
rates should be adequate and not excessive". 
6.4 Rate regulation in the Chinese auto insurance 
64.1 Yhe auto insurance market 
Auto insurance is the largest class of business in China's non-life insurance sector. In 
2001, the industry wrote Rmb42.21bn premiums for auto insurance, representing 
61.6% of the total premiums of non-life insurance. That was more than 21 times the 
premium income of auto insurance recorded in 1988 (Rmb2bn). It was also the first 
time in 1988 that the auto insurance, accounting for 37.6% of total premiums of non- 
life insurance, exceeded the enterprises property insurance. 14 Since then, the auto 
insurance has maintained its top position. It rcaliscd 19.53% of average annual growth 
during 1993-2001(see Table 6.2). Auto insurance is very important because of its 
widespread impact on industries and households across the country in which a total of 
14.94 million automobiles had been underwritten in 1999. " By 2001, thcre wcrc nine 
main market players including PICC, CPIC, Ping An, flua Tai, Sinosafc, Tian An, Da 
Zhong, Xinjiang Construction Corp, and Yong An. The market is very concentrated, 
with the top three insurers (PICC, CPIC, and Ping An) occupying 96% of tile market 
share in 2001(see Chart 6.1). Auto insurance in all the three major insurers was the 
" They assert that premium rates should include certain proportion of costs which are used in loss 
prevention or to reward insured's safety records which benefits both insurers and the whole economy. Id. 
"A kind of commercial line in property insurance. It mainly covers damages to an enterprises' property 
that are caused by fire or other kinds of natural disaster. 
" "Auto insurance at a turning point of development" Zhongguo Xnji Shibao (China Economic Times) 
October 17,2000. 
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largest class of non-111C business and loss ratios ram-, c ti-om durmu- 199 
1999 (see Tahle 0. ', ). 
Table 0.2 Auto insurance premiums iii China 1993-2001 1 Rmb hn) 
Ycal 1 1991 1994 1995,1996 P)97 199S 1991) 2000 loo I 
(iross written 1 10.13 14.09 18.97 20.97 20.92 NA 30,6X 1 36.93 -42,21 
Source: CIRC China Insurance Almanac 1998,1991), 2000, and. /m/i Ribw) (/'*("II"1? II( A/dI) '\LI, L! LJNI S, 2002 
Chart 6.1 Auto premium market share in 2001 
Ping An 
CIDIC 
12% 
75'. ý 
74 A kind of' commercial line in propcrty insurance. It mainly covers damages to an cmerprises' 
propcity that are causcd by fire or other kinds of natural disastcr. 
7 "Auto insurance at a turning point of dcvelopillent" Z-11011, qR110 linii Shibao (China h. com, mic Imie. 0 
October 17,2000. 
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Table 6.3 Auto insurance business of PICC, CPIC and Ping An during 1997-1999 
Premiums of non-life Automobile and 71ird Party Liability 
1997 Premiums % of non-life Loss ratios 
PICC N/A N/A N/A N/A 
CPIC 5,621 3,279 58.33 66.39 
Ping An 3,869 2,153 55.65 51.23 
1998 
PICC 39,918 22,204 55.62 58.61 
CPIC 5,547 3,224 58.12 68.38 
Ping An 3,886 2,112 54.36 61.29 
1999 
PICC 44,281 26,580 60.02 56.13 
CPIC 5,870 3,520 59.96 58.15 
Ping An 4,091 2,371 57.95 53.28 
Sources: CIRC China insurance Almanac 1998,1999,2000. 
The demand for auto insurance is created mainly by three different forces: the risks 
involved in the use and ownership of an automobile, the rapid growth of China's auto 
market, and the existence of administrative discretion requiring drivers to possess 
motor third party liability insurance. Firstly, China has established a system of liability 
for injury or damage caused by automobiles, which is charactcriscd by fault-bascd civil 
liability. 76 An automobile accident can result in liability for injury or death to the 
driver, passengers, occupants of other vehicles, or even pedestrians, leading to liability 
for medical care, earning losses, and other damages. It can also result in liability for 
property damage either to one's own property or to anothces property. An automobile 
can be damaged or stolen. All these risks generate demand for insurance. According to 
official statistics of China, in 1999, China recorded 412,860 deaths resulting from road 
transportation, among which 383,217 of deaths were from automobile accidents. The 
compensation accounted for Rmb2.86bn for the deaths and Rmb2.12bn for injuries 
besides huge financial loss in terms of damage to property. " Secondly, China's 
domestic auto market grew at about 20% annual rate in recent years. The cvcr-growing 
number of automobiles in turn strongly supported a flourishing auto insurance market. 
" For example, the 1986 General Principles of Civil Law and associated legislative interpretations set 
out a tort law system which also applies to road traffic accidents. Regarding the procedure, when an 
accident occurs, any party to the accident shall report to the Public Security Bureau (Police) in 
reasonable time, or they must bear the total liability. The police carry out an investigation and determine 
the respective liability of the persons concerned. An administrative review is available if any party 
disagrees with the police determination of the liability. The issues of tort and compensation are 
determined by the parties through negotiations in which insurers may participate when insurance 
coverage is involved. Any party may resort to litigation if they fail to reach an agreement. 
77 <http: //www. stats. gov. cn/sjiw/ndsj/zgnj/2000> 
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Thirdly, although there is no nation-wide law making auto insurance compulsory so far, 
third party liability insurance is required in practice by the Transportation 
Administration Departments of the Public Security Bureau in charge of auto licensing 
and annual vehicle registration. 
China's auto insurance has huge potential for the near future. According to the 
forecast by General Motors (US)'78 there were about 7 million families with the 
purchasing power (Le. annual disposable income exceeding Rmb30, OOO) for a car in 
2000. By 2005, the number of the families is expected to reach 42 million. In 2010, 
China is predicted to be the third largest auto market in the world with 6% of the global 
auto market share, close to that of the US and Japan. The premiums of auto insurance 
just for new automobiles will arrive at Rmb20bn annually if annual new car sales reach 
four millions and premiums assume Rmb5,000 for each car. 
Auto insurance policies 
Having designated auto insurance as one of the main types of risk, China mandated a 
uniform auto insurance system nation-wide, and had introduced several versions of 
auto insurance policies and rates, of which the latest was in 1999, with a partial revision 
in 2000. " The 1999 policy consists of a number of different coverage including, basic 
liabilities (vehicle-damage liability, third-party liability), and additional liabilities 
which can be only selectively purchased by policyholders of the basic liabilities. All 
auto insurers were required to follow the policy except for those in ShcnZhcn where the 
CIRC issued a specific policy for local auto insurance. " 
The basic liabilities provide two types of coverage (see Table 6.4). 771ird party 
liability is a traditional auto liability that covers the legal liabilities in tort incurred by 
the insured. The coverage compensates for deaths, injuries or damage to property 
sustained by third parties including pedestrians, the driver and passengers of other 
vehicles, when the policyholder is found to be at fault. It typically includes medical 
expenses, wage losses, and damages to property. There arc five compensation 
limitation levels (Rmb5O, OOO, 100,000,200,000,500,000, and Imn), which arc 
optional to policyholders when contracting. The coverage typically lasts one year and 
there is no limit on the number of accidents. Each accident occurring in the coverage 
71 Zhongguo Jinji Shibao (China Economic Times) Feb. 27,2002. Also see "A positive outlook for 
China's auto market" PricewaterhouseCoopers 2000. 
" See the CIRC, 4utomobile Insurance Policy 1999. 
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period might generate claims up to the compensation limitations. According to the 
policy, insurers have rights both to review the compensation agreements that 
policyholders made, on their own decision, and to refuse to follow such agreements. 
The second basic liability is vehicle damage coverage which compensates 
policyholders for damage to the insured vehicle, caused by a collision, a turnover, some 
natural disaster, or some other accidents. The compensation is limited to the insured 
amount, and the coverage will cease after compensation reaches the full amount. 
Insurers also cover the reasonable expenses incurred by the insured to protect or save 
the insured vehicle in an accident. 
Both third party liability and vehicle damage coverage apply absolute exception of 
compensation based on the degrees of the insured's fault. For example, an insurer only 
pay 80% of total compensation when the insured is held fully to blame for an accident, 
or 85% when the insured bears the main responsibility. " 
The additional liabilities include nine different types designed to protect against 
specific types of losses. They are divided into two categories: purc property losses e. g. 
whole-automobile-stolen coverage, vehicle fire damage loss, and combined losses 
including damage to humans and property, e. g. liability to occupants of the insured 
vehicle, no-fault loss. The former needs vehicle damage coverage as a precondition, 
while the latter needs thirdparty liability. 
6.4.2 Auto rate regulation and its negative effects 
a. Auto rate regulation 
The premium (before a deregulation trial in GuangDong province in 2001) rates of 
both basic coverages and additional coverages were all set by the CIRC. " Insurers were 
prohibited from making any amendments to meet the requirements of different market 
needs except that of charging premiums within a fluctuation range of up to 30 percent 
above or below the unified rates. The actual fluctuation range should be approved by 
the CIRC before being implemented by an insurer. 
According to the 1999 Automobile Insurance Premium Rates, auto insurance 
premiums are designed with the "type of vehicles" in mind instead of rcflccting "the 
characteristics of both drivers and vehicles". The premium rates have several 
The CIRC Automobile Insurance Policyfor ShenZhen 1999. 
Art. 17, supra note 79. 
The CIRCAutomobile Insurance Premium Rates 1999. 
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determinants (see Table 6.4). Firstly, between commercial usage and non-commcrcial 
usage, the minimum premiums for the commercial usage arc the higher. Secondly, 
there are different minimum premiums and rates relating to different types and sizes of 
vehicles. Thirdly, for vehicle damage coverage, minimum premiums are applicd when 
premiums calculated by rates and insured sums are less than the minimum premiums. 
In addition, imported vehicles and those of Chinese-made vehicles bear different 
minimum premiums, with higher premiums for Chinese-made vehicles, as they arc 
assumed to be generally inferior to imported vehicles. Fourthly, third-party liability has 
fixed premiums divided into five stages to match the five stagcs of liability limitation. 
The premiums of additional liabilities usually are a certain percentage of premiums, 
insured sum, or compensation limitations of basic coverage. For example, the 
premiums of no-fault loss are 20% of actual premiums of third-party liability, and 
whole-automobile-stolen coverage are 1.2% of the insurcd sum of vehicle damage 
coverage. 
b. Comments 
Insurers in developed countries normally determine auto insurance rates mainly by 
the characteristics of drivers together with the characteristics of vehicles. The insurers 
believe that driver-oriented pricing is an efficient and cffective way of risk 
classification in auto insurance, which contributes to the cfT*icicncy of the business and 
avoidance of consumers' adverse selection. When determining the rate for particular 
coverage of auto insurance, the insurers usually consider certain factors including the 
insured's driving safety record, the number of years of driving cxpcricnce, the number 
of miles driven annually (as prescribed in Prop. 103), and the age, gender, marital 
status, and place of residence, of the insured. The insurers justify the use of these 
variables by statistical differences in the likelihood of the driver being involved in an 
accident and the amount of financial liability. " The drivcr-oricntcd pricing mcthod has 
" For Example, an investigation in the US in 1992 showed that disproportionate share of accidents 
existed in drivers of different age groups. The age group of 25 to 34 constituted 23.9% of all drivers and 
26.5% of accidents and 25.6% of fatal accidents, while ages between 20 and 24 comprised 9.9 % of 
licensed drivers, but accounted for 15.9% of all accidents and 15.6% of all fatal accidents. See 
PropertylCasualty Facts. Insurance Information Institute, the US, 1994 p88. 
257 
20 . 
Se i 9§ 12 m -E CY C, 4 - 
0 r` 
C. ) 
tr. E So 
ýr E 0. 
m - - Z Z 
0 0 0 ; (0 : 00 ; : 
to 0 
.ýi j2 
-C9- 
2 
. 
cc 
e, l- . - ý 
CL 
*1 0E -0 
U) 0 
eq eq eq C4 
Itt 
z 
.1- U) 
4 
- 
m 
VO 
CD 
ca 8: z Ld 46 : 
a 
258 
obvious advantages over the vehicle-oriented pricing method that China adopted, 
although some characteristics such as the driver's age, gender and marital status, 
especially the place of residence may neither be actuarially strong nor used without the 
approval of insurance regulators. " 
That China opted for a vehicle-orientcd pricing method was most likely due to the 
fact that for a long time the majority of vehicles were subject not to individual 
ownership but enterprise ownership or state ownership. Such ownership structures 
means that many people could driver a certain vehicle. Therefore, it was difflicult in 
practice to decide premiums based on drivers' risk profile. However, vchiclc-orientcd 
pricing had led the Chinese insurers to managing risk incfficiently and incffcctivcly 
because of its inadequacy in terms of risk classification. The vchicle-oricntcd pricing, 
uniform rates and strict rate regulation in the Chinese auto insurance market 
demonstrated at least three negative effects, viz. price compression, price suppression, 
and price exploitation. 
Price compression As the regulators adopted vehicle-orientcd pricing and prohibited 
insurers from designing their own premiums and policies for auto insurance products, 
insurers can not use risk classification to differentiate various risk-prorile drivers. 
Neither can they launch competitive rates according to their respective situations. 
Stringent rate regulation provided insurers with few incentives to design customer- 
favoured products. Alternatively, it became one active factor that drove insurers to be 
involved in irregular and unhealthy competition. 
Price suppression Although statutory rates in China usually support excessive 
pricing rather than the capping of premiums, we can still find some traccs of price 
suppression. For instance, both compensations and premiums of third-party liability 
were capped by the regulators who failed to increase them to adapt to inflation and 
legal cnvironincnt changes. In 2000, the ZheJiang branch of the PICC registered a loss 
of third-party liability of over 100%. " Several factors arc behind this. Firstly, the 
statutory premium rates had remained unchanged over years, while the local average 
living standards - the main parameters of compensation for third-party liability - had 
steadily increased annually. Secondly, compensation in tort cases had accordingly 
increased. Thirdly, there were huge disparities between the actual compensation 
" For example, in California of the U. S. the Prop. 103 states that no auto insurer could use these 
characteristics of drivers to determine premiums without the approval of the insurance commissioner of 
the state. 
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amounts paid out in different provinces, while the regulators still maintained a nation- 
wide uniform premium rate system. Insurers, having to provide the coverage without 
the right to adjust premiums, suffered from this price suppression. 
Price exploitation is the opposite of price suppression. Where price exploitation 
exists, premiums or rates arc fixed by regulations at a level which is artificially higher 
than it would be in a competitive market. This results in extra profits for insurers who 
could consequently lose the incentive to improve their management or take advantage 
of these statutory profits to embark on irregular or illegal price competition in order to 
seize market share. 
Rate regulation in the auto insurance market witnessed typical price exploitation 
frequently exploded in the mass media. "' It was reported that in Beijing, the average 
premium in 2001 for a Rmb 120,000 new car was around Rmb5,000, of which 15% was 
given to car agents as commissions. In some cases, the commissions reached as much 
as 38% or even 50%. 87 By contrast, the statutory commission was just 8% of premiums 
actually received by insurers. By examining auto insurance's cost composition (see 
Table 6.5), it can be seen that high commissions derinitcly jcopardisc insurers' 
profitability and hence worsen their solvency. The problem is some insurers had to pay 
high commissions, since more than 50% of auto insurance contracts were reached 
through agents, especially car dealers. " 
In addition, the premium level set by the regulators much higher than what it should 
be provided insurers with space to manoeuvre. To compete in the auto market, insurers 
had no scruples about engaging in every kind of irregular and unhealthy competition 
supported by their extra profits due to the price exploitation. In the end, consumers 
suffered. 
See "Analysing problems in auto insurance pricing" Baoxian Yanjiu (Insurance studies) No. 11,200 1. 
See "Auto insurance: can hidden discounts turn into visible discounts" Viongguo Jinji Shibao (China 
Economic Times) Febuary 27,2002, and YaReng Sheng "Reform of the Chinese auto insurance system" 
Baoxian Yanjiu (Insurance studies), No. 4,2000, p24-25. 
87 Jinji Ribao (Economic Daily) Aug. 8,2002 
" It was reported that about 80% of auto insurance business of ShcnZhen branch of I luaTai insurance 
company was handled by agents who are car dealers. See Zhongguo Zhengquan flao (China Securities 
Newspaper) September 2,2002. 
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Price exploitation also brought insurers few incentives to improve the quality of their 
services and to lower operational costs thus lowering premiums. Instead, many insurers 
strove to secure their market by fostering connections with local governments. " 
Table 6.5 Cost composition (excluding expenses) of auto Insurance 
Items % of premiums 
1. Refund for a no accident record 0-10% 
2. Business tax 6.5% 
3. Loss of reinsurance (balance of statutory 
reinsurance premiums minus compensations by 
reinsurers) 
4% 
4. Commissions 8%-50% 
5. Loss ratio 45%-65% 
Total 63.5%-135.5% 
Sources: based on Zhongguo Zhengquan Vao (ChinaSecurilies Newspaper) 
September 9,2002. 
6.4.3 Experimental deregulation since 2001 
During October 2001- December 2002, a pilot deregulation project had been carried 
out in South China's Guangdong Province, " as a prelude to the CIRC's initiation of 
auto insurance rate deregulation. The main purpose of the reform is to end the rigid rate 
control over the auto insurance market, thereby eliminating insurers' dependence on 
statutory rates, increasing competition in the market, and finally reducing auto 
premiums. " According to the CIRC, insurers in the experimental regions are entitled to 
set their auto premium rates according to their respective situations. By examining 
limited data available since then, we find some striking and problematic results. 
Guangdong province has been leading the country in insurance premium income 
since 1984. By the end of 2000, the province had nine domestic and overseas insurance 
companies or branches, and one insurance brokerage company, which together had 
50,000 employees and operated 670 sub-branches across the province. Meanwhile, 22 
foreign insurance firms opened representative ofliccs in the province. 9' Insurance 
premiums accounted for 9.22 % of the country's total in 2001, reaching Rmb19.48bn 
(US$ 2.36 billion), 38.44% from property insurance. " By 2001, live non-lifc insurers 
" See "Rectifying insurance industry and prohibiting illegal competition" Beijing Gongshang Guanli 
(Beying Administration ofIndustry and Commerce) No. 4,200 1. 
The CIRC "Pilot Project of Auto Premium Reform in Guangdong Province" September, 200 1. 
"A freer auto insurance market" Chinadaily Business Weekly October 16,200 1. 
"Survey on insurance market in GuangDong province" Baoxian Yanjiu (Insurance Studies) No. 8, 
2001. 
" <http: //www. chinainsurance. com> March It, 2002. 
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(PICC, CPIC, Ping An, Huatai, and Sinosafe) ran auto insurance in Guangdong. Prior 
to the experiment, PICC had the biggest market share, with 70% of the auto insurance 
market; auto premiums were nearly 70% of the property insurance income of the five 
insurers. 
a. Experience in ShenZhen 
The deregulation of auto premiums started in ShenZhcn with three steps. At the first 
step (April-July 2001), the local regulator of the CIRC adjusted rate structures. For 
example, it increased rates of third party liability due to the high loss ratio of the 
product. At the second step (July-Septembcr 200 1), premium fluctuation range was 
deregulated to reduce auto rates while increasing no accident discounts. The market 
then saw a fierce price war and a frequent price fluctuation. Insurers vied with raising 
premium discounts from 10% up to 72%; premium rates changed even weekly. At the 
third step (since October 2001), all insurers in ShenZhen were allowed to set their own 
auto rates, based on the CIRC auto insurance policies and rates and their respective 
conditions. Insurers must first file with the local regulator their self-sct rates and then 
stick to the rates. After the reform, there was a gradual fall in auto rates. For example, 
average premium decreased from Rmb6,683 (September 2001) down to Rmb4,070 
94 (April 2002). Meanwhile, auto insurance business was increasingly concentrated in 
large insurers while small insurers' market share shrank. Besides rates and 
commissions, insurers' strength and service quality became important competitive 
edges. 
b. Price wars andprice collusion in GuangZhou 
In October 2001, GuangZhou, the capital of GuangDong province, embarked on a 
same pilot reform as that in the third step in ShcnZhen. However, it saw consecutive 
price wars similar to those of ShenZhen. At the beginning of the reform, Iluatai, the 
fifth largest non-life insurer in the country in terms of premium income, and a new 
entrant in Guangdong, announced a price-cutting policy. It reduced its auto insurance 
premium rate according to different automobiles, drivers, and the relationship of 
demand and supply in the auto insurance market. It also reduced premium rates by 
differentiating vehicle usage. The premium rate of vehicle damage coverage for 
government vehicles fcll about 55%, whereas private vehicles for non-commcrcial 
Zhongguo Baoxian Bao (China Insurance News) September 18,2002. 
262 
usage was reduced by only 25%; rates for commercial usage remained unchanged. 
Huatai also launched a bonus plan, e. g. up to a 30% discount for vehicles that have a 
no-accident record for the past three years. 
Other local insurers first responded by secretly reducing their rates for ihird-party 
liability by 10% or more. Such discounts were normally available to two categories of 
consumers: 15% discount for those non-commercial vehicles through direct marketing; 
10% discount for those having no accident record in the previous year. " Later, fierce 
price wars spiralled. Rate discounts rose, even up to 72%. The primary result of pricing 
competition was the redistribution of auto premiums among insurers. PICC reported 
that due to its customers moving to lower-ratc insurers, its auto premium income 
declined by 11 % in November 200 1, meaning that its profit from auto insurance could 
drop by around RmblOOmn. " Interestingly, HuaTai, the first insurer to launch a price 
war also saw its auto premium income decreased. This was caused by the defection of 
its car-dealer agents, whose auto insurance transaction had once contributed to 80% of 
HuaTai's auto premium income, to insurers paying higher commissions. 
To avoid competing with each other, the insurers resorted to price collusion. During 
just six months, they made agreements for five times trying to fix commissions and 
prohibit irregular competition, but none of the agreements was a succcss due to 
undercutting the agreed prices by some insurers. The insurers then resorted to self- 
regulation. They established a co-ordination team for auto insurance in GuangZhou, 
and set out self-regulation pledges containing a standard of up to 15% for commissions 
and penalties for unhealthy competition. Meanwhile, insurers carried out internal audits 
in preparation for offering rates that would be as accurate as possible, according to 
historical data. 
c. National liberalisation ofauto insurance prendunis and rates 
Although chaos arose in the pilot reform in GuangDong, the CIRC is determined to 
further liberalise auto rate control and expand the reform across the country. The 
nation-wide auto rate liberalisation started on January 1,2003. " All auto insurcrs were 
required to file their auto premiums and rates with the CIRC before that day and then 
follow their prc-sct prices. In preparation for this sea change, other insurers wcre 
See "Opening auto premiums in Guangdong insurance market entering into war era" Jinji Cankao 
(Economic Reference) December 25,200 1. 
" Id. 
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reported not having filed until PICC - the market leader - presented its prices, " which 
seems a shortcut in competition. 
6.5 Can market-based pricing properly function In China? 
Debates on rate deregulation mainly focus on two kinds of topics: one is China 
should speed up the deregulation; another is whether the deregulation is appropriate for 
the current Chinese insurance market. Tao Liang asserts that China already met the 
preconditions for speeding up rate liberal isation. " For instance, within the insurance 
market, China established a primary competition mechanism with monopoly passing 
away. Policyholders are getting mature, and the insurance legal system has been 
preliminarily built. Outside the market, the market economy has replaced to large 
extent the former planned economy, together with the establishment of many kinds of 
markets, e. g. money market, capital markets, labour market and real estate market. 
However, some believe that rate liberalisation should have prudential regulation, 
market transparency, and a complete supervisory system as its preconditions which 
China has not yet met. Therefore, markct-bascd pricing does not fit the realities of 
China. " 
In my opinion, China has not been ready for a rash libcralisation of rate regulation, 
although market-bascd pricing is a right direction towards further reforms. As analysed 
in section 6.2, competitive pricing (market-bascd pricing) in some US auto markets 
only works effectively under certain conditions. The market must be competitive, 
which means that at least no access barriers exist. There is also a wcll-cstablished legal 
environment in which both solvency regulation and market performance regulation 
have been substantially constructed, and information is appropriately disclosed. Ilicse 
are further reinforced by legal standards directly relating to rate regulation, such as 
standards for determining insurers' profit margins, rate standards, and procedural 
provisions on rate approval and filings. All these conditions force insurers to compete 
Zhongguo Jingyin Bao (China Management Newspaper) September 20,2002. 
Id. 
Tao Liang "On speeding up liberalisation of premium rates" Baoxian Yanjiu (Insurance Studies) No. 
8,2001. 
" See ZiChao Liu "Competitive pricing is not appropriate in the near future" Baoxian Vanjiu (Insurance 
Studies) No. 1,2001. 
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in a healthy manner. In addition, consumer protection organisations powerfully monitor 
insurers' pricing and market behaviour, and have an important influence on insurance 
commissioners' administration. On the other hand, most insurers are mature, having 
ample actuarial data to set reasonable prices. Meanwhile, we also observed that strict 
rate regulation, especially the prior approval approach, still exists in many insurance 
lines in many states, and it works satisfactorily in some places such as the Californian 
auto insurance market. 
In contrast, the Chinese insurance market does not yet have similar conditions for 
market-based pricing. Firstly, the Chinese insurance market is still in its infancy. 
Market access is under the tight control of the CIRC, which leads to limited players and 
oligopoly in the market. Consequently, competition in the market is incomplete. A rash 
liberalisation of rates could easily lead to insurers' pricc-cutting competition and price 
collusion which were already seen in the deregulation reform. 
Secondly, the Chinese insurance market does not lack fierce competition, and 
unhealthy competition indomitably refused to vanish although the regulators carried out 
repeated overhauls. Long-term tight government controls and the incomplete evolution 
of the competition mechanism in the industry mainly caused this. Furthermore, most 
importantly, the majority of local insurers are new entrants, possessing neither 
sufficient historical data nor skilled personnel for setting appropriate prices. Some 
insurers have not built effective and manageable distribution channels, and we saw the 
high dependence on car-dealer agents in some insurers. In addition, most insurers have 
low-profile corporate governance and internal risk control, leading them to taking up a 
strategy of offering unsustainable low prices to acquire market share. All these show 
that the industry is not ready for a swift sea change to markct-bascd pricing. 
Thirdly, a fear of destructive competition launched by insurers, especially those new 
entrants, is realistic, as competition is becoming fiercer in the wake of the WTO 
accession. When adopting markct-bascd pricing, one challenge for the CIRC is to 
prevent a powerful foreign insurer or a domestic insurer, especially a new entrant (even 
one not as large as existing insurers), from launching destructive price wars. As we saw 
in the pilot reform, such destructive competition can easily blow up and weaken 
insurers' financial strength and solvency. 
Fourthly, China has not established a legal environment for market-bascd pricing. 
Neither an integrated prudential regulatory system nor a market conduct regulatory 
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system has been well established. "' Nor has been established an effective complaint- 
handling and dispute-solving system for protecting policyholder benefits. Also 
significant is the fact that China has not established a complete rate regulation system 
favouring to a market-based pricing. The main shortcomings are that there arc no 
explicit rate standards, and provisions for rate administration procedure are not well- 
knit. For example, in the pilot rate reform, insurers are required to file prices before the 
prices become effective. However, the meaning of "file" is ambiguous. It could mean 
that the prices need no approval by the regulator. Nevertheless, the insurers are required 
to stick to their prices once filed, which means they can not adjust the prices according 
to changes in the market. Nor is it made explicit whether the regulator has the right to 
change the filed prices, based on its own judgement on the accuracy of the prices or on 
market changes. In addition, provisions on rates and information disclosure are 
deficient, and self-regulation by the insurance industry is at a primary stage. Insurance 
intermediaries are seriously problematic, and fledging policyholder organisations are 
badly in a need of growing. In summary, under such legal environment, rate 
liberalisation must be carried out with caution. Otherwise, a rash libcralisation could 
cause a chaotic market. 
Fifthly, a market-bascd price reform needs associated reforms to make it more 
successful than one-side rate deregulation. The objectives of insurance libcralisation, 
including rate deregulation, are not just to reduce premiums. Goals more important arc 
to introduce a competition mechanism into the industry while setting best standards for 
insurers and ensuring that they provide enhanced services for consumcrs. These rcquire 
to consider many factors that interact with premiums and rates. Bcsidcs rcasonabic rate 
standards and rating elements, the regulator needs to improve transparency and 
disclosure in premium pricing, commissions, essential contract terms and insurers' 
"' These two conditions are essential for even a country with market-based pricing, e. g. the UK. In the 
mid 1960s, the UK general insurance industry received a wake-up call with the scandal of the Fire, 4uto 
andMarine Insurance Company systematically defrauding policyholders. Another typical case occurred 
when Vehicle & General, a new entrant to the motor market, adopted an entirely new rating system, 
ignoring the industry-negotiated "tariffs", and soared to dominance of the market but later collapsed into 
insolvency. These events led to the UK government enhancing regulation and actively supervising 
compliance by insurers. See "Report of the Tribunal appointed to inquire into certain issues in relation 
to the circumstances leading up to the cessation of trading by the Vehicle & General Insurance Company 
Limited" (1972) II. L. 80/lI. C. 133. IIMSO. 
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contractual obligations, thereby facilitating well-informed purchases and monitoring by 
consumers. 
One important factor is that premium level and policy terms interact closely. Without 
a simultaneous improvement of policy terms, rate deregulation can hardly succeed on a 
full scale. Many cases in the auto insurance support this. For example, the whole- 
automobile-stolen coverage has a large market potential. However, this coverage is 
required vehicle damage coverage as a precondition. There are also other kinds of tie- 
up sales, and insurers have no right to break them up to cater for consumers' needs. 
Another case is that insurers often abuse the term that "insurance companies have rights 
to review the compensation agreements that policyholders made, on their own decision, 
and to refuse to follow such agreements. "'02 In practice, consumers have complained a 
lot on this issue. The regulator needs to further specify in what circumstances insurers 
can refuse to follow the agreements. Complaint handling is another important issue, 
which requires an effective and efficient solution (see section 3.4.3, Chapter 3). 
6.6 Concluding remarks 
This chapter examined rate regulation and the potential impacts of deregulating 
prices in China's non-life insurance markets, focusing on auto insurance as a typical 
case. From observing rate regulation and deregulation practice in the US, we learn that 
competitive pricing can only work effectively in a well-functioning competitive market. 
Moreover, it requires a set of general rate standards to assess whether premium rates are 
excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory. There is also a need for standards to 
assess whether a market is competitive and change to prior approval is necessary if the 
market is found not competitive. Other essential elements to ensurc that competitive 
pricing works effectively include prudential regulation, market performance regulation, 
consumer protection organisations, adequate disclosure requirements, and certain rate 
advisory organisations. In contrast, China's insurance market is still far from maturity 
and lacks complete competition. In addition, China lacks an integrated and 
comprehensive framework of rate regulation. The current rate principles and standards 
are outdated and fail to properly reflect the basic requirements of insurance pricing. 
Other necessary legal infrastructures are still in construction. Under these conditions, 
`2 Supra note 82. 
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the regulator's initiation of rate deregulation reform in the auto insurance market has 
inevitably led to irrational price wars and collusion between insurers. 
The essential point concerning market-based pricing in China's insurance sector is 
the conflict between the urgency of rate deregulation and the defacto immaturity of the 
preconditions for rate deregulation. There is no other solution for this conflict than 
actively creating the required conditions while cautiously and gradually adopting 
deregulation measures. Accordingly, the author recommends the following proposals: 
Firstly, the core objective of premium rate deregulation is to establish an orderly 
market-based pricing system, thereby ensuring that insurance prices are set according to 
the price mechanism'03 in a competitive market. This means that the premium rates of 
most insurance products should be set by insurers themselves rather than by regulators. 
Even the "basic premium rates for property insurance for the main types of risk", which 
are currently required to be approved by regulators, should be given the consideration 
of the price mechanism. To fulfil these requirements, China needs to reform the 
existing rate regulation system, gradually transferring the current statutory rates and 
prior approval system into a markct-based pricing system. Ideally, premium rates 
should not be excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory but flexibly and 
appropriately reflect changes in risks and in the relationship between demand and 
supply, through theprice mechanism together with indirect regulation. Considering that 
China is not yet ready for a rash rate libcralisation, a gradualist approach to the 
liberalisation is thus suggestible, beginning with relaxing the controls on premium rates 
of regional business, short-term policies and file-and-use for large commercial lines. 
Secondly, China needs to speed up the construction of a competitive insurance 
market, as market-based pricing needs complete and healthy competition to limit 
insurers' setting prices arbitrarily. This requires an interaction with the libcralisation in 
other areas, e. g. market access, insurance investment, and policy terms. 
Thirdly, while supporting competition, China must not eliminate regulation totally. 
An appropriate framework contains some essential elements, including: (1) rate 
standards; (2) standards for assessing market competitiveness; (3) explicit provisions 
on prior approval and competitive pricing systems; (4) explicit provisions on filing 
procedures; (5) complete prudential regulation; (6) an cffcctive market performance 
10' it represents a system in a market economy whereby changes in price response to changes in demand 
and supply has the effect of making demand equal to supply. See John Sloman Economics 3rd edition 
Prentice Hall 1997, p 15. 
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monitoring system; (7) certain advisory organisations or insurers' associations that help 
insurers collect basic data but are prohibited from recommending rates or engaging in 
other anti-competitive behaviours; (8) adequate rating records which should be 
maintained by insurers, advisory organisations or insurers associations, and can be 
examined for compliance with laws and regulations; (9) consumer protection 
organisations who monitor insurers' pricing behaviour with rights of access to helpful 
information on pricing and coverage; (10) provisions on appropriate disclosure by 
insurance firms; and (11) a streamlined, effective complaint-handling and dispute- 
solving mechanism. 
Fourthly, China needs to adopt a comprehensive approach to ensuring the success of 
market-based pricing and the improvement of overall quality of insurers' services. 
Regarding the auto insurance, for instance, the regulator needs to adopt certain 
measures to improve road conditions and vehicle safety as in the case of Prop. 103, 
because these elements are closely related to loss ratios. It is also important to strictly 
enforce the existing provisions on the commissions payable to intermediaries to avoid 
auto premiums being unduly inflated by high commissions. Regulations that ensure 
adequate control over non-traditional distribution channels such as car-dcalcrs are very 
important; otherwise, car-dealcrs' non co-opcrativc conduct can offset the positive 
effects of rate deregulation, as seen in the pilot reform in GuangDong province. Other 
measures relating to providing policyholders with high quality services include the use 
of loss assessors to provide independent loss assessments, and encouraging the setting 
forth of a code of practice for customer service by the insurance industry. '" 
Finally, the regulatory efficiency of the existing prior approval system needs to be 
improved. To speed up the process of rate approval, the CIRC needs to eliminate desk- 
drawer rules, set out and comply with clear procedures and checklists regarding 
timeframes and documents required in a filing of proposed new rates or rate changes. 
To effectuate its operational efficiency, the CIRC also needs to deal with regulatory 
culture changes which focus on serving competitive environment for the benefits of 
both consumers and the insurance industry. 
I" For example, the General Business Claims Code, governing general insurance claims made by private 
individuals, implemented by theAssociation ofBrifish Insurers (ABI) in 2000. 
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